

International Relations Since 1919


PART THREE (1945—Present Day)

Regional Studies and International Organisation

By

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PREFACE

This is Part Three of "International Relations Since 1919". In the first, we traced the course of international relations from 1919 to 1945 in three sections: Diplomatic History, Regional Studies, and International Organization. I had thought that on the same pattern the story of international relations from 1945 to the present would be covered in the second volume. But while the work was in progress, it was discovered that this would mean a book of about 800 pages which the reader may find inconvenient to handle. The treatment of international relations from 1945 to the present has, therefore, been divided in two volumes, one dealing with Diplomatic History (Part Two) and the other (Part Three) covering the Regional Studies and International Organization. It is for this reason that the reader would find in the present volume the serial of Chapters and pages continued from Part Two. To facilitate reference, the contents of Part Two have also been given in this volume.

I must express my gratitude to my colleagues in the Department of Politics, and my students of International Relations with whom I have discussed many problems. I must also express my sense of obligation to the staff of the Allahabad University Library for giving me many facilities of reference.

*Department of Politics,
January 2, 1959.*

MADAN GOPAL GUPTA.

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Protest of the Middle East

We have surveyed in Part I the leading features of Middle East affairs until 1945. Of all the factors which shape the Middle East ^{science} today, Arab nationalism, expressing itself in a movement which is anti-Western and anti-Jewish, is undoubtedly the most potent. Starting as an intellectual movement over a century ago, it has evolved through many stages until now and is the credo dominating the thinking of the whole Arabic-speaking world. It is true that in different countries and at different times it has undertaken many forms and phases: passive, active, violent, static and dynamic. Thus from the original call of independence from the various occupiers (Ottoman, British, and French) the nationalists in the Middle East now have the more dynamic call for unification on a regional basis, and, more recently, positive neutralism in international affairs. In some cases the governments have responded to these two calls coolly and have even reacted unfavourably but they are undoubtedly the cherished aspirations of the vast mass of Arab opinion. Indeed these calls are the two main streams "feeding the giant current of nationalism running through the whole region, in spite of many attempts to divert or dim it by those desiring to maintain the *status quo* in these countries, whether they be native or alien elements".

It is true that the Middle East has always been a tinder-box, even in the days before the scramble for oil, for, as the cross roads between Africa, Asia, and Europe where so many strategic interests and forces converge, this was inevitable. After World War I, communism of Russia became a threat from the Western point of view. During the second world war both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. got seriously interested in the riches of the region and at the end of the War, it became one of the major storm centres of world politics. We have surveyed the Soviet-U.S. conflict after 1945 centering on the interests in the Middle and Near East, and have seen how the U.S. concern with Western Europe prompted the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine and how, to an increasing extent, the success of the Marshall Plan depended on a steady flow of oil from the Middle East to Western Europe. The Middle East, therefore, in the post-war period assumed unprecedented importance in global strategy. About a billion people of the region, poor, hungry, illiterate,

frustrated and angry at the West which they believe has treated them as animals over the years because of their race and their colour are all in revolt. This is an opportunity for the communists to exploit. The Soviet Union finds so close at hand the kind of economic and political conditions which play most directly into their hands. There is, therefore, intense and bitter nationalism based on frustration and the deep-seated uncertainty that drive people into revolution, into change for change's sake to wipe out the hated *status quo*. The creation of Israel in 1948 has added to the heat and ferment in the area. The Arab states deny its existence and resent the presence of the Jews in Arab land. The people of the Middle East, therefore, are up in arms against the centuries old social and economic maladies that have corroded their body and soul.

There is, on the one hand, the explosive demagoguery among the leadership that attempts to divert the peoples' mind from their domestic troubles to foreign "enemies". And, on the other hand, there is the uncontrollable impulse of nationalism which goads the people and their leaders to repudiate their past and challenge the present. Like the Asians, the people are sensitive, and are guided at least as much by considerations of prestige as by those of economic profits. In its concept of foreign policy and neutralism, Arab nationalism constitutes the only acceptable third alternative which redeems the Arabs from either tolerating those elements of Western domination which the large majority of Arabs have rejected, or, on the other hand, being forced into the Soviet orbit as a means of escape from, or protection against, exploitative colonial domination and aggressive Zionist expansion. The Jews, on the contrary, are equally assertive and are determined to safeguard the integrity of Israel with all the energy and resources that they command. And this is understandable. In a country of small size and intricate configuration, the proximity of enemy guns becomes a constant and haunting theme. Israel is a land where the normal pursuit of life has become a challenge to the courage and valour of all its citizens. (The Arab nationalism in its multifarious forms and manifestations, the Jewish tenacity, the Soviet expansionism, the Western colonial control and strategic and economic interests are the major factors that determine the main currents of the Middle Eastern revolt after 1945.)

Apart from oil, the Middle Eastern countries are rich in raw materials, although a considerable proportion of the land area is either desert or waste land, and due to inadequate rainfall large tracts of land which are potentially cultivable remain barren. Bahrain and Kuwait are rich in oil. In Iraq, in addition to oil, there are deposits of sulphur and in Iran there are deposits of iron ore and coal, copper and lead. Turkey has extensive

deposits of chrome and copper, coal and iron, salt, mercury and emery. In Egypt the most important mineral resources are phosphates and iron oxide. Due to the economic backwardness of these countries even the existing material resources except oil have not been fully exploited and even the production and marketing of oil is in foreign hands. The lack of natural resources makes industrial development on a large scale difficult. Coupled with this is the shortage of trained technical personnel and comparative lack of experience in the investment of trends in industrial enterprise. Agriculture is the main stay of the economy of all countries and about four fifths of the national income is derived from agriculture. The principal crops are cereals and cotton. In practically all the countries there are a large number of peasants holding small areas of land, but in Iraq and Iran a considerable percentage of the total cultivable area is still held in the form of big estates by land-owners. Although in Egypt the land reform decree limits individual holdings at 200 acres, the total area available for redistribution is not sufficient to affect the size of individual holdings or to reduce the number of landless peasants. The situation is better in Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and the Sudan where very large estates are few in number and individual peasant holdings are not too fragmented. Industry has not made much headway anywhere except in Turkey, Israel and Lebanon. Whatever industries are developed are either food processing industries or those which are based on agriculture, e.g., cotton weaving. The engineering and chemical industries have not made much progress. In the sphere of public finance, a large proportion of the ordinary revenues is derived from indirect taxation. The machinery of tax collection is inefficient and direct taxes, therefore, are not collected. Indirect taxes, though easier to collect, have to be borne by the poorer classes. Money which should have been spent on nation-building activities is spent on administration and defence. The development of the oil industry in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran has had important effect on their economy. The "large oil revenues averaging £60 millions a year are at once a blessing and a challenge—a blessing in the sense that oil revenues provide the wherewithal for comprehensive economic development and a challenge in the sense that the prosperity brought into being by oil might vanish either when the wells go dry or world prices for this commodity slump". For all these reasons the Middle East countries are anxious to develop their economies, for, without it they can neither have the basic amenities of life, nor can they keep off their borders the Western imperialist and the Soviet communist.

The Middle East nationalism, therefore, has assumed many forms and has worked in several directions in the post war period.

First, it has expressed itself in an attempt to nationalize assets which hitherto were exploited by the Western concerns. Persia, for instance, took over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (A.I.O.C.) in 1951 and Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal Company in 1956. In both cases the intention was to deprive the foreigners of monies which must legitimately be utilised by the countries to which the assets belonged. We will consider these developments in the following pages. *Secondly*, effort was made to drive out the forces of occupation and to eliminate Western bases as, for instance, Egypt and Persia did. *Thirdly*, in the areas which are still under imperialist rule, the attempt was made to seek liberation as the movement in Cyprus amply illustrates. *Fourthly*, the Middle East nationalism expressed itself in a movement positively against the Western Powers and in sympathy with the Soviet Union's policies, as in the case of Syria and Egypt. A variant of this is a wave of neutralism which has been actively militating against the Western-sponsored defence projects in the area. Another form taken is a regional movement illustrated by the Arab League and such moves as the creation of the United Arab Republic. *Finally*, Arab nationalism has been pitted against Jewish nationalism in an effort to drive out the Jews from the Middle East. The Arab feeling on the Israeli issue, like the sand in the desert, gets into everything. To the Arab the Israeli state means dispossession of his lands and displacement of his brothers in betrayal of the pledges of Arab unity and independence given by Britain to secure Arab support in World War I. "Bad enough that after the war Britain should have carved up the Arab world into separate kingdoms and protectorates and shared the spoils with France. But to set up under the Balfour Declaration first a national Jewish home and then a separate Israeli State came as a deliberate assault on the Arab homeland. This wound will bear only very slowly". The Suez tragedy not only reopened it but poured a bucketful of salt into the raw and tender flesh. The whole situation gets complicated by a sense of uncertainty born of—a conflict of fear and hope—hope that through the blockade of Israel and the progressive efflux of European Jewish elements back to Europe, Israel will eventually disintegrate; and fear of unlimited Jewish immigration leading to the unlimited Israeli expansion, economic and political, at the expense of the Arab States who will be picked off one by one. This fear can be eliminated by Arab Unity to which we have already referred.

NATIONALIZATION OF OIL IN PERSIA

At the end of the second world war the passion of the Persians was to rid their country of foreign control, direct or indirect. The revenue of the Persian government, like that of the Governments

of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, depended (even now depends) on oil which only Europeans and Americans could extract, refine and distribute. Soon after the Soviet Persian conflict on the question of the evacuation of the Persian Province of Azerbaijan had been settled, the Persian public opinion turned against the British. The rejection by the Persian Parliament of an oil agreement with Russia was followed by a general attack on oil concessions to foreign countries—and this meant the rights enjoyed by the AIOC (Anglo Iranian Oil Company) under the terms of an agreement signed in 1933 according to which the AIOC was to pay a royalty on each ton of oil. By the end of 1946 the Company had paid the Persian Government £65 million and was giving employment to about 60,000 Persian citizens. It controlled the largest tanker fleet in the world, owned at Abadan the largest refinery and made a significant contribution to British finance in dividends and taxes. The oil companies "were obliged to take on political responsibilities in the territories in which they operated, and since the economy of the states depended so much on them, they negotiated with their governments almost like one sovereign power with another." The AIOC behaved like the East India Company and because of its power and wealth became a main target of nationalist animosity.

In 1948, the price of oil had risen considerably and negotiations began for a revision of the royalty terms in favour of Persia. In July 1949, a Supplemental Oil Agreement was signed which greatly increased—and for the year 1950 actually doubled—royalty payments to the Iranian Government. This Agreement was vehemently opposed by an important section of members of the National Assembly led by Dr. Moussadeq, an ardent and hysteric nationalist and was referred to an 18 man parliamentary committee under his chairmanship. On March 7, 1951 a religious fanatic shot and killed at a Teheran mosque Premier Razmara, who was in favour of the Supplemental Agreement. The assassin, Abdulla Rastegar, was jailed but was soon hailed as a popular hero. The Shah was threatened with death unless the assassin was at once released. Even while Razmara's burial ceremonies were in progress, the 15 active members of the 18 man parliamentary committee unanimously voted for a proposal to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. At the end of April, Moussadeq became the Prime Minister and in March and May, 1951, the Iranian Majlis passed two nationalization Acts declaring the industry to be nationalised and establishing a National Iranian Oil Company. The Persian nationalist had acted and, as one authority has put it "this was the perfect symbol for Moussadeq's purposes. The oil company was foreign, it was prosperous, it had made huge and notorious profits out of Persia, it excluded Persian employees from the higher level of manage-

ment; it was tactless; it made larger payments to the British Treasury than to the Persian The Persians resented it because they felt that its whole existence was the result of trick” Moussadeq thought that the Iranian oil was vital to the functioning of the industrialized world and that there would be certain market for Iranian oil on any terms. With nationalized British equipment and petroleum above and below the ground he assumed that Iranians could produce and that hired technicians could process oil which, priced below the levels prevailing in the Persian Gulf, would yield more state revenue than would any contractual arrangement with the A.I.O.C. The closing out of A.I.O.C. operations and removal of personnel in the summer and autumn of 1951 were regarded with satisfaction as clearing the way for strictly national enterprise. To the protest of the British Government, the Persian reply was categorical: that as a sovereign state Persia was entitled to nationalize any industry, that no international body was competent to investigate the question, that Persia alone and not Britain was a party to the dispute, and that the conduct of the A.I.O.C. had caused discontent among the Persians.

The British Government and the A.I.O.C, then, appealed to the International Court of Justice. Persia refused to recognise the court's jurisdiction. A number of British efforts to settle the dispute failed to yield any results. In May, 1951, Persia served notice on the A.I.O.C. that all oil installations would be taken over. To any use of force by Britain, the U.S.A. was opposed, for, the latter was worried primarily over the possibility of a communist take over of Persia. While, therefore, Britain, holding 52% interest in the A.I.O.C. favoured strong-arm diplomacy, the U. S. A. deemed “persuasion bailed with economic assistance” the safer way, and since both methods of approach were tried tentatively, neither was efficacious. It was widely believed in Britain that Persia had been encouraged by the United States. Suspicions were confirmed at the announcement of “an apparently more equitable oil agreement between the Americans and Saudi Arabia”. The U. S. A. adopted “an attitude of impartiality” which irritated the British. In October, the A.I.O.C. left the country and abandoned Abadan. Earlier in September, the question had been referred by Britain to the Security Council on the ground that Persia was violating an interim judgment of the International Court, calling upon each side to maintain the position as it was before nationalization, and that Persia was causing a threat to world peace. Persia denied the charges and challenged the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Eventually the Council adjourned its debate until the International Court finally decided on its own competence. In Persia anti-British campaign was pushed forward virulently and by January, 1952

the British Consulates were closed down. Efforts were made by Persia to market small quantities of oil but, warned by a British proclamation that oil shipped from Persian ports would be treated as contraband, shipping interests generally avoided the issue. In February-March, 1952, the U S A made substantial Point-Four grants to Iran, supplemented by some forms of military assistance as well as by urgent counsel to Britain to forego claims for compensation in Persia. But this, as we will shortly see, failed to stem the rot in Persia. On July 22, 1952, the International Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction in the case because the 1933 agreement was not a treaty between two governments. In August, Moussadeq became virtually a dictator and got emergency powers for six months. Britain and the U S A made fresh attempts at a settlement but failed. On October 22, 1952 Persia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.

Meanwhile the economic situation was deteriorating in Persia. Indeed, seldom have calculations involving such important international interests as in the Persian oil nationalization proved to be so faulty. The reactivation of the Abadan refinery proved to be extremely difficult, Iranian oil even at bargain prices found almost no purchasers, the anticipated crisis in world oil supply did not come off. From March, 1951 to December, 1952 only 120,000 tons of oil had been sold. Crude oil production declined from 31.75 million tons in 1950 to just over 1 million tons in 1952-53. Output of refined products declined from 22.5 million tons in 1950 to 1.3 million tons in 1952 and 1.2 million tons in 1953. By far the greater part of production was absorbed in domestic consumption and exports were negligible. The strength of Moussadeq was failing and he had become the prisoner of the intense nationalism he had himself largely created. His violent attacks on the constitutional authority of the Shah, and his dissolution of the Majlis, had created a host of enemies. He quarrelled with some of the terrorist leaders, such as the Mullah Khashani, who had begun to threaten him. "The violence of his nationalism forced him towards the left, even though he had personally little interest in social reform, and his quarrels with the West forced him towards closer relations with Russia which, in the popular mind in Persia, is the hereditary national enemy, and, because it is contiguous with Persia, more dangerous than the Western countries."

By July events were moving fast and the crisis was reaching its climax. At the end of June, Eisenhower decided to end U S aid to Persia until the oil dispute was settled or submitted to natural arbitration. This was a terrible blow to Moussadeq. On August 16, 1953, an attempted coup by the Royal Guard was suppressed and the Shah fled from the country. On August 19, General Zahedi, whom the Shah had appointed Premier a few

days before his flight, staged a successful revolt. The army won; the Shah returned; Moussadeq was arrested, tried for treason, and in December, sentenced to three years solitary confinement; and General Zahedi became Prime Minister. The Shah appealed to the U. S. A. for help and "the prompt granting of \$ 45 million in emergency aid and the promise of continuing technical assistance, coupled with an Iranian Government programme for ending corruption, waste and inefficiency, paved part of the way to a healthier internal order". Hoover spent several weeks in Persia in an effort to renew oil operations.

In December, the American, British, French, and Dutch oil companies held conversations at London on the marketing of Persian oil. The resumption of diplomatic relations in the same month signalled the return to more satisfactory relations with the West. An oil consortium was eventually formed of American, Dutch and French oil companies together with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and its representatives began talks with Persian officials in April, 1954. On August 5 it was announced that a 25-year agreement had been reached, subject to ratification by the Persian Parliament. The agreement was ratified by the Majlis on October 21 and by the Senate on October 28 and went in force on October 29.

The agreement, which was for 25 years and for three 5-year extensions, left intact the Persian nationalization decree. The A.I.O.C. was to receive a net interest-free payment of compensation amounting to £ 25 million in 10 equal instalments beginning on 1st January, 1957, a 40% holding in the consortium and reimbursement for the remaining 60% from the other participating companies—5 American holding 8% each; the Royal Dutch Shell with 14% and the French Company of Petroleum with 6%. The consortium was to carry out the functions previously performed by the A.I.O.C. The National Iranian Oil Company would "receive payment for all oil the consortium exported, on terms which would bring Persia 50% of the profits on the standard basis of the Middle East oil-producing countries. By another agreement, the Anglo-Iranian Governments made arrangements to govern payments relations between Iran and the sterling area. Operations by the consortium began on October 29, 1954 and by the end of the year Iran had produced 1.4 million tons of crude oil of which 898,000 tons were refined. Crude production had recovered to 15.7 million tons in 1955. Early in 1955 Persia announced a new 7-year development plan costing over 60,000 million rials (£1=89.6 rials) to develop agriculture, irrigation, social welfare, industry and mining. At the same time the stage was being set for the Persian adherence to the Baghdad Pact. (See the Chapter on Regional Security). The Tudeh Party was banned, although it has many sympathisers. Anti-westernism is

very near the surface in Persia. Problems of poverty, illiteracy and disease are still there and unless the rulers of Persia and their Western patrons move rapidly to meet the rising tide of nationalism the lid of the cauldron will blow off.

THE DUEL OF ARAB AND JEWISH NATIONALISMS PALESTINE

We have stated above that in Israel the dynamic Arab nationalism is face to face with a militant Jewish nationalism. In Part I we had brought the story of Palestine down to 1945 and we noted that at that time the U.S. interest had been roused in the problem of Palestine. In October, 1945, Truman had appealed to Attlee to allow 100,000 displaced Jews in Europe to immigrate to Palestine. On November 13, Bevin had announced that an Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was being set up to examine the Palestine question in all its aspects. This Committee gave out its report in April, 1946 and explicitly referred the partition plan and recommended the continuation of the present mandate until the hostility between Arabs and Jews ceased and a trusteeship agreement under the U.N. was executed. It laid down (a) that Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine, (b) that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state, and (c) that the form of government ultimately to be established shall, under international guarantee, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

The Arab reaction to the Report was a protest against the modification in favour of the Zionists of the 1938 White Paper which, though they had received coldly at that time, they "had now come to regard as the palladium of their national aspirations". They demanded the scrapping of the Mandate, the evacuation of the British troops, and the establishment of an Arab democratic state and, even threatened to ask for the Soviet support. The Zionists, in their turn, accepted that part of the Report which favoured their cause and were prepared to accept it "as a first instalment, but no more, of progress towards their Jewish State". The U.S.A. and Britain, for their part, neither accepted nor rejected these recommendations and appointed a new Anglo-American Commission composed of higher officials and to devise ways to implement the Committee's recommendations. The official approach, however, was conservative. Morrison had proposed provincial autonomy within federal framework, while Bevin had suggested the famous Cantonization Plan which provided for a British trusteeship for 5 years and a Constituent Assembly at the end of 4 years. None of the plans had been acceptable.

either to the Jews or to the Arabs. The Anglo-American Commission gave out the Grady-Morrison Plan which revived the old British project of a federalised Jewish-Arab Palestine and made further Jewish immigration dependent upon common Jewish-Arab consent. Invitations were sent to the Jews and the Arab to join a conference at London to discuss the details of this plan. Meanwhile the Mufti escaped from Germany to the Middle East and, encouraged by him, the Palestine Arabs refused to attend the Conference. The Jews had been embittered by the pro-Arab policy of the Labour Government and at the news of the escape of the Mufti and gave a limited acceptance. They accepted the invitation "if the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine were the purpose of the discussion". Meanwhile unlimited number of Jews were immigrating by sea from Central and Eastern Europe, at the encouragement given by the Jewish troops in the Allied armies and other Zionist agents acting under the direction of the Jewish Agency which had skilfully organised escape-routes to the Mediterranean coast, and purchased or chartered ships for their onward voyage to Palestine. In such a situation the government resolved to transfer all unauthorised immigrants arriving after August 11 to Cyprus. The Zionists vehemently opposed this move.

The London Conference, therefore, was attended neither by the Arabs nor by the Jews of Palestine. The Arab States had accepted the invitation and their representatives arrived. The Conference was bound to fail. Meanwhile, unprecedented violence and bloodshed was going on in Palestine. In January, 1947, the Zionist terrorists kidnapped a few British civilians. On January 31, the Government in Palestine ordered for the evacuation of all British women and children and other non-essential civilians. The British Government had realised by now that the game in Palestine was not worth the candle. On February 14, 1947, Bevin announced that the British government would turn over the issue of Palestine to the U.N. as "both parties had rejected a new federal plan which would have admitted 96,000 Jewish immigrants in the next two years, subsequent immigration being controlled by the High Commissioner after consulting both Jews and Arabs." In March, more outrages followed and martial law was imposed on Tel Aviv. On April 2, 1947, Britain requested the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the problem. The Assembly met between April 28 and May 15, and set up a U.N. Special Committee in Palestine (UNSCOP) composed of 11 states and under the Swedish Presidency it visited Palestine and presented a report to the Assembly session in November, 1947. The report was not unanimous—the majority proposing partition and the minority, which included India, suggesting a federation. The Assembly, however, on November

29, 1947, voted to recommend the partition of Palestine, along with an economic union as proposed by the majority plan.

The problem now was the execution of the partition plan. Both the Arabs and the Jews had opposed it, the Jewish opposition being milder. In March, the question of execution was referred to the Security Council and on March 19, the U.S. admitted that the plan could not be executed peacefully and proposed, instead, that Palestine should be placed under temporary U.N. trusteeship. The Security Council's appeal for a truce between the Arabs and the Jews fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile Britain had refused to enforce any settlement not acceptable to both antagonists and announced on January 1, 1948, a decision to abandon the mandate on May 15, 1948. On February 6, 1948, the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine had declared that they would resist by force any attempt to foment a Jewish state in Arab territory. Armed detachments of Arabs had begun to enter Palestine and attack Jewish settlements. The U.S. proposal of March 19 was considered by the Assembly in a special session between April 16 and May 15, 1948, and failed to find majority support. The Assembly, therefore, recommended the appointment of a U.N. mediator and of a U.N. Commissioner for Jerusalem. On May 14, 1948, the British formally terminated their mandate over Palestine and withdrew their last forces from the country. On the night of May 14, the Zionist leaders, meeting in Tel Aviv, proclaimed an independent state of Israel in the area allocated to the Jews in the U.N. partition scheme. Within a few hours, Truman accorded *de facto* recognition to Israel. The issue of partition was thus settled. On May 17, the Soviet Union granted *de jure* recognition and other states followed suit. Meanwhile, the armies of the neighbouring Arab states crossed the frontiers into Palestine and a supreme struggle between the Arabs and the Jews began.

All that the U.N. had now to do was to restore peace in Palestine. On May 20, 1948, the Security Council appointed Count Folke Bernadotte (Swedish) as the U.N. mediator for Palestine. Meanwhile, the war between the Arabs and the Jews was going against the Arabs who, though numerically superior, were unable to do more than occupy the Arab areas not yet under Jewish control and secure the old city of Jerusalem. Important territorial gains were made only by Abdullah of Jordan, whose subsequent incorporation of Palestine territory into his own kingdom aroused the anger of his colleagues in the Arab League. Following the Arab failure in the war, a series of *coups d'état* occurred in Syria and the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nuqrashi Pasha was murdered and the monarchy was eventually liquidated. Taking advantage of the lull that resulted from the Arab defeat Bernadotte effected a truce. On September 16, 1948, he recom-

mended to the U.N. Assembly a change in the proposed partition boundary assigning the Negeb to the Arab State. On September 17, he was assassinated by Jewish terrorists in Jerusalem and was succeeded by Dr. Ralph Bunche, an American. The upshot was that between January and July, 1949 a series of armistices were concluded between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria. These agreements maintained the territorial disposition resulting from the war operations. About three-fourth of Palestine fell under the authority of Israel in north, west and south. The Arabs retained the central-eastern part adjoining Transjordan, but with a respectable wide Jewish corridor between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and the so-called Gaza-strip along the Mediterranean. The central-eastern part was occupied by Transjordan's Arab Legion, the Gaza strip by the Egyptians. No peace treaties were signed and, therefore, no peace was established. The war was continued by other means. Scores of Arab villages were razed by the Jews as insurance against their owner's return. A million Arabs had been driven out of their houses. In Iraq, on the other hand, 100,000 Jews were exiled and as they started pouring in Israel a disastrous situation was created. Terrible refugee problems followed. The future status of divided Jerusalem had yet to be determined. The U.N. set up various committees to attempt conciliation but in vain. On May 25, 1950, the three Western Powers—U.K., U.S.A., and France—issued a Tripartite Declaration expressing their firm resolve to prevent any violation of frontiers or armistice lines. This also failed because Western interests in the area made any strong action against either party impossible.

The new state of Israel had a land area of 8,000 sq. miles "with disproportionate long frontiers full of anomalies". Its economic position was extremely weak and immigration added to food shortages. The need to import food and raw materials led to an adverse balance of payments. The war with the Arabs further strained the resources. The Arab blockade cut off oil supplies for the Haifa refinery, and their continued non-recognition made Israeli future uncertain. The four-year plan adopted in April 1949 had to face heavy odds. The presence of the Arab minority made Israeli politics turbulent. On May 3, 1950 Israeli forces with mortars and automatic weapons drove 12,000 Arabs from two villages near Hebron in order to clear the area for cultivation by Jewish settlers. To pay for its excess of imports, Israel depended upon American aid and the contributions of the Western Jewry. The capital which poured in had not been invested very productively. Surrounded by the hostile Arabs, fear haunted Israel and "under the impulse of fear, Israel turned increasingly to fear as its best protector". It policed its border

which was never quiet. Under the impulse of fear it delivered a crushing reprisal raid in the Gaza strip in February, 1955. All through 1955, the border fights grew worse. It was partly due to the humiliation suffered by the Egyptians in 1955 that Nasser decided on the famous Arms Deal to establish superiority over Israel. He sought arms from the Western countries and when they were not forthcoming, he turned to the U S S R.

"Problems of survival", it has been suggested, "are reflected in Israel's foreign policy". In the early phase of its birth Israel followed the policy of neutrality. Since October 1949, following the failure to get a loan from the U S S R relations with that country cooled off and those with the West improved. Israel began to take on a Western slant and as the prospect for a Middle East command evolved into a broader scheme for a Middle East Defence Organization, the earlier reserve of Israel was gone. Possibly they calculated that their participation in this would lead to a peace settlement with the Arab states. But this hope was not realised for the Arab-Israeli feud continued unabated. The joint Anglo-Israeli invasion on Egypt in October, 1956 generated greater heat than ever and this we will examine shortly after.

In short, the disequilibrium caused by "the sudden eruption of a dynamic Jewish state in the midst of an atomized and ambivalent Arabic Muslim world" has created most complex problems for world peace. One might say that no other problem in the Middle East is "so comprehensive, so frustrating, so fraught with hazard as that compounded of the suspicion, fear, and hate with which nationalistic Jews and Arabs regard each other". The Arabs are determined to exterminate Israel and the latter is equally determined to exist. No problem of the Middle East today can be properly understood except in the context of this deadly contest between the Arab nationalism and the Jewish nationalism.

CYPRUS AND THE ENOSIS

Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean (area 3,572 sq miles), is situated 240 miles north of Egypt, 60 miles west of Syria, and 40 miles south of Turkey. The estimated total population of Cyprus on January 1, 1956 was 523,800 with the Greeks accounting for about 421,000 and the Turks for 92,000. There are also smaller Christian communities of Maronites and Armenians long established in the island. Since 1954 Cyprus flashed in the headlines and the world attention was derived not only from its growing strategic importance in relation to Middle East defence but also to the existence on the

island of a strong movement, Enosis, seeking union with Greece. The Greek Government has lent its support to this movement, and the question of the status of Cyprus has been raised and discussed in the U.N. and at the N.A.T.O. forums. The island has been a meeting place of races and tongues, of races that met but did not mingle.

In the 16th century the island formed part of the Venetian Empire and in 1571 the Ottoman Turks overran it. For the next 300 years it remained in Turkish hands. During this period the Turks followed the policy of plantation—importing Moslem Turks, speaking a foreign language and practising a different religion to form an ascendancy and help to keep the native Greeks under control. During the Napoleonic wars the French and the British both cast interested eyes on the island. From 1821 to 1832 the Greeks in Cyprus helped the mother country in gaining independence and for this reason the claim of the Greek Cypriots to Enosis is represented as going back to the 1820's. In 1878, Cyprus was leased by the U.K. under the terms of *Cyprus Convention at Constantinople with the Sultan of Turkey*. In return for the lease the U.K. promised to assist Turkey against Russian encroachments on her eastern provinces. The titular sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey was left unaffected. Nominally Cyprus remained Ottoman territory until the outbreak of war with Turkey in 1914, when the U.K. annexed the island. In 1915 a war-time offer by the British Government to cede Cyprus to Greece on the condition that Greece gave Serbia her immediate and complete military support was declined by the Greek Government and the offer fell through. The British annexation was recognised by the Treaty of Lausanne to which Greece was also a party. Under the Anglo-French Convention of 1920, however, the British Government undertook "in virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus off the gulf of Alaxendretta" (which was then under French control but which is now under Turkish control) not to consider ceding or alienating Cyprus without the consent of the French Government. Since then this undertaking also stands. In 1925, the island was designated and has since remained a Crown colony.

The recent disturbances on the island and the Greek endorsement of the principle of self-determination for Cyprus stem from the agitation for Enosis, or the Union of Cyprus with Greece. Indeed, from the beginning of their occupation the British met with the demand for Enosis and the chief spokesmen of this demand were the leaders of the orthodox church, the natural representatives of the people in the absence of political organization. The church in Cyprus continued ever since to lead the Enosis movement and to be quite uncompromising on the question.

The advent of the British was welcomed by the Cypriot Greeks who hoped that the U.K. would, in due course, transfer Cyprus to Greece as a gift in the way the Ionian Islands had been transferred in 1864. The first Greek Prime Minister to raise the question of the Enosis with the British Government was Eleftherios Venizelos in 1912. But the first manifestation of an intensive campaign for Enosis was an outbreak of violence and disorder in October, 1931 during which several lives were lost and a rioting crowd turned down the inflammable mid-Victorian wooden bungalow diverted from Ceylon to Cyprus by Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1878 for use as Government House. The Government quelled the riots and suspended the Legislative Council. More restrictions were imposed in 1937.

During World War II, leaders of all the political groups undertook to suspend political agitation for the duration of the war. The formation of political parties was permitted and municipal elections were held in 1943. At the end of the war the communists in Cyprus joined in the demand for Enosis which got aggravated as time passed on. The movement was accorded wide support in Greece which also espoused it in international councils. Archbishop Makarios and other Cypriot church leaders made numerous visits to Greece. The Greek radio has repeatedly condemned the British policies in Cyprus and this led to bitterness between Greece and Britain. Several constitutional proposals were made by the British Government from 1947 to 1954 but none of them was acceptable to the Cypriots.

On July 28, 1954, the Minister of State for Colonies announced a new constitution for Cyprus granting a limited amount of self-government in internal affairs. There was, of course, no question of Britain relinquishing her sovereignty over the island, for, it was now the intention of the British government to transfer the headquarters of the Middle East Command from the Suez canal zone to Cyprus and "events in Egypt had seemed to show only too clearly the desirability of having political control of the area in which an important base was situated." The announcement was followed in Cyprus by increased demonstrations for Enosis, and on August 2, seditious laws were promulgated by the Cyprus authorities to regulate the situation. The official Greek attitude was gradually stiffening. On February 15, 1951 the Greek Prime Minister had officially supported the Enosis. In August, 1954, Greece decided to refer the question to the U.N. 9th Assembly. On September 24, the steering committee of the Assembly decided, against a strong British protest, to place the Cyprus issue before the forthcoming session. In the voting the U.S.A. had abstained.

On December 14, 1954 the issue came up before the Assembly. Before the Greek resolution could be taken up the New Zealand

delegate moved a counter-resolution to the effect that the Assembly should give no further consideration to it. The Turkish delegate supported the New Zealand move, as did the U.K. delegate who declared, moreover, that he would boycott all discussion if this was not accepted. An amendment was, however, made to the New Zealand resolution under which the Assembly was not to adopt a resolution on the Cyprus question "for the time being". This was accepted by the Greek delegate. On December 17, therefore, the Assembly decided not "to consider further the item" since "for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus." This decision was followed by widespread riots in Athens and Cyprus and the E.O.K.A. (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*—National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) began acts of violence against the British authorities. Meanwhile, Turkey had vehemently opposed the Enosis and rejected the Greek demand of self-government or plebiscite.

On May 10, 1955, the Greek delegation at the U.N. informed the Secretary-General of the "alarming" situation in Cyprus caused by the British policy "of brutal repression". The relations of Britain, Greece and Turkey (all N.A.T.O. members) were put to a severe strain and Britain, therefore, took the initiative in inviting Greece and Turkey to a conference on the question of Cyprus. The conference began at London on August 29, 1955. Here also old themes were repeated: the British Government insisting on claiming exclusive jurisdiction in Cyprus; Greece asking for self-determination for the Cypriots who will not be compelled to join Greece but should be free to make a choice. The Turkish delegation, on the other hand, strongly demanded maintenance of the *status quo*. He contended that if any change in the status of Cyprus was contemplated, Cyprus should revert to Turkey, since Cyprus was geographically a prolongation of the Anatolian mainland; that Turkish association with the island was historically too close while it was never administered from Athens and was never in any sense a Greek island; that juridically Greece has no case in Cyprus as under a lawful treaty to which Greece was a party sovereignty over Cyprus devolved on Great Britain; and that if changes were made in the status of Cyprus, Turkey, too, would claim a right to ask for other modifications in the Treaty of Lausanne by which she had ceded the island to Britain. It was argued that the defence requirements of Turkey made it imperative that Cyprus should belong to Turkey, for, if ever the island were in the possession of an unfriendly power, the consequences to Turkey would be fatal. On the question of self-determination, Turkey took the view that this principle, seemingly harmless, cannot be applied indiscriminately, without grave risks and cannot be allowed to take

precedence over such a factor as a country's security. In the case of Cyprus, it was contended, the application of the principle of self-determination clashes both with Britain's right of sovereignty, derived from the Treaty of Lausanne, and with Turkey's right to ensure her own security. Finally, it was pointed out that a demand to change the status of Cyprus might affect Greco-Turkish friendship. Thus on August 21, 1955, the Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, declared that the maintenance of the *status quo* in Cyprus is the minimum acceptable to Turkey.

After protracted negotiations, the British delegate proposed on September 6, 1955 self-government for Cyprus within the framework of strategic requirements. Provisions were made for safeguarding the Turkish minority and it was proposed to establish a special tripartite committee to examine the detailed aspects of the proposed constitution and to deal with problems arising out of self-government. The Turkish and Greek delegates reserved their decision on these proposals and the Conference broke up in an atmosphere of acrimony. There was serious rioting at the expense of the Greek property in Istanbul and the Balkan Alliance seemed almost to have dissolved. The Anglo-Greek and Turko-Greek relations were made much worse. Greece withdrew from N A T O manoeuvres in the Mediterranean area during September "because of the presence of Turkish forces".

On September 18, Dulles expressed his concern at the situation Greece had, meanwhile, referred, for the second time the Cyprus issue to the U N Assembly which, on September 23, decided by 28 votes to 22 with 10 abstentions not to consider the question. On September 26, Sir John Harding was appointed as Governor and Commander in Chief of Cyprus and the discussions he carried with Archbishop Makarios failed. At the end of November 1955, a state of emergency was, therefore, proclaimed and intensified efforts were made to suppress the E.O.K.A. On December 14, the Communist Party of Cyprus (the A.K.E.L.) was banned and 135 leading Communists were arrested. On March 5, 1956, the Government in Cyprus jammed Athens Radio broadcasts and on March 6, the B B C programmes were discontinued by the Greeks. On March 9, Makarios, along with other leaders, was banished to the Seychelles Islands.

The deportation of Makarios roused strong feelings in Greece and led to violent anti-British riots in Athens, Salonika and other centres. On March 10, Greece recalled its ambassador from London and protested to the U N Secretary General. On March 13, Greece asked that the Cyprus question be placed on the agenda of the 11th session of the General Assembly. On March 15, the Greek Government issued an official statement expressing the hope that negotiations might be resumed if the Archbishop were allowed to return to the island. Relations

between Britain and Greece were deteriorating sharply. On December 19, 1956, the British Government published a proposed Radcliffe Constitution for Cyprus "establishing a dyarchy under which the Governor would retain control of defence, external affairs, and internal security as well as reserved powers in other fields." A day earlier the emergency regulations had been somewhat relaxed. On December 20, the Greek Government rejected the Radcliffe proposals. The Turkish Government regarded these proposals together with Lennox-Boyd's references (made on December 19) to self-determination and the possibility of partition as an eventual solution of the Cyprus question, as a reasonable basis for eventual solution, and sent legal experts to London.

Meanwhile at the U.N. the 11th Assembly decided to discuss the Cyprus question—both the Greek item on self-determination and the U.K. charge of Greek-sponsored terrorism in Cyprus. Charges and counter-charges were made. From February 18 to 22, 1957 the question was discussed in the Political Committee and five draft resolutions were tabled—one by Britain, two by Greece, and 1 by Panama. The 5th resolution was introduced by the Indian delegate, Krishna Menon, under which the Assembly expressed "the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accord with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the U.N. and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end". This resolution was adapted by the Political Committee on February 22, 1957 by a vote of 76 to 0 and on February 26, the Assembly approved it by 57 to 0 with one abstention. On February 27, the Ethnarchy of Cyprus expressed satisfaction at this decision and asked for the release of Makarios to resume negotiations and on March 4, the mayors of 14 towns in Cyprus reaffirmed the appeal of the Ethnarchy and called for the abrogation of the emergency regulations. On March 14, the E.O.K.A. offered to suspend its terrorist activities. On March 20, Lennox-Boyd, the U.K. Secretary of State for the Colonies, asked Makarios to clarify his position and accepted the offer of Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of the N.A.T.O. for conciliation. On March 28, the U.K. Government released Makarios. On April 4, the Governor of Cyprus announced relaxation of emergency measures. It now appeared that the situation in Cyprus was well under control.

These hopes, however, were soon belied and tension between Greece and Turkey continued to grow. On May 3, Menderes re-emphasised that "we can never permit Cyprus to go to Greece. We can never consent to the majority in Cyprus being given the possibility of oppressing the Turkish community there, not even under the guise of administrative self-government. The partition of Cyprus in the final stage and the utmost limit of the sacrifice that we are in a position to make." Nevertheless, the

old rigidity of the problem was now gone and the Cyprus situation came to have greater elements of flexibility. New dimensions were added in 1957-58 to the problem—the increasing concern of the U.N., the tendering of good offices by N.A.T.O. to which all parties belong, the existence of a draft constitution which has tended to lay a more specific basis for the agreements, the growing importance of Turkey as a party concerned, and developing Greek concern lest the British become frustrated over the failure to reach agreement and withdraw either before any settlement is reached—thus intensifying friction between Greece and Turkey—or after resorting to partition. Of course, the chances of peace remain uncertain. In August, 1957 a major explosion, which fatally injured a terrorist, showed that Cypriot Greeks were still producing bombs. At the end of the month, another explosion which fatally injured four Turks led to the discovery of explosives in a Turkish house, and increased fears that the Turks were contemplating an active role in the event of a second round by E.O.K.A. It was reported that on September 8, 1957 a defiant leaflet was circulated in Nicosia which proves that a hard core of fanaticism had yet to be overcome and which said, *inter alia* “if it becomes necessary I shall appeal to the Greek nation and the political world of the free fatherland urging them that in view of the Anglo-Turkish conspiracy against us, they should actively partake in our struggle.”

Thus in Cyprus Greek nationalism is pitted against Turkish nationalism and both are face to face with British colonial interests. Even the fact that all three parties are members of the N.A.T.O. has not prevented them from a head-on collision although it might have put them under some restraint. After all there has been no clash of arms so far. In Cyprus there is no Cypriot nation conscious of being neither Greek nor Turk but Cypriot, and content with its position as an independent member of the Commonwealth.

NATIONALISM IN EGYPT THE SUEZ CRISIS

The Suez crisis, which followed the Suez Canal Company's nationalization in July 1956, was an expression of developing militant nationalism in Egypt and the culmination of a series of grievances of the Egyptians against the Western powers. We have traced in Part I of this work the story of the Egyptian struggle for freedom from the British control and the record of humiliations and sufferings to which the Egyptians had been subjected from 1880 to 1945. These were all reflected in the events of 1956-57. The Suez crisis has many other aspects—the Soviet threat, the dubious role of the U.S.A., the heat and bitterness injected by Israeli association with the British invasion, the irresponsible policies of

the British Government, the role of neutralist countries like India and of the Middle East countries like Persia, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the handling of the issue at the United Nations, the legal and political consequences of the crisis, and the role of the Labour opposition in Britain. The most dominant of these aspects is the context of the Anglo-Egyptian relations since 1945 and to this, therefore, now we turn.

The Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations for Treaty Revision.

The relations between Egypt and Britain after 1945 were consistently bad. The presence of the British troops on Egyptian soil, the question of the future status of the Sudan, and the problem of the foreign-owned Suez Canal Company were the main issues which embittered relations. The first two questions which the Egyptians insisted must be considered together were the main points of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The second world war had greatly stimulated Egyptian nationalism and led to the demands for a revision of the 1936 Treaty. Egypt which had been a sleeping partner in the Allied victory was, in 1945, a land transformed from the anxious country of a decade before, and in no mood for bridle on its nationalism. The struggle between Egyptian nationalism and British privilege, therefore, ensued. The original purpose of the Treaty of 1936—to safeguard the Suez Canal—had now changed to the securing of a base with which Britain may be able to maintain its military power throughout the Middle East. The Egyptians were not only irked at an occupation of Egyptian territory by foreign troops, but also by the fact that the number of forces retained in the Canal base after the war considerably exceeded the number provided for in the Treaty of 1936. In 1946, Britain and Egypt reached substantial agreement with respect to the evacuation of British troops by September 1, 1949 under certain conditions which provided for future mutual defence measures. But inability to agree on other issues, especially that of the future status of the Sudan, resulted in the breakdown of the talks. On July 8, 1947, Egypt placed the matter before the U.N. Security Council. Charges and counter-charges on the old pattern were repeated and since no solution was forthcoming the matter was left on the Council's agenda. By 1948, the possibility of another war motivated British policy more strongly to retain an installation regarded as vital to the defence of the Middle East and as the world's largest military depot. But developments in Palestine had further irritated the Anglo-Egyptian relations. The U.N. decision to partition Palestine, the British withholding of arms and ammunition from Egypt in response to the U.N. resolution, the Egyptian refusal to permit the passage of crude oil through the Suez Canal to the British refinery at Haifa, and the

continued disagreement on the Sudan pulled Britain and Egypt ever apart. The outbreak of the Korean war in June, 1950 gave a new complexion to the Middle East problems. The Egyptian profession of neutrality on the question of the North Korean aggression, the deepening of the crisis of Persian nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the growing extremism of Egyptian nationalists, and the Western preparation for establishing a Middle East Defence Organization added to the difficulties. In December, 1950 negotiations with respect to the Canal base began and they continued into the fall of 1951.

During the summer of 1951 the U.S.A., the U.K., France and Turkey had agreed to participate in a plan for the defence of the Middle East. Prior to inviting Egypt to participate in the defence plan, Morrison suggested in the House of Commons that in this plan Egypt would be assigned key role. The Egyptian Foreign Minister rebuffed Morrison and declared in the Chamber of Deputies that "the ever present possibility of Great-Power rivalries flaring up into a world war was no justification for asking Egypt to tolerate indefinitely an occupation violating our sovereignty and independence." On October 13, 1951, the 4-power Middle East Defence Plan was presented to Egypt and it was proposed that if Egypt accepted it, the canal zone would be evacuated by Britain and would become an Allied base with full Egyptian participation. Five days earlier, the Egyptian Government led by Nahas Pasha had introduced legislation to denounce the 1936 Treaty and on October 15 it was duly enacted by the Parliament. The 1936 Treaty was abrogated, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreements were abolished and Farouk was proclaimed King of Egypt and the Sudan.

On November 6, the British Government replied that while the 1936 Treaty had contained no provision for its unilateral denunciation at any time, they were prepared to open negotiations for its revision and that "meanwhile they intend fully to maintain their rights." The relations between the two countries, however, took a turn for the worse. The fighting in the canal zone was resumed to the accompaniment of ominous disorders in Cairo. Customs and other facilities were peremptorily denied to British troops. A boycott of British goods was initiated and the British evacuated families from the Canal Zone. Guerilla warfare broke out. Bridges and military depots were blown up. On January 25, 1952, 1,500 British soldiers supported by tanks and armoured cars surrounded the Governorate in Ismailia. Two hundred and fifty Egyptian policemen, regular and auxiliary, were trapped inside and 16 were massacred in cold blood. What followed on January 26, 1952 makes a harrowing tale. The outbreak of violence in Cairo that day was premeditated, planned and organised. The regular police stood aside and made no attempt to intervene.

The army was confined to barracks until the day was over. If it was an orgy, it was a controlled orgy. Even General Neguib has recorded in his Memoirs: "On the morning of 26th January, as if by pre-arrangement, mobs began to gather all over Cairo. Resolute action on the part of the Government or the Palace would probably have prevented the holocaust that followed. No action of any sort was taken. Before long, the mobs were attacking and setting fire to numerous foreign and luxury establishments. Before the Army was permitted to re-establish order, 17 foreigners (including nine Britons and one Canadian) and 50-odd Egyptians had been killed. A British club, a Jewish School, an office of the Moslem Brotherhood, four hotels, four night clubs, seven department stores, 17 cafes and restaurants, 18 cinemas, and 70 other commercial establishments, including banks, automobile display rooms, and air-line ticket offices, had been destroyed. There can be no doubt that extremists in the pay of more than one communist embassy incited the mobs to arson and murder" (*Egypt's Destiny*, pp. 101-102). The Army did not intervene just because the King and his Cronies, in collaboration with British agents, attempted to create a situation that would so embarrass the Wafd as to justify the dismissal of the Nahas and his Cabinet, the suspension of Parliament, and the appointment of a care-taker Cabinet that would obey the wishes of the King. (*Ibid.*, pp. 102-103).

Revolution in Egypt. While these scenes were being enacted in Cairo, Farouk was giving a banquet at Abdin Palace in honour of the son that his new queen had borne him ten days earlier, the Prime Minister was visiting his manicurist, and the Minister of Interior was moving a piece of furniture which he had just acquired. At nightfall the Army moved into the city and restored order. The British forces in the Canal Zone had been alerted and were ready to move at 20 minutes' notice to occupy Cairo but they desisted from doing so on a direct order of the British Cabinet to maintain the occupation until the emergence of a friendly regime would have entailed a political and military effort of a magnitude and an intensity of which the U.K. was no longer capable, in which she would have had much of Commonwealth against her, the United States and a great deal of world opinion. In Cairo, martial law was proclaimed and on January 27, King Farouk dismissed Nahas and his Wafdist Government and appointed Ali Maher as the Prime Minister. A succession of Egyptian Cabinets took office between February and July 1952 but all were too weak to enter into serious negotiations with the British Government. From March to May 1952, exploratory talks regarding the disposition of the base yielded no results. On July 23, 1952, an event occurred which drastically changed the Egyptian political scene and whose effects are felt even today. On that day the young army officers led by General Neguib rose in

revolt and forced the King to abdicate. The King made several attempts to seek the help of the British. It was only when "Acheson, after consulting President Truman, informed Eden that the U.S. Government would strongly oppose any thought of foreign intervention in the circumstances" that the British Government decided to ignore Farouk's appeal.

The Revolutionaries confiscated the King's wealth and later sold his property at a series of public auctions and used the proceeds to finance reforms. All of the King's followers were arrested and placed on trial. The resurgence of nepotism was curbed. The official titles of Bey and Pasha were abolished. Committees were appointed to purge the Armed forces and services of undesirables and to investigate public scandals. Penalties for tax evasions were stiffened. Farms were established for the rehabilitation of child beggars, schools and hospitals were built up. Important land reforms were instituted which were based on expropriation, co-operatives supervised by the Government, and limited agricultural holdings. It was on the question of this land reform that the revolutionary Junta got tired of the dilatory tactics of Ali Maher. On September 7, 1952 they took over the Government, Neguib became Prime Minister and on September 8, the Agrarian Reform Law went into force.

Soon after coming to power, Neguib opened negotiations with the British Government on the Sudan problem as a separate issue from the Canal base and agreed to the principle of the Sudanese right to self-determination. By so acting he won over the goodwill of Sudan's leaders, including those of the Umma Party which stood for complete independence of the Sudan. The course of negotiations between Britain and Egypt was by no chance smooth, although the quick recognition given by the British Government to the new regime and the restraint shown by Britain in July 1952 had created a favourable background. The talks were more than once suspended and the Egyptians threatened to resume guerilla action in the Canal Zone.

Finally, on February 12, 1953, an agreement was signed between Egypt and Britain which recognised the principle of self-determination for the Sudan after three years during which period the stage would be set for independence under the control of the Governor General assisted by an International Commission. The elections in the Sudan were held in December. They resulted in an overwhelming victory for the National Unity Party and thus repudiated the old British theory of Western tutelage and vindicated, for the time being, the new Egyptian theory of unity in independence. But they did not improve the Anglo-Egyptian relations, for, Britain still held that under Article 12 of the February Agreement, Sudan had the option to join the

Commonwealth or Egypt. Neguib vehemently opposed this interpretation. The February Agreement nevertheless, opened the way for further negotiations regarding the canal base although the atmosphere had deteriorated by the time the talks actually began. They were broken off on May 6. They were resumed in late August, 1953, continued in late September, but a new deadlock developed in October. Egypt flatly declined to join the proposed Middle East Defence Organization. In June, 1953 she was proclaimed Republic with Neguib as President and Premier and Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser as Vice-Premier and Minister of Interior. Meanwhile the high degree of tension continued to cause incidents, including attacks on the British soldiers. On the British side the conservative forces ranged themselves against the withdrawal of the British troops and the idea of opening negotiations with Egypt. In Egypt trouble had developed between Neguib and the Revolutionary Council. Differences of tactics and strategy had pulled them apart and on February 23, 1954 Neguib sent in his resignation to the Council. On the 24th, he was put under house arrest and at his residence the Republic Guards were replaced by a mixed detachment of infantry and military police. On the 25th, the Revolutionary Council issued a communique and framed charges against Neguib. But as soon as the news of the arrest spread in Egypt and the Sudan, people got excited. Neguib was scheduled to visit the Sudan on the 28th and on the 27th an official Sudanese delegation flew up from Khartum with instructions to fetch Neguib and to elicit a promise from the Revolutionary Council to set him free. The hostile reaction of the Sudanese as well of the Egyptians, therefore, obliged the Council to make Neguib President again on February 27, 1954. But henceforward his influence started waning and in November 1954 he was relieved of his post on the ground that he had lent support to subversive movements.

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, July 1954. The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, as we stated above, ran in difficulties and for a long time the gulf could not be bridged. The U. S. A., however, used its good offices in an effort to bring about a compromise solution of the base question. The British Government, on its part, had modified its approach, for, the value of the Suez Canal base in the context of nuclear weapons was questionable. After several offers and counter-offers, informal talks were resumed on July 10, 1954 and an Agreement was initialed on July 27, 1954. The final Agreement was concluded on October 19, 1954 and was ratified on December 6, 1954. It contained 13 articles, two annexes, and one agreed minute interpreting certain of its articles. Under the Agreement the British troops were to be withdrawn from the Canal Zone within

20 months of the Agreement being signed and some installations were to be maintained by civilian technicians on behalf of the British Government while Egypt was to assume responsibility for the remainder of the base. In case of an armed attack upon any party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or Turkey (member of N A T O) Egypt would afford to the U K facilities for putting the base on a war footing including the use of Egyptian ports. In case of a threat of such attack mutual consultations were to be held. Under Article 8 the parties "recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway, economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October, 1888." The Agreement was to be of seven years duration.

The Agreement created consternation in Israel. The lifting of the embargo on the export of arms to Egypt by Britain, and the fear that the departure of the British would remove a buffer zone created misgivings. For Egypt, the Agreement ended a period in its history. It marked the end of the British military ascendancy in the Middle East. In Britain a section of the Conservative Party bitterly criticized Eden for having agreed to the evacuation.

Arms Deal Much of the goodwill generated by this Agreement was undone by the events connected with the Baghdad Pact which we have already surveyed. Nasser condemned the U S -Pak military deal, the Turko-Iraq-Alliance and the Baghdad Pact. It was regarded as a serious challenge to his leadership in the region. At the same time the feud between Israel and the Arab States, which we have surveyed, undermined the stability of the Middle East. Egypt, in order to off-set Israel, wanted more arms than what Britain or the U S A was prepared to supply. Negotiations for the arms deal with the U S S R began in July, 1955 and these resulted in a formidable delivery of weapons from Czechoslovakia and Russia, and in arrangements for training in Poland the officers and technicians of the Egyptian army. This move seriously embarrassed Britain and the U S A "who were unwilling to compete in supplying the Arab countries with arms for use against Israel and at the same time faced Israeli demands for arms to counter-balance communist consignments to the Arabs." Since the Baghdad Pact had challenged the Egyptian leadership in the Arab League and the Egyptian policy of neutrality, and since her position in the Sudan was worsening, Egypt in order to counteract these tendencies, moved to conclude pacts with Saudi Arabia (which had a conflict with Britain over the

Buraini oasis) and with Syria. Yemen was also involved in a dispute with Britain on the question of the Aden protectorate and decided to fall in line. By April 1956, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen had agreed to set up a unified command for their armies. Meanwhile Egypt also secured the overthrow of General Glubb, the pro-British Prime Minister of Jordan. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria promised to give subsidy to Jordan to replace the one she received from Britain and in March 1956, Glubb was dismissed. On May 1956, Jordan had reached a military agreement with Egypt.

Increasing tension with Israel. It was in this background that Egyptian-Israeli relations in 1955-56 can properly be appreciated and the Israeli involvement in the Suez crisis can be understood. Since 1949 the Egyptians, along with the Arab states, were waging a life and death struggle against Israel. In 1955 from bases in the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptians started taking revenge on the Israelis for their campaign of extermination of the Arabs. Systematic raids by commandos or "*fedayeen*" into Israel were organised. In April 1956, Dag Hammarskjold set off on a tour of Israel and the Arab states but yielded no results. The United States had no consistent policy to offer. The British prestige was at the lowest ebb since the fall of General Glubb. The U.S.S.R. had scored a diplomatic victory over the West by striking the arms deal with Egypt. Israel was determined to take revenge and to secure the downfall of Nasser whose glory and prestige had now become a legend and who had acquired almost as great a hold on the Arab masses as Nehru has in South East Asia. The stage was now set for the final drama in which the principal actors would be Nasser and Eden.

The French were equally annoyed and were particularly belligerent. Somehow they convinced themselves that the Algerian crisis, which we have elsewhere surveyed, could be solved by crushing the Egyptian leader. Just as Eden saw in Nasser the image of Hitler, the French saw in him the Enemy No. 1 of their imperial stronghold in North Africa. France, therefore, came to believe as firmly as Israel and Britain that national safety required that Nasser be taught a lesson. On the other side, Nasser's glory was expanding and his confidence knew no bounds. He was determined to secure the expulsion of the Westerners from the Middle East even with the support of the U.S.S.R., to build up the Egyptian economy, and to exterminate Israel. Thus in 1956 explosive situation had developed in the Middle East in which Egypt, on the one hand, and Britain, France and Israel, on the other, were determined to have a trial of strength. For both sides vital issues were at stake and no compromise was possible. All that was needed

was a "precipitating cause" and it soon came in the dispute over the Aswan Dam

The Aswan Dam Dispute and Nationalization Decree
In order fully to understand the background of the Suez crisis, it is necessary to relate briefly the Aswan Dam story. Egypt is a backward country with no heavy industry. The Western monopolies invested mainly in industries producing raw materials. Cotton, therefore, had become the basis of Egyptian economy. The one sided nature of economic development, the shackles imposed by foreign capital and extensive dependence on foreign trade all combined to create serious difficulties. Industrialization was thought to be necessary and for this, in 1953, the High Dam Scheme had been formulated which would make it possible to lay out a new permanent irrigation system and bring 840,000 hectares of hitherto untilled land under cultivation. The hydro-power plant at the dam would provide 10,000 million kilowatt-hours of cheap power per annum. It was estimated that the total cost of the dam would be \$ 1,000,000,000 and that it would take about 20 years in completion. In 1953 Egypt applied to the International Bank for a loan and the latter stated that Egypt's dispute with Britain and Israel and the non existence of parliamentary regime precluded the possibility of accepting Egypt's application. Later, the West German firms agreed to provide £ 5 million, Britain £ 45 million, U S A \$ 40 million. At a later stage Britain scaled down their promise to £ 5 million. The International Bank also offered a loan of \$ 200 million provided that U S A and Britain between them lent \$ 70 million and Egypt undertook to provide \$ 900 million in the form of services and materials, and further provided that the other riparian states of the Nile—the Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia—also agreed to the scheme. It was also the Bank's condition that it would approve Egyptian economic programme, would control its state expenditure, that the Egyptian Government should contract no foreign debt, that Egypt should not conclude agreements involving payments, such as the arms deal, without the Bank's consent, and that all these conditions should be liable to amendment according to circumstances. Egypt refused these conditions.

But the U S S R at once proposed aid to Egypt. Shepilov visited Cairo and discussed plans for economic development and offered a loan of \$ 1,200 million repayable over 60 years at the low rate of 2%. This news created panic in London and Washington and the President of the World Bank, Mr Eugene Black, flew to Cairo. But no progress could be made and old conditions were repeated. Meanwhile the opinion in the U S A had hardened as a result of the arms deal and it was feared that the U S loan might be actually used for an arm build up. In

June 1956, Nasser had recognised China repugnance of which is a political neurosis in America. And then "there seemed to be no end to his trouble-making in Jordan, Algeria, Kenya, and else where. The American Government may have been disquieted that he was able to use for his propaganda the funds given him by Saudi Arabia, which came from oil royalties paid by America. During the summer of 1956 the State Department had been questioning the reliance on Egypt and debating whether America should not, instead, go in the Baghdad Alliance. An ominous sign for Egypt was the replacement of an American ambassador who favoured Nasser by one who was less committed. In short, there was a disposition in Washington to cut Nasser down to more manageable size; and Zionist influence may have encouraged it further".

In July 1956, Egypt formally asked for U.S. loan. The U.S. Senate Appropriation Committee asked the Administration not to advance any such loan without consulting the Congress. Shortly after, on July 19, the U.S. offer was withdrawn. Britain followed suit on July 20. The World Bank's offer stood automatically lapsed. The shock to Egyptian opinion could not be blurred even by the Id rejoicings on July 20. In the following days the Cairo and Moscow Press published the theme of an Egyptian-Soviet Aid Agreement. On July 26, a rally was addressed by Nasser in Alexandria and towards the close of his rigorous speech he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal and declared that its revenues would finance the Aswan dam. "The Suez Canal tragedy", he declared, "would not be repeated in the High Dam Scheme. I hereby declare that we shall henceforth recover our lost rights in the Suez Canal. Mr. Black tried to act with me as De Lesseps acted with Viceroy Said but Black has failed. I hereby declare that henceforth Egypt will secure the £ 35,000,000 profit obtained by the Suez Canal Company every year. We shall not allow those who traffic in war and in humanity to impose their will upon us. We shall henceforth depend entirely upon ourselves".

THE SUEZ CANAL

The Suez Canal was opened for the use of the world's shipping on November 17, 1869, by the Universal Company of the Suez Canal—a company organized largely through the efforts of the Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps. The Company operated by virtue of a concession from the Egyptian Government, as ratified by the Sultan of the Turkish Empire. According to this concession, the Canal became the sole property of the company for 99 years, Egypt being entitled to a royalty of 5 % in the profits.

With the advent of the 15th century oceanic revolution and the increasing trade with the East, along with the difficulties of a long route and the fear of the "gentlemen pirates", the Venetians, whose forefathers had used the Suez route, thought of improving it. The efforts of Louis XIV and Napoleon also proved abortive and it was not till the middle of the 19th century that the project could be taken up in right earnest. Indeed, in the beginning, the British Government had opposed the construction of the Suez Canal and placed all kinds of obstacles in its way because Lord Palmerston saw in it a serious threat to the British maritime supremacy. Soon however, the Government recognised its value "as the shortest and most convenient route to British areas of interest in the East, and its strategic importance as a link with those areas". When, late in 1875, the news reached Disraeli that the ruler of Egypt, being in dire need of money wanted to sell off all his shares in the Canal Company, the British P.M. hastened to strike a deal and purchased all his shares (1,76,602) for a paltry sum of £ 3,976,382. By this bargain Egypt lost the largest number of shares owned by a single person and the British Government acquired approximately 44% of the company's total shares. Seven years after, a good opportunity offered itself when at the request of the Egyptian Viceroy, Britain militarily intervened in order to suppress an Egyptian army revolt. Britain secured a special position in Egypt, her army of occupation remained there and Egypt became a virtual British protectorate, although the Turkish Sultan remained the Viceroy's suzerain until 1914.

Shortly after the British occupation of Egypt, the maritime powers made efforts to establish an international regime to govern the status and use of the Canal. On October 29, 1888, the famous Constantinople Convention was signed by the U.K., Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain and Turkey. Britain, however, made reservations in view of her occupation of Egypt. She reserved the right to use the Canal to guard its position in Egypt as long as the occupation lasted. France refused to ratify it because of this qualification. However, she eventually accepted the British position, and by the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8, 1904 relating to Egypt and Morocco, France recognised Britain's sphere of influence in Egypt in return for British recognition of France's sphere of influence in Morocco. According to the Constantinople Convention the Canal "shall always remain open, both in times of peace and war, to all commercial and war vessels, without distinction of flag, and including the ships of belligerents". Of course, the Convention does not neutralise the Canal since it is open to warships even in war time. During the first world war, the Convention was adhered to in spirit, though

not in letter, for the defence of the Canal from sabotage was primarily a British responsibility. In 1919, the defeated powers were obliged to agree to the substitution in the Convention of the name of the U.K. for that of the Ottoman Empire. During the second world war both sides were fully prepared to put the Canal out of action if it assisted their cause. We have already surveyed the history of the Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1945 to 1956 and have seen how the Canal question, among others, bedevilled these relations.

Why Nationalization. This question can be understood if we bear in mind the economic value of the Suez Canal for the Egyptian economy and the correct nature of the Canal Company which had so far been making profits out of the Canal. The status of the Canal Company was rather unusual. It was registered under Egyptian law as an Egyptian Company, but was incorporated as a joint stock company and governed by the provisions of the French Code respecting such companies. The Court of Appeal in Paris was designated as the tribunal of ultimate resort in legal matters affecting the Company. The Company's registered office was in Alexandria, while its administrative head office was in Paris. Under the French law a joint stock company is a business association in which the liability of the shareholders is limited. Important company decisions on policy and finance were made in Paris. Till 1937, Egypt derived no benefit other than royalty from the Canal Company. In 1937, the Company agreed to employ 33% Egyptians and a minimum annual royalty of 300,000 Egyptian pounds. Again, in March, 1949, the Canal Company agreed to increase Egypt's control over the administration. The number of Egyptian directors on the Board was raised from 2 to 5 and it was promised to raise it to 12. In 1956, 16 Directors were French, 9 British, 5 Egyptians, one Dutch and one American. The approximate income from the Suez Canal was 100 million dollars a year. The largest number of shareholders were British. Britain held in 1956, 1,96,034 capital shares out of a total of 4,37,000 and 1,57,470 ordinary shares out of a total of 3,62,998. The concession was to expire at midnight on November 16, 1968—a concession granted on November 17, 1869 for 99 years by the Egyptian Government. Under the 1949 Convention already referred to, Egypt's share in the profits of the Canal Company was increased to 7% with a guaranteed minimum of 3,50,000 sterling a year.

The Canal has a vital importance for the Egyptian economy which was not very sound. There had been a serious drain on Egypt's foreign assets during the 1st half of 1956—a drain of 45 million pounds. During 1955, Egypt's spot assets fell by £34.9 million. The price of cotton which is the main export of Egypt went down in the first quarter of 1956. During 1955, imports

rose by nearly £ 22 millions to reach £ 183 2 millions while exports remained unchanged at £138 4 millions with the result that the unfavourable trade balance widened from £ 23 1 million to £44 8 million Exports of cotton fell by £ 5 7 million to reach £107 4 millions but this fall was made good mainly by the rise in rice exports Provisional balance of payments estimates for the third quarter of 1955 showed an overall deficit of £19 8 millions compared with a deficit of £ 15 2 millions during the corresponding period of 1954

It is in this economic background that one can appreciate the vital importance of the need of rapidly building up the Aswan Dam in Egypt which would be a very great factor in the overall stability of the Egyptian economy It would provide employment to more than 100,000 persons, would be a source of irrigation and powers, would lead to a 30% increase in the production of rice and cotton, and would be the mainstay of the nascent Egyptian industry When, therefore, the U S refused to grant the necessary aid to Egypt, except on conditions which, as Col Nasser described, amounted to "sending the World Bank's directors to sit in my place here", the Egyptian Government had no other honourable course except to take over the Suez Canal Company

The Anglo-French Concern The British Government was most concerned over the Law of Nationalization promulgated on 27th of July, 1956 They had the largest number of shares in the Canal Company, as we have already seen British ships were the biggest users of the Canal In 1954, of the 13,125 ships which passed through, there were 4,493 British vessels The supplies brought to Britain through the Suez were more vital to her than perhaps to any other country Of the total crude oil imports into Britain in 1956 of some 28 million metric tons, over 20 million tons passed through the Canal The U S A was also bringing large quantities of oil through the Canal—about 12 or 13 million tons a year But with her own resources of coal, oil and natural gas, the U S A was not nearly as completely dependent on these imports as the U K From the economic point of view, the nationalization of canal presented two possible dangers to Britain One was that Egypt might be able, at a moment's notice, to bar all tankers bound for Britain from using the Canal, as in the past she barred tankers bound for Israel (already referred to) But even if no value was attached to Nasser's promises, not violating the international character of the Canal, economically this was an unsound proposition If the object of nationalizing the Canal was to use the resources to finance the Aswan Dam, Egypt would never bar the Canal's best customer But, then, there was the second danger which lay in the possibility that Egypt might decide to increase tolls on ships

passing through the Canal as a means of adding to her resources of foreign exchange for economic development.

In case the Canal was closed to Britain either because of a bar or because of the exorbitant rate of tolls, the only alternative before Britain would be to bring supplies of oil from the Western hemisphere which would mean a further strain on her dollar resources. This was the short-term picture. In the long run, supplies could be got by diverting tanker round the Cape. But this would necessitate the manufacture of many more tankers for this was a much longer route. Thus from all points of view, the nationalization of the Canal clearly added very considerably to the problems facing both the oil companies and the national economy of the U.K. As one British conservative M.P. put it, "onwards for our bread, clothing and housing we will depend on the mercy of Col. Nasser".

In addition, Britain and France were concerned with the consequences of the nationalization of the Canal on the security of the international guarantees governing its operation. As on July 30, Eden told the House of Commons: "Britain could not accept any arrangement that left the Suez Canal in the unfettered control of a single power". The issue, therefore, became one of how much international control, how to exercise it and how to maintain it if challenged. Again, the post-war industrial expansion of Western Europe aided by the European Recovery Programme had suddenly created a vast demand for fuel for power which Europe's coal fields and hydro-electric capacity were quite unable to meet. While Europe's dependence on oil for fuel had grown from 10.2% of total energy requirements in 1948 to 17.2% in 1955, it was estimated that imports of oil would grow further from 109 million tons of coal equivalent in 1955 to 135 million tons in 1960 and 235 million tons in 1975. Mainly because it was cheaper but also because its dollar content was less than that of Western hemisphere oil, 90% of Europe's oil supplies in 1956 were coming through the Canal or through the Syrian pipe line. Neither the British nor the French economy in 1956 was strong enough to take the risk of having to bear the strain resulting from a partial interruption of their normal oil supplies.

Other Issues involved. Nasser's nationalization also raised legal and political issues of considerable importance. In the first place, there was the question of the sovereignty of Egypt. Had Egypt the legal right to nationalize the Canal? Legally, for the exercise of the right to nationalize two elements are essential. First, the element of jurisdiction. Egypt had the legal claim over the Canal and this fact was recognised in the Constantinople Convention of 1888, the 20-year Treaty of 1936 and the Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954. The British

Government did not challenge that in Para 2 of the 3-power communique issued on the 2nd of August, 1956. They did not question this right except with two qualifications: (a) nationalization under appropriate conditions, and (b) nationalization of goods not impressed with an international interest. In the view of British Government, these two conditions were absent in the present case and so the Egyptian action was arbitrary. But it would be seen that if these two conditions are necessary for nationalization, Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez becomes illusory. One could not have said to Egypt, "You have sovereign rights over the Suez but because it is an international highway you cannot exercise these rights." Secondly, there is the element of compensation. The law nationalizing the Canal provides for a compensation on the basis of the last price on the Paris bourse on July 26, 1956 and in the shareholder's currency. Moreover, the international character of the Canal had been fully recognised in the nationalization decree and the previous treaties and agreement had not been violated.

A second issue raised was the question of fundamental human rights. It was argued that by compelling employees of the Suez Canal Company to continue to work under threat of imprisonment was a denial of fundamental human rights. What was actually done was that precautionary measures against sabotage were taken. Only the terms of contract with the employees were enforced. There was neither a reduction in the wages nor an increase in the working hours. Their jobs were guaranteed until the termination of their existing contracts. Any member of the staff could give notice and resign. Of course, walkouts were not permitted, for, they would have amounted to sabotage and the penalty for sabotage was from 3 to 15 years imprisonment. The number of employees affected included 350 French, 135 Britons, and 900 persons of other European nationalities.

Another issue involved was whether Egypt could enforce the international character of the Canal. Sir Anthony Eden said that the Egyptian Government would not be able to do it. In fact this was the crux of the matter. The Russian Government believed that Egypt could be relied for this. As Mr Khrushchev put it: "The Soviet Union being directly interested in the maintenance of freedom of shipping through the Suez Canal and taking note of the statements of the Egyptian Government to the effect that the Suez Canal will remain free for all, considers that there are no grounds to show alarm and concern over this matter."

Indeed, the proper steps to ensure this were not the orders of mobilization, the freezing of Egyptian assets in the U.K., stopping of payments of sterling to Egypt, stopping the export of war goods, the orders to warships to stand by for possible emergency

sailing to the Mediterranean, the calling up of the Reservists for emergency duties in the Mediterranean, the general orders to a large force of Canberra jet bombers to be ready to fly, and stopping of leave for sailors. The proper steps should have been to reconcile with the rise of colonial people; to negotiate with Egypt the schedule of payments of compensation; to negotiate directly with Egypt on the question of how best to maintain the international character of the Canal. If a Conference was to be thought necessary, it should have been possible; to negotiate with Egypt about the place and date of meeting and about the countries to be invited to attend it. And in case reasons of prestige or factors of distrust came in the way a reference to the United Nations could have been made just in the beginning.

The Crisis. The story of development of the crisis may now be briefly narrated. On July 27, Nasser's action was condemned by the British Government and the Opposition. The French reaction was sharper and much more hostile, for, there it was believed that if only the voice of Cairo Radio could be stilled, the tremendous human and financial burden of the war in Algeria could be lifted from the French shoulders and the Algerian war even today dominates all other problems that France has to solve. It was thought in 1956 that a defeat for Nasser would have a magic wand over the manifold difficulties that the Mollet Government had to face. In April, 1955 Churchill had retired and Eden had become the Prime Minister in Britain. On July 30, Eden declared that no single state could be allowed to control the Suez Canal. This was a new claim for at the expiry of the Company's concession in 1968, the Canal would, in any case, have reverted to Egypt. The Anglo-French stand, therefore, was contrary to law. In fact, both Britain and France were waging old battles and were trying to react to Nasser in 1956 in a manner they ought to have reacted to Hitler in 1938. The nationalization was regarded by them as totally undermining their position and authority in the Arab world which could not safely be allowed to pass unpunished and un-redressed.

As early as July 29, urgent talks had begun in London between Britain, France and the U.S.A., following which a joint 3-Power statement was issued on August 2, which doubted the legality of the Egyptian Government's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company and proposed the establishment of international control over the Canal with the professed aim of ensuring freedom of navigation through it. The three governments declared that a Conference of countries party to the 1888 Convention would be called in London. Meanwhile, the Egyptian decision of nationalization had been hailed in Asia, Africa and by the Communist world. Nehru declared on August 1: "What is taking place now with the Suez Canal Company indicates the

gradual diminution of European influence in Asia and Africa. The peoples of Asia and Africa are throwing off the colonial yoke. The new forces of freedom are growing."

On August 16, in London's Lancaster House, the 22-nation Conference met. Egypt had refused to take part in it in view of its "tendentious and unrepresentative character" and because its sponsors had openly declared their purpose to be the imposition of international control of the Canal on Egypt. Wing Commander Ali Sabry "observed" the proceedings without attending them. At the instance of the Soviet and Indian delegates, the work of the Conference was assured of extensive publicity and delegates accorded unrestricted speaking rights. It was decided that the Conference would take no decision on the substance of the Suez problem, but should confine itself to an exchange of opinions and exploration of ways and means to solve the problem. After four days of arid debate, on August 20, Dulles put forward the U.S. plan for a settlement and 18 of 22 nations endorsed it. Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Persia, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S.A. The U.S.S.R., India, Ceylon and Indonesia refused to adhere to it. The Plan referred back to the Preamble to the 1888 Convention, which demanded a definitive system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal", and laid down that such a system should assure efficient and dependable operation of the Canal as a free and open water way, insulation of the operation of the canal from the influence of the politics of any nation, a fair return to Egypt for the use of the Canal to enable its enlargement and greater use, and canal tolls as low as is consistent with these requirements. The plan proposed a convention with Egypt incorporating these points and provided for associations with and review by the U.N. Eventually it was decided to present the full record of the London Conference to the Egyptian Government. The 18-powers appointed a committee of five (Australia, the U.S.A., Sweden, Persia, and Ethiopia) to take the proposal mentioned above to Nasser. They elected Mr. Menzies as the head of the mission and the Conference broke up on August 22.

The Menzies Mission Meanwhile the board of the former Canal Company began a campaign of disruption aimed at disorganizing the traffic through the Canal, hoping to prove that Egypt was unable to ensure its normal functioning. It called upon the non-Egyptian employees to stop working and promised them three years' pay. With the help of the Soviet, Yugoslav, Indian and Italian pilots, the operation of the Canal continued. On August 28, Nasser agreed to receive the Menzies mission.

Same day Dulles explained at Washington the differences between him and Eden and Mollet. The fissures in the West which had been masked by the London Conference were now nakedly revealed. The Menzies Mission met Nasser on September 3 and on September 9 he rejected the London Formula. On September 10, the mission returned to London and reported failure. Same day Nasser presented a formal note to the U.N. and invited them to consider a solution of all aspects of the Suez Canal problem and proposed to all users except Israel a Conference to create a negotiating body to discuss free passage, development and tolls. France and Britain rejected the proposal and Eden announced on September 12, 1956 an American-Anglo-French plan for a Suez Canal Users Association (S.C.U.A.). On September 13, he promised to refer the issue to the U.N. "if circumstances allowed". On September 18, Israel made another complaint to the Security Council against Egypt. On September 19—21, a second conference met at London and 15 of the 18 countries that attended it, adopted the S.C.U.A. proposals. On September 23, Britain and France asked for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation. Dulles got disturbed and regretted that a reference to the U.N. should have been made before the S.C.U.A. had been properly organised. On October 2, he referred to fundamental differences between the U.S.A. and Britain and France, and said that the U.S.A. was against colonisation and against the use of force and economic coercion in Egypt. While Dulles favoured private meeting of the Security Council attended by Egypt, Britain and France wanted a public hearing. Britain, in the end, fell in line and the closed debate began on October 5. After the initial flurry of charges and counter-charges, the Council came into the open on October 13. The Anglo-French resolution was now divided in two parts—one consisting of a set of principles similar to the Egyptian principles, which was unanimously approved; and, the other, endorsing international control of the Suez, the London Plan, and the S.C.U.A., which was rejected by Egypt and vetoed by the U.S.S.R.

The Anglo-French Invasion. On the one hand, the Council discussions raised the hopes for a negotiated settlement and brought Egypt and Britain and France on a discussion forum, and, on the other, it widened the gulf between the U.S.A. and Britain and France. On October 16, Eden and Lloyd went to Paris and consulted Mollet and Pineau. The U.S.A. was not informed about it. After his return a cabinet reshuffle occurred in Britain. Meanwhile tension between Jordan and Israel was mounting and on October 17, a joint army command was established by Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Israel had decided on a drastic action. On October 29, Israel invaded Egypt in spite of the two urgent warnings to Ben Gurion by Eisenhower.

The U S A at once called an emergency meeting of the Security Council. On October 30, it met to consider a U S resolution requiring the Israelites to go back to their borders and the parties to refrain from using force. Britain had decided to veto this resolution but did not take the U S A in confidence about this decision. Nor did Eden inform the U S A about the imminent visit of Pineau to London and the joint Anglo French ultimatum inviting Israel "to advance 100 miles into Egyptian territory." Same day at 4.15 p.m. the Anglo French 12 hour ultimatums were delivered to both Israel and Egypt requiring them to stop fighting and withdraw to 10 miles from the Suez Canal (which is 100 miles from the Israeli-Egyptian border on the Egyptian side). The air attacks on Egypt began the next day. Meanwhile the U S resolution had been vetoed by the U K and France on October 30.

On November 1, the Assembly met and resolved by 64 to 5 (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France and Israel opposing) for an immediate cease fire, the evacuation of troops to the respective borders, a general embargo on the entry of military goods, and immediate steps to reopen the canal. Britain invited the U N to accept the physical task of maintaining peace in the area. On November 2, Eden evaded the demand to accept the Assembly's resolution. On November 3, France and Britain formulated their conditions, for accepting the resolution that a U N Force should be sent in the area. Meanwhile the Canal had been blockaded and the Egyptian forces in Sinai had been routed by Israel. On November 4-5, while Egypt and Israel were accepting the Assembly's resolution, the Anglo-French troops were occupying the Egyptian territory. Same day Port Said surrendered and Bulganin sent a message to Eden and Mollet "In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked by more powerful States possessing every kind of modern destructive weapons? And there are other countries which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts of Britain, but could have used other means such as rocket techniques." An offer was also made by Bulganin to Eisenhower to take joint and immediate steps to stop aggression. The *Tass* stated that volunteers would be allowed by the Soviet Government to go to Egypt. On November 6, Eden told the House of Commons that Britain welcomed the Israeli decision to withdraw. Within a month the sterling area's gold and dollar reserves had declined by 84 million dollars. At midnight on November 6, the Anglo-French troops ceased fire. On November 21, it was announced that Eden's Doctor had ordered him complete rest. He spent three weeks on holiday in Jamaica and returned to his duties shortly before Christmas. On January 9, 1957, it was announced that he had tendered his resignation to

the Queen. On December 21, 1956, the Anglo-French forces had been withdrawn from Port Said. The U.N. Emergency Force under General Burns' Command had acted as a buffer until the withdrawal. By March 1957, protracted negotiations and political pressure secured Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Sharm el Sheikh, and the Egyptians resumed control and administration of all the territory from which they had been ejected. By the time of the cease-fire 18 ships had been sunk by the Egyptians in the canal. Since the Anglo-French teams were not permitted to help in the work of clearance, the U.N. team under General Wheeler undertook the salvage work and completed it by April 9, 1957.

Consequences of the Crisis. Was there any justification for the conduct of the British Government in attacking Egypt? If there was a need to separate the combatants (Israel and Egypt) and secure the canal, it could not be realised by the methods Eden and Mollet actually employed. Their ultimatum, in fact, encouraged Israel which was the aggressor. Instead of separating the combatants, the Anglo-French, in effect, joined the Israeli forces. Nor did the action secure the Canal. If anything, it led to its blockade. Nor can it be convincingly argued that the Anglo-French action was intended to quell the turmoil in the Middle East, for, there was no danger of war and Nasser had neither the means nor the inclination to start one. To compare him with Hitler was unfair and unhistorical. Hitler was demonstrably the greatest and most immediate threat to British security and independence and by no stretch of imagination could Nasser, "in a world dwarfed by the vast power of the Soviet Union and the United States" be so described. As Susan Strange has pointedly written: "Whatever nuisance might be caused by the aggressive nationalism among many in Asia and the Middle East, the facts of geography and of strategy made nonsense out of reaction based on the lessons of Munich". The phrase "Nasserism" invented by Eden and Mollet could only indicate a tone of disapproval by its authors and had no reality whatsoever. Egypt was hardly a Power and if Nasser was threat to any one, it was Israel and not Britain or France.

Nor was there any such thing as a Russian plot for as Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi have said: "The conjunction of Nasser and the Russians was a marriage of limited convenience. Nasser planned, dangerously enough, to use Russia against the West. The Russians planned to use Arab nationalism against the West. So long therefore as Arab nationalism was directed against the West, Arab and Russian interests coincided. It is a common delusion of rising nationalists that they can use major powers for their own ends, but while they try to play off one against another they never intend to substitute a new foreign

domination for an old—although this may on occasion be the unwelcome result of their over-confident diplomacy. Nasser, while trying to extract every ounce of profit out of the cold war, was aware of the length of spoon needed to sup with the Russians. Only if forced by the West will an Arab leader ally himself with the Communists, and even then reluctantly. The Anglo-French attack went a long way to forging this very dangerous alliance. Far from putting an end to Russian influence in the Middle East, the loss of face suffered by Britain and France, the encouragement given to Arab nationalism and the continued failure of either the U.S. by force or the Secretary-General by mediation to pacify and stabilise regional international relations in the area, all combine to offer new opportunities to Russia to take a part in those relations. If the Suez affair demonstrated anything anew, it was the impossibility of excluding the Soviet Union altogether from the Middle Eastern politics.

Again, if France and Britain really thought seriously of the Soviet threat, could it have been met by concealing designs, moves and tactics from the U.S.A. which was the major partner in the N.A.T.O. and the major force behind the Baghdad Pact. An American official described the Anglo-French ultimatum of October 30, 1956 'as the most brutal in modern history'. It is true that the U.S.A. did not follow a consistent policy during the Suez crisis and did not offer the slightest support for British policy towards Egypt. The result was a severe strain on Anglo-American relations and a rift in the N.A.T.O. Even the subsequent Eisenhower Doctrine has not led to the restoration of balance. But for Britain and France, to hold secret parleys at the back of the U.S. Government and to take steps which had almost taken the world to a third total war was unfair as well as inexpedient. Certainly Britain and France could not have assumed that U.S.A. would fall in line and that the U.S.S.R. would remain aloof. In the U.S.A. it was an election year and no Administration could have risked a policy of that kind.

Nor did the Anglo-French action strengthen the U.N. hands. On the other hand, everything was done by France and Britain to stultify the U.N. processes. The truth is that both countries wanted to use an Israeli attack "as a cover for a separate Anglo-French attack". The French saw in Israel a real ally against the Arab nationalism which was threatening its imperial hold in Algeria. The British saw in her a lever to beat and humble "the new Hitler". The entire affair underlined at least three basic weaknesses of the United Nations: (a) The Charter does rule out the possibility of preventive war as under Article 51. But while the action of Israel on October 29 was contrary to the Charter she yet argued that Egypt and other Arab states were preparing war against her which might have led to her

extinction and that the action she took on October 29 was intended to prevent this from happening. Here, therefore, was a case of preventive war which from a commonsense point of view seemed justified, but was contrary to the U. N. Charter. (b) That the Charter makes no provision for safeguarding the rights of those countries which suffer a civil wrong. A state may do harm to another state (as Egypt allegedly did to Britain in nationalizing the Canal Company) without sending an armed force across the frontier. It may be very damaging, economically fatal. Is the victim to have no protection? And is it not to be allowed to use force to put the matter right? (c) That the Charter does not provide for peaceful change. The whole burden of Article 51 is that the *status quo* must remain. Is a country never justified in using force to bring about a change?

Finally, the Suez crisis also demonstrated the relative weakness of two declining Powers—Britain and France—in terms of power politics and proved their inability to use their military force without American support and in the face of the Soviet opposition. It also revealed the limited value of British bases in Libya as well as in Cyprus. It established that a venture of this kind was beyond the economic capacity of both Britain and France. Indeed, it failed to achieve any of the advertised objectives assigned to it. It exposed the real nature, the limits as well as the strength of the U.N. system. In all immediate aspects the U. N. role in the Suez crisis was vigorous and effective and the precedent of the U.N.E.F. (United Nations Emergency Force) may do something for the limping prospects of collective security through international organization. After all hostilities were stopped, invading troops withdrawn, the Canal zone taken over by the U. N. E. F. and clearing operations begun and completed by U.N. team. True, that the Soviet threat, the U.S. hesitation, the friction in the Commonwealth, the hostile reaction of world public opinion, schism in the Eden Government, the hostile attitude of the Labour opposition and the over-all weakness of Britain and France had all led to the Anglo-French acceptance of cease-fire. But the U. N. played a positive role in crystallising world opinion and provided useful procedures for resolving the conflict. The Suez crisis also induced the U.S.A. to formulate an integrated policy in the Middle East as expressed in the Eisenhower Doctrine. The strains on the Baghdad Pact proved to be temporary and soon after, the U.S. association with it became closer. Finally, the Suez crisis constituted a triumph for Col. Nasser and vindicated the right of the colonial peoples to throw off the yoke of imperialism. During the Suez crisis Indonesia repudiated the debt of the Netherlands. Imperialism, therefore, received a serious jolt.

Conclusions. With respect to other areas in the Middle East

also nationalist ferment has been extremely strong. For instance, in Saudi Arabia the forum of nationalist revolt has been the Buraimi dispute. In Iraq a socialist revolution is being throttled by the ruling clique on and the air of the country is super-charged with animation and ambition. The whole country seems like a volcano which may erupt any day. A revolution seems to be imminent. In Syria, the Middle Eastern nationalism presents all its characteristics—hostility to the West, a desire to federate with Arab States, positive neutralism, resentment of military alliance, calculated friendship with the Soviet Union, and progressive economic policies. In Jordan, the nationalist turbulence is ever present and there is a degree of instability and uncertainty. In practice, the armed forces of all these countries play a dominant role and different sets of politicians ally themselves with different army chiefs in order to remove one government and institute another. It is important to remember that nationalism in the Middle East is not an ally of communism and no country is in a mood to replace one master by another. But in an effort to regain freedom and self-respect, the nationalist leaders are prepared to accept help from any quarters. An important expression of the Middle Eastern nationalism is an effort to transform the region's social structure and economy. The nationalists everywhere are attempting to industrialize their countries. They are against rearmament and against military alliances, and wish to pursue a policy of non involvement and neutrality in order to extend the area of peace which is an indispensable condition for their development. The problem of Israel is a constant source of friction and, if properly handled, the Arab states can be brought to see reason and reconcile themselves with the independence and territorial integrity of Israel.

Revolt in Africa

If soon after the first world war the chief vortex of disturbance in world affairs was the Middle East and East Europe, after the second world war, it shifted to the west of Asia. The combined forces of war, nationalism and revolution that swept off these areas, started gathering momentum in Africa, which is the last great colonial domain of the Western Powers and where Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain are facing the colossal task of so controlling and guiding the forces of nationalism and social revolution that political freedom and industrial development may be adjusted with the vital interests of the colonial powers, and this consummation be brought about as rapidly as possible so that the rot might be stemmed before it is too late. In the African continent, it should be borne in mind, there is a triangular struggle between Nationalism, Communism and Western Imperialism, although this is not in such an advanced stage as in Asia. But it is there definitely and its outcome might well be decisive for the entire world.

The continent of Africa has thus emerged from a deep slumber with exaggerated speed into the embrace of the modern times, and is springing in a step from black magic to white civilization. Its people, backward, illiterate and poverty-stricken, want better education and technique, better modes of life and standards of living, and freedom from domination and exploitation. Lying open like vacuum, it covers about 14·25 million square miles—an area representing 1·5% of the entire land surface of the globe. Rising out of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic, it is “a continent mass, shaped like some monstrous liver or kidney”. It is rich in raw materials; its 200 million people are divided into a fantastic number of tribes, speaking about 700 different languages and professing Islam, Paganism, Animism and Christianity. Out of these 200 millions, there are 5 million European whites, 50% of whom are concentrated in South Africa and 70% of the rest are in French North Africa. Yet the Whitemen lose everywhere. The great desert of Sahara divides the African continent into two parts which are quite different from one another, although disease, poverty, difficulties of communications, lack of road and highways, unnatural political frontiers, narrow familistic loyalties, a general restlessness and discontent are common factors.

✓ What are the principal features of the widespread revolt in the Dark Continent, and what is its significance? At one time, the historically decisive characteristic of the African continent was said to be its inaccessibility. Indeed, Africa below the Equator did not begin to be opened up till the 19th century and until then "it was a coast not a continent." The only interest of the Europeans in Africa was the establishment of way-stations where India-bound ships could put in, and the obtaining of people who could be found to work as slaves on the sugar and cotton plantations in America. After the slave trade was prohibited and the institution of slavery was abolished, Europeans seemed to lose their interest in Africa for a while. The demand for a shorter route drew men's attention to the need of a canal at Suez and in 1869 it was opened to traffic. When the great depression of 1817 led the Europeans to look for markets for the goods that Europe produced but could not consume, Europeans got interested in exploring the interior of Africa and the vast continent was partitioned between 1880 and 1890 among the major European powers—Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Italy. From 1880 to 1914 the initiative for the occupation and exploitation of Africa largely came from individual Europeans interested in profitable investments. The first world war introduced a change, and as the economic possibilities in Asia started diminishing the Europeans started looking more and more to Africa. The second world war intensified the economic problem of the West by revealing the discouragingly inadequate domestic supplies of such minerals as zinc, lead, copper and iron ore. The strategic and economic value of Africa came to be realised more and more. Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were extremely important to the French as a base, as source of military man power, and as a position into which the French armies would retire for continued defence. Tangiers and Gibraltar are essential to the success of any military operation in the Mediterranean against possible Russian thrust, and Libya was the battle ground in the second world war for the control of Egypt. Egypt controls the Suez Canal as its guardian, and on it depends the security of the Middle East. Suez is both a land bridge from Asia to Africa and the connecting link in the water routes through the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and this position has long been recognised as one of the vital strategic focal points in the world. Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Somaliland are of principal importance for possible use of the ports for minor naval operations in control of the Western Indian Ocean. British South East Africa, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika are extremely important. Madagascar is important in protecting the sea lands in the Indian Ocean. South Africa occupies a key position in the control of the Cape.

sea traffic. Dakar guards the lanes passing around the Cape from the North to the South Atlantic.

Economically, the west is dependent on Africa for precious raw materials like uranium, iron-ore, cobalt, columbite, manganese, bauxite, diamonds and chrome. At present, the United States depends on Africa for something like 99% of its uranium and 70% of its iron-ore. Africa produces 98% of the diamonds of the world, 55% of its gold, 22% of its copper, 66% of its cocoa and 60% of its palm oil. Indeed, it can grow every crop on earth. Although, in recent years, the export of its raw materials has greatly increased, it, nevertheless, amounts to only 3% of the export of the raw materials. It does not even produce enough food to feed itself. On this showing, Africa is not only vital for what it already has, but is incomparably the greatest potential source of wealth awaiting development in the world.

Secondly, it should be remembered that the frontiers drawn by the colonial powers during the partition of Africa were largely artificial and arbitrary. The revolutionary forces in Africa are common to the whole continent and events in one part, therefore, react upon the other. The disposition and banishment of a chief in Bechuanaland causes suspicion and concern in Basutoland and Nyasaland. The progressive disintegration of the traditional tribal society of Africa in unloosing new political and social forces and an intense nationalism is sweeping over the entire continent. Although the boundaries of most of the existing political units in Africa today are not the result of the growth of national states but were imposed by competing colonial powers which divided Africa between them with hardly any regard for ethnic boundaries, there is a close affinity based on common colonial experience which leads to the development of a common territorial nationalism. Although there are marked differences between the development of various colonies in Africa, efforts have yet been made to stimulate a pan-African nationalism which aims at achieving the freedom of all black Africa and at establishing some kind of political union of all Africans. All the black people of Africa have been subjected, in greater or lesser degree, to the same cruel discrimination, and this has naturally led some of them to see the desirability of uniting against a common enemy. A few intellectuals such as Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, who have studied in western Universities, learnt the power that comes of united action and sponsored the pan-African movement. But rival loyalties in Africa have always been strong and much of their strength continues. The larger national loyalty is new and continental nationalism is yet far

away. This became abundantly clear in the proceedings of the first Conference of independent African States which took place in Accra (Ghana) from April 15 to 22, 1958. Of the nine independent states in the Continent only South Africa declined an invitation to attend and the assemblage of representatives of Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Ethiopia, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) was really impressive. On the broad front of international affairs—colonialism, racialism, and Pan Africanism, the agreement was wide. The Conference decided to celebrate April 15—the opening day of the first conference of independent African States—as the African Freedom Day throughout the continent annually. The conference expressed itself firmly against the continuation of imperialism in all its forms—both the old and the new, and insisted on “their right to share with the colonial powers responsibility for preparing the colonies for independence”. The eight African States also pledged to offer direct aid to colonial freedom movements. The conference proclaimed a “Monroe Doctrine for Africa” and resolved that “in the event of a dispute between two African States they should first seek to reach agreement through direct negotiations”, failing which “they should invite the arbitration of other African States”. All the participants affirmed their faith in the Bandung Principles and the Charter of the U.N. Non-commitment between the power-blocs and dynamic neutrality was endorsed, the immediate suspension of nuclear tests demanded, and the failure to associate smaller states with the Summit talks deplored.

But on other issues the conference ran into difficulties almost from the start. The original proposal to restrict it to independent states gave rise to acrimony. Ghana's more powerful neighbour, Nigeria, was offended, nor did she trouble to hide her feelings. The Sudan was anxious for the near independent state of Somalia to be invited. M. Habib Bourguiba, the President of Tunisia, and Dr. Nkrumah, Ghana's Prime Minister, thought that to throw open the Conference to non-independent states would immediately raise the question of seating the Algerian Liberation Front (A.L.F.). The A.L.F., nevertheless, came and after a good deal of controversy it was decided that the Algerians should be allowed to testify to the conference in closed session. The U.A.R.'s attempt to get a resolution committing the African States to sending aid to Algeria failed, although the Conference openly designated the A.L.F. as the official group with whom France should open negotiations. The proposal was subsequently mooted at the Tangiers Conference held from 27th to 30th April to discuss the question of a federation of the Maghreb States. The Accra Conference also decided to send a mission to the capitals of the world to win support for the cause of Algerian independence. Under another resolution the conference expressed “its

deep concern over the question of Palestine, which is a disturbing factor of world peace and security", and urged "a just solution of the Palestine question".

In fact, the Accra conference gave a lie to the old theories viewing Africa in terms of "Muslim Africa" and "Black Africa", "Mediterranean Africa" and "Africa south of the Sahara". There was a striking similarity of outlook among the participants with the U.A.R. and Libya being more progressive. Even Ethiopia seemed to abandon her traditional aloofness to African affairs. The Conference laid down an ambitious programme for cultural exchanges, economic co-operation, and political consultations. It was decided to hold a biennial conference, the next one to be held at Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, the representatives of the eight states at U.N. were to act as a liaison committee to provide regular exchange of views and correlate aspects of policy in order to realize the objective of forging a common foreign policy.

Thirdly, it should be remembered that nationalism in Africa is not merely a protest against their economic conditions and their political dependence, it is also an expression of a desire to play a befitting role in world politics. African nationalism is based on an emotional affinity between Africans on grounds of colour, and is implicitly anti-White. (It displays here, as it does in Asia, a deep resentment of an unjust historical inferiority, great sensitiveness to any discrimination and a ready self-identification with the sufferings or achievements of similarly forced peoples in every part of the world.) The nationalist leaders are non-traditional leaders and come from the newly created intelligentsia, the lawyers and doctors, teachers and shopkeepers, civil servants and trade union leaders, who have been produced by European training. Indeed, European ideas of national sovereignty and democratic rights and freedom have greatly stimulated nationalism throughout Africa and the great monotheistic religions—Islam and Christianity—have also played an important part, stimulating nationalism in some areas and diverting attention to communal loyalties in others. These nationalist leaders with few exceptions are not communists, but they are ready to accept support from any quarters. It is also necessary to understand that nationalistic ideas in Asia operated on traditional civilizations and cultures as old as those of the western countries. African revolt, therefore, is not so much a demand for political freedom as it is a demand for freedom from poverty and disease. (We are not arguing that political freedom can be long denied to these people, for, men rather prefer to govern themselves badly than to be governed well by others.

Another feature of African nationalism is the basic conflict between the African majority and the White minority. Indeed, African nationalism is face to face with European nationalism.

While the basis of European nationalism in Africa is the fear that the five million Whites will be swamped and overpowered by the Africans, whose standards and values are incomparably lower than theirs, African nationalism is generated by the struggle against colonial rulers who treat them as inferiors and who preach the political doctrine that the children of Ham shall forever be hewers of wood and drawers of water.

Finally, it may be pointed out that Communism does not play such an important part in the African national revolt as it does in Asia and the Far East, even though the social structure in both cases is plural and the socio-economic problems are of the same pattern. The reason is not far to seek. In Africa, with few exceptions, there is no traditional problem of landless peasantry being exploited by a wealthy land owning class. Land is often communally owned and the peasant has not been separated from his land. The problem in Africa, therefore, is not so much of landlessness (as in Asia) as it is of the low productivity of the soil itself. African peasants, therefore, are not likely to be caught by the slogans of land distribution or nationalisation, except possibly in Egypt or South Africa, where population pressure on the land is serious. The African peasant, unlike the peasant in China, is conservative in political development, and Communism has no strong appeal to him. Communism appeals to the de-tribalised natives in industrial and urban areas where a proletariat is coming into existence. It is true that the Communist doctrine of self determination and their well thought out theory of autonomous rights has a tremendous force in the entire colonial world. If, therefore, the Europeans now in control of Africa cannot reassure the Africans, the latter may well turn to Russia for a help not because of a doctrinaire interest in Communism but rather because in their inability to get concessions, they may feel a need to rely on the enemy of their enemies. Thus the challenge of Africa is as serious as the challenge of Communism. ✓

West Africa Since as we have stated, nationalism in Africa is tending to develop on a territorial rather than a continental basis it is necessary to give a rapid survey of particular nationalisms in Africa. In West Africa, except for the independent Republics of Liberia and Ghana, the entire area is under the jurisdiction of alien powers—France, Britain, Portugal and Spain. The Liberians have a fierce pride as an independent nation and the groups of Americans and Africans are merging into a common nation. In Sierra-Leone, nationalism is a recent growth and has been stimulated by the spread of western education. Here were established the famous Fourah Bay College where students from different parts of the country learnt the meaning of democracy and self government. Gold

Coast became free in March 1957 as Ghana. Under Dr. Nkrumah, the Convention People Party persuaded the British to part with power at a much quicker pace than they had apparently intended. This rapid victory of nationalism has naturally inspired African nationalists all over the continent and its importance can hardly be overestimated. In Nigeria, efficient political organization developed very late, and there is also a lack of unity. In the north and in the west regional loyalties are deeply rooted. The three main regions of Nigeria even today enjoy virtual autonomy and it is expected that by 1960 Nigeria would have achieved complete independence. In Gambia, a new Constitution was inaugurated in 1954. In French West Africa, the territories of Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, French Guiana, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Dakar, Togoland and Cameroons are included. French colonial policy has been that of assimilation centering upon a desire to make the colonial groups part and parcel of continental France. This calls for complete incorporation of African communities into metropolitan France. Political organization is, however, permitted and there are now definite indications of the development of territorial nationalism. Portugal and Spain control Guiana and Fernando Poo, but these two powers have the least area and the least influence in West Africa. Their colonial policy is based on the 18th century philosophy that colonies exist primarily for the benefit of the holding countries. In West Africa, Dr. Nkrumah sponsored the movement of a United State of West Africa but the French policy of sticking to its colonies and the hostile attitude of Dr. Malan have put serious barriers against it.

Belgian Congo. Another region of Africa is the Belgian Congo which is administered from Brussels. Education is largely in the hands of missions. The economy of the Congo remains uninfluenced by foreign factors. Politics is allowed neither to 100,000 Europeans in the country nor to the Africans. There are signs of national movement but not on a mass scale. The country is enormous and is peopled by many different tribes and it may be long time before any common sense of nationality emerges. Communism is not a problem here and small local uprisings have been due to fanaticism.

French Equatorial Africa. Another region of some note is the French Equatorial Africa covering an area of about one million square miles and a population of more than four millions which includes about eight thousand Europeans. There are considerable areas of French Equatorial Africa which are part of the Sahara desert and, therefore, virtually uninhabitable. European exploration of this region goes back to the sixteenth century but French control was gradually pushed until it met with British opposition at Fashoda in 1898. International rivalries prior to

World War I provoked constant debate over the French colony. As part of the Agadir Agreement of 1911 France ceded to Germany over 10,000 sq miles of territory in the Cameroons, but this was restored to her by the Versailles Treaty. Under the Mandate System, France obtained the major part of the former German colony and is today responsible for it to the Trusteeship Council. The final demarcation of the boundaries between French West Africa and the French Equatorial Africa was made in 1929. The welfare of the people of this region was rather neglected, and as late as 1930 only 215 km of railways had been built as compared to over 3,000 in West Africa. Conditions improved somewhat after 1930 but no substantial advance could be made because of the depression. After 1945, the picture started changing and in 1947, many economic and social projects were undertaken for the rapid development of the territory. Emphasis was laid on agriculture, particularly on cotton and rice. Popular movement is still in infancy, and French imperialism is not facing any serious threat in this part of the world.

The Union of South Africa The most explosive situations are found in the British White Settler countries, e.g. the Union of South Africa, the new Central African Federation and the British East Africa. In 1910, the British Government handed over political power in South Africa to a White Settler minority which now accounts for about 20% of the total population of 14 millions. In addition, the Union contains 366,000 Asians, or more than two-thirds of the Asian population of Africa south of the Sahara, a population derived mainly from relatively recent immigration from the Indian sub-continent. South African Society is a caste society in which social mobility between the different strata is at a minimum, and in which caste status is determined on the basis of race. Political power, economic opportunity, and rewards, as well as educational opportunities and social privilege are concentrated in the hands of the upper caste, the European minority, and are at a minimum in the case of the lowest caste, the African majority. Cape Coloureds (people of mixed descent) and Indians occupy intermediate positions. The South African policy of racial segregation and discrimination, known as Apartheid, has done much to give African nationalist leaders a sense of urgency, which they have been able to impart to a growing mass of African people. The doctrine of Apartheid is based on the logic that South Africa must be permanently a white society, that there is no place for non-whites in it, and that, therefore, the two groups must develop along separate lines according to their separate traditions and capacities. There seems to be an ill-judged humanitarianism on the part of many of its supporters, who sincerely believe that only through separate development can the

non-whites find those opportunities for advancement which they can never attain in a community dominated by Europeans.

In fact, three main interacting factors provide the foundation of racial conflict in South Africa. They are (i) complex ethnic composition of the population, (ii) the wide differences in cultural background between the various groups, and (iii) the fact that Europeans are so heavily outnumbered by non-Europeans. The result of cultural contact between the diverse elements making up the population has been to set in motion a chain of events, culminating in the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the African population. These rapid changes have, in their turn, caused further conflicts and created a great deal of maladjustment, which is not limited to the African population or even to non-Europeans. The attitudes and behaviour of the large majority of Europeans exhibit their singular failure to adjust to the reality of the situation in which they find themselves. They are, in fact, trying to escape from a tricky situation by a number of repressive measures and by segregating the ethnic groups, in an abortive attempt to retard the processes of change that have already been set in motion.

It is true that in the Union of South Africa, there exists wide racial differences, and differences in civilization, culture, religion and way of life. But there seems to be absolutely no basis for the assumption that the African differs so radically from the European in his cultural background and in his needs and aspirations that it must for ever remain impossible to find common ground upon which the black and the white can work together harmoniously in a common political structure. With the handling of the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa by the U.N., we are not presently concerned. A full treatment of this is given elsewhere in this volume. Here it is necessary to analyse the basis of nationalism in South Africa. Throughout their contact with the Europeans, the African people have never wavered in their rejection of Apartheid. Nothing which has happened thus far has shaken them in their conviction that there is no genuine desire on the part of its advocates to create an area, or areas, of liberty or untrammelled development for Africans, but only an intention on their part to convert South Africa into a single area of liberty for Europeans. Therefore, the African looks upon the policy of Apartheid as but a thinly veiled form of exploitation and he regards any person who advocates it as his political enemy. However long he may be physically compelled to endure it, he is determined not to give his assent to a policy which is designed to place every European permanently in a position of artificial superiority over every black man in every sphere of life. In their struggle the Africans, as well as the Indians, in Africa enjoy the support not only of India, but of entire Asia, the Middle East,

Africa and even a large section of the Europeans. The South African nationalism is thus a powerful force. For many decades secondary and higher education have been available to the Africans, and ever since the discovery of gold on the Rand there has been much coming and going within the country and even from outside of Africa. Indeed easy communication, education and a common oppression have provided a solid basis to a nationalist movement covering all sections of the African population and strongly supported by the most influential Indian political organization, for the Indian minority suffers even more severely from the Apartheid policies than do the Africans. On the other hand, the Europeans, fearful of the possibility of eventual black domination, have in the past few years attached themselves increasingly to the predominantly Afrikaner Nationalist Party, which is chauvinistic in the extreme. Thus two nationalisms—extremist white nationalism and moderate nationalism of the black African National Congress—are sharply in clash with each other in the Union of South Africa.

Central Africa In Central Africa, a Federation of three British territories—Southern Rhodesia (150,333 sq miles and 2,301,400 population), Northern Rhodesia (288,130 sq miles, and 2,034,800 population), and Nyasaland (49,177 sq miles and 2,613,600 population)—was established in 1953, after the most careful study of the whole question at a series of conferences during the two previous years. The economic and political strength gained by the federation it was suggested, would provide a surer foundation than previously existed for developing and extending the policy of racial co-operation and partnership without fear of outside influences. In Southern Rhodesia, there has long existed a substantial measure of self-government which has been effectively used to discourage African political ambitions. It is only recently that an independent African political party has been developing. The Southern Rhodesian Whites outnumber the Whites in the rest of the Federation. In the total population of Southern Rhodesia, the Europeans number 115,500. In Northern Rhodesia, the number of Europeans is only 37,000 and this region has had a far longer spell of colonial office rule. Here therefore, more attention has been paid to African interests, and with fewer restrictions, more political activity has been possible. In Nyasaland, the number of Whites is still fewer—4,000 only. The people of these two areas, therefore, vehemently opposed the scheme of Central African Federation, being convinced that the federal structure would enable the White settlers to dominate the government, to deprive the African population of any real voice in the affairs of the country and that the whole political trend would be in the South African direction. The scheme was, however, for-

cibly imposed in 1953 and since then the African leaders' bitterness has been mounting up. As Mr. Peter Wright has recently written: "The imposition of federation by arousing intense African opposition gave tremendous impetus to the infant nationalist movements—the Africa Congresses of the two territories—and since federation there has been close co-operation between the African leaders of the two states. The Africans aim at undoing federation and at the establishment of truly democratic governments in their respective territories. The growing strength of the Africans politically has alarmed the Whites and they tend to draw together in their own white nationalist organizations and to aim at so increasing their population (now only 4% of the total) by immigration that their dominance will become unsailable. As in the Union there are two parties, one extremist which is now in opposition and the other more moderate, now forming the Government".

The British East Africa. In British East Africa there are three territories, (Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika) forming a solid geographical block lying north and south of the Equator, and stretching inland over 700 miles from the Indian Ocean to the Belgian Congo. The total area of these territories is approximately equal to that of Western Europe but large tracts are infested with tsetse fly and are too arid to support life. Their total population amounts to some 20 million Africans, a quarter of a million Asians and some 65,000 Europeans. Each of the territories has a different political status: Kenya is a colony and Protectorate, Uganda is a Protectorate, and Tanganyika a U.N. Trusteeship Territory under the British administration. The economies of these three territories are primarily agricultural, and their major exports—cotton, coffee and sisal—accounted for 72% of their total exports in 1953. Before the second world war, industry consisted mostly of processing agricultural products and supplying farmer's needs for insecticides, fertilizers and containers. Since then it has expanded and diversified.

In Uganda, there has been an extensive economic expansion. The emergence of a modern nationalist party is a very recent phenomenon. Since 1952 an effort was seriously made to build up a united national party, representative of all Uganda, aiming at creating a democratic and independent state. In 1953, a serious political crisis developed when the governor deported the Kabak or King of Buganda, the largest princely state in the Uganda Protectorate. It gave the new Uganda National Congress a great opportunity to popularise itself. An ill-considered suggestion from the British Secretary of State for Colonies that all East Africa be federated came at a time when African opinion had been inflamed by the scheme of Central African Federation. In 1954 important constitutional reforms were introduced, and

at present as a result of the pressure of the Congress, the stage seems to have been set for self government in Uganda as a predominantly African State

Tanganyika is a Trust Territory and it is fully treated elsewhere in the present study. Here it is enough to point out that the British Government, with an eye on the U.N. has moved rather cautiously and has avoided those features of colonial rule which characterize the British policies in Kenya and Central Africa. Slow economic and educational expansion, poor communications and limited resources have hampered the growth of a wide and broad based national movement. The early political stirrings were tribal and local, e.g. the Kilimanjaro Union in the North of the Territory. Its objectives, however, were limited. Recently the Tanganyika African Association was formed but with weak organization and leadership it could not cut much ice. Since 1954 constitutional reforms have been accelerated and a measure of responsible government has been extended. The Tanganyika African Association has now been transformed into a powerful Tanganyika African National Union having a wide appeal and is pressing for full independence.

More dramatic and more explosive scene is presented by *Kenya* which is the most controversial of all British colonies. The area of Kenya is 224,960 sq miles and the total population is estimated to be 6,043,000, with the Africans numbering 5.8 million of the total, Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, and Goans) 144,100, Europeans 52,400, Arabs 31,600, and others 5,100. The Africans are of many different tribes, the four largest being the Kikuyu, who make up nearly 20% of the African population, the Luo, Baluhya and Kamba. The great majority of Africans are engaged in agriculture. The economy of Kenya, therefore, rests on the export of a number of agricultural and mineral products, mainly produced by European enterprise, the most important of which are coffee, tea, sisal, pyrethrum, gold, and sodium carbonate.

It was in the 19th century that Kenya was colonised by the British. In 1893, it was placed under the control of a Commissioner and the present status of the territory dates from the Kenya Annexation Order in Council of 1920. In Kenya there is at present, an entrenched and privileged White minority comprising less than 1% of the population yet dominating the affairs of the colony under the protection of the Colonial Office. As a result of missionary activities and expansion of education, ideas of democracy and self determination started spreading among the people but these are pitted against the principle of segregation and discrimination imposed by the White settlers. On the one hand therefore, the Africans have developed a considerable degree of political consciousness and, on the other, they

are bitterly critical and distrustful of the European's hypocrisy. The Whites and the Africans both have developed intense nationalism. At the end of the second world war, the Africans organised the Kenya African Union led by Jomo Kenyatta with the aim of securing equal treatment for the Africans and a hand in the administration of Kenya.

In 1951-52, there broke out unprecedented lawlessness in Central Kenya—the Mau Mau—which was an expression of the tribal character of Kikuyu nationalism. Government and mission schools were boycotted and Jomo Kenyatta tried to put in their place his own schools with a low standard of education but a high level of nationalistic bias. These schools were closed down by the British colonial rulers, the Kenya African Union was smashed, thousands of Africans were killed, and atrocities on both sides were committed. In March 1954, the Secretary of State for Colonies, Oliver Lyttleton, visited Kenya, and some constitutional advance followed, which broadened the government somewhat, but which did not provide for participation of Africans in electing their own representatives. In 1955-56 greater advance was registered and the Kenya government decided to offer to the terrorists new terms on January 18, 1955 which might induce them to surrender in mass. But no tangible results followed and the British authorities decided to intensify military operations in June 1955. The operations were quite a success and on September 1, 1955 the military forces engaged in Kenya were reduced. By December 1956, most of the Mau Mau leaders had been rounded up. The African bitterness is, however, constantly on the increase. The Whites have all the good land in the Kenya highlands, and the Kikuyu are expropriated. They feel that even if they are educated and experienced, very few of them would be given the same opportunities as the Whites. Much of the bitterness in Kenya is due to this feeling of helplessness and frustration which the British Colonies Rulers have done nothing to alleviate.

Ethiopia and the Sudan. Ethiopian nationalism is not a new growth and is "as old as that of the older European states and has rallied the Ethiopians to the heroic defence of their country" both during the period of Portuguese penetration and more recently in the struggle with Fascist Italy. Even now nationalism plays an important role in the socio-economic development of the modern Ethiopia and generally supports the Emperor in his development programme.

The Sudan, which had been governed jointly by the U.K. and Egypt, since 1899, formally became a sovereign independent republic on January 1, 1956. A unique chain of events has led to Sudan's independence "before the national movement there

had attained to that degree of unity which is normally necessary to displace even so compromising an imperial power as Britain". The Sudan has no long continuous history as a nation. It was subjugated by Mehmet Ali of Egypt and became an Egyptian dependency early in the 19th century. A religio-political movement led by Mahdi turned out the Egyptians in the second half of the 19th century and in 1899 a joint Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was established at a time when Egypt itself was a British Colony. This was therefore, a partnership of unequal partners, for Britain was the sole ruler of the Sudan. The Egyptian national struggle led to a friction between Britain and Egypt and thus the Sudanese were quick to exploit. They played the two countries off against each other in such a way that each made bids to secure lasting Sudanese friendship. Thus the speed of constitutional advance was accelerated and complete independence was won by 1956. On February 12, 1953 an Anglo-Egyptian agreement provided for the Sudanese independence within three years and for the establishment of a Sudanese Committee to advise on the process of substituting Sudanese for foreigners in all positions which might affect the freedom of the country in the exercise of self-determination. By January 1955, this Committee had investigated 1,036 British held posts and the process of replacing their occupants by the Sudanese was well under way. On August 16, 1955, the Sudanese Parliament requested the Governor-General to ask Britain and Egypt to withdraw their forces from the country within 90 days. On June 8, the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the composition of an International Commission to supervise the process of self determination in the Sudan began in Cairo. After an early conflict of views, it was agreed on August 14, to invite the Sudanese Parliament to choose the members of the proposed Commission and on August 22, the Sudanese Parliament decided to set up a 7 nation Commission to supervise the elections and to invite Czechoslovakia, India, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia to appoint representatives on the Commission. At the instance of the Sudanese Parliament the two co domini signed documents on December 3, 1955 relating to the establishment and terms of references of the International Commission to supervise the holding of a national plebiscite as proposed by the Sudanese Parliament. Earlier, it must be noted, India had informed Egypt that it was unwilling to serve on the Commission unless its terms of reference were acceptable to the U.K. On December 12, Sir Knox Helm resigned from the position of the Governor-General and on December 19, the Sudanese House of Representatives issued the Declaration of Independence which was at once recognised by Britain and Egypt. A large number of countries immediately recognised the Sudan.

Since January 1, 1956, the relations between the Sudan and Egypt had been friendly, and both pursued the policy of positive neutrality, and with both, Arab unity occupied a foremost place. In spite of the U.S. pressures, the Sudan refused to adhere to the Eisenhower Doctrine and in 1957 economic agreements were signed between Egypt and the Sudan. It was, therefore, surprising when in February 1958 troop movements began over the 600 sq. mile barren tribal area north of the 22nd Parallel, without seeking before hand to settle the dispute peacefully.

Libya. The developments in Libya have been dealt with at length in the Chapter on the Trusteeship. The United Kingdom of Libya consisting of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan formally came into being on December 24, 1951. Nationalism in Libya presents all the characteristics with which we have been dealing in this section. A more important region, however, is the French North Africa and to this now we turn.

The French North Africa. The French North Africa includes three principal countries—Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia which are but artificial political divisions of one natural area and, which from the anthropological as well as geographical aspect might still be called by its old name Barbary. Its inhabitants were known as Berbers and the area is also referred to as the Maghrib, which, in Arabic, means the West (of the Islamic World). With the defeat of the Europeans at the hands of the Turks the North African states degenerated into mere communities of pirates. Civilization and commerce declined in the Turkish period (1518-1830) and then followed the era of French imperialism in North Africa. If, until the Revolution (1789), the French Colonialism was characterized by mercantilist principle, from the middle of the 19th century to the outbreak of the Second World War, France built up a colonial empire second only to that of Britain. During this war, France was occupied and cut off from the colonies. American occupation of North Africa brought the native population into contact with the wider world and roused their nationalist aspirations. Growth of Arab nationalism and left-wing governments in post-war France gave a fillip to nationalist sentiments. A new phase in the French colonial policy was, therefore, inaugurated in 1945. In 1946, the Constitution of France created the French Union and the French undertook to lead the people in her care towards free and democratic self-determination. Improvement in public health led to a spectacular rise in the population of North Africa, which tended to outstrip her productive capacity and created discontent. Provision of schools led to the growth of educated elite whose natural political aspirations had no adequate outlets.

With economic development there came economic crisis and growth of nationalism. Humiliation of France in the second world war, German occupation of Tunisia, the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt's talks with the Sultan of Morocco, the formation of the Arab League in 1944-45, the achievement of independence by Syria, Lebanon, Libya and Asian countries, and the release of Arab leaders, encouraged the nationalist movements in North Africa. "French settlers constituted privileged vested interests opposed to the political and economic rights claimed by the native nationalist movements. Repressive measures increased the discontent of the native population and goaded them to a head on clash with France and the French settler interests. On April 5, 1954, nationalist leaders in French North Africa signed an agreement at the Arab League's Headquarters in Cairo setting up a Liberation Committee. The agreement called as the Pact of the Liberation Committee of the Arab Maghrib provided that the Committee would jointly fight for the complete independence of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and for their adherence to the Arab League and would reject any union with France or any division of sovereignty with that country. In April 1955, the Bandung Conference declared, in the Resolution on Problems of Dependent Peoples, its support to "the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to self determination and independence", and urged the French Government "to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay". It is roughly in this background that we will briefly survey the nationalist revolt in North Africa.

Morocco Morocco is situated in the north west corner of Africa and the territory was divided, till recently into three zones of French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, and the international zone of the Tangier. It differs from other Arab states in two important respects. It has a 1000 Year old tradition of independent national existence, more or less within its present frontiers, and it has a long Atlantic coast line from which it looks across to America. It was only in 1912 that the Treaty of Fez put a temporary end to the independence of Morocco and the Sultan accepted a position tantamount to a French protectorate. Morocco is a plural society with many groups speaking many languages. The economy is essentially agricultural and the main exports are corn, beans, peas, fruits and dates, phosphates, barley, fish, wheat and manganese. France took 42% of the exports and supplied 4% of the imports which included sugar, vehicle petroleum, product, cotton cloth and tea.

Though new ideas concerning the government of subject peoples were in the air and not without their influence on French thinking, Morocco was treated as an area for colonization, and Government soon became the prerogative of newly created French

departments employing French officials. These gave priority to the protection and development of colonization. But colonialism was not an unmixed evil and during 44 years of the Protectorate (1912—1956) Morocco became in outward appearance more modern-looking than Egypt. An elegant European-style capital was built up at Rabat and a great city and seaport at Casablanca. These were supported by "a magnificent framework of roads, railways, ports, hotels and government offices—too magnificent, in fact, when the general backwardness of the country is taken into consideration, and its need for wide-spread but simple and gradual improvements".

Gradually, nationalist wave swept off Morocco. The French argued that Moroccan nationalism was a French invention, that it was created by the Germans and Spaniards during the war in order to embarrass France and is now encouraged by anti-French elements in the United States and the U.N., that the average Moor has no interest in national freedom and his nationalism is little more than vengeance, and that Morocco was not fit for independence and had neither trained leaders nor educated electorates. However, as soon as the first generation of young men who had received a western education grew up, they demanded a share in the administration of their country and in the formation of its policy. Finding their requests refused and themselves treated as subversives they reacted adversely and convinced themselves and their compatriots that the colonial regime which had partly been the cause of their awakening was now strongly hindering instead of hastening their development. They realised that Morocco was never allowed a national election and the country was just a French-run subject state, that the French had never given a time-table of their withdrawal, that no share was permitted to the Moroccans even on the lower levels of administration and that civil liberties were denied as was justice and education. It was also felt that Moroccans were forcibly impounded into the French army, that greatly disproportionate slice of the budget went to the salaries of French functionaries and the French got most of the benefits without paying anything like a fair share of the tax burden, and that the French prevented the labour from organizing trade unions through which they could get the redress of their grievances.

It was on the basis of these grievances that the nationalist movement gathered volume and strength. In 1930, in Morocco a Committee of Action was organised as a rejoinder to a French plan which was believed to aim at dividing Arabs and Berbers. Youthful Moroccan intellectuals had set up patriotic societies early in the second world war. In 1943, the *Istiqlal* was founded out of merger of various smaller parties. It was never recognised by the French as a party but was just allowed to exist.

The communist group in Morocco was never powerful. In 1952, violent riots broke out in Morocco. On November 18, 1952, the Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef repeated his demand for a revision of the treaty of 1912, and following an appeal for a 24 hour strike in protest against the murder of M. Ferhat Hached, the Tunisian trade union leader, violent anti-European riots occurred in Casablanca on December 7-8, 1952. On December 20, the French authorities claimed that strong evidence had been found proving collusion between the Istiqlal and the Moroccan Communist Party in the preparation and execution of the Casablanca riots. These parties were subsequently banned in Morocco. On August 20, 1953, the Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef was deposed in favour of his uncle, Moulay Mohammed Ben Arafat, and at the same time wholesale arrests of supporters and sympathizers of the Istiqlal and the Democratic Independence Party (the Moderate nationalists) were carried out by the French Colonists. This was a signal for a popular revolt against French imperialism and throughout Morocco, including Spanish Morocco, demonstrations of loyalty to the former Sultan took place on November 18, 1953. The Moroccan nationalists and the French leaders entered negotiations in 1954-55 and on September 2, 1955, General Catroux went to Madagascar for consultations with the ex-Sultan who was in exile there. An agreement was reached and on October 31, 1955, Sidi Mohammed arrived in France and on November 16, he returned to Morocco after the French Government had formally recognised him as the Sultan on November 6. A bitter controversy, therefore, came to end. On March 2, 1956, a joint French-Moroccan declaration was issued in Paris which announced the French Government's recognition of the independence of French Morocco, complete with its own army and diplomacy. The Treaty of Fez was abrogated. On April 7, 1956, a declaration ending the 44 year old Spanish Protectorate regime in Morocco was signed in Madrid also. On May 28, 1956, an agreement giving Morocco the right of the full diplomatic representation as a sovereign state was signed in Paris under which the newly independent state of Morocco undertook to respect the obligations resulting from the international treaties made by France in the name of Morocco. A large number of countries soon recognised Morocco. The British Government announced that they were willing to consider existing treaties with Morocco in the light of modern conditions and to discuss the future of the Tangier International zone with the other interested parties. In July 1956, the Security Council, and in November-December 1956, the General Assembly approved Morocco for membership of the U.N.

A dispute soon arose between Morocco and France about the extent to which the French forces in Morocco (whose status

had been left completely vague) were entitled to intervene on Moroccan territory in order to hinder the passage of arms smugglers or volunteers across the frontiers into Algeria. The agreement that was reached did not work well, and in 1957, there was trouble again when Morocco attempted mediation between the Algerian leaders and the French Government. A plane had been chartered by the Moroccan Government to carry to Tunis five Algerian leaders who had been the guests of the Sultan in Rabat. The French intelligence diverted this plane from its course while not in French air-space, and directed it to Algiers, where the five men were arrested. This action caused popular indignation both in Tunisia and Morocco and resulted in the murder of a number of French people in Meknes. The Moroccan-French relations were badly strained and France withheld economic aid. Morocco at once turned to the U.S.A. which promptly promised \$7 million and negotiations started for U.S. bases in Morocco. Another serious problem that is yet to be solved is that of integration of the former Spanish zone, one-tenth of the area of the country, with a population of over a million, and of the former international zone of Tangier, into the nine-tenths of the country which constitute the former French zone. This division has given rise "to completely artificial differences of currency, economic system, administration, and language between the two main areas, with Tangier sharing certain characteristics of both as well as having others of its own".

Tunisia. Tunisia, "probably the most inflamed country in all Africa" occupies a central position on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and is very much a Mediterranean state. Bizerte, its great naval base, is only about 100 miles from Sicily. "In its earlier Carthaginian manifestation, it helped to create the pre-Roman Mediterranean Civilization and in that capacity it exerted a considerable influence on the civilization of southern Spain and was the pioneer in the exploration of the West African Coast. In the Middle Ages, the inland capital, Cairouan, was the base from which the Arabs carried out the occupation of the Maghrib as far as the Atlantic and so across into Spain". Tunisia was also the starting point for the Arab conquest of Sicily and Malta. Later it was "the base from which the Arabized North Africans who had adopted a heretical form of Islam carried their faith into Egypt conquering the Nile Valley and founding the City of Cairo. In the 19th Century, Tunisia under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire rivalled Syria as the most advanced and progressive region of the Arab world and was the first Arab State to experiment with a constitution by which it was sought to impose limits on the arbitrary authority of the monarch". Thus Tunisia has gone farthest in the assimilation of Western

Civilization It differs in marked degree from Morocco and Algeria with which it is closely associated in that it is considerably smaller, more compact, and better developed. Like Algeria it was not part of France and it is substantially richer than Morocco in agriculture though not so rich in minerals. Basically the people are Arab but the townsmen do not think of themselves as Arab but as Tunisians. Tunisia is much more westernized than Morocco, close to Europe, and more advanced. The Islamic structure, as one observer has noted, is not so unpenetrable and mosques are open to Europeans and women are beginning to drop the veil. Unlike Morocco, Tunisia had no strongly entrenched feudal lords. For these reasons "Tunisian nationalism is more educated and articulate than that of Morocco or Algeria. Tunisia has an intellectual elite that knows exactly what it wants and where it is going. The French cannot easily dismiss Tunisian nationalism as anything fabricated, weak or spurious, it is an undeniably serious force, with deep indigenous roots."

Tunisia has an area of 48,312 sq. miles and a population of 3,320,000 (in 1951) of whom 2,832,972 are Arabs, 1,43,977 French, 84,935 Italians and the rest are Jews, Spaniards, Maltese and Greeks. Agriculture is the main occupation of the people and the leading industries introduced by Europeans include flour milling, oil refining, lead smelting and distilling. The country is rich in phosphates, iron ore, zinc, mercury, manganese, copper, salt and lignite. In the 19th century Tunisia became a field of commercial rivalry amongst European Imperialist powers. In 1881, the French compelled the Bey of Tunisia to accept the French protectorate and on May 19, 1881, the Treaty of Le Bardo was signed. During the second world war Tunisia was occupied by the Germans. Following the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942, Tunisia became a battle ground with the Axis forces pinched between the British and French Forces from Algeria. The Axis units surrendered in May 1943, and Tunisia was then turned over to the De Gaulle Government. On May 15, 1943, Bey Sidi Mohammed al-Mouncef was deposed in favour of his cousin the present Bey, Sidi Mohammed Lamine.

The Tunisians had grievances similar to those that the Moroccans had. The French treated them with contempt and indifference. Before the second world war two patriotic organizations, the "Young Tunisians" and "Old Turbans" had come into being. In 1919, the Destour or Constitutional Party had been formed to put Tunisian views before the Paris Peace Conference. In 1934, an insurgent wing broke off to found the Neo Destour led by Mr. Habib Bourguiba. Both the Old Destour as well as the New Destour were suppressed by the French in 1938. From 1938 onward, the Destour had no legal existence until 1954 when Mendes France restored it. But the Tunisian nationalist move-

ment, it should be noted, has been strongly allied to what is probably the best-run and most powerful trade union organization in Africa, and it has had a real leader in Habib Bourguiba. In 1952 he was put in exile. In March that year the prime Minister Mohammed Chenek, and his entire cabinet were arrested and "tossed into the Shara," an event unparalleled even in French Colonial history. From January 14 to November 30, 1952, about 2,000 people had been arrested. In April 1953, elections for rural and municipal councils were held but in all the principal towns the nationalists had boycotted them. Later in 1953, a new Resident-General was appointed to forestall the U.N. criticism of the French violence in Tunisia. But the French forces continued their operation throughout October and November 1954 against the nationalist guerillas very few of whom had surrendered in response to the Resident General's offer of pardon. Between October 18 and November 21, 1954, in a series of violent engagements hundreds of nationalists lost their lives. Meanwhile, Mendes-France had assumed the Premier's office and he promptly offered to Tunisia home-rule within the French Union, the appointment of a representative interim government under the leadership of M. Tahar Ben Ammar and the opening of negotiations to implement these reforms. Negotiations began on September 4, 1954, but since the guerilla activities continued, on November 11, the French Government announced that the proposed conventions could not be adopted until the *fellagha* activities were stopped. On November 18, a joint Tunisian-French appeal was issued to the guerillas to surrender. Between December 1-10, about 90% of the *fellaghas* gave themselves up.

The surrender of the *fellaghas* and the Tunisian decision to abandon their demands for the establishment of a Tunisian Army and Tunisian diplomatic missions in foreign countries led to some progress in the negotiations, but on the question of the control of the police, deadlock ensued. In February 1955, Mendes-France went out of office and the talks were suspended until they were resumed on March 15. Meanwhile the Afro-Asian group at the U.N. had demanded, on July 28, 1954, the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 9th session of the General Assembly of the item "The Tunisian Question". The Assembly adopted a non-controversial resolution congratulating the parties on the existence of the negotiations and expressing the hope that they would succeed. On June 3, agreements were signed between Tunisia led by Bourguiba and Tahar Ben Ammar and France led by Faure. On July 9, the National Assembly ratified the Franco-Tunisian Agreements under which France retained full responsibility for defence and arrangements were made to safeguard the French culture and language in Tunisia. These Agreements were, however, opposed by a section of the French

Community in Tunisia, by an extremist wing of the Neo Destour led by M. Salah Ben Youssef, and by the old Destour and the Tunisian Communist Party. Eventually, by a Joint Protocol signed in Paris on March 20, 1956, France recognised Tunisia's independence, including the right to set up a national army and to conduct foreign affairs. The Treaty of 1881 was abrogated and the two countries agreed to define an interdependence "freely achieved between the two countries" by organizing co-operation between them in fields of common interest, particularly defence and foreign relations. On June 16, 1956, the French High Commission in Tunis announced that a preliminary agreement had been reached between France and Tunisia on a diplomatic convention defining co-operation between the two countries on foreign policy. In November, Tunis entered the U.N. The new state is facing the tasks ahead with confidence. But until the problem of supporting the rapidly growing population can be solved, the economic life would remain unstable and until the problem of Algeria, to which we now turn, has been settled, the relations of Tunisia with France are bound to be imperilled.

Algeria Bounded on the West by Morocco and on the east by Tunisia, Algeria has an area of 222,000 sq miles and a Mediterranean climate. The population of about 9,000,000 includes about a million foreign nationals, French, Italian and Spanish. It is an integral part of France and its African citizens are full French citizens. It has never been a real national entity like Morocco and the French have deeper roots here than in Morocco and unlike the latter, Algeria is not a theocratic state and has no Islamic monarch. The social structure is mixed up and one can find here, as nowhere else in Africa, proletarian Europeans and bourgeois Arabs. The Algerians can and do emigrate to France and there are about 300,000 of them in the mainland at present. The Communist Party cannot be outlawed here as in Morocco, for, Algeria is part of France where the Communist Party is legal. Algeria has 3,396 miles of railway and an excellent network of roads of more than 30,000 miles.

Early in the 19th century, Algeria fell to the French imperialists. A dispute arose over the supply of wheat to French traders by Algerian nationals and "during the negotiations, the French consul was struck by the Algerian king with a fly whisk in April 1827. The incident provided an occasion for armed intervention." By 1830, Algeria had been occupied and by 1848 the conquest of the entire country had been completed. On January 11, 1851, Algeria was included in the French Customs System. After France fell in 1940, Algerian Government was loyal to Vichy and their control was ended by the Allied invasion of Africa in the fall of 1942. In 1943-44, it became the head-

quarters of the Provisional French Government of General de Gaulle and of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

Since 1830, Algeria had been badly exploited by the French Colonists. Monopoly of available land by French settlers has reduced former Algerian landowners to the condition of labourers. In a country where there is not enough wheat, vine-yards flourish and the produce is exported. Peasants drift into towns in the hope of livelihood and crowd together in scanty towns—hives of poverty and political ferment. Ill-nourished, disgruntled, and frustrated, they are ready to resort to any measure to better their lot which growing numbers believe can hardly be worse. France always used Algeria as a good source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods, and industry is practically absent save that of mining, which is well developed to serve the ends of the alien government.

Like other colonial peoples the Algerians never submitted to foreign rule and ever since the occupation they have been agitating for deliverance. Abdel Kadar Mokrani Bouamama and Lalla Fatma were the stalwarts of the liberation movement and there had been many armed conflicts before an effective organised national movement could be launched in 1925 under the banner of the North African Star, an association demanding the independence of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. This organisation was disbanded by the French in 1937 and replaced by the Algerian People's Party. This party was also suppressed by the French in 1939 but it carried on the Algerian People's resistance until 1947 when the Movement of the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (M.T.L.D.) led by Messali Hadj was created. There is also a moderate association called as the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (U.D.M.A.) led by Farhat Abbas. In addition to these there are the Ulemas and the Communists. All the 4 elements united and on July 27, 1951, they formed the Algerian Front for the Defence of Liberty to work for common objectives and oppose French repressive action.

Indeed, since the proclamation of the Statute of Algeria in 1947, Algeria presented an outward appearance of calm in contrast to the violence occurring in Tunisia and Morocco. This calm was resoundingly shattered on November 1, 1954, when about 60 attacks occurred on French troops and police accompanied by arson and sabotage. The consequent strong measures taken by the authorities led to the creation of an Army of National Liberation and a Front of National Liberation. These two national movements are at present carrying on the national resistance to the French rule.

The November insurrection did not spring a surprise on the French. On November 12, Mendes France expressed his government's firm determination to repress the disturbances. Early in January, the Government decided to implement "the Mitterand Plan" (Mitterand was French Minister for Algeria) for the socio-economic development of Algeria. On March 22, however, the Government had to declare a "state of emergency" for six months which was extended on July 30, 1955 until April 3, 1956. Earlier, Paris had sent a French Parliamentary Mission which gave out its report on June 29, 1955 and expressed "earnest anxiety at the Algerian situation". On August 20, the most serious uprising yet to have taken place occurred at 20 places when many hundreds of people, both Europeans and Arabs, were killed. The outbreak led to the extension on August 30 of the state of emergency to the whole of Algeria, the despatch from France of many thousands of troops, and on September 13, the dissolution of the Algerian Communist Party. On September 25, Faure pledged his government's unswerving adherence to the policy of integrating Algeria with Metropolitan France.

Meanwhile, on January 5, 1955 Saudi Arabia brought to the attention of the Security Council what was described as a grave situation in Algeria and the potential danger that it constituted to the maintenance of international peace and security. On July 26, 1955 the Afro-Asian nations including India requested that the question of Algeria be included in the agenda of the 10th session of the General Assembly. While the General Committee of the Assembly decided against inclusion, the Assembly, on September 30, reversed this recommendation and decided to debate the Algerian situation by 28 votes to 27, with 5 absentions. After the vote, Pincau, the French Foreign Minister declared that the Assembly's decision was null and void. He walked out of the Assembly accompanied by the entire French delegation, after declaring that he did not know what would be "the consequences of this vote on the relations between France and the U N."

From June 1955 onwards, large reinforcements to rebel forces were made. During 1956 the number of violent incidents increased, and by December 1956, it was surmised that more than 5,000 civilians had been assassinated of whom 4,200 were Muslims. On October 22, 1956, the five Algerian leaders who had been to Morocco were forced to land in Algeria (see above) and this led to wide scale anti-French demonstrations in Tunisia and Morocco. On October 29, Mollet, the French Prime Minister, appealed for a cease fire in Algeria but this led to no results. Earlier in March 1956, the N.A.T.O. council expressed concern at the situation in Algeria. In May, in a Franco-Soviet statement hope was expressed that "an appropriate solution of so important a problem in conformity with the spirit of the times

and the interests of the people" would be found. On May 22, Nehru called for an end to the violence and bloodshed in Algeria and suggested a 5-point settlement including the recognition of freedom of Algeria, equality of Algerian peoples and direct negotiations between the parties. On June 5, 1956, Guy Mollet rejected the Nehru Plan "because it introduced the idea of a mediator". In July, Nehru discussed Algeria at Brioni with Tito and Nasser and asked for a peaceful settlement of the problem.

But on January 9, 1957, a policy statement¹ was made by Mollet in which he reiterated the French intention to retain Algeria as part of the French Union and offered cease-fire and elections. The Algerians declined the offer and demanded recognition of the principle of self-determination for the Algerian people. Meanwhile the question was discussed at the U.N. Soon after the French delegation had walked out of the Assembly, at the instance of the Afro-Asian group headed by Krishna Menon the Political Committee decided on November 25, 1955 unanimously to remove the question of Algeria from the Assembly's agenda for the current session. Pineau hailed this decision as "a victory for reason" and the French delegation returned to the Assembly on November 29, 1955 after an absence of two months. But on April 12, 1956, the 17 Afro-Asian nations invited the attention of the President of the Security Council to the "grave situation" in Algeria and stated that since the French government was persisting "in ignoring the legitimate demands of Algerian people and the appeals of the Bandung Conference the U.N. must intervene". On June 13, this request was followed by the demand of 13 Afro-Asian nations (excluding India) for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation in Algeria under Article 35 (1) of the Charter. Discussion of the question was postponed, at the Soviet request, to June 26. But on June 26, the Security Council rejected the demand and decided against inscribing the issue on its agenda. At the request of the 15 Asian-African countries, who accused France of "extensive military repression", of "violation of the Genocide convention", and of pursuing a policy "based on the repression and extermination of the Algerian people" the Algerian issue was placed on the agenda of the 11th General Assembly. But on February 4, 1956, Pineau told the Political Committee that France "has never accepted, does not accept, and shall never accept the competence of the U.N. with regard to a problem which on the strength of international law, France considers to be an essentially internal affair". He also added that France allowed the Algerian question to be placed on the agenda of the 11th session without a debate because she "wanted to reply to campaigns of criticism to which she had been subjected", to stress foreign interference in Algeria, and "to

give all members opportunity of showing the same respect for the charter as France does" On February 15, the Afro-Asian resolution was lost and a compromise resolution was passed by 77 votes to nil in which hope was expressed for "a peaceful, democratic and just solution—through appropriate means in conformity with the principles of the U N Charter"

The question of foreign interference in Algeria was pointedly raised by the French on October 25, 1956, when their delegation informed the Secretary General of the U N about "Athos incident" It was alleged that on October 8, 1956 the French navy had seized off the coast of Algeria an Egyptian ship, the Athos, which was really a private ship, without papers, and that on board were found 72 tons of modern arms and ammunition sent to Algeria by the Government of Col Nasser It is also alleged that Syria and Saudi Arabia also supply money and material to the Algerian insurgents Morocco and Tunisia also provide active assistance and it is said that there is a 6-member committee in Tunis which is believed to be in charge of organizing rebellion in Algeria

In 1957, the Algerian situation took a turn for the worse In April-May 1958, the dissident military chiefs and their Royal-wing collaborators in Alger rebelled against the French authorities in Algeria and attempted to seize power in Paris so that the subject of Algerian freedom may not be reopened at all In May 1958, a Committee of Vigilance, representing about 20 European nationalist organisations had started denouncing Pflimlin, the French Premier, on the ground that he was preparing to abandon Algeria—in other words, to adopt a policy too moderate to be accepted by the most right wing of the settlers On May 13, Pflimlin formed the government in Paris and same day a general strike was called in Algeria In the riots that followed, the offices of the Ministry of Algeria were entered and sacked and a Committee of Public Safety was set up under the leadership of General Massu, paratroop Commander of the Algiers region At the same time, the commanding officer for Algeria, General Salan, announced that he was taking over civil and military power in order to maintain order and his authority was confirmed by Pflimlin's government on May 14 It was not clear whether General Salan and Massu were guilty of sedition, or had placed themselves at the head of the Committee set up by the insurrectionists in order to prevent bloodshed among European On May 16 and 19, General de Gaulle offered "to assume the powers of the Republic and praised the Algiers generals This encouraged the Algiers insurrectionary committee to call for a government in Paris headed by General de Gaulle The outcome of these developments is yet to be seen

CONCLUSIONS

This brief survey of the nationalist movement in Africa leads to several conclusions. *First*, the entire continent is seething with discontent, forces of nationalism are gathering strength and colonialism is on the retreat. *Secondly*, if the colonial rule is not liquidated peacefully, the nationalist movements are likely to become violent, (indeed, they have already assumed violent aspects) and to be captured by extremist forces. *Thirdly*, the racial discrimination practised in many parts of Africa would lend a bitterness which centuries will not be able to remove. The challenge of Africa is, therefore, extremely serious and what is needed is statesmanship and magnanimity. If the rich resources of Africa are to be used for the well-being of mankind, the African must be allowed to exploit them. Rabid colonialism cannot last for long and its days are numbered. The French have to realise that Algeria will be free in a couple of years. What Africa needs is freedom, peace, and economic development. It also needs help. Who does not? To help Africa is no mere charity, it is also expediency. By helping Africa to freedom, the West would help itself. Political repression and racial discrimination will close all doors for reconciliation.

CHAPTER 17

Revolt in Latin America

We noted in Part I of this work that by 1945 the suspicion of Latin America with regard to the policies and intention of the North had been considerably overcome, and that the second world war had intensified the Latin American desire for greater independence, better standard of living, and liberation from colonial economy. The cold war which characterised the relations between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. immediately after the end of the second world war obliged the former to reevaluate the economic and strategic conditions of the Latin American continent, to strengthen the American regional security system and to resume the policy of intervention. This led to the outburst of anti Americanism and to a wave of revolts and coups throughout Latin America. Like Africa and Asia, in Latin America the problem of underdeveloped nations had magnified into continental dimensions. It is obvious that due to the size of their population, geographical extension and huge natural resources, all three continents cannot but struggle to modify the unequal and disadvantageous conditions through which they are related to the world order and economy.

Since 1945 several factors have influenced the course of politics in Latin America. In the *first place*, there has been low level of popular education due to poverty resulting from many years of insufficient national income and low and unstable prices of export on which Latin America largely lives. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, Europe and the United States of America, which were most advanced, seized the new discoveries and techniques, developed them, applied them and in so doing accelerated their progress and went further and further ahead, separating themselves from the rest of the world. While, therefore, Europe and the United States grew in riches and knowledge and became the centre of the world economy, Asia, Africa and Latin America exhausted themselves and constituted the periphery. In course of time, the industrially advanced countries through the weight of economies developed the power to determine the prices at which they sold to the peripheral countries and also the prices at which they bought from them. Once this process was started, both time as well as commerce conspired to worsen the effects and as one authority has put it, the difference in wages between

them and the advanced countries became wider, competitions were established between one under-developed area and another, culture became stagnant at one end, while it rapidly ascended at the other, until there came into existence "a world composed of large, poor, ignorant masses, over which a few columns of wealth and culture tower". In Latin America, for instance, the banana business which is mainly carried on by an American corporation in Central America, has been paying large dividends in the United States, corporate taxes in the United States and executive salaries in the United States, while Central America's share has been only "the amount of the pay-rolls, paid in Central American wages, and, like Poe's raven nothing more".

On the one hand, the low national income of Latin America has arrested the growth of productivity, and on the other, the scant savings resulting from a meagre income have not led to the necessary accumulation of capital and the economy, therefore, by and large, has been in a state of virtual stagnation. Almost everywhere opulent minorities flaunt their riches before "a melancholic sea of illiterates". As one writer has put it, "the wealthy few who maintain estates of thousands of hectors derived lucrative fees and commissions from foreign business firms and drive about in expensive American limousines, have little in common with the miserably under-privileged masses of the people, whose role throughout life is to serve as beasts of burden, shine the shoes of the upper class in the town plaza, or sell lottery tickets. It is difficult to name the other areas of the world in which so few have so much and so many have so little. With the possible exception of Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, the Latin American countries contain only an infinitely small middle class. The social ladder has only two rungs—the lowest and the highest. The lowest is very low and the highest is very high. The gap is so wide that those on the lowest rung can almost never reach the one above. However passionately Lazarous may desire to become Dives, his chances of doing so by orderly processes are, except in rare cases nil". About 70% of the national wealth of Columbia is, for example, controlled by 3% of the population; in Argentina fifteen families possess one-tenth of the entire precious land of the country and own land-holdings amounting to seven million acres; in Chile 3% of the total number of land owners own more than 52% of the entire farm land; in Venezuela, less than 3% of the land owners own more than 70% of the land. There are millions of inhabitants without a home or an organised family life, without schools, without land, without even personal belongings, and, as Dr. Alberto has put it "their only risk in joining a revolutionary movement is the loss of the following day's wages." As late as 1952, it was estimated that whereas wage-earners in the United States had to

spend less than 38 per cent of their income for food, those in Brazil had to spend 48 per cent, in Mexico 56 per cent, in Argentina 60 per cent and in Chile 80%. In 1950, it was calculated that two thirds of Latin America's 143 millions were physically under nourished, and one half of them suffered from either deficiency or infectious disease. Life expectancy ranges from 17 years in few areas, to 32 in many others, compared with 63 in the United States. In 1953, only four Latin American countries had an annual income superior to three hundred dollars per inhabitant, two showed annual income superior to 150 dollars per inhabitant seven showed incomes superior to one hundred dollars, and another seven showed incomes inferior to one hundred dollars per inhabitant. The rates of investment in 1953 was only 14.3 per cent. It is conditions such as these which lead to revolutions. The periodic uprisings in Latin America are neither the result of "the habitual inactivity of the people who do nothing but accumulate bile" nor are they "epileptic fits". On the contrary they are the result of social and economic pressures which have been building up for generations and which finally find an outlet in sudden change. There is a saying in India that when pain becomes despair it breaks all the dikes. The Latin Americans have been forced to see that they could ameliorate their conditions only by revolutionary methods.

Secondly, the foreign exploiters have encouraged the continuation of semi-feudal society in which the few families receiving large incomes mispend and invest their savings without any national plan. A narrow minority of exploiting landlords serving as stooges of imperialists exercise political power through professional politicians and military chiefs maintaining absolutism and retarding the evolution towards democracy. The social and industrial classes coincide with the racial stratification of the people. The Creoles constitute the land owners and the new capitalists; people of mixed blood form the middle classes, Indians, Negroes and Mestizoes compose the proletariat, and the majority of Indians are the peasants. Only Cuba and Puerto Rico, on the sugar and tobacco plantations, and Mexico, in the mines and mills, have an appreciable number of proletarians. A few of these are found in Peru, Columbia and Venezuela. But a true proletariat psychology is little in evidence anywhere in Latin America. The middle classes are the revolutionists who fight against feudalism and capitalism. These revolutionists are rapidly winning over the civic employees and professional classes. The army remains the loyal proponent of the feudal and capitalist classes. The fact that the soldiers receive better wages than the peasants and workers might explain this phenomenon.

Thirdly, all the Latin American countries have become intensely nationalistic and this nationalism frequently expresses itself

in the form of high tariffs, anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese emigration restrictions, social legislations, controlled currencies, tax favouritism, the control of capital export and anti-imperialism. While all the Latin governments are republics, in order to curb the political and economic turbulations in their countries, they have taken on various political forms. But everywhere Latin American nationalism manifests itself in a great resurgence of the common people who are determined to cease living on 20 cents a day. They are also conscious that the principal party responsible for their exploitation and misery has been the United States of America. If, therefore, the United States will not buy their products at a price that could give them improved living conditions, they would sell to those who could do so. It should be noted that while in Africa and Asia nationalism has been predominantly a movement for political liberation from imperialist control, in Latin America all the countries had obtained their political independence in the 19th century, except for the small extensions of land which we are still ruled from Europe, and the "administrative status" of the Canal zone in Panama. While, therefore, nationalism in Asia and America acquired a tremendous dynamism, gathered a sharp momentum and an irresistible psychological impulse to fight for a better world, in Latin America such a stimulus does not exist. Again, while in Asia and Africa the nationalist movements developed close affinities and the national leaders of different countries forged close bonds of unity, in Latin America, nationalism, though expressing itself in a common battle for changing the bad economic conditions, nevertheless foundered on the hard rock of the narrow conflicting national interests among the same states and the sharp opposition between class interests within each of these countries.

Fourthly, the political systems of practically all the countries of Latin America have been thoroughly unstable and towards this instability the Army and the Church had made a major contribution. In fact intervention of the armed forces in politics is as grave a problem in Latin America as it is in the Muslim world. The army, here, is a state within a state. While most of these countries profess to work democratic constitutions on the pattern of the American Constitution, in very few democracy functions, and in many, democracy has been destroyed by the intervention of the Army because it was working rather well. Constitutions have been rapidly superseded and this has not tended to create a veneration for existing constitutional forms. Dictators backed by the armed forces have been ruling these countries for the last century and the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister of war generally becomes the President. For instance, Peron, who was the Minister of War became President

in Argentina. In Brazil, Vargas took over the government with the support of the Army in 1930 and was removed in August, 1944 because he became unpopular in the Army. Earlier in 1946, Dutra, Minister of War, was elected President. In Peru, in 1948 General Odría, Minister of War, set up a military dictatorship and got himself elected in 1950. Illustrations may be added. In many countries people have been conscious of the incalculable harm which can be caused by the Army's intervention in politics and laws have been passed against it. But these laws have proved to be dead letters and the Spanish tradition bristling with Army uprisings has proved to be stronger. The cult of the hero catches the imagination of Latin Americans and the Army provides some kinds of glamour for the young men and they are keen to join it in order to advance their own position by rapid promotions. Elections are frequently tampered by Army bosses and as one Cuban politician put it, "you can win an election with the Army, you can win an election without the Army, but you cannot win an election against the Army". Frequently, revolutions have attempted to broaden the basis of government which was cumbersome, inflexible and irresponsible to people's desire. The presidential system providing for a fixed tenure of office for the chief executive forces the opposition to wait for scheduled elections. But in these countries public opinion changes too rapidly to enable the politicians to wait. An administration which is elected today may fall out of people's favour tomorrow and in a couple of months it may fail so completely to fulfil popular expectations that the people rise in fury against it. If a president, therefore, insists upon serving out his full term he can be ousted only by revolutionary methods. As Donald M. Dozer has written: "The long experience of the presidential system during the last century and a quarter has conditioned Latin Americans to the necessity of revolution which provides them with a substitute for a needed but unscheduled election". Often it represents an effort by the nation's loyal opposition to make its influence felt upon the governing group.

It is not merely the Army which plays a dominant role in the revolutionary situation of Latin America. The Roman Catholic Church is an equally powerful factor. In Spanish America, the Church functioned in many cases as an instrument of the political machinery of the local administration. Many of the public services were performed by the Church. For instance, it organised education and maintained hospitals and asylums. It held its own property and received large grants of land which it exploited for its own benefit. The Church, therefore, acquired an economic power which it retains in many countries even now, and which is badly resented by the nationalist governments. On this showing, the conflict between the

Church and the State becomes understandable. The Church participates in politics to defend its privileges. In many countries, for instance in Mexico and Argentina, anti-Church measures have been taken to curb the anti-State activities of the Church. In many others, the Church enjoys a privileged position. Very often Church meetings have been the seats of propaganda against civilian government.

Along with the Church, organised labour has also intervened in politics and more recently has begun to support parties or candidates in order to achieve better conditions. In most of the countries the dictators have violently suppressed labour movements but in many cases they have climbed into power with the help of labour organisations. For instance, in Argentina, in Farrell's government, Peron was the Minister of War as well as the Secretary of Labour and he organised the labour movement in Argentina to his immense advantage. When he was confined to the island of Martin Garcia, the workers were incensed and they marched on Casa Rosada and had Peron released. This was the famous march of the "Shirtless" in 1945. In all the Latin American countries, constitutional guarantees have been provided for the protection of labour and the workers have the right to form labour unions and to strike.

An extremely important factor of the Latin American revolt has been the rapid outburst of anti-American sentiment soon after 1945 and the theme of "Yankee Imperialism" has been frequently repeated. Of this there are many reasons. In the first place, the second world war and the victory of the United States roused, throughout Latin America, a hope of freedom, which provoked a series of popular revolutions overthrowing, one by one, the dictatorships in El Salvador, Guatemala and Brazil. New regimes were installed in Peru and in Venezuela. During 1944-47, the political pendulum in Latin America swung so sharply toward democracy that by the end of 1947 only five dictatorships remained in existence. But from 1948 onward, reaction and dictatorships were triumphant, military coups were effected in Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia was plunged into violent civil war. The United States quickly recognised these military regimes imposed in utter violation of their national constitutions, and signed military pacts in 1952 with a series of Latin American countries. The State Department aided the rearmament and equipment of armies not designed to participate in international wars but, in effect, a police force occupying their own country. The Latin American people are, therefore, convinced that the American government, influenced by the exigencies of the cold war, prefers the apparent safety of a dictator who calls him an ally and an anti-communist

to the uncertainty of revolutions and governments of popular origin. Thus the slogan of anti-communism, on the one hand, dominates the policy of every Latin American country subjected to dictatorship, and, on the other, it motivates the United Nations policy towards Latin America. With this slogan, the Latin American dictators try to play on the fears and phobias and ingratiate themselves with the Pentagon. This, naturally, leads to a positive sentiment of anti-Americanism. Again, any attempt at agrarian reforms and nationalisation of basic monopolies, along with the rapid growth of middle class, the increase of labour unionism, the agitation among Indian populations and the new socio-political ideologies affect local interest as well as big American companies which for fifty years or more have been investing in Latin America. The apparent identification of the United States, with certain companies trying to retain past privileges inevitably increase the anti-American sentiment. Nor have these countries been able to obtain that degree and that kind of financial help which would enable them to develop their economy on a self-sufficient basis. It is commonly believed that all that the United States is interested in is the containment of communism. As we noted earlier, there was general resentment among the Latin American delegations when Secretary of State, Dulles, left the Tenth Inter American Conference at Caracas immediately after having obtained the resolution directed against the Arbenz Government in Guatemala without even waiting to listen to the economic requests of the Latin American governments. In short, the average Latin American does not know the North American as other than "the ivory tower diplomat, the big businessman, ready to suck away the national wealth, and the itinerant tourist who always behaves abnormally."

Finally, the ultra-nationalist revival, the antagonism toward foreign industrial capitalism, the economic depression and the instability and inadequacy of the existing governments have made Latin America a fertile ground for the propagation of both communism and fascism. All the Latin American countries have sizeable communist parties and there are large groups of fascists in Mexico, Peru, Chile, Brazil and Argentina. All these factors and characteristics of Latin American politics can be best illustrated by a short study of a few most populous and important republics in the Latin American continent, such as, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Guatemala.

Mexico With a population of 29.5 millions in 1955 and an area of about two million sq. kms, Mexico was in a terrible ferment from 1910 to 1940, when there was hardly a year when it failed to make headlines in world press. In 1911, the era of social revolution began. On February 5, 1917, a new constitution was promulgated, which from 1929 to 1952, was frequently

amended. The prevailing religion is Roman Catholic, but under the constitutions of 1857 and 1917, the Church was separated from the State and since 1917, the property of the church has been held to belong to the State. In 1929-31, the priesthood was suppressed and the churches were temporarily closed. An understanding between the State and Church was, however, reached and at present all churches eschewing public affairs flourish freely. In spite of the revolution, the basic problem of Mexico, had not been solved, although by 1947, the foreign oil industries had been expropriated and nominal compensations had been paid to them. Nevertheless, the standards of living had not improved and the rural Mexicans were hardly better off than their ancestors, living in the same shacks, on the same inadequate diet of corn, beans and chila. Illiteracy was rampant and as late as 1940, 52% of the total population could neither read nor write. Women had no vote until March, 1953. Opposition parties had no chance of forming a government, and freedom of press was actually limited. From 1946 to 1952, Aleman Valdes and Cortines tried to consolidate the Mexican revolution and full attention was concentrated on industrialization as the only means of raising the standard of living of the people. By 1951, the United States Export-Import Bank had lent \$300,000,000 for public works and by 1953, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had contributed \$64,000,000. By 1955, the American capitalists had invested more than \$500,000,000. The American Petroleum Companies were staging a come-back in order to explore new oil fields. Hydro-electric works, programmes of road building and construction of railways were pushed forward under state control.

Agriculture, however, was neglected and, in 1957, it was in a wretched state. Generation of erosion, single crop cultivation and inadequate fertilisation along with primitive means of agriculture had created serious bottle-necks in the sphere of agricultural production. The grievous fact of Mexican agriculture is that arable land is lacking so that only 9% of all Mexico can be so classified. At present, an effective campaign is being waged to train the farmer in better methods of ploughing, choice of seeds and care. Great irrigation projects are being developed and in 1956, the harvest of cotton reached an all time peak of 1.25 million bales. But since the Mexican economists were worried by the threat of dumpings by the United States of unwanted surplus supply, the government wisely cut down credit and discouraged cotton planting. In 1956-57, the coffee crop reached a record of 1.7 million bags and the production of iron industry registered a 22% increase over the previous year. This general prosperity was duly reflected in the national budget and

in total exports and imports. The 1957 budget called for a total of about \$600,000,000 compared with \$480,000,000 in 1953. The total exports for the first eight months of 1956 were \$629,000,000, up \$87,000,000 over the previous year and imports in the same period, amounted to a total of \$789,000,000. In the context of this overall prosperity, the relations between Mexico and the United States of America have been on the whole stable and correct. If Mexico differed with the American government in Caracas on the Guatemala issue, it was on grounds of non intervention. It was maintaining principles it had defended in the long controversy with the Mexican oil companies.

Colombia While Mexico was on the whole prosperous during the period under review, it was different with Colombia. Until the upheavals of 1948, Colombia seemed to be a quiet and peaceful country. On April 9, 1948, when the Bogota Conference was in session, the Colombia liberal leader, Gaitan, who was respected as a sage by people, was assassinated. This was a signal for widespread revolt and people started attacking church property with the active help of the police. The government at that time was headed by the Conservative leader, Ospina Perez. The murder of Gaitan and the suppression of the revolt that followed in its wake dashed all hopes for social reform. In 1949, Perez called in the army to shut down the Congress, proclaimed a state of seige and suspended the activities of all representative bodies. Elections were held under martial law and censorship of press and radio, and Colombia fell under the dictatorship of Gomez. Foreign capital was not forthcoming and Colombia became more dependent on coffee sales than ever. In 1953, General Rojas Pinilla staged a military coup and assumed the presidency. His government, to a certain extent, checked inflation and started a programme of building of roads and electrical installations, but at the end of 1957, Colombia was passing through the worst economic crisis in her history and the regime of Pinilla was tottering.

Brazil With an estimated population of about 60 millions in 1956, an area of more than 8 millions square km, Brazil is one of those Latin American countries where the drive for industrialisation reached its height in the post war decade. The country is extremely rich in raw materials and the resources are ample for a population many times as big as Brazil's. The iron ore deposits represent between a fifth and a quarter of the known deposits of the whole world. The nuts of Amazon forests are said to be enough to end the world's food oil shortage. But the country lacks fuel and transport and the resources could not be fully exploited unless these first essentials could be developed. The fifteen years of the Vargas dictatorship (1930-45) were characterised by large budget deficit, extravagant bank credits

and expanding currency inflation. The second world war intensified these trends and, although Brazil had a comfortable supply of foreign exchange earned by war-time sales of its raw-materials, it was unable to spend its money abroad because of a world-wide shortage of goods. The Brazilians could not spend it at home either, because productivity was low and domestic producer could not cope with the demand. Inflationary pressures, therefore, increased, prices went on rising and wages lagged behind. The already low standard of living dropped still lower; the rich patronised black markets; and the poor stood in long queues for hours to procure the barest necessities at fantastically high prices. The result was riots and strikes which further disrupted the economy. The Government of Vargas and that of General Dutra were helpless in controlling the situation. In the elections of 1950 Vargas, however, was re-elected. But instead of attacking inflation in a forthright manner, he tried to apply some palliatives. Price controls were set up, trade and investment were regulated and exchange rates were juggled. Although his government carried out real improvement in education and health services, he failed in fighting out corruption in the civil service and in establishing political conditions. The press was muzzled and political parties were dissolved and suspects were imprisoned without adequate trial. The Government of Dr. J.C. Filho, which followed that of Vargas, on August 24, 1954, had no greater success. The American loan of \$180,000,000 in 1954 and of \$200,000,000 in 1955 did not eliminate the crisis.

In January 1956, Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira assumed the office of president and he, at once, applied the approach of a dynamic businessman and organised a council of prominent economists to advise him. The emphasis was placed on heavy industry and in spite of inflation, foreign capital is now flowing readily. In addition to the American capital, the French capitalists, the Krupp interests and the Japanese industrial concerns have undertaken to invest huge amounts. The Communist influence is tangible in Brazil and the anti-United States sentiment predominant. The role of the army is extremely important in Brazilian politics and Kubitschek is having difficulty with the army. It may be casually pointed out that the problem of racial relations has been more successfully solved in Brazil than anywhere else in the world. Brazil has a larger proportion of Negroes than any other independent country except South Africa, but, there is no colour bar and practically no racial discrimination. Although the Negro causes as much debate and misunderstanding in Brazil as he does in the United States, in the former country the question of the Negro from the beginning acquired very little of the moral overtone that has complicated the issue in the United States.

Argentina The Argentine Republic, consisting of 21 provinces and one federal district, contains the land area of a little less than 3 million sq km and an estimated population of a little more than 19 millions. It has been said that "the most famous, or notorious, of the post war attempts to fulfil the Latin American desire for economic independence and political stability was made in Argentina in the name of Peronismo". It was on June 4, 1943 that Peron came to power on a wave of revolution. At that time Argentina were still a country of rich landowners and poor workers. With considerable adroitness and patience, he built up a totalitarian state "behind a smoke screen of democratic talk and the facade of a new Constitution (1949)". He successfully smashed the powers of the landowners, kept the Church out of Politics and secured the support of the working class.

The principal aims of Peronism included the establishment of Argentine leadership in South America and South American hegemony in the American world, social justice and economic independence of Argentina. Argentina considered herself the leader of the South American nations and this had automatically put her in a traditional posture of opposition to the United States and its policies. To the doctrine of Pan Americanism advocated by the United States, Argentina opposed the theory of Latin American solidarity against the Yankees. Early during the second world war, the Argentine Government of President Castillo refused to agree to the United States' demand of American solidarity against the Axis Powers. Soon after coming to power, Peron gave a new turn to the Argentine opposition to the United States. He opposed the United States at the platform of various American conferences, used effectively his military and economic power, and attempted to gain influence among the other Latin nations with the help of the Argentine labour movement. He re-equipped the army and replenished the navy and the air force and reduced the dependence of the country's armed forces on imported material.

When a Latin American country like Uruguay tried to shelter the exiles from the Peron regime, Peron used economic weapons against it and embargoed all commerce with it. He persistently tried to establish an economic union of the South American countries, and in 1946, signed a Treaty of Economic Union with Chile, and with Bolivia in 1947. With regard to Brazil his effort failed. In September, 1952 General Ibanez became the President of Chile and early in 1953, Peron went on a visit to Santiago. This visit was returned by Ibanez in July, 1953, and at Buenos Aires, the two Presidents signed a treaty of Friendship and Union, which the Chilean Congress ratified after certain amendments. A little later, Paraguay also adhered to this treaty. Along with these means of extending the Argentine in-

fluence in the Latin American continent, Peron also used the technique of penetrating into the labour movement in order to capture widespread support for his regime among the rank and file of the Latin American countries. This aspect of Peronist diplomacy has been based upon the asserted achievements of the Peron regime in matters of labour relations and social policy. He made full use of trade unions, and somehow the workers of Argentina came to look upon him as their own champion. Peron established a special school for training labour attachées in order to indoctrinate the future diplomatic officials (who were chosen largely from the Peronist labour movement) in Peronist ideas and in methods of operation in the labour movements of neighbouring countries. These labour attachées conducted "a campaign to show the glories of the Peronist fatherland at first hand to the labour leaders of the other Latin American countries. Large delegations of labour leaders were sent from virtually every country in the hemisphere to visit Buenos Aires to be shown the supposed accomplishments of the regime. They were received by Peron and his wife (Evita) who were usually at their most charming during these interviews". In these interviews, Peron and Evita used to expose their philosophy of social justice based on three points: (a) a social system should be built up which is a means between capitalist imperialism and Communism; (b) Latin Americans have no direct interest in the Cold War; (c) Latin America should assert its independence and develop its natural resources for its own benefit. This philosophy rested on a recognition of the need of social and economic revolution and a desire to be free from the control of the United States. In order to achieve economic independence, Peron tried to acquire Argentina's public services which were owned by foreign share-holders. In short, Peron's regime though dictatorial, had an interest in the welfare of the workers. The struggle for economic independence had cost dear by 1955. The government, nevertheless, was neither afraid of the local feudal landlords, nor of the foreign shareholders and the Catholic Church. Indeed, in April 1955, Peron put a ban on the teaching of the Catholic doctrine in all Argentine schools and in May, he disestablished the Church.

The conflict between Peron and the Roman Catholic Church, however, seriously undermined the foundations of his regime. It gave a handle to disgruntled elements in the Navy and Airforce to oust Peron. On September 16, 1955 the armed forces of Argentina led by General Lonardi revolted and in a short and sharp fight successfully knocked out Peron who was made to take refuge on a Paraguayan gunboat at Buenos Aires, and was soon permitted to fly to Paraguay. General Lonardi established a Provisional Government. But very soon he was accused of being too soft with the Peronists, and too kind to the reactionary Catholics. On

November 13, 1955, therefore, Lonardi was forced out by another general, Pedro Aramburu, who at once, intensified the elimination of Peron's followers from key positions and the reversal of the trend towards clericalism. His government promoted private enterprise, reduced the size of the civil service, arrested inflation and tried to restore constitutional government. At times there have been serious revolts against Aramburu, as in December in 1955 and in June 1956, as well as illegal strikes and acts of sabotage. Nevertheless, his government ruthlessly carried out the policy of de Peronisation. All the Supreme Court justices were dismissed, the pictures and statutes of Peron and Evita were removed, the Peronist professors and administrators were eliminated, courses were redesigned and text books were rewritten, and the labour was reorganised. The Constitution of 1949 was annulled and that of 1853 was revived. On the economic front early, in 1956, a general 10% increase in wages was decreed. The government invited foreign investment except that the contract which Peron was about to conclude with the Standard Oil Company of California for the exploitation of petroleum deposits in Argentina was given up for good. The petroleum industry, therefore, was entrusted to a national agency.

The foreign policy of the new government has been more co-operative than that of Peron. The country needs extensive foreign aid in order to achieve economic recovery and development. The new regime joined the World Bank which Peron had boycotted and ratified the charter of the O.A.S. In August 1956, it invited Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay to join it in forming a South Atlantic defence system in harmony with plans of the Inter-American Defence Board. Aramburu's government cultivated friendly relations with Washington and the latter reciprocated by advancing a loan of 100 million dollars to Argentina. The relations between the two countries are, however, still uncertain.

Guatemala With an area of about 159,000 km² and a population of only 3.5 millions, Guatemala is a small state which flashed into headlines in 1954. It provides an example of naked American intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries which had chosen to follow a policy friendly to the U.S.S.R. As long as Guatemala was ruled by Jorge Ubico, a fascist, the American interests were well protected. The notorious United Fruit Company operated banana plantations and subsidiary corporations owned the rail roads and port facilities. Electric power in the country represented other American investments. The country was badly exploited by the United States business magnates and the average man remained with a per capita income of 77 dollars a year, compared with about 1,680 dollars for the United States. According to Donald Grant, in

1950 about 2% of the landowners owned 70% of the land; 50% of the Guatemalans had no shoes; 70% of them were illiterate; and Guatemala had one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world. But as long as Ubico toed the line of the United States, Guatemala's misery did not concern the United States at all. In 1944, however, a revolution threw him out and J. J. Arevalo came to power. In 1949 his term expired, and the progressive forces led by the Communists brought forward the candidacy of a respected army officer, Col. Arbenz. The non-communists supported Col. Arana. On July 18, 1949, unfortunately Arana was assassinated. The Americans inferred that the assassination was brought about by the Communists. Suspicions were confirmed when Arbenz was elected President. The Americans at once decided to break the power of the Arbenz regime at some convenient time.

The Government of Arbenz was the most enlightened that Guatemala had ever had in her history. Land reforms were pushed forward and freedom of the press was jealously guarded. By October, 1953, the State Department had decided to teach Arbenz a lesson. On October 29, the new United States ambassador, Peurifoy declared that his mission was to establish a stable government in Guatemala. It was decided to isolate the Arbenz regime from the rest of Latin America, and at Caracas Conference in March 1954 Dulles, by exercising economic and political pressure, obtained a resolution reaffirming that "Communism constituted an outside interference in the affairs of the Americas and thus was subject to action under the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Pact". The resolution did not name Guatemala, but its purpose became clear when Guatemala became the sole American republic to vote against it. Soon after the United States started preparation for a most discreditable and shameless interference by the greatest power in the world in the affairs of one of the very smallest. "Honduras was chosen as the staging ground, with auxiliary air-fields in Nicaragua. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas was selected the chief local instrument for overthrowing the Arbenz government, and a build-up of his forces was begun". As Castillo's intentions became obvious, the government of Arbenz was naturally forced to adopt measures of security. Tensions increased. On June 7, the United States gave the signal and advised Armas to invade Guatemala. Popular resistance was quickly crushed. Armas assumed power at the head of the military junta and became President. The U.N. was not allowed to consider the complaint of Guatemala and American imperialism successfully suppressed a popular regime and established in its place a reactionary and undemocratic government. The new government, a puppet of the United States, is thoroughly unscrupulous and opportunistic. It dismissed in the true Nazi fashion hundreds of teachers, accused

of communist tendencies ordered a purge of text books, exercised pressure on the teachers to support the Armas' regime and suppressed civil liberties. A new Constitution was brought in force on March 1, 1956.

British Guiana No story of the revolt in Latin America will be complete without a reference to the brutal manner in which the government of Dr Cheddi Jagan of People's Progressive Party (PPP) was turned out by the British imperialists in October, 1953. British Guiana is their only possession in the continent of South America, having an area of 83,000 sq miles and an estimated population of 0.5 million. The country is rich in resources but for 150 years of British rule it has had a typical colonial economy and majority of its people continued to live on imported food. The country was bound by a traditional policy of buying dear and selling cheap and was not allowed to spend as many dollars as it earned. In 1951, 31.5 million dollars of its exports went to the dollar areas, chiefly Canada while it was allowed to import only 14.5 million dollars worth of goods. On the other hand, while the exports to Britain amounted to 15 million dollars, the imports amounted to 27 million dollars. There has been a perpetual drain on British Guiana's resources by way of pensions, profits, interests and savings. The banks, insurance companies and post office savings were all controlled by the foreigners. Sugar cultivation which is the sheet anchor of the economy of the country, and constitutes more than sixty per cent of its export trade is controlled by absentee British businessmen. The members of the Legislative Council in this colony had direct and indirect interest in the sugar industry. The average farmer has less than four acres of land, large tracts are kept idle and the sugar planters control about 1,70,000 acres. People on the whole live below human decency and schools are under-staffed and crowded.

It was in 1943 that a new Constitution was granted to British Guiana and under this, elections were held in 1947. In January 1950, the PPP was created and thus successfully united all the racial groups in the colony. As the demands of the Guianese people could no longer be ignored, Mr Attlee's Government sent out the Waddington Commission to recommend changes in the Guianese Constitution. In March 1953, the Waddington Constitution came into force and in April the first general elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage were held. In these elections the PPP won eighteen out of the twenty four seats in the legislature and on May 28, 1953, Cheddi Jagan's Cabinet came to office. The new government adopted a large number of progressive measures, protecting the rights of the tenants, rice farmers, removing the ban on the entry of West Indians, safeguarding the right of trade unions, removing

church controls from the schools, eliminating corruption from the Public Works Department and reforming local government. The Essential Services Act was applied for compulsory arbitration. Extravagant house-buildings for government officials were cut down and education was made cheap. These measures were hardly communistic. But they thoroughly frightened the British Government as well as the Pentagon. The pressure of the sugar planters obliged the British Government to depose Jagan's Cabinet. The American pressure was mounting everyday and Drew Pearson warned the American people that "while Americans were fighting to preserve democracy against communism, in far-off Korea, a Communist Government was being set at their back door". The State Department got excited, and the U.S. Vice-Consul, stationed in Trinidad, made repeated visits.

Eventually on October 4, 1953, it was disclosed that the British soldiers were moving towards Guiana. On October 6, the B.B.C. broadcast a statement which the British Government had issued, saying that, "Her Majesty's Government have felt it necessary to send naval and military forces to George Town." On October 8, 1953, Jagan protested against the landing of the troops. On October 9, it was announced that "Her Majesty's Government had decided that the Constitution of British Guiana must be suspended to prevent Communist subversion of the Government and a dangerous crisis both in public order and economic affairs.....the faction in power have shown by their acts and their speeches that they are prepared to go to any lengths including violence to turn British Guiana into a Communist State". On October 11, the Legislative Houses were prorogued and the Governor had become a dictator. Same day Jagan was refused permission to visit his office. The British Government issued a white paper charging Jagan's Government of fomenting illegal strikes, of trying to get control of the public services and of provoking violence in the country. Reference was made of the P.P.P.'s ties with international Communist organisations and to the visit of some of its leaders to the World Peace Congress. All these charges were entirely baseless and false. In fact the British Government under pressure of the sugar planters and the State Department, unleashed the forces of repression. As the British troops landed in Guiana, the American Press went wild in jubilation. The *Washington Post* said that it was necessary to re-establish the authority of the Governor of Guiana. The *New York Herald Tribune* declared on October 9: "The British Guiana affair is of vital importance to the United States. Not because of the internal events within that colony but because of its strategic juxtaposition. Venezuela is the synonym for two very important items to the United States economy—oil and iron ore". The *Church Times* was even more frank and declared on October 16: "Iron ore deposits

covering 75 sq miles have been discovered in Venezuela near the British Guiana border. On the British Guiana side of the frontier iron ore deposits have also been discovered which will be in continuation of those in Venezuela. They are claimed to be the biggest in the world. The frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela, moreover, in the region where the new iron ore deposits have been discovered is in dispute. This is one reason for the American interest in the deterioration of the situation."

On January 1, 1954, an interim government was established in British Guiana consisting of a wholly nominated Legislative Council, and a nominated Executive Council to be presided over by the Governor. A commission was appointed to investigate in the problem of British Guiana and it reported in November 1954 that the suspension of the Constitution was fully justified.

CONCLUSIONS

Many conclusions follow from this brief survey of the revolt in Latin America. *First*, the popular discontent against foreign interference, colonial rule and primitive socio-economic structure is progressively increasing. *Secondly* the United States and the U S S R boldly impinge on this struggle—the U S supporting reaction and imperialism, and the U S S R supporting progress and colonial liberation. *Thirdly*, the force of the United Nations has not been able to assert itself in favour of progress. And, *finally*, the Latin American continent cannot, for long, be satisfied with the existing conditions and unless the U S A modifies its policies in such a manner as will take into account the aspirations of the people, the relations between the North and the South will continue to deteriorate.

CHAPTER 18

The Resurgence of Asia

If a person went round Asia in 1920 and never since, until 1945, he would be struck by a remarkable difference expressing itself in a firm determination on the part of the people not to allow their countries to be used as pawns by others, and to have their own policies in world affairs. The Asian countries have entered in the society of independent and equal states at a time of swift revolutionary changes unequalled in human history—changes which have brought to an end the system of classical imperialism that has governed Asian-Western relations for three centuries. The Asians, moreover, are making bold efforts to break the vicious circle of poverty, ignorance and disease. (The protest of Asia, therefore, has not merely been against foreign domination or Western Colonialism, equally important is the resolution to end old and wretched ways of living, and the centuries-old feudal relationships, which, although could not provide effective resistance to the Western advance in the 19th century, nevertheless, persisted and were even encouraged by the conquering West.) When the West appeared on the Asian scene in the 18th century, it was equipped with several weapons. The ideology of the Renaissance which had freed the individual from the bonds of a static, religious, and feudal society, reinforced by Protestantism, had given an ethical justification to what Tawney called “the acquisitive Society”. This ideology had set free the thirst for knowledge and had facilitated the conquest of nature which, in turn, provided the means for the technical mastery of the many new tasks now facing the Western nations. It provided, that is, for navigation of the oceans, improvement of transport, agriculture and trade, and mechanization of production. It also encouraged the development of the modern national state, with its machinery of Central Government, administration of justice, its armed forces, its tax collecting apparatus, and the professional Civil Service. Indeed, without the new philosophy of the individual, there would have been few discoveries and little scientific research. And without the protective and organizing power of the modern state, capitalism would not have been possible and Western supremacy over Asia could not have been established. When, therefore, the West, equipped with a new philosophy, armed with a new technique and a new organization came into clash with Asia, the

latter with its static and outmoded skill and organization went under

When, therefore, it is argued that Asia today is in revolt, the reasoning is that its teeming millions are trying to narrow down the gap between themselves and the West and wish to share in the advances in productivity and welfare through scientific and technological development. When the Asian technique was subjugated by that of the West, the Asians, in order to redress the balance, as it were, assiduously built up the legend that whereas the West was materialist, the East was spiritualist. This legend might have performed a historic task of raising the morale and sustaining the spirits of a people beaten in the battlefield; it, nevertheless, prevented us from looking beyond our own religions, institutions and spiritual ideals. On the other hand, our material needs could not be satisfied by traditional values and institutions, and we have, perforce, been obliged to accept European economic and political theory and techniques to answer to those needs. On the one hand, we regard the Western civilization as materialist, inadequate, and even poor, and fear that the inroads of Western philosophy and values would destroy our own norms and might disintegrate our culture which we anxiously wish to preserve. On the other, when we look to our poverty, disease, illiteracy, and ignorance and compare our standards of living with those of the West, we rush to the West and wish to adopt the Western techniques, which necessarily, and to a considerable extent, tend to undermine our values and cultural norms. Can we make a compromise? Can we, that is, select such of the Western technique as may enable us to raise our standards of living and, at the same time, enable us to preserve our values and norms? This, in fact, is an insuperable task, for, it would be readily seen that in the West the development of science and technology formed part of the social process and proceeded in cohesion with social evolution, modifying it as well as moulded by it. In Asia, on the contrary, social evolution followed the traditional lines and a technique foreign to it has been imposed from outside.

{ This was roughly the point at which Western colonialism started withdrawing from Asia as a sequel to the two world wars of the twentieth century, and as a consequence of the liberation movement of Asian countries. What has been the character of this movement? It is, as we stated above, a revolt against foreign domination and its life breath is nationalism, feeding itself on growing opposition to Western imperialism, stimulated by Japan's victories from 1900 onward, reinforced by Wilson's crusade for self-determination and encouraged by the gradual weakening of Imperialist Powers and the proportionate progress of the Colonies. Just as in Europe, by and large, the doctrine of nationalism developed mainly as a revolt against Napoleonic aggrandizement,

nationalism in Asia arose as a protest against the Western domination. Its justification and source of sustenance, however, lay in a growing appreciation of its own culture to which European scholarship had also materially contributed, and in the practical necessity of achieving national unity in face of all the centrifugal forces of ignorance, superstition, localism, familistic and religious customs, local warlordism and the like which tended to disrupt unity and, therefore, rendered the task of resisting foreign encroachment all the more difficult. Asian nationalism has another distinct feature. Whereas European nationalism of the 19th century was characterized by "the perversion of the facts of ethnology", and has, therefore, been a political creed, Asian nationalism has opposed all foreign domination of the White as well as of the Black, and has had "more social and cultural overtones". Moreover, nationalism in Asia has been closely linked with movements for social and economic reforms, so that many Asian nationalists have been revolutionaries. The primary aim was, of course, to shake off the alien yoke but this was also a means to change the stereotyped social and economic structure. Now, this aspect of nationalism in Asia, on the one hand, rendered it cosmopolitan, humanist and international and has particularly brought the peoples of Asia closer to each other as well as closer to the peoples of other backward areas, and, on the other, it has brought it in a special relationship with communism.

In order to understand this relationship, it is vital to remember, first, the links between Communism and Nationalism and, secondly, the real nature of the economic and social problems of Asia. The nationalist leaders all over Asia have been fully conscious of these problems. But they were born, brought up and educated in the liberal school of the 19th century. Their ideal was parliamentary democracy with all its paraphernalia and they sincerely believed that once the foreigners left them to their fate, they would successfully establish and maintain parliamentary institutions, and once that is done, all their social and economic problems would be solved. But it is obvious that in the West industrial revolution and economic progress preceded political revolution, and by the time political power was diffused amongst the common men, the state had developed the economic means to satisfy their demands which were bound to be made with the diffusion of political power. The gap between economic power and political consciousness was, therefore, narrowed without convulsion. In Asia, economic progress remained thwarted as a result of colonial rule and a primitive, immobile and stagnant social structure, sanctified by indigenous forces and to some extent encouraged by colonial rulers. By 1948, in China the Communists had captured power and in the following years unfolded their

plans of consolidation. Elsewhere (leaving out Japan) the Imperial control was lifted, power was transferred, and democratic constitutions based on adult suffrage were set up. But economically and socially Asia was still in the 15th or 16th century. (Thus 20th century democratic ideals are face to face with a 15th century social structure in Asia. As an Indonesian novelist has recently written "Asia is living in thirty centuries at once and the same time. The Stone Age lives alongside the Machine Age, medieval feudalism and mysticism battle modern democracy and rationalism, and communalism and economic planning jostle each other daily."

In fact, on the one hand, as a result of political power being transferred to the common man, he has developed a consciousness of his low position, and, therefore, he formulates his economic and social demands. On the other hand the state, with a set of democratic tools and weapons, but with an undeveloped economy and a plural society is hardly equipped to answer the calls made on it. The Asian dilemma is therefore, really serious. If we follow democratic methods as evolved in Britain and the U.S.A., it would take very long to change—so slow may be the pace that the huge mass of people, ignorant, poor and sick, but conscious of their needs and of their power, may rather precipitate a crisis and open the floodgates of revolution. If we change rapidly, and try to achieve in 20 years what has been achieved in the U.S.A. in 200 years, democratic technique has to be given up and instead of private enterprise we have to accept rigid control of consumption, forced capital formation and investment, and a government monopoly of foreign trade methods which have been tried elsewhere and have yielded miraculous results.

It is here that Communism has a special appeal in Asia. Russia (a European country) was until yesterday thoroughly backward and in a short span of 40 years outclassed the United States and successfully launched the Sputnik. She provides for Asia an experience and a pattern of economic and technological development. China (an Asian country) with her rapid strides in agriculture and industry is even a better model. The communist ideology resting on economic interpretation of history, class struggle, surplus value, inevitability of socialism and World Revolution, makes a powerful appeal to those in whose life hunger, disease and ignorance are concentrated—an appeal almost irresistible in the context of strong sanction of powerful evidence and concrete examples. Again communism might have been a relentless opponent of nationalism in Europe. The Communists, in fact vehemently denounced nationalism as a trick of the ruling classes to control the toiling and exploited masses and as a deception to prepare them for war. Lenin planned a two-fold attack on the citadel of capitalism through agitation for social

revolution in the metropolitan countries and for national independence in their colonies. On capturing power in Russia, the communists announced themselves as champions of movements for national liberation. It was thought that imperialism is in itself the summation of capitalism and its destruction even by bourgeois national movements was a progressive stage in evolution and, therefore, deserved support. The Soviets lent a good deal of moral support to the national movements in India, China, Indonesia, Indo-China and elsewhere. Thus communism, an enemy of nationalism in Europe, has become its ally in Asia and meets a quick response from the Asian intelligentsia. It is true that fascism too makes capital of poverty but Communism has a better doctrine and a better record on such issues as the breaking down of inequalities of races or castes, the elimination of absentee landlordism and middle men, the redistribution of land to small-holders and tenant farmers or the organization of industry on co-operative lines. Finally, Asia has not so far experienced what the West calls communist imperialism or Red enslavement. Communism has appeared on the Asian scene as a liberating force and it provided economic and social contents to Asian nationalism.

On the contrary, it is different with the West. In spite of the fact that the nationalist leaders of Asia were educated in the liberal school and parliamentary democracy has been their cherished ideal, there is an inherent distrust of the West. Europeans have, until very recently, been known to us as colonizers, exploiters and intruders. Even the United States of America, under the dictates of the pressure of the cold war, has supported the Imperialist powers in the restoration and maintenance of their crumbling empires (e.g. Indo-China). Elsewhere they have supported feudalistic regimes (e.g. Formosa and South Korea). They have made frantic efforts to halt the pace of progress in a continent which is desperately crying for change. They dropped the first Atom bomb on Asian soil. The Asians feel that the West tends to take them for granted. The non-recognition of the People's China is taken to be an affront to Asia and the attempt to ring the Asian countries in regional alliances is interpreted as an encroachment on their newly won independence. The anti-communism of the U.S.A. has hardly any interest for us and military links are considered as unnecessary hindrances to our growth and as a device to set one Asian country against another. In short, the Western prejudices are too strong to enable the West to understand the equally strong Asian complexes. ✓

We will be in a better position to appreciate these complexes and their results if we remember another aspect of Asian revolt. Asian nationalism, at no stage of its growth, evolved

from the bottom and even in a highly industrialized country like Japan which could successfully compete with its Western compeers, the masses have been left unaffected. The national leaders came from a very narrow class which could afford expensive education through which nationalism infiltrated in Asia. And if one finds the nationalist movement becoming popular and the average poor man facing the bullets of the Imperialist rulers, it was not because he understood liberalism and self-determination, the value of franchise and democracy or of independence and Swarajya. It was just because the nationalist leaders interpreted nationalism in economic and social terms which the poor could easily understand, and explained their grim poverty, misery, helplessness, disease, unemployment, famines, floods and the rest in terms of national subjugation. They were told that all their evils were due to foreign domination and that the panacea for them all is liberation or independence. The legend was built that the only factor which stood between them and salvation was the "Firangi" and once he leaves, all would be well. The masses, in fact, were even immune from this. Only the urban folk and a minority of villagers who could join the gatherings frequently addressed by the nationalist leaders developed this consciousness. Thus seen, the nationalist movement in Asia was organized from the top. "Nowhere was it a movement starting from the bottom, an upsurge of social protest caused either by the sufferings or the awakened conscience of the masses." In India, for instance, the untouchables never rose themselves against the social barricade, but it was the highcaste Hindus who organized them and formulated the demand of the abolition of untouchability. The peasantry nowhere in Asia organized itself. The machinery of Central Government has been everywhere weak and the range of effective government has not been in proportion to the magnitude of the task. Life as well as loyalty of the average peasant in Asia could never be focussed to the "Nation" but has largely been concentrated on family, caste, religion, or village or land. Even during the inter-War period it was the middle or the lower middle class in Asia (numerically very small) which was the standard bearer of national movements. At the close of the Second World War the Europeans, thoroughly weakened due to heavy burdens of the War, struck a compromise with this leadership, and transferred power to it. In China, the situation took a different turn and in 1949 the Communist regime was installed, throwing a powerful challenge not only to the West but also to the national revolution of the East, where, the average man had not been taken into account and the rural masses remained comparatively unaffected. In the non communist Asia, the revolution, therefore, remained conservative—a

middle class revolution frantically trying to construct a dam to regulate and slow down the gathering floods of social and economic change. In Asia, in short, one can see at least three types of reactions against the Western dominance. First, the Japanese. Japan replied to the West in its own coins and in a short span of about fifty years evolved a political and economic technique closely resembling the Western technique, and thus equipped, it entered into a honorable pact with the mightiest power of that time—Great Britain—in 1902, humbled Russia in 1904, and became one of the most ambitious imperialist powers of the world. The social structure was still based on feudal lines and individual initiative was still prevented from fructifying into a mass movement of freedom. A second type of reaction one sees in South-East Asia including the Indian sub-continent. Here Nationalism gradually developed, largely as a result of the liberal ideas received from the West through English education and a cultural renaissance, a revival of our lost heritage, the discovery of our soul to which also English education had contributed in so small measure. At times a militant tone developed but it was put under restraints and was moderated and scissored by the non-violent technique cultivated by Gandhi. The national leaders of the entire area were affected by this technique and the national movement of all the countries here bore that hall-mark in varying degrees. Finally, there has been the Chinese reaction. China has not had that kind of colonial regime as existed in India, Burma or Indonesia. But in practice the results here and there have not been materially different and in some respects China, in fact, suffered more than the rest of Asia. The Chinese revolution, starting with the turn of the 19th century as a liberal revolution, gathered momentum which the liberal nationalist leaders could not control and which expanded into a radical socialist movement overthrowing the decadent bourgeois regime of discredited and corrupt Chiang clique and carrying forward the process of transformation much ahead of the Japanese revolution either before 1945 or after, and much ahead even of the Indian revolution, for, both, for different reasons, remain essentially conservative. }

The articles of faith of the leaders of this revolution are Democracy, Individual Rights, Civil Liberty, Independent Judiciary, Free Press, Opposition, and with these instruments they wish to plan and nationalise in order to emancipate women and the downtrodden. In the background there is poverty, hunger, unemployment, superstition, disease, ignorance, and population pressure. Thus, they want change and for this they look to the Communist experiment; they also want Democracy and the rest and for this they look to the West. They try to combine both and the outcome is Mixed Economy, Peace and Neutrality. Thus if Nationalism is

one of the strongest political forces in Asia, Peace is one of the great objectives of the Asian elites. While Nationalism is an importation from the West that quickly took root and was nourished by the growing opposition to Western domination, pacifism is supposed to be deeply embedded in the religious beliefs of Hinduism and Buddhism. The so-called superior Eastern culture based on non violence and spiritualism is often contrasted with the superior Western culture, based on violence and materialism. Slogan of peace, therefore, from whatever quarters, finds a warm response in Asia and our leaders unquestionably prefer to seek peace and security through the United Nations, favour membership of the U.N. for all qualified governments, and desire a larger representation on the Security Council. In the war of nerves between the United States and the Soviet Union, in our view, lies the source of world tensions and, therefore the best course is to pursue an independent policy, a neutral policy, to work for universal disarmament, prohibition of production or use of or experimentation with thermo-nuclear weapons and to achieve social security by international economic co-operation and utilisation of money now spent on arms for economic developments. Neutralism in Asia is thus related to the strong desire for peace, and to the legend of religious pacifism. But it is also related to the principle of equality, the spirit of pride and self respect that is on guard against foreign dictation, that is resentful whenever Asians are not consulted when the great powers are deciding Asian issues and the determined opposition to racial discrimination. That explains the Asian attitude towards foreign aid. We are badly in need of it, are desirous of it, are aware that without it all planning would founder and democracy would be unceremoniously buried, but are extremely suspicious of the motives and political strings. What is desired is economic aid on a basis of equality and mutual benefit and if, comparatively, the Soviet Union can meet these conditions more easily than the United States, the former receives a more cordial reception in Asia than the latter, even though the latter might have given or can still give larger quantities of aid than the former. Asia is a most sensitive area and in the psychological battle in Asia, that system would succeed whose advocates are prepared to make effective use of psychological weapons, and follow a positive policy. It is not by missionary conversions, or by the slogan of the Communist danger and regional alliances that the battle would be won. If Asia is to preserve its system of values and to bring about the rapid salvation of its mute millions without an upheaval, it is to develop by socialist methods that have been tried in China and Russia modified and softened to suit the local conditions of each country. This seemingly impossible compromise can be achieved if the West is prepared to accept a change in its approach and

policy objectives with regard to Asia. This new Asia, eventually, would not be a stooge of international Communism but would be a firm ally of Democracy against Totalitarianism.

It is vital to remember that International Communism is not the same thing as Socialism. The United States recognised this distinction while it supported Tito's Yugoslavia and recently Poland. The West has to remember this distinction with regard to Asia. What is to be opposed is International Communism and not Socialism. The components of International Communism are Russia, Marxism and the element of accident. To oppose or obstruct the rapid development of Asia by Socialist methods and to equate this opposition with anti-International Communism reflects a serious error of judgment of historical forces. An effective programme for Asia has to be based on the assumptions that Asia is undergoing historic changes simultaneously in every field, that the Asian countries cherish their values and are anxious to preserve them, that they do not want to be committed in the cold war which they view not so much as a tussle between Democracy and Communism as a power conflict between the United States and Russia, and that they are solidly interested in their rapid economic development. The Soviet Union has seized the initiative because it has recognised these assumptions; the West is loosing because it has not. Though neutrality is equated with hostility and differences are bracketed with treason in the Soviet system, the Soviet Union has, nevertheless, adapted its policies to exploit the Asian sentiment of neutrality. On the contrary, the West led by the United States which developed the concept of neutrality as a general principle of foreign policy, tends to view Asian neutralism "as not only hostile but as morally criminal". On the psychological front, indeed, the Western policies do not make much sense at all—policies which are based on supporting or opposing individuals like King Saud of Arabia or Col. Nasser of Egypt. A policy on Egypt, for instance, must recognise the fact that Nasser is a popular legend there. The support of minority groups against the current of majority opinion can hardly be said to be a rule in diplomacy. It is doubtful if the United States has gained—either in the short run or in the long run—by giving military assistance to an unstable country like Pakistan in the teeth of opposition of all sections of people in India. When an Indian says it, he is likely to be misunderstood by an American whose charge may well be that our bitterness is not so much due to economic reasons as to the fact that U.S.A. has attacked our prestige and insulted India. But the West is at least as much guilty, for, by basing its policy on abstract considerations of 'prestige' or 'principle' the pursuit of which is hardly compatible with the real interests of the West, it has not only lowered its stock in Asia, but has damaged those

interests. The British handling of the Suez crisis illustrates in an ample degree the exhibition of 'prestige' entailing heavy losses on all fronts. The Eisenhower Doctrine using the principle of hostility to Communism as a condition or qualification for help is an example of the use of 'principle' causing a good deal of damage to the objectives involved. Similarly the regional alliances in Asia based on hostility to Russia reflect poor thinking. In fact what is intended to be achieved through these can be achieved more easily and with better results through the United Nations. But all this is possible if three basic facts are borne in mind: (a) the fact that Imperialism is dead and is fast dying and that, therefore, the 19th century relations—economic, political and racial—between Asia and the West which were much more advantageous to the latter than to the former are now to be replaced by a pattern which would be mutually advantageous to both, (b) the fact that part of Asia has already accepted Communism and that the existing American policy towards that part might firmly make it part of International Communism, (c) the fact that the demand of the rest of Asia for peace and rapid social and economic development, if not met in time, would lead to a disaster from which it would be really difficult even for the West to wriggle out.

BURMA

With a population of about 19,000,000 million and an area of 261,610 sq. miles, Burma is one of the most important South-East Asian states. From 1824 to 1935 it was governed by Britain as part of the Indian Empire. The population is of Mongolian tribal origins speaking more than 125 native languages and dialects. The country is mountainous and the economy is primarily agricultural, with rice as the principal crop. Although poor in minerals, it has extensive deposits of oil. British rule opened Burma to the outside world and led to modernization and material improvement, even though it destroyed an ancient political system, weakened the Buddhist religious influences on the people, and permitted the growth of agricultural conditions which fomented protests and revolution.

The incorporation of Burma in the Indian Empire led to conditions which created a certain amount of ill feeling between the two countries and stimulated the growth of Burmese nationalism. The average Burmese is a merry-go-lucky fellow and took little interest in commerce and industry, which were looked after by the British, Indians and Chinese. As a result, the new found wealth of the country from the exploitation of its natural resources—timber, oil and rice, became concentrated in foreign hands. A Burmese, like the native of any other Asian country, found

himself in a corridor of which the exit was blocked by a Westerner. Resistance, therefore, was bound to develop—a clear desire to eliminate the intruder, even though it was not well organized and appealed to negative instincts. Gradually, however, imperialism brought education, consciousness, consolidation, stability and ever-widening contacts and nationalism grew in dimensions, intensity and volume. In Burma, on the one hand, the British business houses developed trade and industry, and, on the other, the hard-working Indian coolie, imported to do manual labour in the cities and ports, was followed by the South Indian Chettians or money-lenders, who established themselves as agricultural banks. The Chettians owned about 25% of the agricultural land in the 13 principal rice growing districts. It must be emphasised that the Chettians did not attempt to snatch the Burmese land and that they were forced to take it from impoverished peasants, especially during the economic depression of 1929-32. The first stirrings of Burmese nationalism, therefore, were directed against the British Imperialist and the South Indian exploiter. The nationalist rebellion of 1930 and the anti-Indian riots of 1938 were all rooted in a desire to oust British rule and all forms of foreign control. It should also be hoped that while the Burmese wanted to get rid of Indians in the economic field, they “followed them with almost pathetic faith in the political field.” As one authority has put it: “The British plan of gradually introducing self-government in India applied to Burma, but when the British Government separated Burma from India under the 1937 Government of India Act, politically minded Burmans opposed the idea mainly from fear that separation would deprive them of the achievement along with India of full self-rule”.

During the second world war Burma attracted the attention of the United States as well as Japan, primarily because the Burma Road was the chief avenue for American supplies to embattled China. After conquering Malaya and Singapore, the Japanese invaded Burma and placed it under military occupation early in 1942. Burmese assisted the Japanese because of the hatred of the British rule and the Japanese promises of independence. Dr. Ba Maw was installed as the leader. In August 1943, Burma proclaimed its independence, signed an alliance with Japan and declared war on the Allies. The Japanese game, however, was soon exposed and the Burmese realized that the new masters were much worse. Resistance groups, therefore, sprang up under Aung San who united them in a body called the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.). This disgust with the spurious type of independence conferred by the “liberators” led to the organization of armed bands who found themselves in sympathy with the objects for which the Allies were fighting”. Aung San, who co-operated with the Japanese

as the liberators of his country from the British, now turned round to co-operate with the British as the liberators of his country from the Japanese. From March 1945 onwards, his support was accepted by the Allies.

The Japanese rule had caused irreparable damages on Burma and its petroleum wells, river boats, mines, railways, and harbours were destroyed owing to actual fighting and scorched earth tactics. However, it greatly fanned the flames of Burmese nationalism and the Burmese had organized peasant unions and co-operatives and gained military experience both in co-operation with the Japanese and in under-ground resistance to them.

As the war came to a close the British authority was restored in Burma, which, however, was now a changed country and no longer in a mood to submit to imperialist control. Early in 1947 the British Labour Government took steps to transfer power to the Burmese. Aung San went to London and arrangements for an Interim Government were agreed to. Elections were held in April for a Constituent Assembly which on June 16, 1947 decided that Burma should be an independent republic outside the Commonwealth. On September 24, 1947, a Constitution for the Union of Burma, composed of Burma proper, and the Shan, Karen, and Kachin States was approved on September 24, 1947. Earlier on July 19, gunmen hired by U-saw, machine gunned Aung San and six of his colleagues. U Nu was providentially absent when this ghastly massacre occurred and he was at once appointed Premier. He went to London and concluded an agreement with Attlee by which Britain recognised the complete independence of Burma. Under it, Britain insisted on the sanctity of its contracts, and payment for British properties lost by nationalization. A supplementary defence agreement stipulated that Britain alone would have the right to send appropriate military missions to Burma and would provide supplies and needed assistance. On January 4, 1948, the Union of Burma was inaugurated.

As an independent state Burma initially experienced a considerable degree of political instability. The Government was faced with a series of revolts led by the two wings of the Communists in Burma—the Red Flag and White Flag (Trotskyites and Stalinists)—and by discontent groups in many parts of the country. But, as a result of the conscientious and effective manner in which the Government has carried out land reforms and other progressive measures they have been reduced to a minor, although continuing problem. A more serious trouble was started by the Karens—the largest national minority of Burma—about 2 million in number and spread throughout the Irrawaddy delta and along the Tenasserim coast. These

people demanded autonomy and a separate state. The story of the Karens in Burma forms part of the general history of colonialism and missionary activities in Asia where racial consciousness among the minority groups was deliberately encouraged by the colonial powers with a view to limiting the influence and the power of the majority groups. In Burma, the Chins, the Kachins the Karens and the Shans were prompted by the colonial government to play up racial differences from the Burmese and to ignore their racial affinities. "The factors uniting the various Tibeto-Burmese tribes were first, Buddhism tinged with the native and pre-Buddhist worship of spirits, and second, the Burmese language which was the common heritage of all the Burmese peoples. Both these factors the British Government attempted to destroy and substitute in their places racial consciousness and racial suspicion". The Shans had been deeply influenced by the Burmese culture and with them the British Government could not succeed. It was on the Chins, the Kachins, and the Karens that the government concentrated. The colonial government was assisted by foreign missionaries, who hoped to introduce Christianity to them and to wean them out of Burmese cultural influence. Up to 1941, the British government prohibited the teaching of the Burmese language in Chin schools. Amongst the Karens the missionaries built up the myth "that the Karens did not belong to the Tibeto-Burmese group of race, but were either members of the Mon-Khmer racial group, or even one of the lost tribes of Israel", thus obliterating the historical fact that the Karen language is merely a branch of the Tibeto-Burmese group of languages. As the Rector of the University of Rangoon, Htin Aung, has written: "As early as 1890, foreign missionaries advised the British Government to arm the Karens and use them against some Burmese rebels in Lower Burma, and from that time onwards, the Burma military police and the British army in Burma recruited Chin, Kachin, and Karen military policemen and soldiers, at the same time refusing this privilege to the Burmese and the Shans. When 'dyarchy' was introduced, and when a more representative form of government was introduced into Burma, after her separation from India in 1937, the British government reserved for the rule of the British Governor the so-called frontier areas which really constituted Highland Burma. When the British were negotiating with the Burmese political leaders in 1947 over the issue of independence, some British officials made in secret fruitless endeavours to influence the representatives of the frontier areas to reject the proposed federation with Burma." All these problems were solved by the Burmese who gradually realized that the Burmese national culture is a common heritage. In 1951, a legislation to establish a Karen state was

introduced by U Nu's Cabinet but it was only in 1954 that new Karen state was created when the Karens were given autonomy. Elements of political stability are, however, still lacking and on October 28, 1958, U Nu handed over the administration of the country to General Ne Win, the Chief of Staff of Burmese Army.

BURMA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1948-58

The Burmese foreign policy rests on four major pegs (i) Relations with Britain and India, (ii) Active participation in the U N, (iii) Relations with China, (iv) Non-alignment in the cold war. Burma's relations with Britain since separation have been "co-operative but only distantly friendly" due largely to Rangoon's continued distrust of British business interests. Under the Nu-Aitce treaty of 1947, British officers train the Burmese army, and British naval and air force units enjoy limited rights of entry into Burma in case of international emergency. This treaty was extended further in 1954. During the critical period of civil war in 1941-50 Rangoon was assisted by a timely Commonwealth loan, the Colombo Plan and by the receipt from Britain of much needed small arms to replace those seized by the rebels. In 1956, the Anglo-French invasion on Egypt, as U Nu said on September 27, 1957 "came to us as a complete surprise, and did much harm to Britain's post war record of statesmanship". However, the Burmese "were relieved and glad when Britain decided to bow toward public opinion" and came to "regard this episode merely as a temporary and exceptional aberration".

With India, Burma's relations have been close if not always very smooth. This is partly due to British colonial administration which, until 1937, considered Burma as part of India, and partly to Burma's traditional fear of geo-political domination by India. While the other countries of South East Asia have been trapped with an "overseas Chinese" problem, Burma has faced an "overseas India" problem. Nevertheless, since 1947-48, the two countries have worked to establish close and harmonious relations. Both have complementary economic interests and share an aspiration to remain outside the cold war and to develop an area of peace. Probably Burma has also counted on India to balance the threat of China. Nu and Nehru have conferred repeatedly on matters of both direct relations and general policy, so that the positions taken by the two governments in the Asian Conferences at the U N, and elsewhere have been nearly identical. As Nu said in 1957 "India under her great leader Prime Minister Nehru has come to our assistance time and again we have been hard pressed, and to her we owe a special debt of gratitude".

With *Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and Thailand* also the relations of Burma have been cordial and co-operative and with them diplomatic relations were first established. Burma has been one of the 5 Colombo Powers and played an active role at the Bandung Conference. With Thailand, in 1957, a Treaty of Friendship was signed which Nu called "an historic event which I believe will bury the unhappy past". With Japan, relations of the Burmese were extremely unhappy since the Japanese occupation in 1942 and in the short space of three years the Japanese militarists succeeded in arousing the wrath of the entire country against them. From 1945 to 1951, all dealings had to be conducted through the occupation authorities in Japan. The most difficult issue in the Burmese-Japanese relations has been the question of reparations. In 1951, Burma refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty because "it did not sufficiently take into account" the reparation claims. The Korean War, and the industry and discipline of the Japanese people brought about a rapid economic recovery. On April 30, 1952 the state of war between Japan and Burma ended and on November 5, 1954, the Reparations Agreement and the Peace Treaty were signed under which Japan promised to supply Burma, by way of reparations, with the services of Japanese people and products of Japan the value of which would be \$200,000,000 spread over a period of 10 years, and to make Burma available for ten years in the form of joint enterprises the services of Japanese people and the products of Japan amounting to \$50,000,000. Burma, however, reserved the right to reopen the issue should Japan subsequently conclude with other claimant countries more favourable reparations agreements. In other spheres, the relations have been quite cordial. Soon after the Geneva Agreement, Burma established diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Laos and exchanged several missions. With respect to Vietnam and Korea Burma has not recognised either of the two Governments. In 1956, diplomatic relations were established with Philippines, and in 1957, with Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan and Malaya. Diplomatic relations were also established with Egypt, Iraq and Israel, and full support has been given to the peoples of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. With Yugoslavia also the Burmese relations have been very cordial.

With *China*, the Burmese relations have been correct and friendly. At the time of Burmese independence, the Kuomintang Government was still in control of China though they were fast losing ground to the Communists. Even before full independence the Burmese Embassy had been set up at Nanking, despite the existence of the Sino-Burmese border problem. The Kuomintang Government was one of the governments which sponsored Burma's admission to the U. N. By the end of 1949,

the Communists consolidated their control of the mainland, and Burma became the first non-communist country to recognise People's China on December 17, 1949. By June 1950, normal diplomatic relations had been established between Rangoon and Peking. Since then Burma has consistently supported the case of China's entry in the U.N. While Burma backed the U.N. resolution of June 1950 condemning North Korean aggression, she voted against the Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951 which branded China as aggressor. Burma's protest before the U.N. against the presence of Kuomintang Chinese refugee troops within its border as we will shortly discuss, was made partly because of a desire to maintain cordial relations with Peking. Indeed, in 1949-50 the prospects of good relations between the two countries appeared to be dim. The Communist rebellion was still going strong in Burma and the Peking Government in the words of U Nu, "seemed inclined to give any communists their moral support apparently regarding us as stooges of the West." Broadcasts from Peking Radio did not attempt to disguise this attitude. Then there has been the Sino-Burmese frontier problem which created bitterness. Chou En-lai's visit to Burma in 1954, however, proved to be the turning point in Sino-Burmese relations and since then these have been conducted in the context of the Panch Shila. In November 1956 U Nu went to Peking and an agreement was reached as to the broad principles on which a settlement of the frontier problem might be reached. U Nu agreed to admit the Chinese claims to Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang. In view of the clear terms of the Sino-British Agreement of 1897, Burma had to recognise that the Manwan Assigned Tract was legally Chinese territory which had been perpetually leased to the British but U Nu insisted that in view of the strategic value of this Tract to Burma, it should be permanently transferred to Burma. On this basis negotiations proceeded in 1957 but a final settlement is yet to be reached.

Relations of Burma with the *United States* have been characterized by mutual regard and sympathy. Soon after independence the U.S.A. recognised Burma but apprehended that Burma would fall to the Communists—apprehensions which were not allayed by Burmese policy towards Red China. Gradually, however, the U.S. doubts disappeared. On January 12, 1950, Acheson suggested that the U.S. might help South-East Asian countries but "only when the conditions are right for help to be effective." On January 13, however, the Burmese Ambassador gave the reply, "There should be no talk of Military Aid" to Asian countries unless that aid were requested and further declared that the smaller Asian countries did not wish to be shuttle cocks between the two hostile camps. But in April 1950, the Griffin Mission came to South East Asia. On September 13,

1950, an economic aid agreement with the U.S.A. was signed. During the fiscal year 1951-53, about \$31 million was appropriated by the U. S. Congress for aid to Burma of which about \$20 million was actually expended.

Two developments, however, marred the relations of the two countries. One was the trial of the American Medical missionary, Dr. Gordon Seagrave, who was well known in the U.S.A. through his book, "*Burma Surgeon*". He was arrested in Burma in August 1950 on a charge of assisting the Karen rebels and was convicted in January 1951 and sentenced to six years imprisonment. In March 1951, however, he was released. Much more serious than this was the presence of some thousands of Chinese Nationalist soldiers who had escaped from Yunnan during and after the Chinese Civil War and settled in northern and eastern Burma, where they lived off the country and frequently victimized its inhabitants. Originally numbering only 1,200—1,500, these forces were enlarged by new arrivals until in 1953 their strength was estimated at 12,000. The Peking Government claimed that these troops were planning to reinvade China, that they were aided and abetted by the Chiang clique in Formosa, and that they received supplies from the United States. This last charge was, of course, denied by the U.S. authorities and their denial was accepted by the Burmese Government. Reports from Burma, however, proved that some American arms were reaching the Nationalist Chinese troops through unofficial channels. In March 1953, the Burmese Defence Minister said that he had conclusive proof that Americans were helping the Chinese but that he did not hold the U.S. Government responsible. Burma was badly embarrassed for, on the one hand, the presence of Nationalist China's troops might create bitterness with Peking, and, on the other, these troops were giving aid to the Karen insurgents. The Chinese troops refused to be disarmed and interned as required by international law. Burma asked the U.S. to use its good offices with Formosa to secure the evacuation of the troops but nothing came out of these repeated representations. In October 1951 Burma decided to approach the U.N. This would have placed the United States in an awkward position and in November, the U. S. Ambassador persuaded the Burmese government not to bring the question before the U.N. Assembly, offering his assistance in solving the problem by private negotiation. Early in 1953 Burma politely turned down Peking's offer of assistance in dealing with the Kuomintang troops, who were conducting occasional raids across the Chinese border as well as against Burmese towns.

In March 1953, however, Burma was obliged formally to approach the U.N. with the charge of aggression against the Chinese Nationalist Government. At this time Burma found itself "in

an anomalous position of receiving aid from the U S Government on the one hand, and on the other, fighting against an army which was controlled and supplied by the Formosan authorities whose continued existence was dependent on large scale American aid " The leftist opposition in Burma was highly critical of their government's policy of accepting aid from the U S A A few days after the appeal, therefore, Burma announced her intention of discontinuing U S economic aid after June 30, expressing thanks for the help thus far received and making clear that she intended no criticism of the existing programme or its personnel But the Kuomintang aggression in Burma had so many cold war overtones that the U N was unable to give it the objective consideration it deserved, even though definite proof of the Formosan involvement was furnished by the Burmese Russia and Poland supported the Burmese complaint of aggression The Assembly, however, only passed a resolution which made no reference to the Nationalist Government, but deplored the presence of foreign forces in Burma, called on them either to leave the country or submit to internment and called on all members of the U N to refrain from giving them assistance On the initiative of the U S, in May 1953, military officers from the U S, Burma, Formosa, and Thailand gathered in Bangkok to evolve a plan for evacuation and in mid June a tentative agreement was reached But at the instigation of Chiang Kai shek, some of the Chinese in Burma refused to leave the country relying on the principle of "no involuntary repatriation" espoused by the U S in Korea General Li Mi urged that his troops be maintained in Burma as a barrier against Communist aggression By September the Burmese patience had been exhausted and they withdrew from the Bangkok talks and bombed the Chinese troops

In October Burma again turned to the U N Assembly where the Formosan and American delegates reported that about 2,000 troops had agreed to be repatriated and were to be flown out via Thailand with U S assistance By May 9, 1954, however, 6 400 guerrillas had been evacuated to Formosa, and on May 31, General Li Mi announced the dissolution of his army in Burma In August 1954, Burma reported to the U N that there were still about 4,000 Chinese troops in the country Indeed the problem had not been entirely liquidated at the close of 1957 In this whole episode, it was established that the U N was ineffective, that the U S was indirectly convening at the aggression led by the Kuomintang, and that the Peking Government was helpful and following a peaceful policy despite grave provocation As U Nu told the Burmese Parliament on September 27, 1957 "While on this subject, I would not like to pass over in silence the helpful attitude adopted by the Government of the People's Republic of China towards the problem created by the Kuomintang aggression

Considering that the Kuomintang forces were openly proclaiming that it was their intention to 'liberate' Yunnan, the Chinese Government could, were it so minded, have made difficulties for us. But instead they adopted a most helpful and understanding attitude....."

The relations with the United States, however, were gradually improved and early in 1957 the Economic Co-operation Agreement was revived under which the U.S. Government has made available to Burma one loan of \$25 million in U.S. currency, and another of about 8½ crores of Kyats out of Kyat funds accumulated in Burma by the U.S. under the PL 480 Programme.

With the *Soviet Union* also the relations have been quite happy, though in the beginning there was some distrust. "When we first became independent", U Nu has said, "the Soviet Union apparently decided to treat us as on probation. Thus she did not stand in the way of our entry to the U.N. But later, as the Communist rebellion gathered momentum, her attitude underwent a change, and indications were that she came to look upon us as reactionaries standing in the way of the people's liberation". Gradually, however, the Soviet attitude started changing. In 1951, diplomatic relations were established. After the death of Stalin, relations became more cordial. We have referred to the Soviet leaders' visit to Rangoon in December 1955 and also to U Nu's visit to the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet economic aid to Burma (Part Two, pp. 381-83). The Burmese Prime Minister expressed his appreciation of the Soviet aid and said that "We shall always remember that it was the Soviet Union which in the difficult days of 1954 and 1955, when we were unable to find buyers for our rice, came to our assistance by entering into barter arrangements involving substantial quantities of our surplus rice, thereby setting a precedent for some other countries". The Soviet intervention in Hungary in October 1956 was, however, condemned by the Burmese.

The Burmese foreign policy, therefore, like that of India, has been one of peace and friendship with all—a policy of non-alignment, dynamic neutrality and based on peaceful co-existence, mutual non-interference and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. Like India, Burma attaches great importance to the U.N. in international diplomacy and to her own role in its deliberation. It was on April 19, 1948 that Burma became the 58th state to join the U.N. and since then, she has been doing her best to strengthen the U.N. processes. It is, therefore, not isolationism that Burma holds as its ideal. Her policy of non-alignment, derived from her geographically exposed position, is reasoned on the premise that her security is best

served by non provocation, co-operation, and friendship with the members both of the Communist and of the non Communist blocs. Under Article 211 of the Burmese Constitution, Burma "renounces war as an instrument of national policy and accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with foreign States" and under Article 212, she "affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality". If, however, Burma avoids entangling alliances, it is not with a view to assuming isolation, but it is intended to retain that freedom of action in foreign affairs which is the first casualty of N A T O, S E A T O and the rest. Burma is fully conscious that in this part of the 20th century, isolation, which the U S enjoyed in the 19th century, is not a practicable proposition. The guarantee against war, however, is not military alliances which would take the world nearer wars, but a determined effort to prevent war by expanding the area of peace, and relaxing international tension. This is the logic of the Burmese foreign policy. As U Nu has put it "The principal obstacle to world peace has been, and is, the Cold War. We, therefore, refuse to take part in the Cold War. Besides, joining one side would mean making enemies of the other, and, in addition, compromising our independent foreign policy. This refusal to take sides does not, however, mean that we have taken a purely negative attitude towards the Cold War or that we behaved like the proverbial ostrich sticking its head in the sand. We could not afford to assume such a posture, even if we were tempted to do so, because the Cold War was too close to us for us to be able to ignore it".

CEYLON

A relatively flourishing island close to the southern tip of India, Ceylon has a population of about 8,000,000 and an area of 25,000 sq miles. The island appears on the map like "a pendant dangling from the apex of the triangular land mass which constitutes India and Pakistan" and lying on the Indian Ocean flank of the sub continent, it has always occupied an important place in the imperial naval strategy of Britain. The economy of the island is largely agricultural and the bulk of population professes Buddhist faith which apart from the links of geography, traditions and racial and linguistic affinity, is a powerful link between the Indians and the Ceylonese. The Ceylonese people are a mixture of the Sinhalese, Kandians, Ceylon Tamils and Indian Tamils, Burghers (descendants of Dutch settlers), and Moors (followers of Islam). Internal strife and constant change of capitals made Ceylon, at the beginning of the 16th century, an easy prey to the Portuguese

invaders, the first westerners to come to Ceylon (1505). Although they came here by accident, they stayed behind for trade and religious conquests. They were followed by the Dutch (1656) who were, in turn, replaced by the British (1796) who, operating from Madras, invaded Ceylon and were welcomed by the Kandyan Chiefs, for, they wanted to get rid of a tyrannous king.

The British colonial policy in Ceylon did not materially differ from that in any other country of Asia and the Ceylonese response to it was, more or less, the same as elsewhere. They exploited the island's natural wealth, kept the economy rural and feudal, fomented social, economic and political schism between the Indians and Ceylonese people. "They (the British colonizers), Sir John Kotelawala writes in his memoirs "thought our country belonged to them, and was theirs alone to exploit, while the richer natives should be kept in their place and enjoy none of the privileges exclusively reserved for the ruling race. Social status, sportsmanship, university education, any physical prowess counted for nothing if you were a son of the soil. The fact that your family prospered was merely due to the tolerance of a kindly government whose main job it was to civilize the natives and make use of them as coolies or clerks . . . Colonialism seemed to infect them (the British officials, planters and merchants) with a tropical disease, of which the most familiar symptom was an ill-concealed contempt for brown, black and yellow men as such. The ancient civilization of Ceylon meant nothing to them, unless they were scholars interested in history. The laws of the land had to be framed primarily for the benefit of British interests. Good roads, hospitals, and schools were a necessity only in the estate areas, and were apparently a luxury to which villagers and peasants were not entitled. First class railway carriages were not meant for third-class natives even if they were Kandyan chiefs or Tamil knights".

Thus, social discrimination, economic exploitation, political disintegration, religious conversion, were the worst features of the British colonial policy. But colonial policy is never static. It has been constantly evolving. In the first stage (17th century) it was rather a projection of concepts current in the domestic policy of the metropolitan powers. In the second stage (18th and 19th centuries) it has had to re-adjust itself, in increasing measure, to conditions created by the changing economic and social standards among the colonial peoples. In the third stage—roughly since 1919 and more particularly after 1945—it became imperative to re-assess colonial policy in the light of the socialist challenge and the concern shown by international opinion in colonial affairs. In this sense, therefore, the British imperialists had to develop the resources and stabilize the political conditions of the areas under their control and in this process, they also unleashed the

process of decolonization. Through English education, they created the climate of revolt and even through conversions, they roused a degree of political consciousness. Through independent judiciary, even if they captured the imagination of the natives, they, nevertheless, laid the foundations of rule of law and, therefore, for the demand of freedom and self rule. The creation of a highly centralised and efficient administration, an army high command, and rapid means of transport and communications, were instruments of social and economic advance, even if they were ready tools of colonialism. The maximum initiative and responsibility rested with the colonial administration in Ceylon or in India and the source of law was local legislation and not the Acts of Parliament. It was in comparatively rare cases that legislation took the form of Order in Council. This procedure, without doubts, assisted the progress of self government, more particularly in view of the growing participation by "natives" in the membership of the Legislative and Executive Councils. As in Britain the political evolution in the colonies went from Executive Absolutism to Legislative Supremacy based on the progressive widening of franchise, growth of civil liberties and a healthy press, increasing restrictions on the Executive Power, broadening civil service recruited from all spheres of society, and the growth of local government units. In all these respects, the British colonial policy was more liberal. There was the intention to grant some measure of self government, although this was done in painfully slow stages. The people in Ceylon as in India were free to criticize the Government, and public opinion could thus be created on important issues and "constant agitation for political reforms could become an irresistible clamour". If, on the one hand, Ceylonese nationalism has been largely the product of English education, and the unifying influence of British rule, on the other it received a tremendous stimulus from the Indian nationalist movement and the forces released by the First World War. As Jennings put it "It is not an exaggeration to say that the Ceylonese as a people were invented in the present century. The War of 1914-18 provided a great stimulus towards nationalism. The wartime propaganda, unofficial as well as official, which asserted that Britain was fighting for the freedom of small nations, the right of self determination, the prevention of imperialist aggression, and so forth, became for the nationalists propaganda for the freedom of Ceylon. Everything said about 'brave little Belgium' could be adapted to 'brave little Ceylon' the essential difference being that brave little Belgium had been invaded in 1914 and brave little Ceylon in 1505. When President Roosevelt included among his Fourteen Points the right of every nation to govern itself freely, he enunciated a doctrine which the educated Ceylonese could hardly fail to apply to themselves."

Prior to World War II Ceylon used to be under British colonial administration as part of India. The association of the people with the administration had commenced in 1853. In 1927 the Donoughmore Commission prepared a constitution for Ceylon which came in effect in 1931. In 1943 Britain pledged to grant the Ceylonese a considerable degree of constitutional reform and "full internal civil administration". The Soulbury Commission of 1945 provided for limited self-government. In December 1947, Ceylon Independence Act was passed and in February 1948, Ceylon became a free Dominion. The form of government is parliamentary democracy though its prospects are yet uncertain and the party system has not yet crystallised.

FOREIGN POLICY OF CEYLON, 1948—1958

Ceylon's foreign policy has, since independence, been based on the following principles: (a) The defence of Ceylon's recently gained independence, (b) Membership of the Commonwealth as a fully independent state, (c) Close friendship with South-East Asian countries, especially India, (d) Avoidance of formal alignment with either power bloc; (e) striving for peace and economic progress in co-operation with friendly countries. India provides "a protective cover" for Ceylon, insulates it from the communist world, and provides re-assurance against any revival of colonialism in Ceylon. Nevertheless, as we will shortly see, Ceylon does not ignore the possibility that relations with India may not always remain cordial. Ceylon's continued membership of the Commonwealth is influenced by the desire for the added security provided by the wider group. "The policy of retaining full membership of the Commonwealth is reinforced by the orientation of the bulk of Ceylon's trade towards Commonwealth countries and the attitude of the Ceylon people towards the Crown." In 1948, Ceylon had permitted the provision, under the terms of the Defence Agreement with the U.K. of such naval and military bases in Ceylon as the U.K. Government might require. In 1957, however, the bases were handed over to Ceylon as a result of representations made by Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to the British Government.

Ceylon's foreign policy has taken full cognisance of the division of the world into two power blocs and has, like India, opposed commitment to either side. Shortly after his assumption of office in 1953, Sir John Kotelawala summoned a conference of Prime Ministers of Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan at Colombo and from this meeting, emerged the proposal for a Conference of Afro-Asian Power, which culminated in the Bandung Conference of April 1955 (see Part Two, pp. 200-208). The neutral policy of Ceylon in some respects is akin to

that of India but, in some others, it is different. Like India, Ceylon has not regarded Communist problem in Asia with alarm or hysteria and like the Indians the Ceylonese believe that Communism cannot be suppressed by force. As Mr R S S Gunewardene, Ceylon's Ambassador to the United States, put it: "Buddhism is a powerful pervading force in South and South-East Asia. Its doctrine of non violence and its belief in 'moral force' are powerful influences in combating the materialist values which underlie communism. The doctrine of non violence of Gandhi is a modern manifestation of this self-same spiritual force. Communism is an ideology and has to be met by a superior ideology. We believe this superior ideology is contained in the democratic way of life and in the spiritual values of religion. We are convinced that these two forces combined can pose an almost insuperable obstacle to Communism as an ideology. It is this confidence that gives us strength to view the problem of Communism calmly, patiently, and without excitement, and we believe that this approach is the most desirable one." It is this logic which one can find in numerous policy statements of Mr Nehru. And it is for this reason that Ceylon as well as India has not been able to see eye to eye with the U.S.A. which tends to emphasize the importance of military defence as a means of resisting Communism. Both India and Ceylon believe that military pacts and groupings increase rather than decrease international tension by arousing fear and suspicion and can only be a temptation to the opposing camp to find justification for an increase in its own military strength and both, therefore, are actively opposed to the American policy of organizing the Asian countries into military pacts—a policy which looks like a comeback of colonialism and appears to be designed to limit the freedom of weak Asian nations, in a subtle form. Again, both Ceylon and India, have been conscious of the danger of internal subversion, and, therefore, have given no quarters to the communists unless they behaved in a constitutional manner. Both believe that the answer to Communism can be found through the improvement of the standards of life of the people, and for this, both have sought and accepted economic aid from friendly countries—whether communist or non-communist—provided such aid is free from foreign entanglements or military commitments. What they want is an era of peace and stability so that the gap of the colonial period might be filled.

On the one hand, Ceylon is a very active participant in the Colombo Plan (1950) as we have noted in Chapter 9 of Part Two of this work—a plan which was unofficially attacked in Moscow and Peking as "a veiled device of the West to exercise domination and control over the economies of South Asia." With Japan, Ceylon has vastly expanded its trade relations. The Japanese Govern-

ment, in 1951, agreed to provide technical assistance for the development of small-scale industries in Ceylon, in the form of technical skill, machinery and equipment. Trade relations with Egypt are fast expanding and Ceylon tea is exported to Cairo in exchange for Egyptian cotton. In April 1957, an Australian trade delegation from 300 business firms visited Colombo. The lists of commodities exportable from Ceylon to West Germany were revised on the basis of the trade agreement of April 1, 1955. Ceylon is getting aid from the U.K., West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the U.S.A. She obtained the largest number of experts from the Colombo Plan Technical Assistance Bureau during the period July 1950—June 1957. From a total of 453 experts provided by the Colombo Plan, Ceylon got 219 of whom 81 were from the U.K., 52 from Canada, 30 from Australia, 14 from New Zealand, 13 from India, and 2 from Japan. Australia trained 147 Ceylonese trainees, India 99, New Zealand 65, Canada 52 and Pakistan and Japan 2 each.

On the other hand, the relations with the Soviet bloc and China were till 1956 less cordial and, in this, the Ceylonese foreign policy was different from that of India. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Sir John Kotelawala denounced what he called "Communist Colonialism". Earlier he allowed the American Globemasters carrying French troops to Indo-China to make use of a Ceylon airport and declared in the Ceylon Parliament that "if even the devil wanted to fight Communism, I would be on his side". Diplomatic relations were not established with either Peking or Moscow and in all conferences there was a marked difference between the attitude of Nehru and Kotelawala. But with the exit of the latter and the advent of Mr. Bandaranaike's Government, the situation has been normalized. The new Prime Minister lost no time in seeking to exchange diplomatic representations with Russia and China. In regard to trade Ceylon led by Kotelawala's Government did not regard herself as bound by the U.N. Resolution of May 18, 1951, banning the supply of strategic materials to communist China, for, Ceylon was not yet a member of the U.N. In December 1952, she entered into a trade agreement with Peking under which China was to supply to Ceylon 270,000 metric tons of rice annually, in exchange for Ceylon supplying to China 50,000 metric tons of rubber annually, the price of both commodities to be negotiated annually. As a result of negotiations concluded on October 14, 1955, China agreed to purchase the rubber from Ceylon at price slightly higher than that quoted on the Singapore market and a new formula was arrived at for fixing rice prices. Thus Ceylon vindicated her right to sell her principal exports in the best markets irrespective of political considerations. But apart from Peking, Ceylon's trade with other communist countries was insignificant

until Bandaranaike became the Prime Minister

Early in 1957, a Ceylon trade mission led by Sir Claude Corea visited Russia and China and reported that "the Soviet leaders appear to desire genuinely the friendship of other countries", and stated that much expansion of trade could take place with mutual benefit. Negotiations were started with the U S S R for a trade and payments agreement the like of which were concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Government of Ceylon has, like India, favoured the entry of People's China in the United Nations, although on the question of Formosa, while India holds the view that it is part of China and it should go to China, Ceylon's view is that Formosa should be under trusteeship for a period and that the Formosans should be allowed to decide their own future. On the whole, the foreign policy of Ceylon has closely followed the lines of India's foreign policy, and like it, is based on the philosophy of co-existence and neutralism. Bandaranaike thus defined the two concepts to Mr H. C. Taussig in an exclusive interview:

"One of the methods by which conflicts are usually solved is war. Yet today this is a complicated and, as always, dangerous solution. To earnestly contemplate war on any scale, small or large, nowadays is to court immense destruction to mankind. I naturally take the line which I consider best for Ceylon. As isolation is no longer possible, I think it is the only feasible line for every country. We simply consider it imperative, while recognizing the different points of view, to always attempt settlement by negotiation and to establish friendly relations and co-operation. The peoples of the world cannot afford to hate each other so much that there is any chance of it flaring up into war. We must also realize that man is more important than "isms". Just as it was said 'Sabbath was made for man' and not vice versa, we must not sacrifice man for any "isms". That, as I understand it, is the philosophy of co-existence, and it is one of the essential parts on which foreign policy is based.

"We ourselves and other Asian countries, in particular those recently emerged from colonial status into freedom, are faced with a dual problem of converting a colonial society into a free society and of doing this in the context of a world which in itself has changed. In the search for such a solution in this dual problem we naturally do not wish to bind ourselves to any particular power bloc or ideology. We wish to look about us in building a society for our country most suited to our own genius and the needs of the modern world. There may be things we take from the capitalist West or the Communist East. This, in other words, is the philosophy of neutralism. Our attitude is governed by these factors and neutralism is as good a word for it as anything. It does not arise

from dishonesty or of 'sitting on the fence'. But it is indeed forced upon us inexorably by the circumstances. (*Eastern World*, Vol. XI, No. 3, March 1957 p. 13).

THE PROBLEM OF INDIANS IN CEYLON

No survey of Ceylon's foreign policy will be complete without a reference to the problem of Indians in Ceylon, for, it is the principal outstanding issue in Ceylon's relations with India. The Indo-Ceylon problem, it may be pointed out, is largely a legacy of the old colonialism. It started with the opening of plantations or estates in the territory of the former Kandyan Kings by British capitalists some 125 years ago. The local population, which was Sinhalese by race and language and Buddhist by religion, occupied and owned the paddy lands in the valleys of this territory, while it used the hills, which were covered with jungle or *patna* (thick grass land on the mountain tops), for the pasturing of cattle, the collection of fire-wood and timber, and the cultivation of chenas (land that is periodically cultivated). Labour was imported from South India and housed on the estates. It was imported by foreign capitalists, with the assistance of the foreign Government then in power. It was accorded special privileges, some of them by statute, and Indian labourers were given facilities of travelling up and down between Ceylon and their homes in India. In course of time the Sinhalese population in the Kandyan villages multiplied without having room for expansion, for it was opened into its narrow valleys by the estates. Thus "one finds in the valleys, cultivating their ancestral lands, the Kandyans, who observe their ancient traditions while on the hill sides between these valleys is a migration population of South Indian wage earners who observe the social traditions of South India. These two sections of the population do not mix, for they are different in religion, language, social tradition, and occupation".

The 1953 census of Ceylon showed that the population was composed as follows:

Indigenous Population.

Sinhalese	...	5,621,332
Ceylon Tamils	...	908,705
Ceylon Moors	...	468,146
Burghers	...	43,916
Malays	...	28,736
Other groups	...	20,678

Foreign Residents

Indians	983,304
Pakistanis	5,749
Europeans	6,909
Others	11,162
Total	8,098,637

The Indian population, which is by far the most numerous of the foreign population, poses a problem for a number of reasons. First, as we have noted, the Indians, who for the most part provide labour on the Kandyan tea and rubber estates, are alleged by Ceylon Government to "have retained their roots in Southern India and have not assimilated into the otherwise Sinhalese community of the Kandyan Hills". Sir John Kotelawala has written bitterly about it "In most countries a migrant population can be absorbed into the indigenous population in one generation. In Ceylon it is still 'Indian' after three generations. The term 'migrant' is, however, used in three senses. In the first place, the population has been imported within the last hundred years. In the second place, a large part of that population is still domiciled in South India. Many of the families in Ceylon maintain contact with their relatives in India and visit their ancestral villages every year. Even families which have been long resident in Ceylon maintain contact with India, so that, for instance, the young men marry wives from within the appropriate social groups in India. In the third place, the population is migrant in that it is not attached to the soil but moves about from estate to estate as employment offers. For this reason even the identification of an Indian migrant is often a matter of considerable difficulty. Within the same province, the same district, and even the same village area, there are thus two distinct communities, unable to speak each other's language, having no social or economic relations with each other, and having in fact nothing in common save geographical propinquity."

Secondly, it is argued that the Indians deprive the Ceylonese of employment opportunities and that, not having developed any roots in Ceylon, they use the island as a means of acquiring money which they remit to India and that all this imposes a substantial drain on the country's foreign exchange. Thirdly, there is an important political aspect of the problem. Under the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 Indians, as British subjects, were granted franchise on the same terms as Ceylon citizens. This franchise remained in force for the first elections held under the 1946 Constitution. "The elections", Sir John

comments, "showed how close were the communal ties among the Indians. Where they had a majority they elected a member of their communal organization and thereby virtually disfranchised the Kandyans in seven constituencies. Where they were not in a majority they obeyed instructions of their communal organization to vote for a particular Ceylonese candidate. It is believed that in 13 or 14 constituencies they secured by these means the election of a candidate who had only minority support among the Ceylonese voters. Thus a communal organization exclusively representing Indians affected the result in one-fifth of all the constituencies of Ceylon then in existence, and communal segregation of Kandyans and Indians had led to a very difficult and serious problem in the Kandyan provinces."

To remedy this situation, an electoral law was passed in 1949 under which Ceylon restricted the franchise to her own nationals, thereby disfranchising a very large proportion of Indians. They had no other option except to boycott the election of 1952. Since then, negotiations have continued between India and Ceylon for a settlement of the status of the people affected. In June 1953, Nehru and Dudley Senanayake discussed the problem at London where they had gone to Elizabeth II's Coronation but the talks failed because Senanayake insisted on compulsory repatriation of Indian residents which naturally Nehru could not accept. On January 15, 1954, Sir John Kotelawala brought a high level delegation to New Delhi and the talks resulted in what is called the Nehru-Kotelawala Pact which was hailed as "a great stride towards a fair and honourable settlement of Indo-Ceylon issues". This pact provided for the expeditious registration of Indians who wished to acquire Ceylon citizenship, but those who did not or could not register—and it was on this point that trouble developed later, for, the test of registration was unnecessarily hard—were liable to be deported. It also provided for the suppression of illicit immigration. Ceylon was to draw up a register of all adult residents not on the electoral register. An unregistered person was to be presumed to be an illicit immigrant if his mother tongue was an Indian language. He was to be liable to deportation and the Indian High Commissioner was to extend all facilities for deportation. ¹

But in practice the Pact failed to resolve the conflict. The Ceylon Indians include a large proportion of persons whom neither country is prepared to accept as citizens. From December 1953 to January 1955, Ceylon Government had rejected 81,500 applications while accepting only 7,500 and while during the same period the High Commissioner had accepted 5,600 out of 8,000 applicants. In October 1954, Kotelawala again met Nehru at Delhi. The two Premiers agreed that every effort should be made by both governments to reduce the number of

stateless persons, that Ceylon would expedite its registration procedures and that registration of Indian and Ceylon citizens would be completed within two years. Negotiations were continued by Bandaranaike in 1956-57 but the problem is still awaiting solution. For, the problem of dealing with unauthorized entries is a grave one. Many Indians have not become assimilated socially or politically. They have imposed some strain on the country's foreign exchange reserves, and they have competed for employment at a time when employment openings were limited. India, on the other hand, conscious of the existence of Indian minorities elsewhere, and the cost of re-settlement of the people in impoverished South cannot afford to create a precedent by authorizing any large scale repatriation of the Indian minority in Ceylon.

THAILAND (SIAM)

Situated in the heart of South East Asia, Siam (the name was changed in 1939 to Thailand—Land of the Free) has an area of slightly more than 200,000 sq miles and a population of less than 20,000,000. Thailand is the only country of South-East Asia which, by a policy of playing off one power against the other, was able to maintain a facade of freedom throughout the 19th century when Britain and France were seizing territories in that area. Both the Imperialist powers agreed to have Thailand as a buffer between British India and French Indo-China. Thailand had lost significant portions of its territory to the British in Burma and Malaya and to the French in Indo-China and it even suffered the division of its entire domain into respective spheres of influence by a series of Anglo-French agreements which also strained its resources. Weak economic conditions rendered its politics turbulent and the economic depression of 1929-31 led to revolts against the King. In 1944, a military dictatorship by Luang Pibul Songoram temporarily appeared. Earlier as Prime Minister he had collaborated with the Japanese and in January 1942 had declared war on Britain and the U.S.A. In order to bind Thailand closer to Japan, the Japanese in 1943 transferred some provinces in Burma and Malaya to her, and had geared the Thai economy to their own needs. Japanese business firms took over the Thai industries and transportation facilities, seized foreign owned properties and the port of Bangkok, and monopolized all trade.

Although the Thai Government was at war with the U.S.A., a Free Thai Movement, with headquarters in the U.S., organized a feeble resistance movement in Thailand. The defeat of the Japanese shook the confidence of the Thai people in the Japanese alliance and in the leadership of Marshall Pibul. On

July 22, 1944, his government was overthrown and an anti-Japanese administration led by Nai Pridi was installed. On August 16, 1945, after Japan had surrendered, the Thai Government disclaimed the war declaration and asked for the resumption of friendly relations with the U.S. and the U.N. The U.S.A. at once responded warmly and advocated the policy of forgiveness. On January 1, 1946, Siam concluded peace with Britain and promised to adjust war claims and deliver 1,500,000 tons of rice free of charge. Siam (Thailand had been renamed Siam in 1945 in a burst of national humility) settled its problems with China and France and after mending her fences with the Soviet Union (with which diplomatic relations had been suspended for a long time) was admitted to the U.N. on April 29, 1947 as the 55th member. In 1947 Marshall Pibul managed to escape trial as collaborator, again seized control of the government and restored the name of Thailand.

The three basic problems of Thailand have been political stability, economic prosperity and security. Like other Asian countries Thai economy is backward and rural and needs industrial transformation. Economic struggle and internal struggle among the military and civilian liberals for effective control of the Government have been regular features of Thai politics since 1945. Her rice surpluses were used to relieve famine and hunger in South-East Asia and the U.S.A. got off to a good start with Thailand by obliging Britain to pay for 1,500,000 tons of rice delivered by Thailand. The anti-communist policies of Songgram have earned a fund of goodwill in the U.S.A. In 1950, he dispatched a small expeditionary force to fight on the side of the U.N. in Korea and in return obtained lavish economic aid from the U.S.A., the World Bank and the U.N. which has not always been used economically and part of which has passed in private pockets. These policies, of course, antagonized the Chinese and the Communist world. The Communists from Malaya and Indo-China threatened Thailand in their thrust toward Laos and Cambodia. Thailand at once appealed to the U.N. for an observation team to report any spread of aggression from Indo-China.

The problem of security rests on geographical configuration. In contrast to the insular Philippines and Indonesian Republic, Thailand is critically located for any communist activity in South-East Asia. "With Communist China pressing close on the north, with the vulnerable states of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam sharing her eastern borders, and with an uncommitted Burma to the west, Thailand understandably feels exposed and threatened". She was even more security conscious as a result of the Viet Minh thrust into Laos and Cambodia early in 1953, the establishment of a "Thai Autonomous People's Government in

South China announced by the Chinese Communists in January 1953 and the fifth column potential of 3,000 000 overseas Chinese within her borders. All these factors drove Thailand in the SEATO and made her a willing recipient of U.S. military aid and economic assistance. Thailand is also a close supporter of the U.N. At one time Thai-Burmese relations were very unhappy. In 1767 the Burmese had sacked the Thai capital Ayutthia. The British colonial rulers deliberately kept up the anti-Burmese feeling among the Thais in order to prevent understanding and friendship between the Burmese and the Thais. European writers on Burma and Siam tended to give undue emphasis on the sack of Ayutthia and only recently, with the waning of colonial rule in South East Asia has it been possible for the Thais to forget Ayutthia and clasp the hand of friendship held out by the Burmese. In order to augment her security Thailand has also been advocating the idea of affiliation with Laos and Cambodia.

Although never a colony, Thai nationalism has been fairly intense though it has antecedents different from those in other Asian countries. The country could not escape the political and psychological effects of colonialism in neighbouring states. The continual threats of political encroachments by Britain and France "helped mould Thai national unity". The institution of monarchy has also been a great unifying factor to which all Thais are bound together by loyalty. Again, Thailand has less ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity than other South East Asian states. Finally, the Japanese occupation also roused Thai nationalism.

We have referred to the political instability of Thailand. Throughout the period up to 1951, Thai politics was turbulent. The relatively high degree of political stability which Thailand had enjoyed under the leadership of Marshall Pibul Songgram since the coup of November 1931 and the subsequent election in February 1932 was shaken by events in 1937. Important developments during 1937 included a general election in February, the declaration of a state of emergency in March, the disintegration of the Seri Manangasila (the main government political party since 1935), the overthrow of Pibul's government in September by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Minister for Defence, Marshall Sarit Thanarat and a further general election in December 1937 which led to the formation of the present government headed by Lieutenant General Thanom Kittikachorn. At present Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and a Unicameral Parliament. These political changes, however, did not involve any change in foreign policy. All political leaders throughout the crisis in 1957 favoured Thailand's close co-operation with the U.S. and continued membership of SEATO. In November 1957 in an

tures, and the solemn declarations that were the product of war necessity had nothing to sustain them once the war was over. The pattern of discussions on disarmament became stereotyped. Every meeting became a circus show in which national views were paraded, charges and counter charges were hurled on each other, and the cold war was waged with full fury. In regard to the atomic weapons the U S A proposed the so-called *Baruch Plan* (after Bernard M Baruch) on June 14, 1946 providing for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which would be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy with managerial control of potentially dangerous atomic energy activities and power to control, inspect, and licence all other atomic activities. It was proposed that once an adequate system of control was agreed upon, manufacture of atomic bombs would stop, existing bombs would be disposed of, and the authority would be in possession of full information for the production of atomic energy. On the other hand, the U S S R on June 19 proposed a convention banning the atomic weapons and destruction of all stocks of atomic weapons (in those days an American monopoly) within a period of 3 months after its adoption. This was to be followed by an international inspection which would rule out the possibility of direct international interference in the domestic affairs of a state. Next year, on June 11, 1947, the Soviet Union elaborated the proposals further and endorsed the concept of an international Control Commission within the framework of the U N Security Council where the veto would apply. Thus the Western powers vehemently opposed. The stalemate was complete. On May 17, 1948, the control committee of the A E C in its third report stated that it had reached an impasse and blamed the Soviet Union for having sabotaged the majority's atomic control plan.

On October 2, 1948 the U S S R slightly modified its position and proposed that there should be a "simultaneous" enforcement of prohibition and international control, and that the A E C should resume its work. However, what specific measures of international control were envisaged by the U S S R was not clear. Nor was it made clear as to how such measures could effectively be introduced "simultaneously" with prohibition if they had not been worked out in detail in advance. On October 19, however, the Western powers agreed to revive the suspended A E C, but on October 20, the U N Political Committee rejected the Soviet proposals of October 2, and on November 4 the General Assembly approved the plan of the Western powers. Under this plan an international agency would control the production of atomic energy and raw materials, grant licences to states to set up atomic undertakings for peaceful purposes, and inspect the territories of all nations to prevent and detect secret production of atomic energy.

and other violations of the agreed plan. The Soviet bloc, quite naturally, voted against the plan, holding that it would give the international control agency arbitrary control over the life and development of other states—an objection which reflected the Soviet suspicion of the West.

In spite of this setback, the A.E.C. resumed its meetings on February 18, 1949, after nine months. On February 25 the U.S.S.R. renewed its old proposals without any important change. The whole business became extremely dreary. The A.E.C. after two dozen formal sessions and hundreds of committee meetings voted 9 to 2 on July 29, with the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Ukraine opposing, to call off its negotiations on the international control of atomic energy "until such time as the sponsoring powers have reported that there exists a basis for agreement".

On September 23, 1949 Truman disclosed that an atomic explosion had taken place in the U.S.S.R. The U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons was no more. This event did not bring about any material change at that time although it went a long way in softening down the rigid attitude of the Western powers in later years. So, on November 23 the General Assembly voted 49 to 5 (the Soviet bloc opposing) the majority plan. This was followed by the "Essentials of Peace" resolution of the General Assembly on December 1 under which members pledged themselves to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to seek international control of armaments.

With the turn of the year, the Soviet Union had taken up the question of representation of the People's Republic of China in the U.N. A Soviet move to unseat Chiang Kai-shek's representative having failed, the U.S.S.R. withdrew from the U.N. organs including the A.E.C. The developments of the Korean War after June 25, 1950, however, brought back the U.S.S.R. to the U.N. The Soviet reply to the Western move (e.g. Essentials of Peace) was to convene a Peace Conference on March 19, 1950 at Stockholm where the Stockholm Resolution was adopted. The resolution demanded prohibition and strict international control of the atom bomb and the condemnation as a war criminal of the first government to use atomic weapons. This, then, is the story of the A.E.C. upto 1950.

We have noted that in February 1947, a Commission on Conventional Armaments had been created. A similar deadlock ensued there too. If the Western powers proposed that disarmament should be preceded by disclosures of the existing military strength by all countries and establishment of an effective system of verification and disclosure, the U.S.S.R. condemned the proposed census as a camouflage for spying activities and proposed an all-round reduction of existing armed forces by one-third. On

August 12, 1948 the C C A recommended the principles for a system for regulating and reducing armaments and armed forces. It was proposed that all states having substantial military forces must adhere to the system of control. But the real trouble developed on November 19 when the Assembly recommended that the Security Council take up the question of arms census. On February 10, 1949 the Council advised the C C A to gather and verify military data from all U N members. The chasm between the Western powers and the U S S R was widening. The latter reacted sharply to the suggestion of arms census. On July 7 France proposed the creation of an agency free of the veto to plan a world wide census of non atomic weapons and armed forces. This was vetoed by the U S S R on October 11.

Undeterred, the General Assembly on December 5 (with the Soviet bloc opposing), asked the Security Council to continue study of means to regulate the world's armed forces and conventional armaments. The Soviet reply was given on October 23, 1950 when they proposed "the strengthening of peace" resolution embodying the demands of Stockholm Resolution. It was also proposed that the 5 Great powers enter a peace pact and as a first step toward disarmament reduce their armed forces by one-third within one year. At that time the Western powers were increasing their armies to strengthen the NATO and the proposals to reduce armed forces were, therefore, bound to fail. The Soviet resolution was rejected by the Assembly on October 30, 1950. Like the AEC, the C C A had completely stalemated.

New Approach, 1950 On October 24, 1950 Truman suggested a new approach by merging the work of the A E C and the C C A. It took the world full 5 years to realize that any successful plan for disarmament must include all kinds of weapons. Truman suggested that it must be based on unanimous agreement and on safeguard, which will ensure the compliance by all nations. The safeguards, he argued, must be adequate to give immediate warning of any threatened violation, that disarmament must be policed continuously and thoroughly, and that it must be founded upon free and open interchange of information across national borders. In pursuance of this line of thought and to meet the Soviet peace propaganda, the Assembly adopted the so-called "Peace Through Deeds" Resolution on March 14, 1951. This same idea of peace through deeds was elaborated in the 6th session of the General Assembly in November 1951 when Dean Acheson presented a disarmament plan jointly sponsored by Britain, France and the United States. Under this plan the U N was to get ready an inventory of existing armaments, including atom bombs. The national inventories of all armed forces and armaments were to be checked and verified in each country by inspectors who would work under the U N. Secondly, the plan suggested that there should

be some criteria for the balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces of each country. Finally, the plan proposed a continuous U. N. inspection to make certain that each nation complied. Dean Acheson introducing this plan challenged the Soviet Union to translate peace talk in deeds. "The record of the past year", he said, "doesn't reveal a single action—and I am talking about action, not words—by the Soviet Union that indicates that it is willing to co-operate with the rest of the world in abating the tensions and dangers of war".

This plan was in a way an improvement on the previous Western stand for it included atomic weapons in an arms census and it treated the reduction of both conventional and atomic armaments as a single problem. Within 10 hours the U.S.S.R. rejected this plan. Vyshinsky denounced it as "spurious" and styled it as "dead mouse". "I could hardly sleep all night last night", he said, "after having read that speech. I could not sleep because I kept laughing". He, then, proposed his own plan providing for a Disarmament Conference, prohibition of the atomic bomb, but without inspection, and the old one-third reduction of armaments which the West had previously rejected since it would leave unchanged the Russian preponderance of strength over the West. In the view of the Western statesmen this plan, if accepted, would disarm the West without similar disarmament behind the Iron Curtain. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs called it the "same old record as before, only somewhat more scratchy this time". The U.S. delegate commented: "Old claims, old misrepresentations, old charges and old proposals". On January 11, 1952, Truman's suggestion of October 24, 1950 was implemented and the Assembly voted to establish a single Disarmament Commission to replace the A.E.C. and the C.C.A.,

The Disarmament Commission was to be composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada. It was directed to prepare draft proposals to be embodied in a treaty or treaties for submission to a conference of all states. The Commission, was convened for the first time on February 4, 1952 and the same day it set up 2 committees, one to deal with the regulation of all armaments and armed forces and the other to deal with disclosures and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces.

The conflict in essentials that broke down the A.E.C. and the C.C.A. also afflicted the Disarmament Commission (D.C.). A week after the D.C. had been set up, the General Assembly transmitted to it the revised proposals of the U.S.S.R. on atomic and conventional armaments. The proposals included prohibition of nuclear weapons and the establishment of international control over enforcement, with instructions to the D.C. to prepare, not

later than June 1, 1952, a draft convention providing measures for implementing To these proposals (submitted to the D C on January 19, 1952) the United States replied on April 5, 1952 by proposing "Progressive and Continuous Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments" The U S proposal dealt with the problem of advance warning against violations and methods for verification, including aerial surveys and ground inspection The Soviet representative on the D C objected to the proposed system of inspection and to the phasing of atomic disclosures He proposed (on April 8) that the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of control should come into effect simultaneously, and that continuous inspection be undertaken by an international control organ but without interference in domestic affairs of states

There was, in fact, no sincere effort on the part of the Western Powers to harmonize the goals of disarmament with the national independence of States Majoritarianism in international relations may well spell tyranny for the majority of simple and innocent souls Every time the U S A proposed effective international control scheme, the U S S R took the position that international control organ should not become an instrument of interference in domestic matters In this the majority of the Asian-African states agreed with the U S S R On April 24, the U S A introduced in the D C the "Essential Principles of a Disarmament Programme" under which armed forces and armaments should be reduced to such a point that no state would be in a position to start a war or to undertake the preparations for war without the previous knowledge of other states or be in a position to commit any act of physical aggression against any other state In addition, the U S also repeated their proposal of an effective international system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments (including atomic armaments) and international control

The U S proposal to reduce the armed forces was further elaborated on May 28, 1952 when the U S A, the U K. and France submitted a paper containing a working formula for numerical limitation of all armed forces This formula suggested a basis of discussion, and provided for a maximum of between one and one and a half million men each for the total strength of the armed forces of the U S A, the U S S R and China, and between 700,000 and 800,000 each for the U K and France All other states would have agreed maxima normally less than 1% of each country's population The plan also specified various safeguards and was supplemented with proposals aimed to prevent undue concentration of permitted forces The Soviet Union rejected these proposals on August 12 as mischievous and unrealistic Same day the 3 Western powers suggested the holding of a 5-power disarmament conference in order to negotiate on the distribution of armed forces, types and quantities of armament, elimination of major

weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and the effective international control of atomic energy. On August 29, Malik rejected this proposal as ill-conceived and premature.

On November 1, 1952 the U.S.A. and on August 12, 1953 the U.S.S.R. tested the first hydrogen bombs which were many times more destructive than the existing ones. The movement of Disarmament acquired fresh urgency but politicians and militarists were yet exhibiting their bankruptcy. However, the backward areas were clamouring for less expenditure on arms and for more aid for their economic reconstruction. On December 8, 1953 in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Eisenhower proposed an **Atoms for Peace** plan for the international development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Under this plan the nations principally concerned would make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency to be set up under the aegis of the U.N. The experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities, including the provision of abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. At the same time the major powers agreed to start high level talks on atomic controls. In the D.C. the Soviet Union's demand to include Communist China, India and Czechoslovakia in the talks was rejected.

On May 2, 1954 the South-East Asian Powers meeting at Colombo supported the efforts of the Disarmament Commission to bring about the elimination and prohibition of hydrogen bombs. Public opinion, in Asia particularly, was in favour of cessation of atomic experiments and utilisation of nuclear energy for peaceful construction. The Soviet Union took the view that unless atomic weapons were prohibited, it would not take part in the international atomic energy pool proposed by Eisenhower. To break this deadlock the D.C. sub-committee consisting of Canada, France, the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S. met in London on May 13, 1954. After preliminary exchange of views, on June 11, the Western powers proposed a disarmament programme which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression, and would freeze all military expenditure and manpower at the December 1953 levels. A treaty was envisaged which would essentially provide for the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, for the diversion of existing military stocks and for the establishment of a control organ to supervise observance of the treaty. A detailed plan for the timing of the introduction of these reductions, prohibitions and control was presented.

These proposals, as usual, were rejected by the U.S.S.R. It submitted new proposals of its own which added to the previous

Soviet position suggestions for an international control organ to carry out inspection on a continuing basis without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. This the Western powers rejected. The D.C., therefore, completely failed to break the eight year old deadlock. In this background the Potomac Declaration of June 29, issued by Eisenhower and Churchill from Washington, did not inspire or encourage anybody.

The situation, however, improved a little with the conclusion of the truce in Indo-China on July 21, 1954. A week later the D.C. unanimously agreed to submit for consideration India's proposal for an interim 'standstill agreement on nuclear explosions (about which opinion in India was strongly asserting) and full publicity of the extent of destructive power and known effects of these weapons'. The D.C., however, could not reach an agreement and adjourned.

On September 30, 1954 the U.S.S.R. presented a new draft resolution on disarmament to the General Assembly, based on the Anglo-French proposals of June 1954. For the first time the U.S.S.R. accepted the principle of inspection and international control. The Western representatives expressed satisfaction. On October 22 the U.S.S.R. joined the Western powers in sponsoring a resolution in the sub-committee of the D.C. calling for a new attempt to achieve disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. In a hopeful atmosphere, on November 4, the Assembly, by a unanimous resolution, adopted recommendations on further efforts to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem by means of an international convention embodying the various proposals for (a) reduction, (b) prohibition, (c) inspection, (d) and international control. Gradually the statesmen appeared to be coming closer and have a look on each other with a view to understanding different points of view. There was more talk of peace now. The cold war seemed to be receding a little. On February 25, 1955 the Five-Nation Disarmament Sub-Committee (U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., France, and Canada) resumed its meetings. On March 8, the four Western powers presented to the sub-committee a joint resolution calling for a treaty to prohibit use of atomic weapons except in defence against aggression. The resolution recommended that the treaty provide that all states possessing nuclear weapons should regard themselves as prohibited (in accordance with the terms of the U.N. Charter) from the use of such weapons except in defence against aggression, pending the total prohibition of such weapons. The treaty was also to provide for total prohibition of nuclear weapons, for a major reduction in armed forces and armaments, and for the establishment of a control organ to guarantee observance of these conditions. On the one hand, the West was talking of reduction and control of arms and, on the other, for the defence of Western Europe and its contribution to the

NATO, the German Federal Republic was being asked to raise 12 divisions.

Taking full advantage of this situation, on March 18 the Soviet Union proposed a plan for disarmament containing a provision prohibiting increase in armed forces or military appropriations beyond the level of January 1, 1955. This plan thus resembled the one which had been jointly sponsored by Britain and France on June 11, 1954 (freezing all military expenditure and manpower at the December 1953 levels). But the net effect of the acceptance of the Russian proposals would have been that the German Federal Republic would have been prevented from raising the projected 12 Divisions. The Russian proposals were, therefore, received coldly by the Western powers. When the Sub-Committee began discussing levels of armed forces on 22nd March 1955, Mr. Gromyko revived the old Soviet proposal for a flat one-third cut in the forces of all major states. On March 29, the Anglo-French representatives made a counter-proposal that the armies of the five major powers should be reduced from one to one and a half million men for the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China and 650,000 for France and the U.K. After some patient negotiations, the Soviet Union accepted these figures and an important step forward was taken.

An interesting compromise was struck between the Western powers and the U.S.S.R. on the question of timings of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. On this question the U.S.S.R. had originally proposed that steps to eliminate nuclear stocks should be taken after 50% of the reductions of conventional armed forces and armaments had taken place. The Anglo-French position in 1954 was that these steps should be taken when these reductions had been completed. On April 19, 1955 the Anglo-French representatives to the D.C. in their new proposals recommended that a draft disarmament treaty should include provision for complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons to begin after 75% of reductions in conventional forces had been achieved. These proposals, therefore, met the Soviet Union half-way. The Soviet Union, therefore, accepted the 75% proposal on May 10, 1955, and the levels of reduction of arms as proposed by the Western powers on March 29, 1955. The old one-third cut proposal was thus abandoned by the Soviet Union and another step forward was taken.

However, while the Soviet Union accepted the 75% proposal and the levels of reductions as suggested by the Western powers, there still remained wide differences. On May 10, 1955 the Soviet Union also called for an international control agency, with inspectors chosen on an international basis, inspectors to establish control posts in big ports, railway junctions, motor roads and aerodromes. They also demanded dismantling of all foreign bases

and a ban on nuclear weapons testing. This last was the crux of the matter. On the one hand, unless there is a complete ban on nuclear weapons and a total elimination of stockpiles there would be no confidence between nations, on the other hand there is no scientific method yet by which one could know where atomic weapons are stockpiled. In the absence of such methods, disarmament may remain a fake. It becomes, therefore, vital that eminent scientists should develop the methods by which concealed nuclear weapons and materials may be detected. [Thus just when agreement had been reached between the West and the U.S.S.R. on the questions of levels of reduction of armed forces and armaments and the timing of disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular, the problem of discovering concealed weapons presented fresh difficulties.] On July 18, 1955, the summit talks between Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Faure began at Geneva and international tension continued to recede.

In order to overcome the difficulty just pointed out and in the hopeful atmosphere at the summit talks, Eisenhower proposed that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. should call for an exchange of blueprints on military information between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to be verified by mutual aerial reconnaissance as a "beginning" for a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament. Other heads of states agreed to study the proposals with the earnestness that they deserved. In the meantime the heads recommended that D.C. Sub-Committee which had suspended its work on June 1, pending the summit talks, resume its meetings in New York on August 29.

When the Sub-Committee met on August 29, the details of Eisenhower's Inspection Plan were given by the U.S. representatives. On the 1st of September the Soviet representative detailed his proposals providing for (a) armed forces of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., and Communist China to be cut from 1 to 1½ million men, with lower levels for other states, (b) a ban on the use of nuclear weapons when 75% of these cuts had been completed, (c) a total ban on and the destruction of atom bombs when the remaining 25% had been cut, (d) a Western promise to use atomic weapons in the interim only in cases defined as aggression by the Security Council, and (e) an immediate end to atomic tests. After patient correspondence, on September 19, 1955 Bulganin in a letter to Eisenhower accepted in principle the Eisenhower Plan for an exchange of military blueprints and mutual inspection of arms installations. This covered, by far the broadest area of agreement among the two major powers. For the first time name-calling and vituperation were given up. Molotov called the Eisenhower Plan as "an expression of a sincere desire" to make progress toward disarmament. Stassen expressed satisfaction over "a real improvement in the

climate of discussion and the exchange of views on facts as they exist in the world". Eisenhower and Bulganin now evolved what can be called diplomacy by letters and this was symbolic of the new attitudes. On October 7, 1955, the Sub-Committee of the D.C. unanimously approved its report, submitted it to the Disarmament Commission, and recessed in view of the approaching meeting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers at Geneva. On October 11 Eisenhower, in reply to Bulganin's letter of September 19, offered to accept the U.S.S.R. Plan for ground inspection team at key military concentration points in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., if the former accepted his plan for exchanging military blueprints and aerial reconnaissance rights. The two plans were finally approved by the General Assembly on December 16, 1955. Earlier on December 3, the Assembly had unanimously resolved to establish an International Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and a 15-member scientific committee to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information on the effects of atomic radiation.

On January 23, 1956 the D.C. agreed to ask its Sub-Committee to resume its work to strike out further areas of agreement on the question of control and inspection of armaments. On March 6 Eisenhower, in another letter to Bulganin, assured that "the U.S. would be prepared to work out with other nations suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons". On March 19 the D.C. Sub-Committee resumed its work in London.

In this series of the Sub-Committee meetings a revised Anglo-French Plan was submitted. This Plan provided for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. It provided for disarmament in three stages. In the *first stage*, on the conclusion of a Disarmament treaty, all states would stand prohibited from using nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression, and initial steps in control, inspection and reductions would be taken. In the *second stage*, limitation of nuclear test explosion would come into effect, the Five Powers would complete the first half of agreed reductions and a proportion of the savings would be allocated to the development of under-developed areas. In the *third stage*, the second half of agreed reductions would be completed, nuclear test explosions for military uses would be prohibited, and nuclear explosions for peaceful uses might take place under control and subject to the approval of an international scientific committee. On 27th March, Gromyko agreed that the control organization should be formed and established in the countries in which it would have to function before the processes of disarmament began.

The Area of Disagreement, 1956 In spite of this agreement, the broadest since 1945, some important differences remained. The first major difference was with regard to the powers to be given to the control organization. Under the Soviet Plan the agents of the control organization could only make recommendations, and before a Government in breach of the treaty could even be called upon to stop the breaches there must be a decision of the Security Council, where the veto operates. The Western Powers, on the other hand, would give the agents of the control organization certain rights of enforcement so that the effective functioning of control would not be hamstrung by the veto.

Secondly, whereas the Soviet Plan provided for the automatic carrying out of the process of disarmament irrespective of whether the control organization functioned effectively or not, under the Western plan actual disarmament must be conditional upon the effective functioning of the control organization.

Thirdly, whereas the last Soviet proposals did not deal with nuclear disarmament, the West insisted on including it in a general disarmament agreement.

Fourthly, there were some differences on the question of levels of conventional forces. Whereas the U.S. view was that the level at the end of the first phase of disarmament should be $2\frac{1}{2}$ million each for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., the Soviet view was that the level should be $1\frac{1}{2}$ million at the end of the whole process of conventional disarmament.

Finally, there was the difference in approach. The Soviet approach, on the whole, now seemed to be that outstanding political problems like that of Germany, Taiwan, and Chinese representation should be settled first if disarmament was to be lasting and real. The Western point of view was that a disarmament agreement would, of itself, help to reduce tension and that the two processes of security and settlement of disputes and disarmament could continue pari passu.

The Disarmament Sub Committee continued its meetings until May, 1956. The U.S.A. presented its working paper on April 3 for the first phase of a comprehensive disarmament but once again no agreement could be reached. At the final meeting of the Sub Committee, Canada, France, the U.K. and the U.S.A. made a joint declaration of the principles of a disarmament programme. They were (1) the programme should proceed by stages along with the settlement of major political problems, (2) effective international control, (3) stopping of stock piles of nuclear weapons at an appropriate stage, (4) a strong control organization providing against major surprise attacks, (5) preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale,

and (6) supervision of disarmament if a major state failed to carry out its obligations or if a threat to peace occurred,

After this failure, the D.C. met in July 1956. The only result was that it adopted by ten to one (Soviet Union) with one abstention (Yugoslavia) a resolution sponsored by Peru requesting the members of the Sub-Committee to study the various proposals made to the D.C. and report back to the commission. On July 6, 1956, Bulganin had addressed notes to Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S.A. pointing out the Soviet declaration made on May 14, 1956 that the Soviet armed force would be reduced by 1,200,000 men by May 1, 1957. Without permitting verification of these reductions by an international authority, he asked other powers to follow suit. The Western Powers replied that international supervisory mechanisms and controls were needed to encourage greater reductions. Eisenhower reminded Bulganin that he had rejected the U.S. proposal for mutual aerial inspection and exchange of military information made in July 1955 at the Summit Conference. On September 11, Bulganin reiterated the Soviet rejection of mutual aerial reconnaissance.

Fresh Proposals, November 1956. On November 17, the U.S.S.R. made fresh proposals of a disarmament treaty: (1) Within two years the forces of Russia, China and the U.S.A. be reduced to a level between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000; those of France and the U.K. to 650,000; and those of other states to 150,000—200,000. As a first step, armed forces be reduced to 2.5 million and 750,000 respectively. (2) Test explosions of nuclear weapons be discontinued forthwith and within a specified period the production of nuclear weapons should cease, their use prohibited and existing stockpiles be destroyed. (3) The army of Big Four in Germany be reduced by one-third during 1957. (4) During 1957 armies of Britain, U.S.A., and France stationed in the N.A.T.O. countries be cut down and the Soviet forces in the Warsaw Treaty countries be reduced. (5) Liquidation of bases in foreign countries. (6) Reduction in military expenditure. (7) A strict and effective international control system to supervise these arrangements.

Towards the end of 1956 the D.C. sent its report to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The First Committee of the Assembly discussed disarmament from January 14 to 25, 1957. After discussing 5 draft resolutions, it adopted a resolution recommending that the D.C. and its Sub-Committee give prompt attention to the various proposals and prepare a progress report by August 1, 1957. This resolution was passed by the Assembly on February 14, 1957. On March 25, the British Prime Minister and U.S. President in the Bermuda communique

declared that "in the absence of more general nuclear control agreements, an agreement on limitation of tests could not be effectively enforced for technical reasons, nor could breaches of it be surely detected" However, they announced that the world conduct tests in such a manner "as would keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be hazardous" and that "they would be willing to register with the U N advance notice of their intention to conduct future tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same"

Meanwhile, the Disarmament Sub-Committee had met in London on March 18, and it continued its meetings till September 6, 1957 It is needless to wade through several working papers and memoranda which were submitted and discussed In broad terms we may note that on April 12, Stassen outlined proposals for international control, and on April 30, the Soviet representative unfolded his plan covering force levels, conventional armaments, control measures, prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and cessation of tests, abolition of foreign bases, aerial inspection, and war propaganda On May 6, the British memorandum was submitted proposing, inter alia, the cessation of all nuclear test explosions following the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes as part of a general disarmament agreement The U K proposals were supported by Canada, France and the U S A, but the Soviet representative contended that there should be a prohibition or a temporary cessation of tests as an immediate step, independent of other disarmament measures and not subject to any international control In reply, the Western delegates agreed that there could be no certainty that tests could be detected unless some form of international control was instituted

Soviet Proposals, 1957

On June 14, 1957 the Soviet representative sprang a surprise by proposing an immediate ce-
sa-tion of nuclear tests for two or three years and the institution of international control over the cessation of tests He proposed the creation of an international commission responsible to the Security Council and the Assembly to supervise the fulfilment by states of their obligation to cease tests, and the establishment, on a basis of reciprocity, of control posts in the territory of Russia, U S A, U K, and the Pacific Ocean area to supervise the agreement For this the Western powers were hardly prepared In fact, the U S S R now was on top of its offensive "to expose the West" The Western powers, therefore, joined on July 2, and in a statement welcomed the Soviet move But now they linked the cessation of tests to measures for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes This, the Soviet

representative vehemently criticised and he reiterated that the test question should be singled out and settled immediately.

On August 1, the Sub-Committee approved its report to the D.C. On August 29, the Western powers submitted their working paper on the lines just referred. On September 6, the Sub-Committee approved their 5th report to the D.C. and concluded its session. The D.C. met on September 30, and just forwarded these reports of the Sub-Committee to the 12th session of the General Assembly. Its First Committee at once discussed disarmament and after discussing 9 draft resolutions, approved only two. The first, sponsored by 24 delegations, endorsed as the basis for continued negotiation in the D.C. and its Sub-Committee the measures of partial disarmament outlined in the Western proposals of August 29; and the second requested the D.C. to make recommendations concerning the organization of an effective and continuing publicity campaign on the effects of modern weapons of all kinds and of the necessity of reaching a disarmament agreement providing for effective measures of control. The Assembly adopted both the resolutions.

Enlargement of D.C. Another important result of the 12th session of the Assembly was the enlargement of the D.C. The Soviet proposal of a new commission consisting of all 82 members of the U.N. was lost and the 6-power resolution (India one of the six sponsoring powers) was adopted by 60-9-11, under which the D.C. for 1958 would consist of Canada, China, Colombia, France, Iraq, Japan, Panama, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. (11 members of the Security Council); and 14 new members—Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegate declared that his government would not serve on the enlarged commission.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis shows that the theory of disarmament as a source of security and peace, though tempting, is really elusive. It is tempting because disarmament means saving of enormous funds that are wasted; it means a climate of confidence and a culture of trust; it means survival which is now, in Churchill's phrase, "the twin brother of annihilation". It is elusive because governments and statesmen suspect the bonafides of their neighbours and pile up arms against the evil day when the imputed malevolence of a rival will explode into hostilities. It is elusive because a race for armament is essentially the product of fear. We seem to live in an atmosphere of impending catastrophe. The sputnik and the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles have unfolded a fearful picture.

And man in the grip of fear is the most dangerous enemy of man. Of all emotions the least compatible with freedom is fear, for fear leads to hysteria and hysteria to the victory of fear over reason, frozen attitudes, rigid postures and a mad race for arms manufacture. Even if it does not immediately lead to a hot war, it does lead to a cold war (which is but armed fear), and a severe competition in terms of power. Jealousies grow and suspicions multiply, and the international atmosphere becomes so charged with burning particles that even little incident may provoke a catastrophe. The theory of disarmament is elusive because all efforts at it have been failing and twenty centuries after the Sermon on Mount mankind still "treasures and piles up murderous weapons in its arsenal, divided against itself, its soul still backened by fratricidal passions and its hands still soiled by human blood"

Why has it been eluding us so far? Why have the efforts at disarmament not been able to bear fruits? For one thing, a formal and direct approach to the question tends to place too much faith in declarations. Disarmament, as we said earlier, is after all a symptom of international anarchy. It is, therefore, not primarily a technical problem of limiting the cruisers, destroyers or bombers. It is a psychological and a political problem of setting up an effective international organization capable of guaranteeing security and settling disputes by other means than those of arms. If armaments are conducive to war, disarmament cannot cut out the road to peace, for, if limitation of armament comes it will be an effect rather than a cause of peace. As long as the system of international politics rests on "power" and the sword remains the "Last Argument of Kings", armaments have a utility and we are unlikely to have them placed permanently on a non-competitive basis. To do this force is to be demoted from its role of supreme arbiter of change. Since this has not been done (and is unlikely to be done easily) armament limitation has always been agreed on (a) in a few cases, (b) for short periods of time (c) when conflict between the agreeing states seemed rather impossible and (d) when a state was defeated in a war and was a helpless victim in the hands of her victors.

Thus, whether it is the question of quantitative disarmament or qualitative, arms-building holidays or revision of the rules of war—what Quincy Wright has called disarmament, not of materials but of methods—moral rearmament or pacific movements, on all such matters, one comes to a dead end. Basically, therefore, the problem of disarmament is not one of cutting down the strength of armed forces or reducing the tonnage of war vessels. It is "a problem of the organization of the world community" not in terms of "balance of power" but in terms of elimination of force as an instrument of foreign policy. (If the nations are assured that in case of attack they will not stand alone and that they can rely on

the collective force of the world community, they will have less arms and less armies.)

As long as this is not brought about, the Leviathan may give up the sword of justice but never the sword of war. The difficult question of agreements on the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, the creation of an international police force and the system of international control and inspection are all capable of solution if there is the will to submit to the rule of law. In the absence of this will budgetary limitations would always be by-passed, bacteriological weapons would certainly be employed, civilian goods would be used as war material, for today the range of national war material is unlimited. It is, therefore, primarily a question of reorganization of world-state system to prevent war.

One view is that this will never come by mutual agreement for in the free judgement of nations anarchy is better than loss of independence. "Just as the substitution of orderly government for anarchy in the Middle Ages depended upon the victory of the royal power", Bertrand Russell has written, "so the substitution of order for anarchy in international relations, if it comes about, will come about through the power of some one nation or group of nations". Unfortunately this view rests on the highly questionable assumption that in a world-wide conflict one nation or one group of nations would so hold a complete monopoly of scientific talent and raw materials that the other would have no other option except to seek survival by submission. As we argued earlier, if the prospect before a losing party is "loss of independence" and the hope of a winning party is "unconditional surrender of the adversary" the war would be total and a total war would spell complete annihilation. There would be no ruler and no ruled, none to enjoy the fruits of 'victory' or to suffer loss of independence. It is, therefore, by trial and error, by more and more study of the problems of war and peace, by greater advancement of science and better opportunities to the poor and the lowly, that the movement of disarmament can proceed further and on the right track. At one time it was fondly believed by many that a unilateral suspension of nuclear tests by one power or the other would change the entire atmosphere and that this would be followed by a general suspension of tests. The U.S.S.R. announced a unilateral suspension in 1958 but the Western powers refused to follow suit. The U.S.S.R. resumed the tests. But there is still some hope that sanity will prevail.

CHAPTER 24

The Minorities

We have covered the Minority problems from 1919 to 1939 in Part One. In the U N Charter, as a result of the deep concern felt for human rights, provisions were made in four different Articles to the effect that the United Nations should promote the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. This is mentioned in Sec 2 of Article 1, in clause (h) of Article 13, in Article 55 providing for social and economic co-operation, and in Art 76 devoted to the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System. Nowhere in the Charter the term "minorities" has been used. The phrase "non-discrimination" was taken to be quite adequate to cover the interests of minority groups.

THE U N AND MINORITIES

There have been, in broad terms, four principal methods or spheres in which the United Nations have sought to tackle this complex problem. First, it has passed several resolutions, and has adopted conventions for the use of states concerned. The principal item, in this, has been the Declaration of Human Rights. Secondly, it has promoted research work, and collected and published useful material on the question. Thirdly, it has played an advisory role of some value. And finally, it has tried to deal with the question of discrimination in specific geographical areas.

A Resolutions and Conventions At the second part of its first session in November 1946, the U N General Assembly passed a resolution declaring that it was in the interest of humanity to stop all religious and racial persecution and discrimination and asking the governments to take prompt and energetic steps to that end. This resolution was sponsored by Egypt for she was anxious to stop the exodus of Jews from Central Europe. Under Art 68 of the Charter, the Economic and Social Council at its first session established the Commission on Human Rights, in order to consider an International Bill of Rights, a convention on Civil Liberties, the protection of minorities and the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language or religion. Ultimately, the Commission decided to concentrate its work on the drafting of an international bill of rights as that would cove

nearly the whole ground. To consider the problem of discrimination, the Commission elected a sub-commission of 12 experts. The third session of the General Assembly at Paris on December 10, 1948 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Forty-eight nations voted in favour of it, none against, and eight abstained. For the first time in history, in this document containing 30 Articles and covering a wide range of man's needs in society, the greater part of the world's population reached agreement on the broad definition of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Along with this declaration, the third Assembly also adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Therein the U.N. took a stand in relation to the sacred right of existence of human groups and established certain international safeguards for the protection of that right. In fact the Universal Declaration and the Genocide Convention are supplementary in that the former deals with the rights of the individual, while the latter seeks legal protection against destruction of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. In an effort to meet a particular need, a U.N. Conference in 1951 adopted the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. After the adoption of these by the Assembly, the Commission turned its attention to the completion of the Covenants on Human Rights which were meant to specify in binding legal terms the rights which had been proclaimed by the Declaration as a common standard of achievement. The draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains non-discrimination clause, and includes a special Article on the rights of minorities. Article 25 of the draft provides that in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities "shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language". The draft not only provides for these safeguards but also provides for their implementation. Under it complaints by one state against another for non-fulfilment of the obligations under the Covenant may be brought before a Committee charged with the function of fact finding and conciliation and may ultimately be submitted to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. The draft also obliges all states to submit annual reports under the Covenant. An elaborate system of reporting on the progress made by each party in achieving the observance of these obligations has been provided.

B. Study and Research. If it is correct to say that existing racial differences do not justify discriminatory practices or, in other words, that such practices are based not on rational considerations but on prejudice against certain races, the correct

step is to attempt to eradicate such prejudice. This is primarily an educational task. This is the second sphere in which the U N have attempted to tackle the problem of minorities. The studies concerned with the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities have helped to identify the causes from which discriminatory practices arise and to classify those rights which need particular emphasis in situations where discrimination has violated the rights of the individual or the group. In this sphere the role of the U N E S C O has been extremely important. It has not only endeavoured to collect and gather the present knowledge about race concept, but has also provided a forum for specialists from various countries and has enabled them to reach agreed formulation of certain conclusions on the subject. The "Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences" by Physical, Anthropologists and Geneticists adopted in June 1951 by 12 outstanding scientists and subsequently accepted throughout the world is a historic document. The results of recent researches on race relations are made available to the educated public. An information centre has been established by the U N E S C O to collect all available information and to disseminate it through periodic publications. Moreover, the U N E S C O has also undertaken to collect the empirical data relating to successful integration of different social and racial groups, as for instance in Brazil.

The underlying idea of all this work is to counter racial prejudice by preventing ideas about racial superiority from being implanted in young minds. The flow of ideas across national frontiers cannot be stopped and ideas of racial equality, therefore, will go a long way in eradicating race complex. After all, the academic research work only underlines various rights which had been violated.

C. Advisory Role But it is obvious that no international organization, at present, can compel national authorities to accept a scientific racial policy. It can only advise the governments to avoid discriminatory practices. Recommendation to governments, therefore is the principal method of the U N. Its advisory role is, therefore, significant. At its fifth session in 1952, the sub-commission at the instance of the Indian representative, Mr M R Masani also considered the problem of advisory assistance in combating discrimination and granting protection to minorities. It was suggested that such advisory services might be extended to states at their request as part of the U N Technical Assistance Programme. This was approved by the Sub-Commission and finally endorsed by an Assembly Resolution in 1953 under which the Assembly authorized the Secretary General to render, at the request of any State member of the U N, technical advice and other services in order to assist the government of that state within

its territory in the eradication of discrimination or in the protection of minorities or both. These services might include technical advice regarding the drafting of legislation and the establishment of administrative and judicial machinery and appropriate services like education.

This resolution, obviously, does not go very far, for, advice can be extended to a country at its own request and a state that is out to discriminate will never ask for such advice. Indeed, no request for assistance has so far been received by the Secretary-General. The Assembly considered this aspect at its tenth session in 1955 and by a resolution of December 14, 1955 authorized the Secretary-General to provide for assistance to governments in the form of advisory services of experts, fellowships and scholarships and seminars. The sub-commission at its eighth session in January 1956 suggested a remedy to overcome the reluctance of governments to ask for U.N. assistance. It was suggested that the Secretary-General might organize seminars of representatives of governments concerned and help creating the necessary stimulus to reluctant governments, and that these seminars be held on limited subjects in order to study any specific method which in a certain country had achieved hopeful results.

D. Implementation of Non-Discrimination. Finally, the U.N. have dealt with the problem of minorities in specific geographic areas. These areas fall into three categories—(a) Trust Territories under which the U.N. has clearly defined supervisory responsibilities; (b) Non-Self-Governing Territories in respect of which the administering states accepted certain obligations in signing the Charter and over which the U.N. itself has been assuming an increasing measure of responsibility, and (c) sovereign states in relation to which the U.N. has no control except through pressures, publicity and persuasion.

Trust Territories. As regards the Trust Territories, under the Charter human rights are to be respected without discrimination. This is the obligation of the Trusteeship Council. It sends missions of investigation to various territories, invites comments from the administering authority and makes recommendations to the Assembly. For instance, it sent, in 1954, a Visiting Mission to Tanganyika where there are Africans, Europeans and Asians and where discrimination in hotels, hospitals, prisons, employment and schools is noted. The Visiting Mission in their report brought the discrimination to the notice of the Council which invited comments of the Administering Authority on the Mission's report. The Administering Authority while affirming cases of discrimination on the part of certain private individuals declared that the situation was steadily improving. The Trusteeship Council did not altogether endorse the observations of the Administering

Authority but adopted a resolution recommending that the Administering Authority put an end to discrimination by educating public opinion and, if necessary, by adopting penal legislation. Thus constant supervision by the Council acts as a spur to governments to expedite the advancement of under-privileged groups and prevents them from erring on the side of moderation.

Non-Self Governing Territories In relation to the Non-Self-Governing Territories, there is the Committee on Information from Non Self Governing Territories to express critical views and make recommendations to the Administering Authorities. This Committee has devoted special attention to the problem of racial discrimination in colonies in social and educational conditions. One of the special functions of this Committee has been to see whether protective legislation has been used by the administering powers as a cloak for discriminatory measures to the disadvantage of the indigenous population. In its report submitted to the tenth session of the Assembly in 1955, the Committee reviewed the progress and noted that legislative developments in a number of Territories under review had been encouraging. The case of Malaya was particularly cited to show the extension of citizenship rights to a large number of Chinese and Indian inhabitants.

Independent States Case of Racial Discrimination in South Africa As far as the prevention of racial discrimination in independent states is concerned, the most important case considered by the U N has been that of the Union of South Africa where the policy of *apartheid* contemplates the setting aside of areas in South Africa in which African interests are to be paramount and areas in which white interests are to be predominant. On the basis of differences in race, civilization, culture, general way of life, and religion, discrimination is practised against non whites in clubs, restaurants, hotels, schools, services, prisons, trains and in respect of marriages, land and buildings. The policy envisages the setting up of separate self sufficient socio-economic units under the final control of a government in which the non-whites will not be directly represented. Thus in their denial of racial equality, the policies of the South African government run directly counter to the world-wide movement towards respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language, or religion.

Now, for more than ten years, the United Nations has been dealing unsuccessfully with one aspect of the South African racial problem the treatment of South African national of Indian origin. These people (about 300,000 in number) have been the object of all kinds of discriminatory laws designed to restrict their freedom of movement, use of public facilities, employment in industries and engagement in business activities,

voting and office-holding privileges, freedom of residence, admission to schools and universities, and marriage with people of other races. The Indian Government brought this situation to the attention of the General Assembly in 1946 charging that the government of the Union was violating international agreements previously entered into with India regarding the treatment of these people and was also violating the provisions of the U.N. Charter relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was subsequently cited as an additional reason for international action concerning this problem.

The first resolution passed by the Assembly on December 8, 1946 was a compromise condemnation. It noted that relations between India and South Africa were strained, expressed its opinion that the treatment of Indians should conform to the "international obligations" assumed in the agreements between the two states, and the relevant provisions of the Charter and asked the two governments to report back to the next session on measures adopted "to this effect". The reaction in South Africa was immediate and it was construed as illegal and unjustified interference by the U.N. in their internal affairs.

In 1949, another resolution called for a round-table conference. But by this time the room for friendly discussion had run out: the government of Smuts had been replaced by that of Dr. Malan who was wedded to the principle of white supremacy in South Africa. The new government at once proceeded to enact the Group Areas Act which provided for the establishment of areas for the exclusive occupation or ownership of single racial groups and limited trade to those living in the area. On this, India and Pakistan refused to take part in any round-table discussion. During 1950 and 1951 the U.N. Assembly made efforts for the resumption of direct talks between the three states and in vain appealed to South Africa to suspend the enforcement of the Group Areas Act. In 1952, at its seventh session, the Assembly established a 3-man good offices commission to try to bring the parties together, repeating its request to the Union Government not to enforce the Group Areas Act. This Commission was to report to the Assembly in the fall of 1953.

At the two following sessions the mandate of the Commission was reviewed. But the Government of South Africa refused to co-operate with the Commission and refused to allow its members to visit the country. Nevertheless, the Commission did a fine job and reached the conclusion that the policy of *apartheid* would never be accepted willingly by the masses subjected to discrimination, and that everyday that passed rendered the problem less open to settlement by conciliation, information and education. In the

three reports that the Commission made till 1955, it suggested that a few round table conferences of representatives of the various racial groups in the Union assisted by a number of the U N representatives might lead to the change in *apartheid* policy. The United Nations, the Commission proposed, should offer technical, financial, economic and social assistance, so that peaceful relations might develop among various racial groups in South Africa. Moreover, due to the thoroughly unhelpful attitude of South Africa no constructive step could be taken by the U N. Indeed, at the tenth session, South Africa went to the extent of withdrawing its delegation from the Assembly after the *ad hoc* Political Committee had adopted a resolution reminding the government of its Charter obligations and renewing the term of the Commission. This last clause, however, failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority and the work of the Commission was discontinued. In 1955, the Assembly adopted a resolution urging the parties concerned to pursue negotiations directly and to report to the next session of the Assembly. The Union, however, refused to initiate any discussion, because "matters relating to persons of Indian origin in South Africa are essentially of a domestic character and are thus not the concern of the U N". On November 27, 1956 the Union informed the Assembly that it would only maintain "a token representation" at the Assembly meetings and the H Q. of the U N in protest against its interference in the Union's domestic affairs. But the Assembly passed a resolution on January 30, 1957 calling upon the Union to reconsider its position and revise its policies in the light of its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter. The Union was invited "to co-operate in a constructive approach more particularly by its presence in the U N" and the Secretary-General was asked to communicate with the Union "as appropriate". On February 3, 1957, Dag Hammarskjöld transmitted the text of the resolution to the Union but no reply was received. On August 8, 1957, eight Arab-Asian countries asked the Assembly to include the question of race conflict in the Union on the agenda of the 12th session.

Thus even today, in the Union, non whites are threatened with exclusion from the two remaining inter-racial Universities and new legislation (1957) grants to the government the "power to forbid a non European to attend any gathering where his presence is considered a nuisance". The Group Areas Act (which zones the whole country racially), the Population Registration Act (under which all the inhabitants must register by race), the Bantu Education Act (which aims at preparing the Africans for the role of servants in the white world), the Pass laws (which control the movements of Africans) and many other laws have established a reign of terror. This reign of terror is described

by the Union leaders as an example of "the contact between a ward and a guardian".

APPRAISAL OF THE U.N. ROLE

Thus after years of toil and struggle the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination is being practised relentlessly and the U.N. failed to convince or punish a state which is openly violating the U.N. Charter. This only proves what we stated earlier—in relation to an independent state, at any rate, the U.N. has no effective control. Not only the South African discriminatory policies continue unpunished or unchecked, relatively few Greek children were sent back to their parents and not very significant results were achieved in the effort to return prisoners of war to their homes.

While judging the record of the U.N. one has to bear in mind several difficulties. In the first place, there is the question of domestic jurisdiction. States usually oppose the U.N. action on the ground that it infringes their domestic jurisdiction. More disturbing is the fact that human rights and freedom have been approached with a very unhappy combination of justice and political bickering. Then, again, there is the divergence between theory and practice as elsewhere.

Not that the U.N. record is one of complete failure. As an international forum of debate on minorities and racial discrimination, the U.N. has definitely led to a gradual awakening of "a human rights conscience". This conscience is, of course, still feeble in its operation and is beclouded by national and political interests. Nevertheless, it is making its voice heard. These debates, involving an attempt to define racial discrimination and human rights, do provide a kind of elementary education. They do throw a spotlight of publicity upon domestic practices of many countries. All these things have certainly established an international standard of minority treatment which ought to be upheld and any falling short of it or deviation by a nation has to be refuted or explained or defended or remedied. The truth is that the concept of Human Rights as incorporated in the Declaration has had tremendous impact not only in international treaties like the Somaliland Agreement, the Japanese Peace Treaty or the Statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union but also in the constitutions of various countries like Indonesia, Costa Rica, Syria, El Salvador, Haiti, etc. and in the legislations and judicial decisions of international and national courts. The studies undertaken by the United Nations have had some influence upon the drafting of the Memorandum of understanding agreed upon between the Italian and Yugoslav Governments on 5th October, 1954 regarding the status of population in the Free Territory of Trieste.

It can, of course, be argued that acrimonious debates embitter feelings and make the solution of a problem more difficult and that agreements based on political considerations do not bring the settlement nearer. But the ideas are a great propelling force in human progress and debates keep ideas alive. These debates also tend to prevent aggravation of a situation. They do offer hope to those who are suffering persecution in the knowledge that the U N is feeling concerned about them. As in other spheres, the U N works as a clearing house of the ideas and experience. Technical and economic assistance and programmes of advisory services lead to a sharing of ideas and experience relating to the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities.

And yet that is all that any international body can do at the present stage of development of international organization. Its basis is still the concept of sovereignty which does not admit of effective functioning of any international machinery. The U N therefore can discuss, debate, resolve, and recommend, it cannot decide. Its weapons, therefore, are study, information, discussions, resolutions, research and investigation, persuasion, and appeal to public opinion. These weapons can achieve limited results even though the objectives are wide. The objectives are certain: protection of minorities, defence of human rights and prevention of discrimination. It is impossible to get away from them. The U N, starting from the premise that it would not enter the field of minority problems, soon discovered that it was an untenable position. What is uncertain is the efficacy of the weapons and the range of results. But as long as a more effective international machinery is not developed it is vital that available weapons be tried to achieve the maximum.

CHAPTER 25

The Trusteeship System

During the course of World War II the operation of the mandate system under the League of Nations practically remained suspended. But there was no doubt that the trend of world opinion was very sympathetic to the aspirations and the rapid advancement of the subject peoples. In the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 (and this was confirmed in the U.N. Declaration on January 1, 1942) Churchill and Roosevelt had declared that they "desire no territorial aggrandizement", "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned", and that "they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live". Thus in relation to dependent areas, the Atlantic Charter implied that territories to be taken or detached from Italy and Japan would either become independent or be placed under some kind of international control.

The general problem of these colonies was discussed at several of the war-time conferences although no definite agreement was reached. It was at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that it was generally agreed between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill that at the following San Francisco Conference no specific territories would be discussed, that each area to be brought under the Trusteeship scheme would be a subject for subsequent agreement, and that, in general terms, former mandated territories, territories to be taken away from the enemy and any other territory which might voluntarily be offered would be placed under the trusteeship system.

The San Francisco Conference. Just as the mandate system was the result of conflicting attitudes and ideas of the governments of Great Britain and the Empire, France and the United States and groups within these countries, similarly the trusteeship system was also the result of compromises. In the beginning, the American liberalism represented by Roosevelt stood for a kind of a New Deal for the dependent areas—including India—so that a new and yet unrealised world might be created. Soon after, however, the problem of Japanese islands seized the leading American minds in the military as well as in the civil spheres. They desired their outright annexation on strategic grounds

"and it soon became clear that the United States would continue to occupy them whatever the eventual arrangements" Thus in spite of its revolutionary origin, the United States had to keep in mind that whatever it proposed or agreed to on the subject would apply to its own territories and to the former Japanese islands in which it would have tremendous strategic interests

Secondly, there was the great awakening of the colonial world largely brought about by the stresses and pressures of the two wars. As K. M. Panikkar has put it, World War I put imperialism on the retreat, World War II converted the retreat into a rout. The ease with which the colonies of Western colonial powers had been conquered by Japan had exploded the myth of their invincibility and had dealt a severe blow to colonialism and its overtones of racial superiority. A large part of the world led by the Soviet Union was now anti-colonial and was demanding independence and a well-defined and broad based international responsibility.

Thirdly, and on the opposite side, the Dutch, the French and the South African ruling cliques sharply opposed any extension of the mandate system. In general, Great Britain sided with them and in spite of their liberal professions, the United States also fell in line with them.

Fourthly, the Conference was meeting during the war time—before the surrender of either Japan or Germany. The development of the cold war could not yet be foreseen—at any rate not in its proportions or directions. One thing was there for every one to see—the P. M. C. of the League no longer existed. Syria and Lebanon both A Category Mandates—were represented at the Conference as independent nations. Transjordan and Palestine were shortly to evolve into independent states. In the first place, therefore, some provisions had to be made for the continued international supervision of the remaining ten mandated territories. Secondly, the defeated enemies were to be shorn off their colonies—the former Italian colonies in East Africa were already under military occupation and these were to be disposed off. Finally, the allies had already committed themselves to respect the right of peoples to live under governments of their own choosing, to respect human rights, and to dedicate themselves to human progress—principles equally applicable to all the colonies and non-self governing territories.

Thus the task of the San Francisco Conference was more difficult, more complex and more cumbersome and of much wider dimensions than that of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. A need therefore, clearly existed for some system of international supervision and administration of all the non-self-governing

territories, and it was realised by international experts that this system should have a wider scope, broader functions and powers, and much greater potentialities than had ever been possessed by the mandate system. At San Francisco, therefore, provisions were drawn up designed to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of millions of people living in non-self-governing areas and these provisions were set forth in Chapters XI, XII and XIII of the Charter. The trusteeship system had now come into existence. (It is, therefore, incorrect to hold that this new system is a mere continuation or a modified version of the League's mandate system.) As we will notice in the following pages, the new system is considerably broader in scope, involves a more extensive international supervision and potentially it holds forth greater promise for the advance of the peoples of trust territories towards self-government or independence.

Theory of the trusteeship system. Essentially, it is "a system whereby states administering dependent territories placed under trusteeship are accountable to the United Nations for the discharge of their responsibilities and obligations in the administration of the territories". It is based on the valid premise that there are some backward, under-developed and primitive peoples unable, at the present stage of their development, to determine their own destiny, who need the help, advice and guidance of the more advanced and developed peoples of the world in achieving their salvation. The objective of the system is to enable these peoples to determine their fate themselves. In this, the trusteeship system is a continuation of the principle of the mandate system. But it is much more. It covers a much wider range. It not only includes the former mandated territories and the territories detached from the enemy powers but also other non-self-governing areas. Although the Australian proposal to place all non-self-governing territories under a limited form of international trusteeship was rejected, the San Francisco Conference succeeded in drawing up certain principles which the colonial powers should apply in colonial territories under their control. This is a clear recognition of the principle that the promotion of independence in dependent areas is a matter of concern for the United Nations, and in this the trusteeship system constitutes a major extension of the mandate system. As Field Marshal Smuts, President of the Commission, examining the incorporation of Chapter XI into the Charter, said: "This scheme diverts in scope very largely from that old Covenant scheme. The principle of trusteeship is now applied generally. It applies to all dependent peoples in all dependent territories. It covers all of them and, therefore, an extension has been given to the principle of very far reaching and important character". True, there are clear limitations on the

U N in this regard as we shall see later, but in theory this is an important step forward

Another significant element in the theory of trusteeship system is its realism. Unlike the mandate system, it provides realistic allowances for security needs in providing for the designation of strategic areas and in the discretion which the Administering Authority may exercise with regard to defence needs of any territory. Again, the trusteeship system envisages a closer examination and supervision by the U N than was done by the League under the mandate system. Whereas the League could be paralysed if the mandatory refused to send annual reports, the sources of information of the U N are many more. It can do what the League could never do—it can send periodic visiting missions to investigate conditions on the spot in various territories.

In short the theory of the trusteeship system rests on three basic principles: (i) international responsibility, (ii) accountability and supervision in regard to the colonial world, and (iii) the promotion of their independence and progress—social, economic, political and cultural—and the recognition of certain strategic and defence considerations of the Administering Authority. The underlying objectives of this system are, first, to supervise the process whereby the dependent peoples are brought to the point of development where they can make their own decisions, and, once this is done, to see to it that the dependent peoples are permitted to determine for themselves their own political status.

Scope of the trusteeship system. For the achievement of these objectives the U N have no uniform procedure, for, the Charter distinguishes two types of dependencies: non self-governing territories covered in Chapter XI (Articles 73 and 74) and the trust territories covered in Chapter XII by Articles 75 to 85 and in Chapter XIII by Articles 86 to 91. These trust territories themselves fall in three categories (vide Art. 77): (a) territories held under mandate, (b) territories detached from enemy states, and (c) territories to be voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

The distinction between the two types—non-self governing territories and trust territories—is that for the former the Charter only provides a declaration of principles and does not envisage machinery of U N supervision except under Article 73 (e) which provides for submission by the administering powers of information to the U N. Whatever machinery has developed for U N supervision of these areas, has developed very slowly and even “painfully through Charter interpretation. On the other hand, for the trust territories there is an elaborate machinery to which two whole Chapters of the Charter are devoted and for which a

separate principal organ of the U.N.—the Trusteeship Council—was created.

Finally, there was the question of colonial areas like India, Burma, etc. They were covered by Art. 78 under which the trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the U.N., relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

In the trust territories for which, at any rate, the U.N. have had a generally recognised responsibility based on agreements freely entered into between the Administering Authorities and the United Nations, there live a little less than 18 million people inhabiting a little less than a million square miles as can be seen from the following table :

Trust Territory	Administering Authority	Population	Area (sq. miles)
New Guinea	Australia	1,006,200	93,000
Ruanda-Urundi	Belgium	3,718,696	20,916
French Cameroons	France	2,702,500	166,797
French Togoland	France	944,446	21,236
Western Samoa	New Zealand	72,936	1,133
Tanganyika	United Kingdom	7,079,557	362,688
British Cameroons	United Kingdom	991,000	34,081
British Togoland	United Kingdom	382,200	13,040
Nauru	Australia	3,162	82
Trust Territory of Pacific Islands	United States of America	60,000	687
Somaliland	Italy	915,000	194,000
Total	11	17,475,647	907,660

THE U.N. AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Under Article 73 of the Charter, members of the U.N. responsible for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise that the interests of the inhabitants are paramount and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote their well-being in various ways: (a) insuring "with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses"; (b) assisting them "in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the

particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement", (c) furthering "international peace and security", (d) promoting development, and co-operating with one another and with specialized international bodies in order to achieve the social, economic and scientific purposes set forth in Article 73, and (e) transmitting regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes, subject to security and constitutional considerations, statistical and other information concerning economic, social and educational conditions in the territories other than trust territories for which they are responsible

It is to be noted that no U N. machinery was established under the Charter for the implementation of the above provisions, nor was any continuing relationship envisaged between the administering authorities and the U N other than the transmission of information to U N Secretary-General under Article 73 (e). Efforts by members of the U N to fill the lacuna have been deeply resented by the colonial countries. That is why the record of the U N in relation to non-self-governing territories has been more one of conflict than of achievement. The U S S R and India and a few other delegations have sought consistently to extend the functions of the General Assembly with respect to non-self governing territories along same lines as those which the Charter gave to the Trusteeship Council, e.g., periodic visits and examination of petitions. The colonial powers, on the other hand, have doggedly resisted this effort and have viewed this extension as interference by the U N in their domestic affairs. They have contended that the Charter contained only the obligation to transmit information. While they accept the extension of the principle of trusteeship to non-self-governing territories outside the trusteeship system, they are opposed to any international machinery for supervision.

We may now examine the implications of international machinery for supervision in regard to non-self-governing territories. In the first place, the effort to establish an international machinery for supervision in relation to the non-self-governing territories raised the question of the competence of the U N under the Charter and the question of accountability of the colonial powers to the U N. We have noted that Art 73 (e) required the Administering Authority to transmit information to the Secretary General. It was argued by the anti-colonial powers in the General Assembly that this submission of information constitutes an act of accountability to the U N. They contended that the Charter would not have included such an obligation unless it intended that the Administering Authority should be supervised by the U N.

Thus the General Assembly set up a special committee (*ad hoc*) for one year in its first session in 1946 to examine the information transmitted to the Secretary-General and to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding future procedure. Its membership consisted of the eight nations which had supplied information on their territories and eight other members elected by the General Assembly and its formal designation was the "Ad hoc Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73 (e) of the Charter". In 1947, it became the "Special Committee", and in January 1952 the "Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories". The term "special" indicative of its temporary character was dropped, as was the specific reference to Art. 73 (e). This Committee, therefore, has now come to stay virtually as a permanent organ of the trusteeship system.

Another controversial matter regarding the international machinery of supervision over the non-self-governing areas has been the question of whether the administering authorities were obligated or should be requested to transmit information of a political character in regard to their territories. Several nations including the U.S.A. submitted such information voluntarily. But the colonial powers contended that the terms of Art. 73 (e) did not require the submission of any political information. However, the non-colonial powers insisted that the submission of political information was essential and was legally justified under the Charter for after all the objective of the Charter [Art. 73 (b)] was "to develop self-government" in such areas. They also argued that it was impossible to evaluate economic, social and educational conditions without information on the progressive development of the free political institutions of the territories. As far as the attitude of the General Assembly was concerned, in the beginning it sought and encouraged voluntary political information. In this, however, much success was not achieved and the Assembly in the seventh session, instead of merely expressing the hope, requested the administering authorities to furnish information regarding the political advance of the territories under their control. It also decided to put this item on the agenda of the Committee on Information.

Now this attitude led the colonial powers to stop furnishing any kind of information to the U.N. and this became another important issue—the issue of cessation of information. In 1946 information was received on 74 territories. By 1948 France had stopped sending information on nine of its overseas territories on the ground that they had achieved self-government. The British stopped reporting on Malta on a similar ground. Both were severely criticised for their unilateral action but both ignored the criticism. So in 1948 the Assembly adopted an Indian resolution

calling for the submission to the U N of information relating to constitutional changes in a territory which cause the administering nation to consider ceasing transmission of information under Art 73 (e) This had some effect and the Netherlands in 1951 with regard to Curacao and Surinam, the U S A in 1953 with regard to Puerto Rico, Denmark in 1954 with regard to Greenland, submitted the necessary documents on the constitutional changes there In regard to Curacao and Surinam, the Assembly did not agree with the Netherlands that self government had been achieved there and, therefore, requested the Netherlands to continue transmission of information This the Netherlands refused to do maintaining that self-government had been achieved there, that, in any case, it alone had the right to determine whether or not self-government had been achieved, and that the Assembly was not competent to direct it to continue this transmission

This raised two issues first that of jurisdiction and second that of an objective criteria to determine whether self-government has been achieved Indeed, if the second could be satisfactorily answered, the first would not be raised A search for this objective criteria had begun as early as 1949 when the Assembly directed the Committee on Information to undertake a study of factors which should be taken into account in determining whether the people of a territory have or have not attained a full measure of self-government The study was made, a report on factors prepared in 1951 and was finally approved by the Assembly in 1953 but its value has thus far been merely academic since it had no effect on the position of the administering powers (including the U S A) that they alone are competent to determine the status of their respective territories They did, however, express a willingness to consider the suggested factors in making their determination On the other hand, the Assembly stressed its competence in its resolution on Puerto Rico in 1953 Thus the issue remains unresolved In the meantime from 74, the number on which information was originally given, fell to 59 in 1954 and to 57 in 1955 In 1956 a major political debate in the Assembly centered on the fact that Portugal had not transmitted any information on territories under its jurisdiction—Cape Verde Islands in the North Atlantic and the islands of San Tome and Principe off the West Coast of Africa, Portuguese Guinea and Angola in West Africa and Mozambique in East Africa, Portuguese India (Daman, Diu, and Goa), Macau in China and Portuguese Timor off the north coast of Australia It was argued by Portugal that these areas were not non self governing within the meaning of Art 72 since Portugal was a unitary state and these areas were integral parts of the metropolitan country No decision has so far been reached whether the Assembly can question the right of a state to decide which territories it wished

to place under Art 73 (e). The Committee on Information in July 1957 dealt with the continued absence of the Belgian representative and the lack of any information on Belgian territories since 1955. But on August 2, Belgium declared that it would henceforth transmit information to the U. N. Library.

Finally, there has been the issue of direct relation which non-administering members have sought to establish with non-self-governing territories. Here also the Assembly was taking a keen interest. It invited in 1953 the members which administer territories whose people have been granted a large measure of responsibility for economic, social and educational matters to include indigenous representatives in their delegations. It also requested the Committee on Information to continue studying means for increasing the participation of duly qualified representatives of the peoples of non-self-governing territories in its work.

Limitations on the Committee of Information. We have seen that the U.N. could act for non-self-governing areas only under Chapter XI which provided for no machinery except for the transmission of information by the administering powers. One limitation on the Committee of Information which gradually evolved was regarding the character of information. In addition, it was also prohibited from making any recommendations with respect to individual territories. Thus if a question arises in a specific dependency—a question which threatens the peace of the world—it cannot be dealt with by the U.N. under Chapter XI. These limitations have resulted in the use of other bodies—other than those originally intended to handle questions regarding dependent peoples. These bodies have largely been the political committees of the Assembly or the Security Council.

Palestine, Italian colonies, etc. Thus early in the history of the U.N. issues of Palestine and of the Italian Colonies were referred to the U.N. for final disposition—the former by the mandatory power (U.K.) and the latter by a provision of the Peace Treaty. Both these cases were handled by the political committees of the Assembly and by the Security Council. Certain techniques and procedures (not provided in Chapter XI) were developed to deal with dependent areas. In both cases the principle of self-determination played an important role and the inhabitants concerned were consulted about their future political status. Missions were also sent out for this purpose and for the first time non-governmental representatives of the peoples appeared before the U.N. Ultimately, in the case of Palestine, the U.N. decided to partition it and create the state of Israel for the Jews. And in the case of Italian Colonies, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan were united into a federal state of Libya which was to become independent two years after the passage of the Assembly resolution;

Somaliland was placed under Italian trusteeship for ten years, after which it was to become independent, and Eritrea was joined in federation to Ethiopia.

Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Cyprus The case of Indonesia was more complicated than these two for here self-determination manifested itself by fighting. In this case the U N turned down the Dutch plea of domestic jurisdiction and encouraged the conclusion of Indonesian-Netherlands agreements of 1949 which finally settled the dispute. The question of West Irian, however, is still pending at the U N. Unlike the Indonesian case, in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia which had been on the agenda of the Assembly since 1952, the U N was not able to do much. The French authorities used force against them, have deposed and arrested their leaders, refused to recognise them as representatives of their people and negotiated with "leaders" of their own choosing. The U N intervened on the grounds of "violation by French of the principles of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights" under Chapter XI, of continued disrespect for the principle of self-determination constituting a threat to peace. But ultimately the U N remained powerless and the French insisted that the U N was not competent to interfere in her domestic jurisdiction. In 1954, Mendes-France made a dramatic flight to Tunisia and offered immediate internal autonomy. The Assembly's resolution in 1954 therefore expressed confidence that these negotiations would bring about a satisfactory solution and postponed further consideration. This matter, therefore, was not placed on the agenda of the tenth Assembly in 1955. Ultimately in June 1955 a series of conventions were signed by the French and Tunisian governments giving home rule to the Protectorate. The later story of the independence of Morocco and Tunisia we have already covered earlier in this volume. The role of the U N with regard to Cyprus has also been dealt with in details in Chapter 15 in this volume.

Conclusions Thus it seems that while the U N played a fairly active role in the cases of Libya and Indonesia, its handling of other cases like Morocco, Tunisia and Cyprus has not been as great a success. The reason is not far to seek. Libya was the colony of an enemy state, Morocco and Tunisia were French dependencies and France, unlike Italy, had a number of friends in the U N. Again, in Indonesia the Dutch control had been paralysed whereas the French control in her dependencies was effective. In short, "the U N is not likely to take decisive action regarding self-determination in cases which involve a dependency of a member state that has many friends and allies in the U N except where the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the maintenance of the authority of the colonial

powers has itself come into question". In all such cases the U. N. intervention would have a limited value.. None can, for instance, deny that the debates at the U. N. went a long way in inducing France to accord freedom to Morocco and Tunisia, and eventually France would be obliged to transfer power to Algeria.

The success of the U.N., therefore, has been limited. The Declaration of Human Rights has undoubtedly fanned the flame of freedom in many territories. The specialized agencies, particularly the F.A.O., the W.H.O., the U.N.E.S.C.O. the I.C.F. (International Children's Fund) have contributed technical assistance to the territories. The International Bank has made loans and carried out useful economic studies. Community developments are in operation in a number of territories—Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar and Morocco. Pilot projects are in operation in American Samoa, Cook Islands and West New Guinea. But it may be noted that the Committee on Information and the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly have, apart from special technical studies done with the assistance of the specialized agencies, little to show for their efforts which can be directly related to the changes that have occurred in the colonial world. They have not even been able to educate the non-administering members about the problem. The result is that these members seek to win in the Assembly what they cannot win in the Committee on Information where the number of administering powers and of non-administering powers is equal. The Administering members constantly invoke the domestic jurisdiction clause and make important reservations. In such circumstances the interest of neither the U.N. nor the dependent peoples can be served.

Some half-hearted efforts have, however, been, made in the direction of education. During the 11th session of the Assembly attention was focussed on educational conditions that one delegate declared were "the very core of the colonial problem : it was useless to speak of liberty, civic rights and peaceful co-existence unless the people had a solid cultural basis". Stress was laid on the importance of adapting education to the environment as "an integral part of community life" with full participation by the inhabitants both in preparing and applying programmes of education. But difference of opinion arose as to where emphasis should be placed : on establishing a broad educational base or on educating an elite. The Assembly passed two resolutions requesting the Administering Authorities to "establish targets and dates for educational advancement", and urging "that all possible steps be taken to speed up the process of education including the fullest possible use of scholar ships offered by member states". The Assembly also approved the arrangements being made by

the Secretary General for a 10 year review of economic, social and educational progress in the "Non Self Governing Territories". The Committee on Information, in July 1957, considered plans for the economic development of these territories and the effects of the European Common Market on them.

THE TRUST TERRITORIES

The achievements of the U N in regard to trust territories are more solid and substantial than those relating to non self-governing territories under Art 73 (c) of the Charter. The U N trusteeship system, the successor to the League mandate system, is applicable to all mandated territories, the territories taken away from the enemy after World War II, and such other territories, as are voluntarily placed under it by the states concerned. No such territory has so far been placed voluntarily. Indeed, even in regard to mandated territories, the Union of South Africa bluntly refused to place South West Africa under trusteeship despite the most severe criticism (The International Court of Justice noted that South Africa was not obligated to place South West Africa under the trusteeship but held that the League mandate still exists and that South Africa must continue to observe its terms, the League's supervisory functions to be performed by the U N.) The Assembly appointed a Committee on South West Africa to examine, as the P M C did earlier, annual reports on this mandated territory. But South Africa persisted in its refusal to send reports and at present the U N Secretariat prepares annually a report on the territory based primarily on official publications of South Africa. At its 11th session the Assembly adopted a resolution urging the Union of South Africa to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system. The Committee on South West Africa in its report to the 12th Assembly in September 1957 censured the Union of South Africa for giving to South West Africa an administration in which political, economic, social and educational rights are governed by the practice of *apartheid*. The Union, however, has done nothing to change its policies. The Assembly has been exercising its pressure and has sought to ensure that at least the terms of the Mandate Agreement are being fulfilled.

Trusteeship agreements In order for a territory to be brought under trusteeship, it is necessary that an agreement is concluded between the states directly concerned subject to the approval of the General Assembly. In practice, the administering state has proposed the terms of the agreement and named the country (its own name) which is to administer the territory concerned. For nearly all territories the U N approval has come from the General Assembly. But a state may designate a territory

as strategic and in such cases the approval of the Security Council is necessary. Once the approval is given, the contract is complete and the territory comes under the trusteeship system. A typical Agreement defines the trust territory, designates the administering authority and enumerates obligations (e.g. to be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, to develop free political institutions, to protect native rights, to ensure equal treatment, to promote education and to safeguard and guarantee human rights), and mentions its rights. The administering authority has full powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction in the territory including the power, in some cases, to administer it as an integral part of its own territory. It may constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with adjacent territories under its control. It may also establish naval, military and air bases and take other measures for defence and may organize public services and works on conditions it thinks just. Finally, it may arrange for the co-operation of the territory in regional organizations.

Most of these provisions are included in the agreement for the strategic trust territory of the Pacific Islands but there are some additional provisions too. We have said above that under the trusteeship system the administering power may designate a territory as strategic. The Pacific Islands fall in this category. The U.S.A. as the administering authority submitted a draft trusteeship agreement for these Islands to the Security Council in February 1947. The additional provisions in this agreement included the right of the administering authority to close certain areas for security reasons (e.g. Atolls, Bikini and Eniwetok were closed to visits by U.N. missions on December 2, 1947). Then, again, the U.S. also reserved the right to confer on its nationals and companies treatment that is preferential to that accorded to the nationals and companies of other nations.

The Trusteeship Council. By December 13, 1946, the first Trusteeship Agreements were approved by the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council, the last principal organ of the U.N. to become operative, started working in March 1947. In 1955, there were 11 Trust Territories, administered by seven different states. The ranks of the Trust Territories were thinned at midnight 5-6 March 1957 when the British Trust Territory of Togoland gained its independence as part of the new state of Ghana. The Trusteeship Council consists of the administering states, such of the permanent members of the Security Council which do not administer Trust Territories and a many other members elected for a 3-year term by the Assembly as will ensure that the membership of the Council is equally divided between members which administer Trust Territories and member which do not. Each member of the Council designates on

especially qualified person to represent it therein. Each member of the Council has one vote. In 1949, Italy was appointed as the Administering Authority for Italian Somaliland and in 1951 she was granted participation without voting power in the Council's sessions as she was not yet a member of the U.N. Italy was admitted to the U.N. in 1956 and since then she has been given the voting power.

Decisions of the Council are made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. The Council is entitled to frame its own rules of procedure including the method of choosing its president. It meets twice in a year—in June and January—but can hold special sessions at the request of a majority of its members, or at the request of the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council, e.g. a special session was called in December 1949 to consider the Trusteeship Agreement for Italian Somaliland. Again, the 6th special session of the Council was held in December 1956 at the instance of France to consider the results of the referendum which had been held in Togoland on October 28, 1956. The 7th special session was held in September 1957 to consider the future of Togoland under French administration.

Working of the trusteeship system The supervisory function of the Trusteeship Council is primarily carried out first by considering annual reports submitted by the Administering Authorities, secondly, by accepting and examining petitions submitted by individuals and groups in the Trust Territories or from other sources pertaining to conditions in these areas, and finally, by sending periodic visiting missions to investigate conditions on the spot in these territories.

1 *Annual Reports* These reports are based on a detailed questionnaire formulated by the Council, covering all fields mentioned in Art. 76 of the Charter, at its first session in April 1947. This questionnaire is subject to any revisions in the light of experience gained by the Council. The Council at its seventh session in 1950 appointed a special committee to suggest possible changes in the questionnaire, taking into account the comments and suggestions of the Administering Authorities and other U.N. organs. The final draft was examined and with a few modifications approved by the Council in 1952. But an effort to substitute for the standard form questionnaire special questionnaires adapted to the individual trust territories was deferred. The questionnaire contains 247 questions concerning the government of a trust territory, touches on every aspect of life, is frank and direct in approach and is detailed. Examination by the Council of the answers to these questions has become part of the routine operation of the trusteeship system although this is done in a

rather perfunctory manner. The Council has so far considered 12 reports on each of the Trust Territories and each one of them was an account of the nature and resources of the country, the condition of its inhabitants, their progress, political development, their economic situation, their health and education, etc. While the Council examines the reports, a special representative of the Trust Territory under examination takes a temporary seat at the Council table (without any right to vote) and answers detailed questions on technical points raised. In the light of the report and the information supplied by the special representative, the Council arrives at its own conclusions, formulates its views and makes recommendations on the administration of each territory to the administering authority.

2. *Examination of Petitions.* The petitions, written or oral, may come directly from the inhabitants of the territories, through the administering authorities or from any other source. Petitions may also be submitted to the Council's visiting missions to the trust territories. In any case, the administering authorities are invited to make their comments on the petitions before the Council makes its decisions which are finally communicated to the petitioners and to the administering authorities. Some of these petitions have contained individual complaints, personal requests, grievances and matters of administrative policy—lack of educational and health facilities, land tenure, political advancement, racial discrimination, economic disabilities, child marriage, etc. In the case of the petition on unification in 1950, the Trusteeship Council played a fairly important role. In the case of the Western Samoan Petition for self-government for Western Samoa in its first session in 1947, the Council decided to send a Visiting Mission to examine the situation on the spot and its report was unanimously adopted by the Council. The satisfactory results of this petition were a main feature of the administration report on the territory which New Zealand submitted to the Council in March 1949. But it may be noted that direct action is not always possible on all the petitions. In case of those petitions which raise general policy, the Council sometimes notes that the action taken by the administering authority to meet the complaint is satisfactory. In some other cases concerning general policy, the Council keeps on the question on its agenda and keeps the petitioner informed. In still other cases, the Council decides to refer the question to its Visiting Missions.

During the last twelve years, two major problems have arisen in regard to the handling of petitions. First, the number of petitions has gone up very high, mainly as a result of the Council's visiting missions. Up to 1951 over 700 petitions were considered by the Council. In 1955, it received about 400 at one session. This trend continued in 1956-58. While the first session of the

Trusteeship Council, held in the spring of 1947, had before it 26 petitions, the 20th session in summer 1957 had 1215. With the increase in the number of petitions, the delay and irregularity in disposing of them has also increased. The Standing Committee of the Council, which has been established to consider petitions between and during Council's sessions, is not a satisfactory and a complete remedy. In September 1957, the Secretary General pointed out to the Assembly that the influx of petitions "has so increased that the Council has found itself obliged to postpone examination of a large number of them from one session to the next." At the 19th session, of the 447 petitions on the agenda, 219 were carried forward to a later session. At the 19th session held from March 14 to May 15, 1957, the Council referred 1057 petitions to the Standing Committee on Petitions which was able to examine only 62. The Council has adopted a U.S. proposal that a special committee be appointed, composed of Belgium, Guatemala, Italy, and Syria to examine the problem of how to handle petitions faster and to report its conclusions at the 20th session. On the basis of the recommendations of the Committee, the Council, at its 20th session held from May 20 to July 16, 1957, set up a two member classification committee, on a one-year trial basis, to screen all communications before they were examined by the standing committee. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that if the Council is to be more than a mere letter box, far-reaching changes in its procedures are necessary and also a sharper definition of the whole function of the Council in regard to petitions.

Secondly, an increasing number of oral petitions are being presented directly to the General Assembly without first being heard in the Council. Four full sessions of the Trusteeship Committee of the Assembly in 1952 were devoted to hearing a petition of representatives of the Wa-Meru tribe in Tanganyika and ten more devoted to hearing representatives from Togoland. In 1953 seven petitioners requested oral hearings. The number of such oral petitions is constantly increasing and may soon become unmanageable.

3. Visiting Missions. This is an entirely new device of conducting international supervision unknown to the old mandate system. The Council sends out one Visiting Mission every year which means that each trust territory will be visited about every three years. These missions investigate and report on the conditions and the extent to which the administering authority is carrying out its obligations. Missions have been despatched to the trust territories in the Pacific, to Western Samoa and to East and West Africa. These missions are the most effective instruments of international supervision over the dependent areas. They enable Council members to have first hand information about

the unknown areas. This first hand data, on the one hand, helps the Council in promoting the over-all development of these areas, and on the other, it provides satisfaction to the dependent peoples that the Council has accurate knowledge about their problems. These missions are not responsible to any government but only to the Trusteeship Council and can, therefore, make independent and searching enquiries on the spot. At the 787th meeting of the Council, Australia, France, Burma, and Haiti were selected as members of the 1957 visiting mission to East Africa.

Limitations. The system, it may be observed, has its limitations. For instance, in regard to the training of indigenous persons and their appointment to positions of responsibility in the administration of the trust territories, in majority of cases very few natives have yet qualified for high positions in spite of best efforts of the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. *Secondly*, the problem of administrative unions between trust territories and the neighbouring colonial regions has proved baffling. The Council and the Assembly have devised a set of principles and machinery designed to ensure that administrative unions do not impair the interests of the people of the trust areas or the ability of the Council to exercise its functions. But there is still much to be desired. *Thirdly*, fewer territories have been placed under trusteeship system than was anticipated. The Union of South Africa, as we noticed earlier, has refused to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system. *Fourthly*, although the Charter permits the U. N. itself or a combination of states to serve on the administering authority of a trust territory, none of the areas under multilateral control has been placed under trusteeship system except Nauru nor has any one of the areas over which the U. N. has been given a measure of jurisdiction (e.g. Jerusalem), been placed under trusteeship. *Fifthly*, the U. N. does not have the power to terminate the authority of an administering state for failure to discharge its obligations under the Charter. *Sixthly*, like the League of Nations, its control is only as effective as the response of the members. It cannot impose its decision on any member. If an administering state does not conform with its directive, it can do little more than advertise or publicize the facts. *Finally*, the U.N. has not been able to set definite time-limit for the termination of Trusteeship. At the 11th session, the Assembly invited the Administering Authorities to estimate for each Territory the time required for the attainment of self-government or independence, and to submit appropriate information to the Council in 1957 for transmission to the 12th session of the Assembly. But nothing substantial has "so far been done because the Administer-

ing Authorities continue to believe that any effort to set precise time limit is both impracticable and unwise"

AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE MANDATE SYSTEM

Nevertheless, the trusteeship system is a considerable improvement on the mandate system. At present five of the trust territories are near the stage of self-government. In Western Samoa, at a Convention in 1954, the people adopted a constitutional plan for self government. The first steps were taken in 1956-57 and the Trusteeship Council expects that full Cabinet Government would be finalized by 1960. Meanwhile, New Zealand has requested the Council to send a Visiting Mission in 1959 to study matters relating to the termination of the trusteeship. In *Somaliland*, the U N Assembly has set as target date December 3, 1960 when the territory would have become a sovereign independent state. The elections that were due in 1958 have, however, been postponed due to domestic differences until March, 1959. The problems of the border dispute with Ethiopia and the economic viability of the region are being tackled. Italy and Ethiopia having failed to arrive at a solution through negotiation, the U N Assembly decided to set up a Tribunal of Arbitration but no progress has yet been made. With respect to economic development, Italy and other members have offered to help Somaliland after 1960. The new government of *Togoland* was established in April 1957 and France, the Administering Authority, has requested the Trusteeship Council to convene a special session to decide its future status. In *New Guinea*, the Council has been taking a keen interest and after its 1955 Report considerable pressure was put on the Administering Authority (Australia) to speed up local government through village councils and to increase the opportunities for the people to participate in the Central Government of the territory. Seven new local government councils have been set up. In *Tanganyika*, there is a complex problem. The population has 120 tribes together with Asians and Europeans. The majority of the people have demanded that the country should become mainly African. This has not yet been recognized by the Administering Authority, although changes in the system of representation will possibly take place after the next election to the legislative assembly in 1959. In 1956-57, the right of the U S to carry on nuclear tests in the Pacific Islands was repeatedly raised but no decision has yet been reached.

Thus the U N trusteeship system has achieved considerable success and its record compares favourably with that of the

mandate system under the League. (i) Its scope is much wider for it includes what the mandate system did not include—the non-self-government territories. The U.N. trusteeship system also asserts principles to be applied by member states to all their colonies. Its concern is not merely for the areas detached from the defeated powers in the two World Wars but for the whole colonial world. (ii) It is more realistic. It recognises the strategic needs of an administering authority. (iii) It exercises a closer supervision than was possible under the mandate system. The Visiting Missions are the eyes and ears of the Council. The U.N. system of supervision is more elaborate, more effective and efficient. (iv) U.N. concept of responsibility for the dependent areas is much wider than the League concept. The fourth regular session of the General Assembly in 1949 recommended that the blue and white flag of the U.N. should be flown in all trust territories alongside the flags of the Administering Authorities, as a symbol of the ideals and aspirations of the trusteeship system. The U.N. flag is the symbol of the world's concern for the right of self-determination of the dependent peoples. (v) Whereas with the League actual administration was in the hands of the mandatory states, under the U.N. trusteeship system while the direct administration is commonly in the hands of states singly or jointly as administering authorities, the U.N. may itself take direct control as it did in Eritrea. (vi) Whereas the mandate system was, at best, a modest departure from the practice of outright annexation, the U.N. system is definitely based on the concept of self-government and for all the dependent peoples. The U.N. has attacked the problem of colonialism with definitely much more vigour than did the League. Whereas the League relegated the problem to the P.M.C., the trend at the U.N. has been to shift the emphasis from the balanced Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly where the non-colonial powers are in majority, and where, therefore, the colonial powers are under constant fire. (vii) The main organ of trusteeship system, i.e. the Trusteeship Council, is definitely a more balanced, a more independent and a better organized body than the P.M.C. was. It can frame its own rules of procedure whereas the rules of procedure of the Permanent Mandates Commission were laid down by the League Council. It has undoubtedly contributed towards the improvement of policies and programmes of the administering authorities. Its recommendations and goadings have eliminated in some territories the legal use of corporal punishment except for crimes committed by convicts in prison. It has strengthened the Administering Authority against the efforts in East Africa to retain or enhance their privileged position. It has encouraged the increased participation of indigenous people in their government and it has, indirectly, caused similar improvements

South China announced by the Chinese Communists in January 1953, and the fifth column potential of 3,000,000 overseas Chinese within her borders' All these factors drove Thailand in the SEATO and made her a willing recipient of U.S. military aid and economic assistance. Thailand is also a close supporter of the U.N. At one time Thai-Burmese relations were very unhappy. In 1767 the Burmese had sacked the Thai capital Ayuthia. The British colonial rulers deliberately kept up the anti-Burmese feeling among the Thais in order to prevent understanding and friendship between the Burmese and the Thais. European writers on Burma and Siam tended to give undue emphasis on the sack of Ayuthia and, only recently, with the waning of colonial rule in South East Asia has it been possible for the Thais to forget Ayuthia and clasp the hand of friendship held out by the Burmese. In order to augment her security Thailand has also been advocating the idea of affiliation with Laos and Cambodia.

Although never a colony, Thai nationalism has been fairly intense though it has antecedents different from those in other Asian countries. The country could not escape the political and psychological effects of colonialism in neighbouring states. The continual threats of political encroachments by Britain and France 'helped mould Thai national unity'. The institution of monarchy has also been a great unifying factor to which all Thais are bound together by loyalty. Again, Thailand has less ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity than other South East Asian states. Finally, the Japanese occupation also roused Thai nationalism.

We have referred to the political instability of Thailand. Throughout the period up to 1951, Thai politics was turbulent. The relatively high degree of political stability which Thailand had enjoyed under the leadership of Marshall Pibul Songgram since the coup of November 1931 and the subsequent election in February 1932 was shaken by events in 1937. Important developments during 1937 included a general election in February, the declaration of a state of emergency in March, the disintegration of the Seri Manangasila (the main government political party since 1935) the overthrow of Pibul's government in September by the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Minister for Defence, Marshall Sarit Thanarat and a further general election in December 1937 which led to the formation of the present government headed by Lieutenant General Thanom Kittikachorn. At present Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and a Unicameral Parliament. These political changes, however, did not involve any change in foreign policy. All political leaders throughout the crisis in 1937 favoured Thailand's close co-operation with the U.S. and continued membership of SEATO. In November 1937 in an

address in Bangkok Marshal Sarit referred to the importance of the SEATO and to the duty of the Thai armed forces "to see to it that Thailand never becomes a Communist country". He reiterated on January 3, 1958, that Thailand would stick to SEATO. December elections (1957) revealed little support for parties advocating neutralism and closer commercial and political relations with Peking. The failing health of Marshall Sarit and his absence from Thailand for treatment in the U.S.A. may bring another revolution in Thailand in 1958-59.

INDONESIA

The sovereign independent Republic of Indonesia proclaimed by Sukarno and Hatta on August 17, 1945, has a total area of 1.9 million sq. km. and consists of the islands of Sumatra, Java and Madura, Bali and the other Nusa Tenggara islands, Maluku (Moluccas), Sulawesi (Celebes), Kalimantan (Borneo) and some 3,000 smaller islands and inlets. The total population estimated in 1957 was 83.5 millions. It is now divided into 4 provinces. The principal elements of the population are the Achinese, Bataks and Minangkabans in Sumatra, the Javanese and Sundanese in Java, the Madurese in Madura, the Balinese in Bali and the Menadonese in Sulawesi. The majority of the people are Muslims but there are about 3 million Christians and a million Buddhists. In Bali Hinduism is the dominant religion. About 40% of the people are illiterate and the principal occupation is agriculture and the main products are sugar, tea, coffee, palm oil, hard rope fibres, cinchona bark and cocoa. Oil plays an important part in Indonesia's economy and the total output of crude petroleum is 11,790,000 metric tons. Industries are not developed except for a few shipyards, textile factories and tyre and glass factories. While it is possible to list some 54 different ethnic groups speaking as many as 200 different languages, the people share common attitudes and concepts, speak one language, Bahasa Indonesia, profess one dominant religion, Islam, and have a fierce determination to preserve national freedom.

The first historical references to Indonesia are found about the beginning of the Christian era in Chinese sources. The continuous flow of the Hindu migrants from India from the 1st to the 7th century A.D. shaped Indonesian culture and deeply influenced Indonesian civilization. From the 7th century to the 16th Islam was widely spread. In the 16th and 17th centuries Indonesian politics was marked by the growth of Muslim Sultanates and their resistance to the advance of the Europeans. In the 16th century Portuguese traders in quest of spices settled in some of the islands, only to be ejected 50 years later by the British and

the Dutch (1595). The latter, however, finally ousted the former. From 1602 the Netherlands East India Company conquered the Netherlands Indies and ruled over them during nearly 2 centuries. After the dissolution of the Company in 1798 the Netherlands possessions were governed by the mother-country from 1816.

The entire 19th century in Indonesia was a period of consolidation of the Dutch power and a life and-death struggle for the Indonesians. All Muslim states succumbed to the Dutch imperialist power one after the other but this led to the development of the Indonesian territorial nationalism. The impoverishment of the peasantry and the depression of the nobility by the Dutch religious interference and a policy of repression under them helped to kindle this nationalism. The Dutch throughout their rule followed a policy of ruthless exploitation and regarded Indonesia one huge plantation for the production of articles for world market and a supplier of cheap labour. The economy of the Islands, therefore, became an "export economy". In 1830 the Coolie Ordinance was passed under which the workers were indentured to work in plantation or mines for a number of years and if they did not live up to their contract, they were to be imprisoned. This contract system was abolished only in 1936 when the U.S.A., Indonesia's best customer, objected to importing goods produced by forced labour. The Dutch ruined the Indonesian economy and refused to develop its industries. An average of 500 million guilders flew to the Netherlands every year (about Rs. 750,000,000). As late as 1941 the distribution of income in Indonesia was unequal. The Europeans and Eurasians received 65% of the income, non-indigenous Asians about 29%, and the Indonesians only 8%. In 1928, the average income of the farmer was 5 cents a day which in 1931 fell to 2½ cents. Indonesia produces 92% of the total world requirements of pepper, 91% of its cinchona, 77% of kapok, 50% of tobacco, 40% of rubber, 31% of copra, 25% of sugar and 25% of palm oil.

It was in this background of grim poverty, illiteracy, disease, corruption and terror, that the Indonesian struggle for freedom proceeded. The nationalists had to put up against the repressive measures of the Dutch, the disunity of their own ranks and the steadfast refusal of the Dutch to compromise with the Indonesians on any question involving the future political self-determination of the Archipelago. From 1938 to 1926, the nationalist movement was guided by the Islamic Association with its 2 million adherents. From 1925 to 1934, national political principles succeeded religious forces as the guiding factor and the Indonesian National party (P.N.I.) under Dr. Sukarno was organized. Violent clashes occurred in 1927 but the revolution was suppressed. Control of meetings was tightened and freedom of assembly and of speech was abolished.

In 1931 Sukarno was arrested and the P. N. I. disbanded by the Dutch. In 1932 Dr. Hatta joined the P. N. I. In 1934, Hatta, Sjahrir and other leaders were arrested and exiled to Dagul. From 1934 to 1941 the Indonesian politicians attempted to co-operate with the Dutch but in vain. In September 1941, all Indonesian parties joined together in a supreme body called the Majlis Rajat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Assembly).

In face of the Japanese menace the Indonesians offered to form a joint defence force with the Dutch which the latter refused. About January 19, 1942 the Japanese were well on their way to Indonesia and on March 8, they completed the conquest of the Islands. But their pose of liberators was soon gone and they began to follow the policy of blood and iron, oppression and exploitation, forced labour and forced military service. The Indonesians, in the face of this new threat, calculatingly decided to split their movement into two segments—one to be legal and to co-operate with the Japanese, the other, in close liaison with the first, to go underground against the common enemy. Thus President Sukarno and others joined the Japanese War Government and Sjahrir and others went underground. In this way they secured all the key posts and carried out all the functions that were previously in Dutch hands. Indeed, the Japanese occupation roused the Indonesian nationalism to new heights, and, in their own interests, by turning over the Civil Service to Indonesians and training others in bearing arms, helped the cause of Indonesian independence. In September 1944, the Indonesian leaders extracted a formal promise of independence from the Japanese. Meanwhile underground leaders were holding midnight meetings in caves and forest hide-outs to organize themselves for freedom. Opposition to Japanese, therefore, grew in the form of sabotage. The Japanese ordered the *kempei* (Jap. Gestapo) to launch a "cleaning action" which led to the massacre of 2000 leaders and intellectuals in Borneo. Meanwhile the Japanese surrendered to the Allies. While still under the Japanese—on August 17, 1945—Indonesia declared its independence which received the Japanese blessings on August 21. From August 17 to September 29, 1945, when the first British troops arrived, the self-styled Indonesian Republic enjoyed an independence inherited from Japan.

Within a year, the British troops restored law and order and brought in the Dutch with whom the Indonesians began fighting. On November 15, 1946, the Linggadjati Agreement was initiated by the Republic and the Dutch who recognised the Republic now exercising *de facto* authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. It envisaged three component states of the Netherlands Indies—(i) The Republic of Indonesia, (ii) Borneo, (iii) the Great East and the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The

Agreement was signed in March 1947 but soon both parties accused each other of bad faith. The Dutch began hostilities in July 1947 without referring the dispute to arbitration as laid down in Art 17 of the above agreement. India and Australia referred the question to the U N and on August 1, 1947, the Security Council issued a cease-fire order. Though infuriated, the Dutch submitted to negotiations conducted by a U N Committee of good offices consisting of U S A, Australia and Belgium. Meanwhile the Dutch were carrying on "mopping up" operations. On January 18, 1948, a truce was signed on the decks of the "U S S Renville" under which demilitarised zones were established, and a set of principles for a political settlement were listed. The Renville Agreement "provided for a sovereign democratic, federated United States of Indonesia with sovereignty in the hands of the Dutch until after a stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands should transfer its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia."

Deadlock, however, again ensued and both parties made charges and counter-charges. The Indonesian nationalists questioned the Dutch good faith, the Dutch accused the former of communist connections. Early in December, a Dutch Cabinet Mission came to Indonesia for discussions, probably to sidetrack the U N Committee of Good Offices. Talks broke down on December 11, 1948, and following a brief correspondence between Hatta and the Netherlands Governments the Dutch started military action on December 19, 1948 and put Hatta and Sukarno in jail. This at once brought the U N in the picture again. The Security Council passed a new resolution for a cease fire and the U S A suspended economic aid to the Dutch in Indonesia, and an Asian Conference on Indonesia met at New Delhi on January 20, 1949 at the instance of Nehru. The Conference demanded the release of the Republican leaders, the evacuation of the Dutch troops from the Presidency of Jogjakarta by March 5, 1949, the withdrawal of the Dutch economic blockade of the Republic, the establishment of an interim Government representing the Republican as well as non Republican territories by 15th March 1949, election for a Constituent Assembly for the whole of Indonesia by October 1, 1949, and complete transfer of power to a United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950.

Responding to these demands and pressures the Dutch had to release the Republican leaders, evacuate their troops from the Presidency, and agreed to call a round table conference to consider full independence to the Indonesians.

In March 1949 the Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker who was on a visit to the U S A was warned by Secretary Acheson to take a more realistic view of the situation and to comply with the

demands of the Security Council. The U.S. Senate also demanded a new deal for Indonesia. On March 31, India and Australia referred the problem to the General Assembly where the Indonesians were certain to find greater support than in the Security Council. The Dutch now became conciliatory and on April 14, thanks partly to the efforts of the U.N. Commission for Indonesia, resumed talks with the Republican leaders. On November 2, 1949 an agreement was signed at the Hague establishing the United States of Indonesia as a sovereign federal republic of 16 states and as an equal partner with the Netherlands under a common sovereign. Irian or Dutch New Guinea was omitted from the territory of the proposed federation. The Dutch commercial interests were to be recognized by Indonesia. On December 27, 1949, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty. The capital was transferred from Batavia to Jakarta. The new state was at once recognized by India and other states and was admitted to the U.N. in June 1950.

Since 1949, Indonesia has been faced with the problem of creating political stability within and a sound foreign policy outside. Internally, a truly national state had to be welded in which all the ethnic groups would be conscious of a common nationality. Education had to be expanded and the non-industrial economy had to be diversified and freed "from dependence on the export of a handful of staple raw materials whose prices fluctuated with the vagaries of world markets". The social and economic problems inherited from the Dutch regime were compounded by the cruelties of the Japanese invasion. The problems of scattered territory, mixed population and pressure of growing population on limited land taxed the ingenuity and abilities of untrained leaders. The country was rent with divisions and danger of disintegration has been stalking the land. The Muslim fanatics of Darul Islam challenged the authority of the government and clamoured for a pro-western theocracy of Pakistan type. The Communists organized volunteers to combat the Darul Islam. The army "became a foot-ball between Socialists and Muslims on the one hand, and the Nationalists and the Communists on the other". The ill-disciplined military units living off the country side marauded the citizenry, and the transfer of sovereignty caught unawares hundreds of Indonesian mercenaries in the colonial army, who had fought against the Republican army. The labour had grown restive. Businessmen had been almost ruined. Government revenues fell off, and the price of rubber and tin had badly declined which forced reduction in general economic operations. In this context the Communists, who had gone in eclipse in 1948, gradually regained influence and power. In the beginning, the Masjumi party—the Indonesian Muslim League—played an important part in Indonesian politics but in 1953 it

was elbowed out by the National Party. The socialist party has little influence. The plethora of parties has bedevilled parliamentary rule in Indonesia ever since the beginning. Until 1953 the Communists had little influence. In the middle of that year the coalition of the Masjumi and the Nationalists fell apart. The Communists had 16 seats in the parliament and with their help and of other small groups, Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo of the Nationalist Party set up the government from which the Masjumi and the Socialist party had been excluded. This upset the western policy framers and the Anglo-American Press started a campaign of vilification against the government of Indonesia. Ali's government could not solve the manifold problems of the country. On May 11, Major General Bambang Sugeng, the Chief of Staff, resigned and the government appointed in his place the military commander in South Sumatra, Col Bambang Uteyo. In the teeth of Army's opposition, he was installed in office on June 27. The army refused to obey him and the government resigned on July 25, 1955.

On August 11, 1955 Burhannuddin Harahap formed the government in which the Masjumi played a leading role, but from which the National party was excluded. The new government issued a 7-point policy statement stressing the objectives of restoring governmental authority over the army, holding the general elections, decentralizing the administration, checking inflation, and continuing the struggle for Netherlands New Guinea and developing co-operation with Afro-Asian countries. Col Nasution was appointed army chief of staff. Elections for parliament were held on September 29, 1955 and for the Constituent Assembly (C A) on December 15 of which the results were announced on March 1, 1956 and July 16, 1956 respectively. In the parliament the P N I (Nationalists) obtained 57 seats, the Masjumi 57, the N U (orthodox Muslims) 45, the P K I (Communists) 39, and others 59 (total 257). In the C A the P N I got 119 seats, the Masjumi 112, the N U 91, the P K I 80 and others 112 (total 514). The elections knocked out the ground from under the feet of the Harahap government which had also been hotly criticized for its conduct of negotiations with the Netherlands. On March 3, 1956, the Government resigned. On March 20, 1956 the P N I, the Masjumi and the N U together with 5 other small groups joined and Ali Sastroamidjojo formed the government again. The P K I (Communists) which had polled over 18% of the votes in the elections had been excluded. On March 24, 1956 the government issued its programme which ran on the lines of the Harahap Government's policies. Much greater emphasis, however, was placed on foreign affairs and on the need to solve the problem of West New Guinea.

But friction soon developed within the coalition and sections of the army began to be restive at corruption in official circles and scant salaries paid to them. On August 13, the army revolted when Col. Kawilarang, the military commander of West Java, attempted to arrest the Foreign Minister, Ruslan Abdulgani, on the eve of his departure to London for the Suez Conference, on charges of corruption. Major General Nasution, however, did not support Kawilarang's action and ordered Abdulgani's release, and the latter was allowed to go to London. Col. Kawilarang was sent to Washington as military attache to the Indonesian Embassy there. In November 1956, Col. Lubis, the former Deputy Chief of Staff, attempted an unsuccessful coup and afterwards went into hiding in West Java. Meanwhile in Sumatra discontent was mounting and the provinces were dissatisfied with the central control. On December 1, Hatta the Vice-President resigned and this also added to the discontent in Sumatra where Hatta was born. Sumatran leaders were also annoyed because while their island was contributing 3rd of Indonesia's foreign exchange, the bulk of proceeds went to Java. The rebels were reported to have obtained the support of the U. S. authorities in their intention to revolt. Between December 1956 and March 1957, many army leaders were openly questioning the authority of the Ali Government, while affirming loyalty to President Sukarno. In October 1956, Sukarno had stated that Western style democracy was not suited to Indonesian conditions, and talked of a plan to reorganize the political system of the country. His "political conception" was revealed on January 17, 1957 when he said that a national council would be appointed to advise the Government. On February 21, he detailed his "Conception" and announced his intention of forming another government on the basis of party strength in the parliament including the Communists, and of establishing a "National Council" consisting of leading figures in the Government and army, provincial representatives, and functional groups. The scheme was supported by the P. N. I. and P. K. I., but opposed by the Muslim and Christian parties.

In January 1957, the Masjumi withdrew from the Ali Government on the ground that a new government was needed to deal with the Centre-Provinces relations problem. Other parties also threatened to follow suit. In March, the revolts in Celebes and Borneo took place and on March 14, the government resigned. Sukarno at once proclaimed a state of war and siege, and placed the country under martial law, with supreme legal authority in his own hands as Commandar-in-Chief. On March 15, Sukarno appointed Suwirjo, a member of the P.N.I. as "Cabinet formateur" (i. e. normally a member of one of the parliamentary

parties, who may or may not head the cabinet he chooses) But he failed, and on April 9, Sukarno himself appointed an emergency extra-parliamentary" Cabinet of experts, led by Dr Djuanda. The Masjumi refused to take part in it. This government worked hard to bring the army under control. On May 6 the National Council of Sukarno's conception was set up and on June 15, it was announced that it would consist of 45 members. Early in 1953 trouble again developed and a virtual civil war broke out.

Foreign Policy of Indonesia. The immediate problem of Indonesia was to settle accounts with the Netherlands. We have referred to the Hague Agreement of November 2, 1949. Within 6 months these were dead letters. The temper of the people was against the federated United States of Indonesia and they wanted a unitary Republic of Indonesia. The Hague Agreements called for a Union under the Dutch Crown but no formal steps were taken to formalize it. In June 1951 negotiations began at The Hague to bring about the dissolution of the Union and to review the Dutch-Indonesian relations. On August 10, 1951 dissolution was agreed in the Hague Protocol subject to ratification by the parliament of each country. The Indonesians were not satisfied with this agreement as it left the economic sections of the Hague Agreements for future negotiations. The Protocol was, therefore, not put up for ratification before the Indonesian Parliament until May, 1953. Further negotiations held in December 1955-February 1956 proved to be abortive. On February 21, 1956 Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and denounced the Union Statute. Legislative approval was given to this denunciation in April. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were virtually broken as Indonesia refused to be represented by a High Commissioner to the Netherlands and no agreement to raise the High Commissions to the level of Embassies was reached. The Dutch lost the special treaty safeguards which they had hitherto enjoyed against adverse treatment of their economic and financial interests in Indonesia. Soon Indonesia set up a Commission under Wibisono, the Finance Minister, to work out the practical application of the abrogation. In July, Col Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, and on August 4, Indonesia repudiated the Dutch debts assumed in the Hague Agreements. Debts to other countries were, however, recognized and repayment guaranteed. On August 10, 1956, the Netherlands sent a strong protest to Jakarta, and in October, both countries presented notes to the U.N. Secretary General dealing with their respective positions on all aspects of the debts question. But the die had been cast and nothing could be done about it.

Another source of tension between the Netherlands and Indonesia has been the detention by Indonesia of 30 Dutch citizens

on grounds of subversion. One of them, Jungschlaeger died in prison in April 1956. On October 15, 1956, Schmidt was sentenced to life imprisonment. Indonesia refused to agree to the Dutch request made in December 1956 to submit these two cases to the World Court. A more intense conflict continues on the issue of the Netherlands New Guinea, the rump of the old Netherlands East Indies. This demand to wrest West Irian (New Guinea) is due in part to a flat and unqualified opposition to Western colonialism, and in part to the latent fear that as long as the Dutch retain a toe hold in Asia, there is danger to Indonesian independence. The recovery of West Irian, therefore, has been included in the policy statements of every government. On August 17, 1954, Sukarno announced that Indonesia would refer the issue to the General Assembly, and since then, it has appeared on the agenda of the Assembly every year but no resolution has so far been passed by it favouring Indonesia. In September 1956, Indonesia announced the establishment of a Province of West Irian with Soasiu as the capital, and with the Sultan of Tidore as the first governor. This has, of course, not been accepted by the Dutch.

With the United States, the Indonesian relations have rather been chequered. As early as October 16, 1950 under an agreement, a modest programme of economic and technical assistance was launched. In 1951, the U. S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 tightened U. S. control on the recipient countries which were required to make pledges to the U.S.A. with regard to "proper" utilization of the aid received. In February 1952, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Achmad Subardjo and the U. S. Ambassador to Jakarta, Merle Cochran were reported to have agreed that the former would accept U. S. aid under the Mutual Security Act. For this Subardjo came under fire in Indonesia and on February 21, he resigned and two days later, the Sukiman Cabinet was forced to resign. The government of Dr. Wilopo succeeded in getting the economic aid programme in Indonesia transferred to the jurisdiction of the Technical Co-operation Administration (T. C. A.) On January 12, 1953, a new agreement was signed restricting U. S. grants for economic and technical assistance only. In addition, Indonesia had also received, in 1950, a credit of \$100,000,000 from the Export-Import Bank. In 1951, the U. N. Assembly resolution of banning export of strategic materials to Peking placed Indonesia in a difficult position, for, she had to obtain rice from China in exchange for rubber. But Jakarta, on the whole, observed the embargo on rubber sales to China. To offset the losses, the U. S. A. in 1950, offered Indonesia a long-term contract for the purchase of rubber, which Indonesia declined. In 1952, however, a 3-year contract was concluded for sale to U. S. of 183,000 tons

of tin. As long as the Korean war continued, the price of rubber was high and Indonesia did not worry about the embargo. But the Korean armistice brought down the prices without lifting the U N restrictions on trade with China. Indonesia, therefore, began to feel the pinch. An Indonesian trade mission to Peking resulted in a preliminary agreement in January 1954 providing for the export to China of rubber among other commodities. Apprehending trouble with the U S A, Jakarta, however, moved cautiously and did not implement the agreement. In July 1954, the government denied that any rubber deal had been made with China and when a trade agreement was signed on September 1, 1954, it made no mention of rubber. Although Indonesia signed the San Francisco Treaty of September 1951 with Japan, in disregard of widespread domestic opposition, whole hearted co operation with Washington has never been possible. In 1955-56, Washington felt concern with regard to the Indonesian neutralism, internal instability and growth of communism. In June 1956, Sukarno visited the U S on a goodwill mission. In 1957-58 complaints of U S intervention in the internal affairs of Indonesia were heard.

With the Soviet Union relations were tardy in the first phase. The U S S R regarded Jakarta as a puppet of the West. In the post Stalin period, there came a change and in September 1954, diplomatic relations were established. In April 1956, an Indonesian parliamentary delegation visited the U S S R and visits have since been made by other delegations and prominent individuals. In September 1956, Sukarno visited the U S S R and obtained a loan of \$ 100,000,000 from that country. A detailed agreement followed under which the loan, bearing 2½% interest, was to be repaid over 12 years. This agreement was approved by the Indonesian Cabinet on May 3, 1957. A trade agreement was signed in August 1956 and it was approved by the Cabinet in Jakarta on May 6, 1957. In May 1957, President Voroshilov paid a visit to Indonesia and travelled widely in the country.

We have referred partially to the Indonesian policy towards People's China which had already been recognized by Jakarta. In September 1956, Sukarno also visited Peking in reply to Chou's visit to Bandung in April 1955. Ali Sastroamidjojo had also visited China in 1955 and Madame Soong, the widow of Sun Yat sen visited Indonesia in August 1956. Following the discussions at Bandung, a dual nationality agreement between China and Indonesia had been signed in April 1955, seeking to regulate the status of the Chinese minority in Indonesia and to settle the question of their citizenship. Under it, the Chinese in Indonesia could exercise a choice as to whether they want Chinese or Indonesian citizenship.

Finally, the relations of Indonesia with Asian countries have been most cordial. She has participated in many bilateral and multilateral Asian meetings and conferences in the past years and played host to the historic conference at Bandung. Indonesia and India have closest relations and agree on all fundamental issues. Like India she is a staunch supporter of colonial liberation, Afro-Asian solidarity, removal of racial discrimination, and disarmament. Her policy is one of peace with all, and one of positive neutrality and non-involvement in the cold war. She has consistently eschewed military alliances as undesirable and unwise. Like India, she does not regard external communism as a threat to her independence. Like us, the Indonesians regard the cold war as nothing more than the traditional power conflict, this one between the Soviet Union and the U.S., intensified and rendered even more illogical by atomic weapons. In this conflict, the only vital Indonesian concern is the hope for peace. Indonesia has also been a very active supporter of the U.N. In recent years she strongly endorsed U.N. intervention in the Suez Crisis and sent a contingent to the United Nations Emergency Force. She also supported discussion of the Hungarian question in the U.N. While abstaining on the resolution concerning Soviet military intervention, she supported those concerned with relief measures and voted in favour of setting up the special U.N. Committee on Hungary. Indonesia has always stood for an understanding between China and the U.S.A. and has advocated a policy of eliminating the sources of friction amongst the Asian countries such as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Her independent foreign policy of peace and neutrality is only an expression of Asian nationalism in all its aspects.

MALAYA

Within an area of 52,286 sq. miles and a population of 6,000,000 Malaya juts into the sea lane that links the Middle East and the Far East. Before 1945 it was vitally important to Britain because of her naval base in Singapore "the eastern outpost for the defence of India". Malaya suffered from many political vicissitudes and was dominated first by the Arabs, then by the Portuguese, and finally by the British. The earlier inhabitants were Malays but today there are in Malaya and Singapore over 3,000,000 Chinese and 800,000 Indians and Pakistanis. Thus there is a very serious racial problem in Malaya particularly because the Chinese control the economic life of the country. The country is extremely rich in raw materials and produces about 60% of the entire world production of rubber and about 40% of the world production of tin. Its value as a dollar-earner to the Commonwealth can be seen from the fact

that in 1950 its rubber exports were worth \$313 million to the sterling bloc, and that in 1953, its total output of rubber and tin amounted in value to £105 million and £41 million respectively. In 1947 the U S A took out of Malaya 457,000 tons of rubber and more than 20,000 tons of tin. Malayan exports to the U S A that year amounted to \$346,000,000 which was \$166,000,000 more than the value of the entire exports of Britain to the U S A that very year. And yet until 1945, with an undiversified economy, Malaya was compelled to import about 66% of its food requirements and practically all of its consumer goods.

The British colonial policy in Malaya was one of systematic exploitation and brutal suppression. Before the Second World War there were hardly any representative institutions worth the name. When it was overrun by the Japanese, Malaya had 3 administrative units—the Straits Settlements (including Singapore) which was a British colony, the Federated Malay States, and the Unfederated Malay States which were both under British protection as a result of agreements concluded between the U K and the Rulers of States. From December 1941 to September 1945 Japan occupied Malaya. From September 1945 to April 1946 Malaya was ruled by the British Military Administration, this period being marked by labour agitation led by the Malayan Communist Party. In April 1946, a Centralized Malayan Union was constituted by Order-in-Council and Singapore was made a separate colony. However, the Malayan Union was never fully implemented because of Malay opposition to the transfer of powers from the State Rulers to the Crown and also because of fears that the citizenship provision might lead to loss of the special position enjoyed until that time by the Malays. In July 1946 a Committee was appointed to draw out a constitution and this led to the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, under which Malaya was given a strong central government. Considerable powers were delegated to the governments of the States and Settlements. The first Federal Legislative Council of 75 members was set under this agreement. It was not an elected body but it had an unofficial majority nominated by the High Commission to represent various races and interests.

In June 1948 there broke out the Communist rebellion supposedly on the directive issued by the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India held in Calcutta in March 1948. But there is absolutely no evidence of this, and the connection of the two events rests on speculation. The British rulers banned the Communist Party of Malaya on July 23, 1948, proclaimed Emergency, and by the end of 1948, a British army including 10,000 Nepali Gurkhas recruited on the Indian soil, was operating against about 5,000 Malayan insurgents. The Communist rebellion

continued right up to 1957. In 1951 the "member" system was introduced as a first step towards ministerial responsibility in Malaya. Meanwhile the Briggs Plan based on concentration camps for the insurgents was adopted and untold sufferings were inflicted on them. In 1952, Templer was appointed High Commissioner and he launched a vigorous anti-communist campaign till May 1954. In January 1955, Abdul Rahman appealed for an amnesty for the Communists. On May 1, 1955, the Malayan People's Liberation Army sent an official offer of peace to the Malayan Government. But the offer was rejected by the British on June 5, 1955. The latter introduced a new federal constitution retaining control over defence and external affairs, finance, and public order. The elections were held on July 27, 1955. The Alliance—a coalition of the United Malay National organization (U.M.N.O.), the Malay Chinese Association (M. C. A.) and the Malaya Indian Congress (M. I. C.)—won 51 of the 52 seats and formed a government, headed by Tengku Abdul Rahman.

The Alliance Manifesto had announced the intention of the Alliance groups to bring the Emergency to an end by offering general amnesty failing which, to wage an all-out war on the insurgents. On September 8, 1955 the amnesty was announced. But the Emergency continues, now in its tenth year. Meanwhile constitutional progress was proceeding smoothly. It was agreed in 1955 that a Constitutional Conference would be held in London in January-February 1956. The result of the conference was the transfer of limited power to Malaya, Britain retaining control of External Affairs and Defence, and joint control over internal security. August 1957 was set as the date of full independence. It was also agreed that an independent constitutional commission would be appointed to make recommendations for the constitution of an independent Federation of Malaya. In March 1956, a 5-man Commission comprising of Lord Reid (Chairman, U. K.), Sir Ivor Jennings (U. K.), Sir William McKell (Australia), Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid Khan (Pakistan), and Mr. Justice B. Malik (India) was set up and it released its report on February 20, 1957. Soon after a working party of 11 members representing the Alliance Government, the Malay Rulers and the U.K. Government was set up to examine this report. In May 1957, a delegation of Malaya went to London and complete agreement was reached on all points. On July 2, the Federation of Malay Independence Bill was introduced in the House of Commons and was passed by the end of the month. On August 31, 1957, Malaya became independent within the Commonwealth, and in November she was admitted to the United Nations and obtained recognition, by a large number of states, including China, the U.S.S.R. and India. The independence of

Malaya, however, is qualified by the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty signed between the government of Abdul Rahman and the government of the U K. Under the Treaty, Malaya allowed Britain to establish bases for an indefinite period—30 years in the first instance—although the Treaty can be reviewed from time to time and can be abrogated if necessary. Britain, in return, promised to look after Malaya's external defence. Malaya also pledged to go to the aid of British protectorates in the Far East if need arose. This Treaty was bitterly attacked by the opposition in Malaya but Rahman, the Prime Minister, quietened the opposition by threatening to resign if the treaty was not ratified. He told the Legislative Council that it was only the Royal Navy and the airforces of the Commonwealth that had prevented Malaya from becoming another Korea or Viet-Nam, and that the British protection was absolutely necessary. "We might just as well get out", he warned the Council, "and you can get some other clever Dicks to run the country". The Treaty was duly ratified.

What shall we say about Malayan nationalism which has been rather of a different order. It should be remembered that there have been many factors which have moderated the intensity of Malayan nationalism in spite of the great terror perpetrated on the people by the colonial rulers. *First*, the geography of the country curtailed contact among the indigenous Malaya people. *Secondly*, the British colonial policy of indirect rule through local Malay Sultans perpetuated sectional loyalties. *Thirdly*, the development of national loyalties has been hindered by the unique racial composition of the country, in which Malays and Chinese are almost equal in number. *Finally*, the Malays are generally easy going people or 'Nature's gentlemen'. When the Japanese troops invaded the country in 1941 the Malays generally were apathetic and quiescent. Indeed, according to one authority, "in 1945 the development of nationalism in Malaya seemed 25 years behind the rest of South east Asia".

SINGAPORE

Situated at the southern extremity of the Malayan Peninsula, Singapore is an island some 26 miles long, 14 miles wide and has a total area of a little over 220 sq. miles with a population of 1,250,000, 50% of which is under the age of 21. Of this population, increasing at the rate of 3% per year, the Chinese constitute 76%, the Malaysians 12%, Indians and Pakistanis 8%, and the Europeans and Eurasians 4%. It is a leading commercial centre in South East Asia and has important British defence installations employing $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the island's labour force, and is an important link in the lines of communication between Asia and Europe.

In 1819, it was purchased by Sir Stamford Raffles from the local rulers, and for a long time continued to be under the control of the Government of India. Since 1867 it has been a Crown Colony, just as a part of the Straits Settlements and from 1846, as a separate colony. In 1953, the Rendel Commission was appointed to review the constitution of Singapore. It reported in February 1954, and the British Government accepted the report under which elections were held on April 9, 1955. The qualified electorate numbered 300,000 of whom only 160,000 persons actually voted. After the elections, the Progressive and Democratic Parties (having 4 and 2 seats respectively in the Assembly of 25 elected and 7 nominated members) amalgamated. The Labour Front had captured 13 seats and its leader David Marshall was invited by the Governor to form the government, which he did in coalition with the Alliance" (consisting of the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A.) and the Singapore-Malaya Union.

On July 25, 1955, the Legislative Assembly adopted a resolution demanding immediate self-government for the colony. In August, Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for Colonies, visited Singapore and Marshall urged for freedom. It was agreed that early in 1956 a Conference should be held in London to suggest amendments to the Rendel Constitution. In December 1955, Marshall, Lim Yew Hock and Abdul Hamid visited London for talks with Lennox-Boyd in order to draw up an agenda for the conference. The first constitutional conference was held in London in April 1956 where Singapore was represented by a 13-man all-party delegation. The conference, however, broke down on May 15, because Singapore wanted Dominion Status, while Britain wanted to retain emergency powers to be exercised in its discretion. Lennox-Boyd, explaining the failure, said that in the light of the fact that there had been no appreciable period of stable democratic government in Singapore, that no political party held a commanding majority, and that the subversive forces of Communism were strongly at work in Singapore, Her Majesty's Government did not think it proper to take "the irrevocable step of abrogating all rights and powers of any sort in connection with Singapore for all times." On May 17, 1956 Marshall, on his own responsibility, made new proposals providing that the exercise of the emergency power by the U.K. Government should be subject to the approval of the House of Commons, that the responsibility for Singapore should be transferred from Colonial Office to the Commonwealth Relations office, and that the government of Singapore should be locally formed. Lennox-Boyd agreed to discuss these proposals provided that they were put forward either by the Singapore delegation as a whole, or by the Singapore Government. But with the failure of the first London Conference

unanimity had become out of the question. The delegation, therefore, returned to Singapore.

Marshall on June 3 resigned as Chief Minister and was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock on June 8, 1956. In December 1956, he went to London for talks and it was agreed that a further constitutional conference be held in London early in 1957. On March 11, 1957 the Conference opened. It was attended by an all party delegation from Singapore led by Lim Yew Hock. The Conference ended on April 11, after reaching agreement on the provisions to be embodied in a new Constitution for Singapore. It was decided that Singapore would be granted self government and would be called as the state of Singapore. The strength of the Assembly would be 51, all elected. The Prime Minister (formerly called Chief Minister) would preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The office of Governor was to be abolished when the agreement would come into force and a Malayan born personage with the title of Yang di-Pertuan Negara (Head of State) would be appointed to act as the Queen's representative in Singapore. There would be a U.K. Commissioner to discharge the duties in the sphere of defence and external affairs, including the full right to the occupation, control and use of the bases and installations in Singapore. The U.K. Government also retained the right to suspend the constitution in an emergency. A separate Singapore citizenship within the Commonwealth was to be created.

THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines illustrate American colonialism and deserve a separate study. They consist of a group of 7,000 islands, situated in the Pacific Ocean off the main-land of South East Asia and having a population of 20 millions. Its people are of the Malay group and enjoy close racial affinities with their neighbours in Indonesia and in Malaya. Majority of the people live in rural areas and agriculture is the principal industry and 70% of the people depend upon it. About a third of the arable land is under cultivation. Major exports are sugar, copra, abaca and tobacco. Large deposits of iron ore exist and there is some coal and some minerals. Historically, the islands have had close ties with Europe and the United States. They were discovered by Magellan in 1521, annexed by Spain in 1569 and were named after the Spanish King, Philip II. It was because of Spanish influence that the country is now 83% Christian. For most of the 3½ centuries of Spanish occupation the Filipinos were in revolt. In 1896, the insurgents proclaimed the country a republic independent of Spain. As a result of the Spanish American

War, the United States acquired the islands and retained them for 50 years. For 3 years after the Americans annexed the Philippines in 1899, the nationalists conducted a guerilla campaign which had to be forcibly suppressed. Gradually, the Americans granted self-government to the Islands. During World War I limited autonomy was conceded under the Jones Act. In 1934, under the Tidings-McDuffie Act a Philippines Commonwealth with limited freedom was created. Full responsible government was promised after 10 years.

During the war the bourgeois-landlord Nationalist Party which was a pretender to the role of leader of the popular masses in the struggle for national independence had compromised itself by open collaboration with the Japanese and the suppression of the popular resistance to the occupiers. But after a relatively brief period of Japanese domination, the Philippines were liberated by U. S. troops. On August 13, 1943 Roosevelt had exhorted the Filipinos to continue their resistance to the Japanese invaders and promised independence. On June 29, 1944 the Congress passed a law stipulating independence of the Philippines. The Islands had suffered the brunt of American colonialism. During this period the living standards of the peasants and agricultural labourers did not register any marked improvement and the economy was tied down to the U. S. economy.

The Islands had been brought within the American tariff system in 1909 and since then they had become entirely dependent on the U.S.A. Even after independence in 1946 the Philippines constitution was amended to give U.S. citizens and capital the same rights as those enjoyed by Filipinos, until 1947. Throughout the period of American imperialist rule the gap between the masses and the small governing class had been broadening and social unrest had deepened. Inefficiency, corruption and nepotism characterized the administration and as late as 1953 it was reported by Alan Edmond Kent that "agrarian disorders and an infamous election revealed that the Islands are far from secure as a bastion of democracy."

The War of 1939-45 had further aggravated these conditions. As President Roxas declared after the War: "There is hunger among us. . . . Plagues of rats and locusts gnaw at our food supplies. Public health and sanitation have been set back a quarter of a century. Housing is shocking in its inadequacy and squalor. Our communications are destroyed, stolen or disrupted. Schools have been burned and teachers have been killed." Indeed robberies, kidnappings, daylight assaults on buses, trucks and trains were daily occurrences. The Japanese had stripped the Islands of raw materials and the country, particularly Manila and the big Islands of Luzon, had been devastated by air raids

and land fighting. In 1942 a formidable resistance had been organized by all progressive forces under Communist leadership, i.e., the Hukbalahap (People's Army of Liberation) led by Luis Taruc which conducted guerilla warfare against the Japanese. In October 1944, MacArthur landed at Leyte with U.S. forces and defeated the Japanese. The Hukbalahap who were strong in Central and South Eastern Luzon, asked for recognition but MacArthur refused to grant the request and turned over the administration in February 1945 to Sergio Osmena who had succeeded to the presidency of the Filipino Government in exile at Washington after the death of Quezon in 1944. On July 4, 1946, the independence of the Philippines was proclaimed with Roxas as the President. For some time Taruc took part in the politics of the country but when President Roxas who was really a traitor and had collaborated with the Japanese, refused to allow him to attend the Legislature to which he had been elected, he reverted to open rebellion. By 1950 his activities had become alarming and Truman sent the Bill Mission to survey the conditions of the Philippines to which the U.S. had lent \$2000,000,000 since 1945. The Bill Mission recommended a grant of \$250,000,000 to finance a 5 year plan. As a result of this as well as of the boom following the Korean War the economic situation improved. The peasants were shown leniency and resettlement schemes were introduced to win them over. By the middle of 1952 most of the Hukbalahan revolt had been dealt with. The Government arrested about 300 Chinese merchants alleged to have supplied the rebels with money and arms. In 1953 Ramon Magsaysay won the election and by the middle of 1954 the rebellion had been suppressed.

Foreign Policy The basic principles of Philippine foreign policy have been (i) the establishment and strengthening of an Asian collective security system with primary dependence on the U.S.A. for defence protection, (ii) the forging of closer ties with non communist Asian states, (iii) satisfactory settlement of reparations claims against Japan and subsequent expansion of commercial relations with that country, (iv) the insistence that Formosa be kept out of communist hands. Filipinos probably remember Formosa as the place from which the Japanese launched their attack in 1941 and they are anxious to prevent any recurrence by doing their part to see that Formosa is kept out of hostile or potentially hostile hands and (v) active support to the United Nations.

Communism has been regarded by the Filipinos as a grave threat. Internally there was the Hukbalahap movement and externally, the Red victory in China unnerved them. The Korean war, the Indo Chinese conflict and the establishment of the communist state of North Viet Nam added to their fears. The

central aim of the Philippine foreign policy, therefore, has been to strengthen national security by suppressing subversion within and to build up strength against attacks from without through participation in collective security arrangements with other free nations. On March 14, 1947, extensive military agreements were concluded which gave the U.S. 99-year leases on several military bases. American technicians were also sent to assist the armed forces of the Philippines and the U.S. assumed responsibility for the defence of the islands in case of external aggression. In August 1950, a Mutual Defence Treaty with the U.S. was signed under which both parties agreed to maintain their capacity to meet armed attack and to consult together wherever in the opinion of either of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either party was threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. In September 1954, the Manila Treaty was signed (See Part Two, pp. 208-214) and the Mutual Defence Treaty was strengthened by the establishment of a Philippines-U.S. Continuing Council. The Philippines have played a very active part in the expansion of the SEATO. The close relations of the Philippines with the U.S. have not always been a smooth course. Here, as elsewhere, nationalism is a strong force and the policy of close relations with the U.S. is badly resented by the people. Senator Recto has been a vigorous critic of this policy. The people want to pursue a truly nationalist and independent policy involving recognition of and trade with Peking. Secondly, the existence of U.S. bases is resented and there was a popular clamour that Philippines should take over these bases. In July 1956, Nixon visited Manila and announced U.S. acceptance of the Philippine sovereignty over the bases. But the question whether or not Philippine law should operate within the bases is still unsolved. Again, the harsh policy of Philippines against Japan came in conflict with the U.S. policy of reviving Japan, particularly after 1950. In short, the policy of close co-operation with the U.S.A. is supported only by the feudal elements because of their fear of Communism. The people want social justice, self-respect and complete freedom, and unless the government of the Philippines satisfy popular aspirations the nationalist ferment will continue to feed on the anti-American sentiment. On January 1, 1956, the Laurel-Langley Agreement came into force and it foreshadowed decreasing ties between the U.S. economy and that of the Philippines.

We have referred to the harsh attitude of the Filipinos towards Japan in whose hands they suffered so much in the Second World War. Anti-Japanese feelings persisted in 1951 when the questions of a Peace Treaty with Japan arose. The Philippines

insisted that Japan accept responsibility for the war damage and it was only with great reluctance that the Government agreed to sign the Peace Treaty at San Francisco. But General Romulo made clear that the ratification depended upon the implementation of the provision for reparations. In January 1952, negotiations began and in April 1954 a preliminary agreement was signed under which Japan was to pay \$400,000,000 but the Philippine Congress regarded this as inadequate and rejected it. In November 1954, negotiations began again on a fresh basis and on May 9, 1956 a final treaty was signed and in July it was ratified together with the Japanese Peace Treaty. Under this, Japan would pay \$550,000,000 worth of capital goods at the rate of \$25,000,000 a year for 10 years and the balance within either the next 10 years or a lesser period. In a separate agreement Japan agreed to give long term loans of \$250,000,000 for the development of private industry in the Philippines.

With other Asian countries, the relations of the Philippines have, on the whole, been friendly. It took part in the Bandung Conference and its leaders condemned the so called "Communist Imperialism", defended military alliances like the SEATO, and criticized the cult of neutrality. The Philippines have not yet recognized Peking and trade with People's China is under strict government control. Relations with Formosa and South Korea are cordial, and Philippines government firmly believe that the islands of the Pescadores and Formosa (the latter is nearly 200 miles from Northern Luzon) should remain in friendly hands. With Indonesia, the Philippines have geographical and racial links. But while Indonesia follows a policy of neutrality and non-involvement in military alliances and, on the whole, an anti-Western policy, the Philippines follow the opposite course. While the latter is predominantly Catholic, the former is predominantly Muslim. Until the signature of the Indonesian-Philippines Immigration Agreement of July 4, 1956, relations were adversely affected by the problem of illegal migration between the two countries, principally from Indonesia to the Philippines.

Finally, the Philippines have played a prominent role at the U.N. which they support as a forum on which small powers can partially influence world affairs. In 1949, General Romulo was elected President of the General Assembly. In 1950, the Philippines supported U.N. action in Korea and sent a contingent to fight there. It has been acting in the various specialized agencies of the U.N. and Manila is the W.H.O. Regional Centre. It also served on the Economic and Social Council and has sought increasing aid from the industrialized powers for the backward areas. It served on the Commission of Human Rights for 3 terms and participated in the drafting of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights and Covenant on Human Rights. In addition, the Philippines also participate in the Colombo Plan.

NEPAL

The kingdom of Nepal, a beautiful hill state famous for its Gurkha troops, the birth place of Buddha, is nestled high on the southern slopes of the Himalayas and extends for 500 miles as a sort of buffer between India and Tibet. Its area is about 56,000 sq. miles and its population is roughly estimated at 10 millions. Its climate, in the phrase of Chester Bowles, is "perfect" and it is situated as a diagonal strip of mountains and valleys 520 miles long by 100 miles wide, between the latitudes 26° and 31° North. Its people are of Mongol origin but for centuries they have been ruled by Hindu Rajputs who fled from Chittor on its capture by the Muslims in 1503, and who, by 1768, had conquered the native Mongol rulers of Nepal. In 1792, Nepal was invaded by the Chinese who were, however, defeated. Newars form a considerable majority of the population in the Kathmandu valley but the population consist mainly of Parbathis, i.e. the Gurkhas. A Gurkha incursion into India was finally defeated by General Ochterlony of the East India Company in 1816, and after the Treaty of Siguli, the relations between the British Government in India and Nepal remained very friendly. In 1846, a Nepalese nobleman, Jung Bahadur Rana, supported by the British, established himself firmly as Prime Minister, swept the decadent King into the background and instituted a ruling dynasty which provided the hereditary occupant of the offices of Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief up to 1951. Thus the Rana (Prime Minister) became a supreme dictator, exercising all the powers of the government, while the King was a mere figure-head, occupying a semi-divine position similar to that of the Japanese Emperor under the Shogunate. It was in the regime of the first Rana that the Gurkha soldiers were recruited in the British army in India—a privilege which Britain enjoys to this day. In the two world wars about 200,000 Gurkhas in their characteristic felt hats cocked jauntily on their heads, and with their ancient kukri knife, which, with its 15-inch curved blade worn at the belt like bayonets and swinging like an axe, is capable of cutting off the head of a buffalo, took part and spread the fame of the Himalayan Kingdom all over the world.

Until 1950, for nearly 100 years, Nepal was a country closed to the rest of the world, guarded from political and economic influences, and known only to a few visitors other than pilgrims from the South and traders from the North, whose information could not reach beyond the narrow circle around them. In

this also the British colonial policy is fully reflected. It was to neutralize Nepal's potential military strength that the British contrived to segregate it from the rest of India by treaty stipulation. "By 1835", D. R. Regmi has written, "Nepal ceased to enjoy in practice all powers of external contact of its choice, and the British indirectly regulated such contacts if any. It could not even appoint to its states or private services any European personnel and their presence or the presence of any Indian was to be reported forthwith to Calcutta. A little later, near about 1846, there was established a vile autocracy which surrendered the remaining privileges to the British, and utilised the situation to maintain its stranglehold over the realm. A deal was struck between the foreign power and the local medieval autocracy on the basis of Nepal's isolation from all external contacts... This was designed to cover the entire field of Nepal's economic and social progress as they came to be related with outside influences, which were shut out deliberately to keep it ever backward. In Nepal's medieval backwardness was discovered the foundation that reared the structure of autocracy and supplied the fodder for the Imperialist gun."

The country is most backward even today. Travel in Nepal is accomplished almost on foot, or assisted by pony or elephant except where air services exist to link the main centres, and where, in the South, there are a few inadequate and unsatisfactory roads and railways. Journeying by surface routes between Nepal and her neighbours, and within the country itself, is, therefore, extremely laborious. Even Kathmandu (the Capital) is still largely isolated, as it has no direct road or rail link with the outer world and its air services are at the mercy of the clouds, wind and rain, which in that area can disorganize the best laid plans. There are language difficulties too. The national language is Nepali, an Aryan language quite close to Hindi. The level of English even amongst the officials is very low. Newari is used as a local language in the Kathmandu valley. Under the Ranas there was no system of national budget and the expenditure on public account was not divulged. No census was taken and there is no accurate estimate of the population of the country, nor any accurate map. In the army, title of General used to run by inheritance rather than by ability. Economically it is a very poor country with a wide trade deficit. Total electric power capacity amounts to only 2,825 kilowatts "scarcely enough to light an American town". It is an agricultural country with 95% of her population employed on the land. The health standards are appallingly low, and malaria, filariasis, small pox, dysentery, cholera, and Kala Azar, are ever present with 40% of the people suffering from malaria. In face of this situation there were, as late as 1933, only 3 doctors, 10 nurses and 650 hospital

beds. In the Terai and Kathmandu valley 95% of the population is suffering from filariasis, that hideous mosquito-borne disease of which the attack is so invidious that it may take up to 6 years after injection to manifest itself. About 95% of the population is believed to be illiterate, and few of the small number of the educated are in a position to use their education to full advantage. In 1953, more than half the land was still owned by large landowners charging rents averaging 50% of the yearly crop, with many rents running far higher, and about 70% of the peasants were making payments to village money lenders at interest rates ranging from 20% to 100% annually. All these conditions were created by century-old isolation, feudalism, and imperialist rule which led Nepal to aloofness and made her "an impregnable fortress of timidity".

Nepal's potential resources were not tapped even for capitalist exploitation much less to ameliorate the conditions of the people. It has immense natural resources, minerals, forest and water power, vast deposits of copper, iron, mica, oil, coal, iron, asphalt, peat, sulphur and quartz; a climate excellent for horticulture, both for fruits and vegetables; a soil which is fertile enough to feed the population, while still leaving an exportable surplus; raw materials for new industries for which there is a local market which is at present met from abroad; traditional skills and plenty of scope for tourism. But all this has left Nepal undeveloped and there are no hotels, no cinema houses and no public parks. Caste system is even now strict; people did not hear of a public meeting till 1951 and radio was not permitted for the people till 1946. Penal code was barbaric and the burden of proof rested on the accused. The first aeroplane reached Kathmandu in March 1950, and till 1936, Nepal's external mail service was managed by the Postal Department of the Government of India. There is no University in Nepal in 1958 and the Nepal degree college is affiliated to one of the Universities in India. There was no public library till 1951; and there is no engineering school even today. On the other side, there is the aristocracy which Regmi has described as "a blood-sucking vampire and a lording wolf".

Struggle for Independence. Even in "the iron curtain" which had been flung around Nepal by the British Imperialists and the tyrannical Ranas, there were "inevitable gaps". Although there was no well developed and politically conscious middle class, no popular desire to attain freedom, and although one could find a deplorable apathy and docility bred by long period of enslavement, and whatever political movement there was, was torn with internal friction and personal rivalries, there were factors which stirred a slumbering people like the Nepalese.

Gurkha soldiers who fought as mercenaries in World War I brought with them a picture of the outside world and tales of "the great democratic ferment stirring everywhere under the impact of Woodrow Wilson's idealism", and Buddhist priests wandering into far away countries returned to tell of new progress being made in other lands to combat poverty and disease. Young students who, for want of schools and colleges, fled to India for education caught the infection of Indian resistance to Imperialism, learnt of Gandhi, Nehru and Bose and imbibed dynamic and explosive ideas of freedom, socialism and revolution—ideas which take firm root in the minds and hearts where they are planted. Greater is the suppression, greater would be the resilience and resistance offered and the oppressor eventually is doomed to failure. It was in the early 1920's that a small movement directed at the removal of the Ranaarchy arose, but its leadership, inexperienced and ill organized, was exiled by the Ranas. The leaders who came to India illicitly organized themselves in alliance with the Indian National Congress. But the Viceroy in New Delhi refused to permit agitation against the Ranas and prevented the Nepalese exiles from interfering in Nepalese affairs. Nepal, therefore, continued to lead an isolated, feudal existence, crushing and suppressing voice of protest with iron hand. Chester Bowles has narrated the story of one Khadgaman Singh, one of the early heroes of the revolutionary struggle who survived the ordeal. When the Rana (Prime Minister) came to know Singh's plans of assassination of all the Ranas, he put Singh and his friends in a cell five feet high, ten feet long and six feet wide in order to shorten their life expectancy. Bowles writes "He induced a guard to take a picture of him, which was smuggled out of the prison. I have a copy of that picture in my library now. It shows a handsome man behind bars in a kind of cage, dressed in rags, with an eighty pound iron ball and chain around one ankle, and heavy manacles at his wrists and throat. But on his face was a look of complete peace and dignity. He explained that the inspiration of Gandhi had reached even into this remote Nepalese prison. 'The Mahatma's cheerful courting of jail in India, news of which was smuggled in, made a deep impression on me. Through Gandhi I came to realize how wrong our bombing plot had been. I gave up all thought of violence. I decided that if our country were to be free it should be by Gandhi's way'."

Despite Rana's tyranny, therefore, the revolutionary movement remained alive and with the march of freedom in India, it went on gathering momentum. The dissatisfaction and spirit of revolt amongst the Nepalese intelligentsia, the transfer of power to the people in India, and the exit of the British, the activities of King Tribhuvan, and the revolution in China in

October 1949 all these gave a fillip to the Nepalese revolutionary movement. The exigencies of the international situation made the Nepalese conscious of their importance in world politics. Britain was interested in the recruitment of Gurkhas even after 1947 as they were valuable against the nationalists in Malaya. The United States, particularly after October 1949, got specially interested in this Himalayan country. People in India feared both the increasing activities of Westerners in Nepal, as well as "the gradual domination of Tibet by the Chinese Communists" which would have its impact on the border between Nepal and Tibet.

India's role in Nepal's independence

The story of the Nepalese people's struggle against Ranarchy after 1947 is interwoven with the activities and policies of the Government of India. Soon after independence the latter despatched Mr. Sri Prakash (now the Governor of Bombay) to Nepal at the request of the Prime Minister of Nepal, to help draft a constitution for that country, which, however, the Ranas refused to accept. Early in 1950, India started pressing Nepal authorities to introduce democratic reforms. As we have noted, by this time Nepal had become "a potential seat of conflict in the cold war" and it was realized in India "that an economically and politically stabilized Nepal would have the necessary strength to remain independent and to resist foreign intervention in the country". The first expression of India's policy came on March 17, 1950 when Nehru told the Parliament: "Geographically Nepal is almost a part of India although she is an independent country . . . It is clear that in so far as certain developments in Asia were concerned, the interests of India and Nepal were identical . . . It is not possible for the Indian Government to tolerate an invasion of Nepal from anywhere, even though there is no military alliance between the two countries. Freedom interests us in the abstract as well as in the guise of a practical and in the context of Asia, a necessary step. If it does not come, forces that will ultimately disrupt freedom itself will be created and encouraged. We have accordingly advised the Government of Nepal . . . to bring themselves into line with democratic forces". With the positive encouragement of India, and active sympathy of King Tribhuwan, the nationalists in Nepal launched an all-out struggle against the Ranas in April 1950. By October, the scheme to enable the king to escape from the Argus-eyed vigil of Rana's soldiers matured and on November 6, the king entered the Indian Embassy gardens and asked for political asylum from the Indian Ambassador. This was a few days in anticipation of the date fixed by the Nepali Congress for the rescue of the king whom they wanted to make "a symbol of

their future independence by diverting the people's allegiance from the Ranas."

The King's flight was a signal for revolt and the nationalists led by General Subarna Shamsher (a progressive and a cousin of the Prime Minister) attacked Bir Ganj, occupied it and liberated 10,000 political prisoners and established an all party democratic government. On November 18, leaflets were dropped from the air on Kathmandu asking the Ranas to surrender, but on November 19, the Ranas had suppressed the uprising. The King having escaped, the Premier proclaimed his infant son as the King of Nepal whom India refused to recognise while Britain and the U.S.A. wavered. This brought India in a straight conflict with the Ranas who wrongly accused the Indian Government of creating disturbances in Nepal by allowing the rebels to remain in its territory. On November 27, Nepalese government, however, sent Major General Bhaiya Shamsher and Kuser Shamsher (Foreign and Defence Ministers respectively) to Delhi and they held consultations with the Indian leaders and King Tribhuwan who had meanwhile reached there. On December 6, Nehru reiterated India's policy. "When we came into the picture, we assured Nepal that we would not only respect her independence, but we wanted to see Nepal develop into a strong and progressive country. We went further in this respect than the British Government had done, that is to say, Nepal began to develop foreign relations with other countries. We welcomed it."

We do not like and we do not propose to like any foreign interference in Nepal. Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal became still more acute and personal, if I may say so, because of the developments across our borders, to be frank especially those in China and Tibet. We are interested in the security of our country. We are convinced that a return to the old order will not bring peace and stability to Nepal. We have tried to find a way, a middle way, if you like, which ensures the progress of Nepal, the introduction of some advance in the ways of democracy in Nepal." On December 8, the Indian Government, in a memorandum, asked the Nepal Government to call for immediate election of a Constituent Assembly (C.A.) to prepare a Constitution, to instal, meanwhile, a popular and broad based all party interim government including the representatives of the Ranas one of whom should be the Prime Minister, and to welcome King Tribhuwan as the King of Nepal. On December 24, the Nepalese Premier made counter-proposals that the C.A. would be called in after 3 years, and the interim government would consist of 9 persons, 3 of whom were to be popular representatives. Nothing was said about King Tribhuwan. This was far from satisfactory and the first attempt to solve the Nepalese problem, therefore, failed.

On January 1, 1951, talks between India and Nepal were resumed and it was agreed that Tribhuwan would continue as the King with the right to appoint a Regent in his absence, that elections for C.A. would be held on the basis of adult suffrage, and not later than 1952, that political prisoners would be granted amnesty, and that an interim government would be formed. These reforms, it is true, could not be said to be "a complete surrender of power to the people", but they were certainly "a surrender to commonsense and the overwhelming pressure of the times". M.P. Koirala of the Nepali Congress, however, described these reforms as disappointing. On January 15, 1951 Tribhuwan returned to Kathmandu. The Ranaarchy had virtually ended and with the appointment of a ten-man Cabinet on February 18, *the first phase of the revolution had been completed*. Of these ten, 5 were Ranas and 5 were popular representatives from the Nepali Congress with Rana Mohun Shamsher as the Premier. However, the Nepali National Congress led by D. R. Regmi boycotted the reforms and for about 6 months there was complete anarchy in the Himalayan Kingdom. The Ranas and popular representatives rendered the Cabinet a house divided against itself. This conflict was once again referred to Nehru for resolution and at his instance, it was agreed that an Advisory Assembly should be established to advise on legislation and help the government in carrying out its administrative duties. But this did not work, and the trouble of Nepal was far from being over. On November 11, 1951, the 5 Congress representatives resigned from the Cabinet. On November 12, the Premier also resigned, and this completed the *second phase* of the revolution. On November 14, King Tribhuwan invited M.P. Koirala to form a new government. In the new government, however, B. P. Koirala, brother of M. P. Koirala and an important leader of the Nepali Congress, refused to participate and this indicated a rift between the two brothers. In April, however, it was decided that B.P. Koirala would be the chairman of the Nepali Congress and M.P. Koirala the Premier, and that while the government was to follow the general decision of the Party in its annual session, the Party would not interfere in the day to day work of the Government. But the relations between Koirala brothers continued to deteriorate, and on July 26, 1952 M. P. Koirala was expelled from the party. On August 10, he resigned from the office of the Premier and the King installed Advisers "to clean up the mess and prepare the ground for free elections to the Constituent Assembly". This arrangement was disliked by all sections, including the King, but there was no alternative. In December, the King came to Calcutta for treatment. In January 1953, the two Koirala brothers met Jai Prakash Narain in an effort to resolve their

difficulties which, however, persisted. The King, however, on June 15, 1953, appointed an all-party Cabinet under M P Koirala in order to arrange for elections to the C A.

This government held office precariously for 18 months. In October 1954, while the King was abroad for medical treatment, his eldest son, Prince Mahendra, presided over the Council of State with his two brothers. Early in 1955, a Cabinet crisis developed when M P Koirala's government, split within itself, was defeated on a vote by the Advisory Assembly. Prince Mahendra prorogued the Assembly for a month and flew to Europe to consult his sick father. The King temporarily vested him with full powers. On his return, the Crown Prince, therefore, accepted the Prime Minister's resignation, dissolved the Cabinet, appointed a number of Royal advisers, and assumed direct rule of the country. On March 13, 1955, King Tribhuvan died at Zurich, and the following day the Crown Prince was enthroned as King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva of Nepal. He at once started consultations with political leaders. On May 8, 1955 an assembly was called which was boycotted by all the 4 parties: the Nepali Congress of B P Koirala, the Nepali National Congress of D R Regmi, the Praja Parishad (Socialist) of Tanka Prasad Acharya, and the Gurkha Parishad with Rana connections. The assembly, however, recommended the dissolution of Advisory Assembly and the holding of elections. On August 8, 1955, the King announced that they would be held on October 8, 1957. On June 10, 1955, the Advisory Assembly was dissolved. In November, the People's Rights of Citizenship Act was passed. It was designed to secure equality before the law, non discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, religion or caste, freedom of speech, freedom from unlawful taxation, arrest or confiscation of property. On January 27, 1956, the King's personal rule came to an end and a Cabinet composed of 4 members of the Praja Parishad, and 3 Royal advisers under Tanka Prasad Acharya came in office. This inaugurated another phase in Nepalese revolution. An election commission was put in office to prepare for general elections. A draft of a Nepalese 5-year plan was released and was subsequently revised extensively by experts from WHO and UNESCO. The plan envisaged an expenditure of Rs 33 crores of which Nepal had been offered (by June 1957) Rs 24 crores in foreign aid (India 10 crores, U.S.A. 8 crores, China 6 crores). Elections are scheduled to be held in February 1959.

In July 1957, Dr K I Singh was appointed Prime Minister. Dr Singh known as "the strong man", a "leftist", and an intense nationalist, took refuge in Tibet and thence to China where he was a guest of Peking Government for several years. He returned from the exile in September 1955, and promising loyalty and non-violence, received a full pardon from the King. Later, he

formed the United Democratic Party. Contrary to expectations he did not, since his return, display any enthusiasm for Communism. He declared himself in favour of a constitutional monarchy, advocated closer economic ties with India, a country which he once disliked, criticized the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nepal and the Soviet Union and China, condemned the China-Nepal-Tibet Treaties and the Chinese gift of 1956, and favoured a policy of non-alignment, with strongest political bonds with India where alone "Nepal's salvation lies". But Dr. K. I. Singh also failed to deliver the goods and early in 1958 he resigned. On September 30, 1957 elections were postponed. On April 27, 1958 Dr. Singh disclosed that "international pressure and conspiracy by traitors at home had obliged him to resign". He declared that a number of topmen in the army and government in league with Americans put up all sorts of obstacles against the popular measures "that his government had taken", and alleged that "Americans had bullied" him to sign an agreement on U.S. Aid to Nepal at the threat of forfeiture of five million dollars". He charged them with "trying to interfere with Nepalese foreign policy" and revealed that during his office "the Chief of the U.S. Operation Mission wrote me a letter saying that diplomatic relations between America and Nepal might come to a breakdown if I did not grant a passport to a Nepalese girl whom the Americans wanted to take to the United States". He disclosed that "the Anglo-American design was to aid anti-communist elements in Tibet and if they had their way, they would drag Nepal into the vortex of international conflicts", and that "propaganda in favour of Pakistan as against India was being made in Nepal through the American Mission". On April 28, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to India and accredited to Kathmandu, denied the allegations made by K. I. Singh and said that "the U.S. considered Nepal as a sovereign and independent nation", that "no American personnel had ever been engaged in 'intrigues' against any Government of Nepal", that "the only American Government personnel permanently stationed in Nepal are members of the U.S. Operations Mission who are there solely to assist in Nepal's economic development and have no diplomatic functions", and that "all the projects in which the Americans or American funds are engaged are Nepalese Government projects, chosen and approved by the Government of Nepal".

Nepal's Foreign Policy. The foreign policy of Nepal rests on the following basic principles: (1) closest friendship with India, (2) amicable and friendly relations with all neighbours like China, the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan; (3) non-alignment in the cold war; (4) close co-operation with the United Nations; and (5) securing economic aid from all friendly countries on the basis of the Panchshila. Nepal entered upon the stage of world politics with a suddenness somewhat disconcerting to many of her

citizens, for, as we have seen, until the end of Rana rule in 1950-51, the country was outside the stream of international relations, being secluded in the Himalayas and in substantial contact only with her neighbours, India, Tibet, and occasionally China. Her geo-political position, scarcity of natural resources, and backward economy made her "an ideal buffer state" between China and the British Government in India. Historically, Nepal and India had closest relations and even today India's influence is overwhelming. We have already noted the role of India in the national, political and constitutional changes that occurred in Nepal since 1947 and the concern and anxiety felt by Indian Government since 1949. Indian contribution in the economic life of Nepal is vital and our aid during the last many years amounts to several hundred million rupees. For the plan adopted in 1956 India is committed to advance Rs 100,00,000. In addition this country is helping Nepal in the building up of schools, hospitals, in irrigation projects and hydro electric schemes. In the military sphere, an Indian military mission in Kathmandu for many years organized and trained the Nepal-ese army. The Indian Air Force is making an aerial survey of west Nepal and Indian military engineers are helping to build up roads and air fields. We have supplied plenty of material and have helped Nepal in the suppression of bandits and raiders. India is helping a great deal in the Kosi River project on the border of the two countries in eastern Nepal so that floods may be controlled, land on both sides be irrigated and electric power for both may be generated.

As early as 1930, India and Nepal signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and a Treaty of Trade and Commerce (July 31, 1930) on the broad pattern of the Anglo-Nepal Treaty of 1925. Under the latter, Nepal had no foreign exchange of her own and had to depend on India for it to cover her reasonable needs. She was required to impose the same export or import duties on trade with overseas countries as India. On goods which Nepal exported to this country, she had to levy an export duty so that Nepalese goods here would not undersell the same kind of Indian goods. In June 1957, however, India signed a new agreement with Nepal which entitled her to have her own foreign exchange control and enabled her to levy any export duty on her goods. The anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal, at present, exists but it is on the decline. India cannot afford to neglect, or disinterest herself in, the political and economic development of Nepal which has much in common with us and on whose security our own security depends. The presence of another great power on its northern border (China) makes what happens in Nepal all the more important to us in India, and to the non communist world. Whatever one may say about ancient Sino-Indian friend-

ship and the present amity and goodwill, no government in India can afford to loosen its grips on Nepalese security, for, if Nepal were to fall under the control of China, our rivals in Asia would be "poised right on the Indian border, about the great heartland of the country, and less than 400 miles from Delhi". Certain vested interests keep up the anti-Indian feelings in Nepal but when President Rajendra Prasad visited that country in 1956 he was given a friendly reception. In short, Indo-Nepalese relations are based on the solid foundations of geographical contiguity, cultural affinity, historical friendship, and community of political, economic and strategic interests.

The relations of Nepal with China have been correct. With Tibet she has had special relations—religious, commercial and political. These were governed by a treaty concluded in 1856 after Nepal had won a local war against Tibet. Under this treaty Tibet paid Rs. 10,000 annually to Nepal and gave many other concessions to her. Following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1951, Nepal complained on various occasions about Chinese actions contrary to this treaty. The Chinese map showing Nepal as part of China, and the Chinese talk of a closer solidarity between China and Nepal after the "liberation" of Tibet had created uneasiness in Nepal and India. Frontiers were tightened, traffic was carefully checked and army posts were established along the 500-mile border. In 1953, Tibet stopped paying the tribute of Rs. 10,000 to Nepal. The Nepalese traders cried for normalization of relations with Tibet (which now meant People's China). In April 1954, Chou En-lai and Nehru reached agreement on Tibet. The Chinese authorities in Lhasa suggested that the Treaty of 1856 be revised in the light of Tibet's "new status in the People's Republic of China". On the Chinese initiative, in August 1955 normal diplomatic relations were established between China and Nepal through the medium of their representative in New Delhi and on the basis of the Panch-Shila. On June 12, the Nepalese Ambassador to Peking arrived and the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi was concurrently appointed Ambassador at Kathmandu. The Chinese offered economic aid to Nepal, made gifts to the Nepalese Tuberculosis Foundation, exchanged cultural missions, invited Nepalese officials for formal visits, and invited the Nepalese leaders to peace conferences in Peking. The problem of Tibet, however, was still creating some trouble.

To solve this problem talks between C. P. Sharma, Nepal's Foreign Minister, and Pan Tzu-li, Chinese Ambassador to India and Nepal began on August 17, 1956 in Kathmandu and, on September 20, these resulted in the signing of a treaty of friendship and trade with particular reference to Tibet. It provided for mutual trade and travel facilities, mutual establish-

ment of trade agencies at agreed places, establishment of consulates at Lhasa and Kathmandu and passport regulations. Nepal agreed to withdraw within 6 months her military escort at Lhasa, and to relinquish the extra territorial rights which Nepalese traders enjoyed under the Treaty of 1856, and to permit such Nepalese in Tibet who hold dual Chinese and Nepalese nationality to opt for Chinese nationality for themselves and for their children under 18 years of age. The treaty was to last for 8 years. This was followed by more cordial relations between Peking and Kathmandu. In October 1956 Nepal's Prime Minister (Tanka Prasad) visited China and on October 8, a joint statement was issued by him and Chou, in Peking, in which it was announced that they had reached an economic agreement under which China would give 6 crores of Indian rupees to Nepal payable over a 3 year period, one third in cash and two-thirds in goods. A sentence was added to the effect that Chinese technical personnel would not be going to Nepal because "India was technically more advanced than China and that was the place to go for technical assistance". At the invitation of Tanka Prasad, Chou visited Nepal on January 25, 1957 and received a warm welcome. He brought with him the first instalment of the gift (1 crore rupees) but could not offer any border guarantee to Nepal. In a joint communique the two Premiers reiterated their support of the Bandung principles and the Panch Shila.

With the United States trade contacts were established in 1945. In November 1946 the U.S. *charge d'affaires* at New Delhi visited Kathmandu "in order to decorate some Gurkha officers for their bravery in the Burma-India theatre of World War II". In March 1947, at the request of Nepal, a U.S. Mission came, and in April, a treaty of friendship was signed and diplomatic relations were established. The U.S.A. has since given considerable economic aid to Nepal, has built up a library at Kathmandu and has given technical assistance. In the new 5-year plan (1956-60) she has given Rs 80 million. Chester Bowles, with his tact and courtesy had captured popular imagination in Nepal. But the anti U.S. sentiment is very strong, and in 1954 the effigies of Eisenhower and Dulles were burnt in the streets of Kathmandu.

With France a treaty was drafted in 1954 and diplomatic relations were established. Burma has consulates in Nepal. On July 26 1956, Nepal announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. at ambassadorial level. On March 12, 1957 the first Soviet Ambassador presented his credentials to Nepal, "together with some vague offers of aid and very definite offers of cultural missions". With Britain Nepalese relations are very happy. In 1947, agreements were signed allowing Britain (along with India) to have the only

resident ambassador in Kathmandu and to continue recruitment of Gurkhas. In May 1956, many countries sent their representatives to attend the coronation of King Mahendra. On September 1, 1956, diplomatic relations were established with Japan and on November 10, with Switzerland. Proposals by Egypt, West Germany, Thailand and Australia are being considered. The Nepalese Foreign Minister denied that an agreement could be reached with Pakistan apparently because Pakistan has expressed doubt of Nepal's independence from India. Although Nepal could become a member of the U.N. only on December 14, 1955, it had already joined such U.N. specialized agencies as FAO, UNESCO, WHO and the ECAFE. She receives technical aid from the U.N., is part of the Afro-Asian bloc, and has played a valuable role in the U.N. deliberations. She opposes colonialism, racial discrimination and rearmament. Her policy is that of positive neutrality and she condemned Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt as well as the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary in 1956. Nepal is also a participant in the Colombo Plan and has received technical assistance from India, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon.

CHAPTER 19

Resurgence of Asia

PAKISTAN

Pakistan came into existence as a separate state on August 15 1947 by the partition of the Indian sub continent. For want of space it is not possible here to traverse the course of struggle the Indian leaders waged to preserve the unity of the Indian sub-continent—a unity based on geographical, ethnic and cultural community. By no stretch of imagination and by no test can the Muslims, as Muslims, be said to constitute a separate nation. This myth in India was deliberately built up by interested parties and assiduously cultivated by sophisticated Muslims who imagined that their co-religionists had a separate culture and a way of life, distinct from that of the Indian masses. A fear was slowly generated that this way of life of Muslims would become submerged in an India where the Hindus could exercise the power of a numerical majority. This led to an ironical condemnation, by the Muslim League leaders, of democracy as unsuited to Indian conditions and to a demand of an independent Muslim State consisting of those areas of undivided India where they constituted a majority. Muslim leaders badly exploited some of the grave mistakes made by the Congress leaders in their handling of the Muslim League and interpreted the Congress moves either as an expression of the desire of the Hindus to dominate the Muslims, or of a weakness usually associated with the cult of non violence. The experience of the Congress Ministries in 1937-39 seemed to reinforce the Muslim League's propaganda and when these resigned in 1939 with the outbreak of the second world war, the Muslims celebrated the event as a Day of Deliverance. The Muslim masses, who in the beginning were politically unconscious and remained unaffected by the League's views, gradually got interested in the legend of a separate Muslim state. It caught their imagination and the fanaticism with which they took it up worked conveniently in a background of their relative backwardness, ignorance and poverty. The British rulers fanned the flames which were already smouldering before the British Raj began. Religion had played a vital role in the Indian politics from a very early period and when religion made an alliance with the doctrine of self-determination, the politically potent Muslim ideal of a religious community

was born. There developed what Wilfred Smith has called "the inherent striving within the heart of Islam towards social expression". The movement for Pakistan acquired impetus and enthusiasm. The pace of events acquired momentum in 1945-46 and early in 1947, the British Government had decided to transfer power to Indian hands. The last effort to retain the unity of India broke down on the rock of intransigence of the League leadership and the reality of communalism.

On June 3, Lord Mountbatten announced the partition plan, and on June 10 and 13, it was ratified by the Muslim League and the Congress. The map of India was to be changed and the massive red pear that had been an ornament in English atlases for a century was now to be sliced. "A country, half the size of the U.S., but with two and a half times its population, was to be divided so that Hindu India would form a gigantic wedge—one thousand miles wide—between East and West Pakistan. It was as if George Washington had united California and Massachusetts into one state with an alien nation spread between. The two Muslim territories, speaking different languages, one facing the east, the other the west—to be permitted no land communication—were the Pakistan that Jinnah had won". The ideals for which Mahatma Gandhi had worked all his life—Hindu-Muslim unity and India's unity—had not been realized even though the Mahatma did not accept defeat till the end and eventually laid down his life for the cause. The frontiers of the two states were defined by a Boundary Commission under Sir Cyril Radcliffe. On July 4, the historic Indian Independence Act had been introduced in the House of Commons—historic because never before had such a large population achieved independence through legislation. It was passed by the Commons on July 15, and by the Lords on July 16, and on July 18 it received the Royal assent.

On August 7, 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah flew from Delhi to Karachi to become the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Earlier in July, Jinnah had turned down the idea of accepting Mountbatten as the common Governor-General (G. G.) of the two dominions. On August 14, Jinnah was inaugurated as G. G. and on August 15, the members of the Pakistan Cabinet were sworn in and the State which, at one time, was supposed to reside in clouds was born as Pakistan. The term was coined from the Persian "pak" (pure) and "stan" (place) and means "Land of the Pure", the spiritually pure and clean. In the words of Choudhury Rahmat Ali, "it symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland." As an acrostic, the term is interpreted as *P* for Punjab, *A* for Afghanistan (N.W.F.P.), *K* for Kashmir, *S* for Sindh, and "*Stan*" for Baluchis-

The word "Pakistan" was first used as the symbol of a political ideal in 1933 by some Muslim students at Cambridge University and the idea was adopted in the Muslim League Lahore Resolution of 1940.

Along with partition, there had to be a division of staff organizations and records, services and institutions, assets and liabilities of the Indian government, and questions of future economic relations, domicile, and diplomatic relations had to be solved. A Partition Committee was set up and it continued even after August 15, 1947. For the settlement of unsolved problems, an Arbitral Tribunal was set up. The Partition Council decided on the division of armed forces on communal basis and this task was undertaken by Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander in Chief, who was redesignated from August 15 as Supreme Commander and who worked under the Joint Defence Council. Since the membership of all international organizations and the rights and obligations attached to it devolved on India, Pakistan had to apply for membership of the U.N. In short, Jinnah had achieved more than Cavour and Bismarck, for, taking a full advantage of the Indian political situation, he had achieved his aim of founding a state without the support of an army.

The new state selected Karachi as its capital. The total area of Pakistan is 364,757 sq. miles and its population estimated in 1957 was 81 million of which 85% are Muslims and 13% Hindus. In November 1954, Pakistan decided to integrate the existing provinces and princely states in West Pakistan into a single administrative unit, and to make the country a federation of two units (West Pakistan and East Pakistan) and on October 14, 1955 the new scheme was inaugurated. Thus East Pakistan has an area of 54,501 sq. miles with a population of about 46 millions, and West Pakistan has an area of 310,236 sq. miles with a population of about 35 millions.

The problems that Pakistan had to face were many and staggering. It had to build up a completely new central Government and a new Capital. To the problems of setting up ministries with neither adequate personnel nor equipment were added those of devising a system of administration for a nation consisting of two disparate blocs of territory, 1,000 miles apart. A new constitution had to be devised. The problem of refugee and communal passion and frenzy had to be tackled. An economy had to be created which could enable Pakistan to survive and even prosper independently of India to which it had been linked historically. The basic economic and social problems had to be solved. To these problems were added others that Pakistan largely created herself such as Kashmir, evacuee property, and the river disputes. In foreign affairs, Pakistan was confronted with the choice of

looking towards the Middle East or towards South-East Asia and since a clear and sensible choice has not yet been made, it has not been able to adjust in either region and has almost ended up in becoming a satellite of the United States of America.

Since its inception, the problems of centre-unit relations, the pattern of constitution, and the choice of a national language have been defying the statesmanship of the Pakistanis. There has been almost a cultural vacuum in Pakistan, for, though its leaders have the ambition of dissociating in every way from India, they have to correlate, nevertheless, their present with the past history of India. The problem of a stable government is a serious challenge and since the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan (1950)—and the conspiracy of that assassination is yet to be unearthed—half-a-dozen leaders have headed the government. The leadership has been engaging itself with offices and the problems of hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy have gone by default. The political parties do not agree on fundamentals and the experiment of parliamentary democracy is sharp failing. Corruption, nepotism and jobbery characterize the public life of Pakistan and these facts have been frequently stressed by the top leaders of the country. Political leaders, in order to retain themselves in power, have been manoeuvring to postpone elections and none has so far been held since Pakistan was born. After the death of Jinnah and the murder of Liaquat Ali in 1951 the Muslim League lost all prestige and the United Front of Fazl-ul-Haq swept off the polls in East Pakistan in 1954. Leaders have been offered high offices and have been dismissed arbitrarily without a reference to the legislature by heads of the State. Patriotic leaders such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahab were detained without trial and the country was thus deprived of sound leadership. In 1958, Dr. Khan Sahab, reputed for his honesty and uprightness, courage and patriotism was assassinated.

It was on February 29, 1956 that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly after a prolonged crisis and scandals involving the highest functionaries, executive and judicial, passed the Constitution Bill. In that crisis, the Constituent Assembly which had "lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function" was dismissed by the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, on October 24, 1954 as a preliminary to calling a constituent convention. The Cabinet was reconstituted and Major General Iskander Mirza was brought in as Minister of the Interior and General Ayub, the Commander-in-Chief, as Minister of Defence. The legality of the Governor-General's action in dissolving the Constituent Assembly (C.A.) was challenged in the Sind Court, which upheld an appeal against the Governor-General's action submitted by the President of the Constituent Assembly,

Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan Having lost the battle there, the Pakistan Government preferred an appeal to the Federal Court which held that the Sind Chief Court "had acted without jurisdiction." This decision created almost a crisis, for, by implication it invalidated all the Acts passed by the Constituent Assembly, since none had received the assent of the Governor General. A proclamation of emergency was then issued by the Governor-General. This was followed by an Emergency Powers Ordinance which sought to validate 35 of the 44 Acts invalidated by the Federal Court's decision. A new Constituent Assembly was elected in 1955 and it at once approved the merger of West Pakistan in one unit. On January 9, 1956 a Constitution bill was introduced in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and it enacted the Bill on February 29, 1956 which received the assent of the Governor-General on March 2, 1956. The Constitution established a theocracy in Pakistan—an Islamic Republic with a Muslim (non-Muslims were not eligible) to be the Head of State. The state was to be organized on a federal basis and the Legislature (National Assembly of 300, chosen equally from East and West Pakistan) was to be unicameral. On March 2, 1956, the Constituent Assembly had reaffirmed Pakistan's decision to remain in the Commonwealth. Under Article 137 of the Constitution an Election Commission was appointed in 1957 and elections were expected to be held in November 1958.

The rapid political changes rendered Pakistan a sort of a "circus" where leaders come, show their feats and retire. Once the idea of Pakistan was realized, its unreality became obvious. The League leaders, on the foundations of sand, failed to build up a system. On the basis of communal tensions, hatred of India, opportunism and corruption, a political philosophy could not be evolved. Secular ideas were ruled out as being repugnant to Islam, and yet, apart from being a homeland of Indian Muslims, there has not developed so far any clear notion of the nature of the new state and the course it ought to take. In the early phase (1947—49) the rulers were preoccupied with the problems of resettling refugees from India. During this period it was only the fanaticism of the Leaguers and the momentum of a fierce, negative, and uncultured nationalism, that kept the Pakistani ship afloat. In the absence of a constructive social or political thinking, intrigues for power were bound to develop and flourish. The result is that in Pakistan hypocrisy has been raised to the level of public morality, fantastic suggestions and bitter recriminations have taken the place of principles and party discipline, and sheer opportunism has been pushed up to the rank of foreign policy.

On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza issued a proclamation abrogating Pakistan's Constitution, dismissing the

Central and State Governments, dissolving the National Parliament and State Assemblies and abolishing all political parties in the country. This proclamation gave a graphic account of the conditions prevailing in Pakistan. "For the last two years", Mirza declared, "I have been watching with the deepest anxiety the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest and industrious masses, the lack of decorum and the prostitution of Islam for political ends.....These despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of the lowest order.....Agriculture and land administration have been made a hand-maiden of politics.....You do not raise the prestige of your country by beating the Speaker, killing the Deputy Speaker, and desecrating the National Flag.....The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation.....In no country in the world do political parties treat foreign policy in the manner it is done in Pakistan.....The Constitution which was brought into being on March 23, 1956 after so many tribulations is unworkable. It is so full of dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon disintegrate internally if the inherent malady is not removed". With this, Mirza abrogated the Constitution, appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. On October 27, Iskandar Mirza stepped down from the Presidency and Ayub Khan assumed complete powers. The post of Premier was abolished and Ministers are to hold office at Ayub Khan's pleasure. Democracy, therefore, has been finally buried in Pakistan and a military dictatorship for an indefinite period seems to have been established.

FOREIGN POLICY

One might have expected that as a Muslim theocracy, having the largest population of all the Muslim states and wedded to the ideal of defending and expanding the ranks of the adherents of Islam, Pakistan would exercise predominant leadership in the Muslim world. But thanks to the short-sightedness of the ruling circles of Pakistan, it failed to solve the Pakhtoonistan question with Afghanistan, and could not establish friendly relations with such states as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Pakistan's aggressive ambitions in the sub-continent pushed her leaders to take sides in the cold war ostensibly against the U.S.S.R., but really against India. But the adhesion to these pacts made Pakistan a force in favour of colonialism and feudalism, and, therefore, brought her in sharp conflict with the resurgence and nationalist

revolution in Asia as well as in the Middle East. Thus Pakistan could not wholeheartedly support the Persian nationalization of oil and the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Her long conflict with Afghanistan is a concrete example of Pakistan's ill conceived expansionism. The case of Afghanistan rests on simple premises, namely that the Durand Agreement which ceded the tribal areas to India was signed under duress and that, in any case, it recognised the right of Afghanistan to interest itself in the welfare of the frontier tribes. Afghanistan's natural, rightful and long-established interest in the area has been demonstrated whenever any major change was proposed or made in its administration. From the time when Lord Curzon separated the North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) from the Punjab, all enquiry committees had recognised that the settled districts and the tribal areas were inseparable, that they were not behind the rest of India in intelligence or capacity, and that they aspired for self government. The Simon Commission also recognised the need of an independent Pathan State. Since 1947, the Pathans have been resisting the Pakistan attempt to incorporate them just on the basis of religious affinity. Even when the referendum was held in 1947 in the N.W.F.P. to determine people's choice for India or Pakistan, the Afghan Ambassador protested to London against the unilateral decision of Britain. In the referendum moreover, the tribes did not vote at all, for, they were being forced to choose between belonging to one or the other dominion when, in fact, they would have preferred neither. Pakistan, therefore, is guilty of continued aggression. Since the Afghans are closely related to the people of Pakhtunistan, the former cannot be prevented from assisting their kinsmen when Pakhtuns are victims of Pakistani aggression. In 1955, a storm arose on the question of raising the flag above their respective missions. The problem is still bedeviling the Pak-Afghan relations.

In the beginning, Pakistan stressed friendship with the U.S.S.R. as well as the United States of America and followed India in condemning colonialism, racial discrimination, rearmament and establishment of military alliances. With the passing away of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan lost a set of leaders who could have put the new state on a footing of stability and self respect in its dealings with the other states. As the cold war grew in intensity, and the internal chaos, lawlessness and disorder threatened the existence of Pakistan, its leaders decided to take full advantage of the international situation. As the divergence between India and the West grew wider, Pakistan started moving closer to the United States, and by raising the slogans of incompatibility of Islam and Communism, her leaders tried to play upon the Russophobia of the Americans.

As the United States gradually took the position that neutralism was a more formidable obstacle than anything else in their fight against Communism, India fell from Washington's favour and Pakistan, emphasising that it had no internal communist problem, began to cultivate closer relations with the United States. In these relations, while the major concern of the United States was to use Pakistan as an instrument of Western strategy against the U.S.S.R. and China, the major concern of Pakistan has been to use American money and material in settling accounts with "Bharat". In signing the SEATO, Zaffarulla Khan made it unmistakably clear, as we noted in Part Two of this study. In 1953, Pakistan sought American military assistance for the building up of its military forces despite India's warning that this step would ruin the prospects of a friendly settlement of the Kashmir problem and would prejudice good relations between the two countries. In 1954, the military aid from the United States started pouring in Pakistan. In 1954-55, she also joined the Baghdad Pact and the Manila Treaty. In 1956, she closely followed the U.S. lead on the Suez issue and the Hungarian problem. In 1957, she favoured and actively supported the Eisenhower Doctrine as we have already seen.

With the U.K., the relations of Pakistan have been less warm. One of the common complaints in the beginning was that Britain had favoured India in the process of partition, in the Radcliffe Award, and that the British Governor-General was a party to the decision to send the Indian army in Kashmir. In 1948-49, Pakistan Government's complaint was that Britain was not supporting her as actively as they had supported the Muslim League before 1947. The constant threat Pakistan held out was that she would sever all relations with the Commonwealth. However, in 1953-54, Pakistan decided to enter the Anglo-U.S. plans of the Middle East Defence and Security in South-East Asia. This brought Pakistan and Britain closer. British support to Pakistan in the latter's disputes with India, especially the Kashmir dispute, cemented the friendly ties. The tone of the British Press towards India has, on the whole, been unfriendly and even hostile; towards Pakistan it has been uniformly sympathetic. In 1956, on the Suez crisis Pakistan's loyalty to Britain was fully tested. Where Persia wavered and Iraq fumbled, Pakistan stood firm in her support to Eden's policies of conquering the Suez canal and occupying Cairo. On all cold war issues Pakistan has been toeing the Western line.

In South-East Asia, Pakistan is one of the five Colombo Powers. We have analysed her role at various Asian Conferences in Part Two. The first Asian Relations Conference held in 1947 at Delhi had been boycotted by the Muslim League. In 1948,

colonialism" and agreed with us on the Indonesian problem. Sir Mohammad Zaffarullah Khan, while praising the Netherlands, declared that the Dutch attempt to subjugate Indonesia was "fraught with suffering and tragedy to the people of Indonesia and constitutes a serious threat to the restoration of peace in South East Asia and to the maintenance of international peace." But gradually Pakistan changed gears, and by the time the Colombo Conference opened in Ceylon in April 1954, Pakistan's opposition to colonialism had watered down very considerably. Against Western Imperialism, Pakistani leaders began to put "International Communism." At the Bandung Conference held in April 1955, Pakistan was openly defending Western policies and practices. In fact, from the very beginning Pakistan has been competing with India for leadership in Asia. At Bandung Pakistan advanced the seven pillars of peace as against the Panch Shila. At one time, Ceylon actively helped Pakistan in the game but with the exit of Sir John Kotelawala, the foreign policy of Ceylon has undergone a change, and has become independent and neutral. With Indonesia, in spite of religious affinity, relations though friendly have never been very close. Though Pakistan had recognised People's China, and exchanged various cultural and economic missions, relations have not been very happy and Pakistan has not given active support to Peking on any of the major issues that concerned China—Korea, Indo-China, Formosa or the question of her recognition at the U.N. With Nepal diplomatic relations have not been established because it is a "Hindu country", and is not "independent of Bharat's control".

With the U.S.S.R., the relations of Pakistan have been chequered. In the beginning Pakistan pursued a policy of neutrality in the cold war. With the adhesion of Pakistan to the West sponsored alliances, the attitude started changing. To the United States, Pakistan posed to be fighting Communism, but when the U.S.S.R. protested, Pakistan's plea was that she had joined these pacts not because they were directed at the U.S.S.R., but because they added to Pakistan's security against her "aggressive neighbour"—India. The bluff, however, failed and the relations between Pakistan and the U.S.S.R. started cooling off. When the Soviet Union openly supported India on the question of Kashmir, Pakistani press went wild. In spite of trade relations and cultural contacts, the Pak-Soviet relations deteriorated in 1954-57. Pakistan's role in the Suez Crisis and on the Hungarian problem added to the strains and her support to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 further widened the gulf.

THE INDO PAK RELATIONS

The biggest problem of Pakistan's foreign policy has been that of relations with India. The question of division of liabilities

and assets, the problems of evacuee property, minority rights, travel and trade, canal-water and eastern rivers dispute, have not been fully solved yet. The problems of Junagarh and Hyderabad created serious strains. The Kashmir dispute became more and more threatening with the passage of time. The issues of U.S.-Pak military alliance, and Pakistan's adherence to the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact widened the chasm between New Delhi and Karachi. The frequent border incidents and partial mobilization have led to panic and hysteria.

In fact the entire background of Indo-Pak relations had been poisoned by the long and bitter conflict between the Muslim League which ruled Pakistan after 1947 and the Congress which ruled India. The Muslims paraded the two-nation theory which, in spite of Pakistan, India has never accepted for reasons already stated. Pakistan, therefore, inferred, notwithstanding the assurances of the Indian leaders, that the latter had not accepted the partition in good faith and would unsettle the settled fact at the earliest opportunity. Any chance that the initial suspicion and bitterness might gradually fade away was destroyed by the deep wounds inflicted by large-scale killing, looting, arson, and the mass influx of refugees who fed the fire of hatred with their tales of horror and brutality which led to mounting communal antagonism and exacerbated the bad feeling between the two countries. The fast of Gandhiji at Calcutta and his efforts at Delhi for the communal peace, his fast which compelled the Indian Government to pay off 55 crores of rupees to Pakistan had some calming effect, and his assassination on January 30, 1948 put an end to disturbances in India.

Junagarh. The problem of Junagarh immediately brought India and Pakistan in a sharp conflict. In violation of the principle of geographical contiguity the Nawab of Junagarh acceded to Pakistan. India and the people of the state refused to accept this accession, and unable to face the tide of public revolt, the Nawab fled to Pakistan. On November 9, India took over the state and in February 1948 held a plebiscite in which 190,870 persons voted (190,779 voted for India and 91 for Pakistan). In January 1948 Pakistan raised the question of Junagarh at the U.N. Security Council. Even to this day Pakistan has not accepted the accession of Junagarh as final. No serious debate on the issue has, however, taken place at the U.N.

Hyderabad. In Hyderabad, the ruler was a Muslim and about 90% the population is Hindu. The Nizam, however, hesitated in acceding to India and wanted to be an independent state. After prolonged negotiations a standstill agreement between him and India was signed on November 29, 1947 under which the old arrangements between the two were to continue

But a Muslim fanatical organisation—the Razakars—made the life of the people impossible, and it was reported that they were encouraged by Pakistan. In September 1948, India took a police action against Hyderabad, and on the 17th, the Nizam surrendered after his troops had fought for three days. Earlier, the Nizam had referred the issue to the U.N. Security Council which considered it on September 16. On hearing the delegates of Hyderabad and India, it adjourned till September 29. Meanwhile the Nizam had surrendered and he at once ordered his delegation to withdraw the case from the Security Council. The delegate of Hyderabad refused to do it but when the Council met on September 20, it had the Nizam's letter requesting withdrawal of the case in its hands. The case was virtually decided. But Pakistan has often tried to bring the matter to the Security Council for understandable reasons. This dispute also complicated the Indo-Pak relations.

Economic Relations Again, in the economic sphere, the relations between the two countries got involved in a morass. In the first place, there were serious difficulties with regard to the division of assets. Railways, Telegraphs, and Telephone lines, Mints, Printing Presses, Laboratories and Workshops had been allotted to the two dominions on a territorial basis. But the division of the fiscal and financial resources of undivided India was a complex problem. It was agreed that pending a final settlement a sum of Rs. 20 crores be made available to Pakistan as its working balance. India accepted initial responsibility for the Indian public debt and Pakistan was to contribute its share to be fixed later by agreement or by arbitration. The proposal for joint administrative control over the collection of revenues was rejected by Pakistan. The two states agreed to have a common currency up to March 31, 1948. But all these agreements did not work smoothly. The trade relations between the two countries became bad. Pakistan decided to set up her own jute mills and deprive Calcutta mills of raw jute which Pakistan produced. India planned a considerable increase of jute cultivation to reduce her dependence on Pakistan export of raw jute on which Pakistan had imposed a customs duty. The Payments Agreement and the Trade Agreement of June 1948 also did not solve the problem. In September 1949, when Britain and India devalued their currency, Pakistan decided to maintain the value of her rupee and the resulting indignation in India made all economic agreements meaningless. Pakistani jute and cotton would now cost India 40% more than before in terms of Indian currency, and India, therefore, refused to recognise the Pakistani rupee at its old value. This led to a gradual severance of economic ties between the two countries. Trade came to a standstill except in so far as it could be financed by black market. By the middle

of September 1949, the Indian agents had purchased and paid for 12 lakhs bales of raw jute in Pakistan which had not been removed to India. Pakistan refused to allow the export of this jute. India retaliated on December 24, 1949 by suspending the supplies of coal to Pakistan. By April 1950 the futility of this war of nerves had been realized in Karachi and a new interim agreement providing for the sale of jute by Pakistan and of steel, jute manufacture and other commodities by India at prices expressed in Indian rupees had been negotiated. In February 1951, another trade agreement was signed which brought the devaluation conflict to an end. In 1952-53 numerous economic conferences were held and in 1953, imports of coal from India and jute from Pakistan were substantially raised and the passports restrictions were relaxed. From 1953 to 1958 trade relations became "as good as it is possible between two countries which are politically hostile".

Evacuee Property Dispute. Another conflict between Pakistan and India has been that of the evacuee property. The partition had led to a migration (from 1947 to 1951) of 7 million Muslims to Pakistan and about 6½ million non-Muslims to India. Further migration has taken place since then. The disposal of the property of these millions who had abandoned their homes, therefore, became a serious problem. In March 1948, India and Pakistan appealed to the minorities to stay on wherever they were but the migration continued. The property left by the Hindus in Pakistan was very much more than what the Muslims left in India, for, while the Hindus were big landlords, industrialists and businessmen, the Muslim refugees were in the main small cultivators or traders. A rough Indian estimate of the value of property left by Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan was more than 3,000 crores of rupees while the property left by Muslims in India was valued at about 300 crores. In August 1947, the Defence Council of India and Pakistan had decided to appoint custodians to take charge of properties and not to recognize the illegal seizure of a property. Pakistan, however, on December 1, 1947 empowered its Financial Commission to grant to refugees leases for one year for land and property abandoned by Hindus, thus eventually preventing the return to an evacuee of his property. On December 18, 1947 the Inter-Dominion Conference set up a Joint Committee to prepare for an assurance to the evacuee owners with regard to the receipts of rents, exchange of agricultural property at government level, and full facilities to be given for the liquidation of urban movable property. While India accepted it, Pakistan rejected for she felt that the only sound method of assessing the value of a property was to put it in market. The Inter-Dominion Conference meeting in January 1949 resolved the conflict somewhat and it was agreed that the government would collect rents, that free exchanges and sales of immovable urban evacuee

property would be allowed, and that movable property would be transported to the state to which the evacuee has migrated, or sold within the state where it was declared as evacuee property. But soon Pakistan issued orders for the declaration of accounts and cash found in the premises of non-Muslims as evacuee property. The Conferences of June 1949 failed to solve this problem. The Indian suggestion that instead of meticulous valuation of properties land could be valued on the basis of land revenue did not find favour with Pakistan. In 1950 the Nehru Liaquat Agreement allowed the migrants to take along with them their movable property and Rs 150 (for adults) and Rs 75 (for children). Jewellery or other valuable objects could be deposited in a bank and liaison officers were to be appointed to prevent harassment to the migrants. Owners were not to lose title to their property if they returned before December 31, 1950 and if their properties were occupied by others the government concerned was to rehabilitate the aggrieved party. The Agreement provided for a minority commission to decide the issues concerning the selling or exchange of property.

In June 1950, a conference was held in Calcutta to work out the details of the Agreement. Meanwhile the exodus of refugees was continuing in 1950-51. In November 1952, India proposed to Pakistan that both governments should take possession of properties left by evacuees and distribute them among the refugees, and that the value of properties should be determined according to some principles failing which the issue might be referred to arbitration. Pakistan however, objected to this as it was "only another method of saying that the question of evacuee property be dealt with on a governmental level". Pakistan, therefore, reiterated that "all matters should be referred to the International Court". It was not before July 1953 that a limited agreement was reached concerning the refund of cash security deposits of contractors, personal effects, and payment of compensation for movable property acquired by governments for rehabilitation purposes. The Agreement came in force on January 1, 1954 after a few Pakistani amendments to it had been accepted by India. Earlier, in November 1953, India had issued an interim compensation scheme. In 1954-57, arid negotiations continued in an effort to reach some agreement on the points left uncovered, but the overall relations had been embittered by other quarrels and no progress could be registered. In short, while India took the view that the problem could only be solved on a government-to-government basis, each government taking over, on proper valuation, the abandoned property and making payment through the government of the other country, Pakistan insisted that under any such arrangement she would

have to pay a considerable balancing charge to India and this she was not prepared to do.

Problem of Minorities. Allied with this problem has been the question of Hindus in East Pakistan. The sense of panic and insecurity amongst the Hindus caused by communal disturbances in East Pakistan, the fact that no non-Muslim could join the ruling party (the Muslim League), and the further fact that the Pakistani Constituent Assembly had decided in 1947-48 that Pakistan would be an Islamic Republic in which the Head of State would always be a Muslim had created a tense situation. The result has been a large-scale exodus of Hindus from 1947 to 1957. Dreary negotiations have been going on since 1947, and various missions and commissions have looked into the problem. Nehru proposed a no-war declaration which Pakistan rejected. On April 2, 1950 Liaquat and Nehru met at Delhi and signed the Nehru-Liaquat Pact seeking to prevent communal disturbances and removal of suspicion and terror from the minds of minorities. It provided for the freedom of movement of migrants in West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, and East Bengal, and for their rehabilitation. In May 1950, the Indo-Pak Newspapers Editors' Conference created goodwill and the leaders of the two countries expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would live in peace. But while the Muslim refugees from Pakistan started coming back, the Hindu refugees refused to go back to Pakistan and India had to face a considerable problem. The no-war declaration fell through because Liaquat insisted that it would carry no weight unless the major disputes between India and Pakistan were solved or at least a procedure for settling them was laid down. To Nehru's offer of December 22, 1949 he replied on January 17, 1950 suggesting the procedure that two months should be given for negotiating a solution of all the Indo-Pak disputes, failing which mediation should be tried for two months, failing which, again, the disputes should be referred to arbitration by a mutually agreed agency or international authority whose award was to be binding. India refused to accept this time-table and procedure, for, all disputes could not be given an identical treatment. She was prepared to refer the canal water dispute and evacuee property case to a tribunal but not the Kashmir question which involved the question of sovereignty of India.

Meanwhile the problems of travel and trade were becoming complex. The freedom of movement provided to the migrants under the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement had been affected by the inability of the two countries to agree to a rate of exchange. From January 19, 1950 goods and passenger traffic from East Bengal to India was suspended by Pakistan unless India deposited Rs. 1,000,000 with Pakistan Government. India also retaliated

and the traffic between East and West Bengal came to a standstill. As a result of a trade agreement of May 1950, interchange of goods and parcels was resumed on June 18 19, 1951, an Indo-Pak Permit Conference met and reached a limited agreement on income tax clearance certificates and resumption of permits to some categories of persons. In May 1952 the two countries agreed to introduce the international type of passport system which created serious difficulties particularly to an average Bengali. In January 1953, another conference was held and it agreed on a procedure seeking to lead to speedier grant of passports and it was decided that in an emergency visas should be issued within 24 hours.

Rivers and Canals Dispute One of the most serious problems that has bedevilled the Indo-Pak relations is that of the canal waters and east rivers. The Indus system of rivers comprises six rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej. The Indus and the Jhelum carry between them two thirds and together with the Chenab about four-fifths of the waters of the entire system. The Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab are so situated that except for minor uses in Jammu and Kashmir, their waters can be developed mainly in the territory that forms part of Pakistan. Cultivation in India depends on irrigation and the whole Punjab is an area of scanty rainfall. The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab are the western rivers, while the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej are the eastern rivers. While the western rivers carry about 150% more water than the Nile, the eastern rivers carry about 25% of the waters of the former. Individually, the Indus rises in Tibet and passes through Kashmir into Pakistan, the Jhelum rises in Kashmir and flows into Pakistan and the Chenab rises in India and flows through Kashmir into Pakistan. In the case of the eastern rivers, the Ravi rises in India and flows into Pakistan, the Beas lies wholly within India and the Sutlej rises in Tibet and flows through India into Pakistan. The cultivable area in the whole Punjab as commanded by all the six rivers is roughly 26 million acres in India (for 21 million people) and 39 million acres in Pakistan (for 25 million people). Of this area, only 18% is irrigated in India, while in Pakistan it is 51%. Thus in the Indus basin, India received 0.24 acres of irrigated land per head of population, and Pakistan 0.84 acres per head.

A complicating factor in the situation has been that the great irrigation works constructed in the basin of the Indus and its tributaries during the British period were not spread evenly throughout the Punjab. The partition, effected on communal lines, resulted in the inclusion in Pakistan of 23 million acres of the irrigated area of the Punjab as against 5 million acres in India. Even the Government of Pakistan admitted in 1952

"At the time of partition...the areas now constituting this country were regarded as surplus food providing areas and they helped to meet shortages in other parts of the British Indian Empire. India also depended on these parts for most of the raw materials for its more highly developed industries like jute and cotton". On the other hand, a large part of the Indus basin which went to India under the partition was a famine area. Moreover, the refugees who fled to India have migrated from the highly developed region now in Pakistan which they had helped to build, into an undeveloped region where they must start to build all over again. On the other hand, the refugees who went to Pakistan have gone to an area already highly developed.

In spite of this Pakistan has felt herself in a vulnerable position, for, she depended wholly on rivers the upper reaches of which lay in Indian territory or in Kashmir. She apprehended that India might deliberately divert her (Pakistan's) supply of water at a time of strained relations, that "in the absence of a fair-sharing agreement, she might face badly a year of draught", and that "even if relations between the two countries were good, India's own need to increase her irrigation facilities might leave Pakistan short of water, since the total available supply of the system is inadequate for desirable development in the West and East Punjab". Not that there is dearth of water, but there is the uneven distribution of the flow throughout the different seasons of the year. "In the Indus the volume of water carried in the six months of the summer is over 7 times that carried in that of the rest of the year, and the figures for the other rivers are somewhat similar. Much of the summer flow is wasted, and it is reckoned that half of the annual volume of water in the system flows unused in the Arabian Sea. In the absence of adequate storage arrangement, the water available in the dry season is hardly sufficient in a normal year, and any diminution of the flow to Pakistan might well be disastrous to her". Then, again, the continued supply of water from the eastern rivers is regarded as a matter of life and death for Pakistan, and it is thought to be imperative to increase the quantities of water at present supplied by them very considerably and very soon so as to ensure adequate food supplies for the constantly growing population of West Pakistan. Finally, water for irrigation is led from the rivers by canals which in many cases take off from dams or headworks. Some of the Pakistan canals have their headworks in Indian territory and one of them flows for many miles through India before reaching Pakistan. Pakistan's fear is that "it would be simple to cut or divert these canals if India so wished".

Soon after partition, the Partition Committee referred this matter to the Chief Engineers of the two Punjab and they

reached a standstill agreement subsequently endorsed by the Partition Committee. Under this agreement, the supply to Pakistan was to be continued on the basis existing on the date of Partition for the period up to March 31, 1948, and a fresh agreement was to be negotiated before the expiry of the standstill agreement. This was the beginning of the trouble. The West Punjab Government took no action to conclude any further agreement in spite of repeated reminders and the Government of India, therefore, discontinued in April 1948 the supply of water to the Central Bari Doab and the Dipalpur Canals in Pakistan. Pakistan held India responsible for this alleged violation of her rights to these waters which Pakistan thought India could have never denied to Pakistan, agreement or no agreement. Pakistan justified this assumption on the ground that the Partition Committee had itself reported that there is no question of varying the authorised shares of water to which the two zones and the various canals are entitled. India, on the other hand, argued that it was Pakistan which defaulted in obtaining an extension of the standstill agreement and that if Pakistan had suffered in crops because of the expiry of this agreement, it was entirely Pakistan's fault. After all, as a sovereign state India had the right to regulate the water resources in her territory. However, pending discussions, an agreement was reached on April 30, under which India reopened the canals subject to the levy of seigniorage charges for water and the adjustment of the capital cost of certain headworks and carrier canals.

As a result of discussions on the subject, an agreement was signed on May 4, 1948. Under this India agreed not to withhold suddenly the supply of water to Pakistan and Pakistan recognised "the natural anxiety" of India "to discharge the obligations to develop areas where water is scarce and which were under-developed in relation to parts of West Punjab". The two governments agreed to approach the problem in a practical spirit on the basis of India progressively diminishing supply to Pakistan canals in order to give reasonable time to enable Pakistan to tap alternative sources. Before long, serious misunderstandings arose over this new agreement. It was meant to be temporary arrangement to give Pakistan time to tap new sources and since Pakistan had made no such effort, India naturally warned Pakistan that the supplies to the two canals would be discontinued. The supplies, however, were allowed but it was made clear to Pakistan that India would gradually diminish supplies. Since July 1950, Pakistan refused to pay seigniorage charges as provided in the agreement of April-May, 1948 and demanded a reference to the World Court. India however refused on the ground that there is no rule of International Law for regulating the flow of water from one country to another and that therefore, it was not a matter

for judicial decision. India's suggestion that an *ad hoc* tribunal consisting of the equal number of judges of high standing from both the countries should give a decision in the dispute was not accepted by Pakistan. Another proposal of India to set up a joint technical study of the problem with a view to putting up a comprehensive plan which would meet the requirements of both countries also went unheeded. India consistently maintained that there is enough water in the Indus system for the reasonable requirements of both countries, that out of the total annual flow of 160 million acre-feet, 120 million acre-feet can be used by means of irrigation works, that at present only about 72 million acre-feet are being used (8 million acre-feet by India and 64 million by Pakistan), and that the remaining 48 million acre-feet which is flowing to the sea can be further utilised. David Lilienthal of the Tennessee Valley Authority visited India in 1951-52 and expressed the opinion that the canal water dispute could be solved not as a religious or a political problem but as a feasible engineering and business problem with the help of the World Bank and that there was sufficient water in the Indus system for use of both countries.

The idea of Lilienthal was picked up by the World Bank's Chairman, Eugene Black, and in September 1951, the Bank offered its good offices to work out a settlement. At the instance of Black a working party was set up with one engineer from India, one from Pakistan, and one from the Bank. This party was "to work out, with the ultimate objective to carry out specific engineering measures by which the supplies effectively available to each country will be increased substantially beyond what they have ever been". The working party met in Washington in May-June 1952, in December 1952 in Karachi and in January 1953 in Delhi. After extensive touring they reassembled in Washington in September 1953. The Indian and Pakistani representatives failed to reach an agreement and the working party, therefore, decided that both should present a plan each covering, from his country's viewpoint, the entire irrigable area in both the countries. While the Indian plan took full cognisance of Pakistan's requirements, the plan put up by Pakistan representative confined itself to an estimate of Pakistan's requirements. At the end, on February 5, 1954 the Bank's representative forwarded the Bank's plan providing that the entire flow of the Western rivers (the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab) would be available for the exclusive use and benefit of Pakistan minus the insignificant flow in Jammu and Kashmir. The entire flow of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) would be available for the exclusive use and benefit of India "except that for a specified transitional period India would continue to supply from those rivers in accordance with an agreed schedule the historic withdrawals

from these rivers in Pakistan" During this transition period of about five years Pakistan was to build up link canals to replace the waters received by some of its canals from the eastern rivers India was to contribute towards the cost of the link canals

Earlier in 1952-53, a serious draught all over the Indus basin created an absolute shortage of water for irrigation. Although both India and Pakistan suffered from this shortage, Pakistan alleged that India took more waters than its stipulated share of water from the headworks on the eastern rivers, and that this action, together with India's withdrawal above the headworks for new canals, left her seriously short of water. Pakistan also apprehended that India would abandon "the Ferozpur headwork, on which important cotton and wheat growing areas in the West Punjab depended" and that new Indian irrigation works contemplated on the Sutlej would still further reduce supplies. In short, by the end of 1953 the canal waters dispute had become very alarming. It was in this background that the Bank proposals of February 1954 were made. It may be pointed out that under the Bank proposals India would have received 20% of the total flow of the Indus basin rivers for its 26 million acres, while Pakistan would receive 80% for its 30 million acres. The Chenab waters so vital to the economy of the areas of Rajasthan in Indian territory would also not be available for all times to come.

Despite these heavy sacrifices involved India accepted the Bank's proposals. Pakistan, however, rejected them. Later, it was agreed, at the instance of the Bank, that both sides would co-operate in working out a plan taking as a starting point the division of waters envisaged in the Bank proposals. No agreement was, however, reached. In May 1956, the Bank reiterated its proposals and suggested that it might be necessary to provide some storage as part of the replacement plan. The talks were extended up to March 31, 1957 but no agreement could be reached. In April 1957 the Bank suggested that the co-operative work should be extended up to September 30, 1957 to give the Bank and India and Pakistan an opportunity to review the situation. A degree of urgency became attached to resolution of this problem when the Government of India found it necessary to announce in July 1957 that the development requirements of Rajasthan and popular needs in that area would require it in any case to proceed in 1962 with distribution arrangements for its share of the canal waters. This allocation would be used whether or not ancillary works on the Pakistan side had been undertaken by that time. The International Bank encouraged further discussions to try to harmonize the conflicting plans of India and Pakistan, and in May 1958, a joint meeting was held

in Rome. It was agreed that a further conference should be held in London at which Pakistan would present a new plan. Significantly, recent discussions have now "progressed from strictly technical problems to wider financial issues". In June 1958 it was widely believed that Pakistan would endeavour to overcome some of the difficulties of cost while making provision for storage reservoirs in addition to link canals.

Meanwhile Pakistan started a crusade against India and her representatives repeatedly stated that India was conspiring to turn West Punjab into a desert, that agreements have been unilaterally violated by India, and that the Bhakra Canal would damage Pakistan vitally. But ever since the agreements of May 4, 1948, India has never cut off supplies to Pakistan. In 1956-57, three agreements were executed through the good offices of the World Bank and they formed the basis of regulation of canal waters between the two countries. Under these *ad hoc* transitional agreements India agreed to restrict her additional withdrawals for the Bhakra Canals in accordance with Pakistan's ability to replace supplies. There is no such agreement from April 1957, for, no request was made by Pakistan for one. Meanwhile, Pakistan has built up three link canals and these are capable of replacing all the waters that the new Indian Canals would withdraw. Finally, a dam on the Sutlej cannot hold up waters flowing into the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab which carry 80% of the waters of the Indus system. At present, only about 10% of the irrigation in West Pakistan depends on the waters from the eastern rivers. In fact the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab are capable of meeting Pakistan's needs of new developments for years to come. To say, therefore, that the whole of the irrigated area in West Pakistan will revert to desert by the withholding of waters from the eastern rivers is a grave distortion of facts. Again, there is no substance in Pakistan's allegation that the Bhakra Canal would affect adversely large areas commanded by the Sutlej Valley Canals in Pakistan. Bhakra is not a new scheme and the dam would go into operation with partial reservoir capacity only in 1958. By 1960, it would operate with full capacity. This will not have any effect on the Pakistan canals as the dam would store supplies only during the flood season when ample supplies are available. On the other hand, as Mr. S. K. Patil put it, such shortage would reduce flood hazards and damage by floods in Pakistan.

The legal case of Pakistan too had no legs to stand on. It is argued, *first* by Pakistan that India is bound by an obligation existing since before partition with regard to the flow of waters from the eastern rivers. This is untrue as we have already examined the standstill agreement of 1947 and the agreement of May 4, 1948. *Secondly*, it is suggested that the partition of the sub-

continent was based on consent and not against the will of India, that India continues under an obligation to permit the flow of the eastern rivers into Pakistan, and that the right to draw on canal works and waterways for purposes of irrigation and the generation of hydro-electric power, and the correlative duty to permit the use of water for these purposes constitute "almost a classic example of an international servitude." It is argued that India inherited the legal personality of British India while Pakistan emerged as a new State, and that, therefore, India continued to be bound by such international obligations as normally survive a change of physical rather than legal status. All these arguments are unsound and unconvincing. In this case India owes a duty not to a third state but to a territory formerly forming part of the same legal entity. If the duty had been owed to a third State, the latter could have been entitled to insist on its being discharged in accordance with previously existing treaty obligations. *Thirdly*, Pakistan argues that the Agreement of May 4, 1948 was merely "an expression of the future intentions of the Parties" and that it did not and could not, affect the legal position as it existed immediately before the partition of British India. This is, again, a very weak argument. The Agreement of May 4, 1948 recognized India's right to exercise full control over the waters of the eastern rivers, and it was duly registered under Article 102(1) of the U.N. Charter. *Fourthly*, it is argued that international law is clear on the principle of "equitable apportionment" of the waters of international rivers, and on the further principle that a state may not unilaterally divert the waters of such rivers so as to prejudice and injuriously affect the rights of other riparian States. It is contended that India has violated these principles. We have already refuted these allegations. The Indian acceptance of the Bank proposals gives a lie to such charges. *Finally*, it is argued that India has not shown willingness to settle the dispute by arbitration or adjudication by the World Court. It is obvious that unless the Agreement of May 4, 1948 is taken into account, no judgment is possible on the merits of the case. India has, therefore, naturally insisted that the terms of reference before any tribunal to which this dispute is submitted must be limited to consideration of the validity of the Agreement of May 4, 1948. If Pakistan only agrees to carry out the obligations arising out of this agreement, there would be no dispute on the rivers and canals.

KASHMIR DISPUTE

The problem of Kashmir has proved to be a most serious challenge to the statesmanship of India, Pakistan and the

United Nations. There are as many aspects of this complex question as there are of any complicated international issue. Here we have a fusion and diffusion of various cultural streams, and here one can see intricate problems of a majority, and a conscious and assertive minority. Here, two important countries of Asia are fighting since their independence and other most powerful countries of the world anxiously watching the situation; here we have a backward people, weakened by exploitation and repression of centuries with a medieval economy based on pain and punury and with stupendous social and economic problems awaiting solution. Kashmir is a strategic spot, attracting military generals and statesmen, a beauty-spot attracting tourists from far and wide—the veritable paradise on earth, the Switzerland of Asia.

Historical Background. Such a land of beauty witnessed the tragic drama of arson, loot and plunder, the indiscriminate firing and spoliation enacted by the raiders, inspired, instigated and buttressed by the Pakistan Government. But that was only the climax of centuries of miserable tyranny to which the Kashmiris had been subjected. The Mauryas, the Kushans, the Hunas, the Turks, Chaks and the Sikhs and the Dogras held the political stage of Kashmir and its inhabitants submitted to them with the same passivity and resignation with which a Chinese offered fealty to the changing emperors of his country. It was in 1846 that the British Government and Gulab Singh concluded the infamous Treaty of Amritsar which literally handed over Kashmir to the latter for exactly a century. The story of Kashmir from 1947 to date is a story of the suspense and hesitation on the part of the Maharaja, the blood and tears resulting from the unwarranted attack of the raiders, the hasty accession to India and the rather conditional acceptance by her of this accession, the actual warfare between India and Pakistan, India's reference to the United Nations, the appointment of commission after commission by the U.N., the communal outburst in India and Pakistan, the hurriedly concluded Delhi Agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India, the non-fulfilment of some of its provisions by the former, the Praja Parishad agitation and the death of Dr. Mookerji, India's opposition leader, in rather mysterious circumstances, the intrigues of foreign powers culminating in the slogan of independent Kashmir, the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah, the hurried visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister to Delhi and the announcement of the joint communique during the 3rd week of August 1953. This is a story which does not make a pleasant reading. A number of factors have introduced serious complications in an otherwise simple question.

It will be remembered that when India made a reference to the United Nations the simple question was in regard to the

illegal support given by Pakistan to the raiders attacking a part of Indian territory. No categorical answer has ever been given to that question and other extra factors have been allowed to get mixed up.

Strategic Importance Kashmir, though economically not very important, occupies a key position strategically, because her geographical position, with her frontiers adjoining three countries, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India passed through the Kashmir State. And, of course, in our relations with Pakistan, Kashmir has played a vital role. In fact, the strategic value of Kashmir had been realised by the British Government in the thirties of the present century when they built up a wireless station in Gilgit to draw it effectively into a wide chain of similar centres in Chinese Turkistan. Its strategic value was stressed by the New York Times on May 4, 1952 when it was said: "The Asian situation as a whole, particularly the occupation of neighbouring Tibet by the Chinese Communists, has given the Kashmir settlement a new urgency."

As we have noted, the State of Jammu and Kashmir became part of British India by the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846. Previous to 1947, it was divided into the Kashmir Province, Jammu, the small state of Poonch, the Gilgit Agency which included Hunza and Nagar and the mountain areas of Baltistan and Ladakh. It is the Kashmir province which includes the Jhelum valley and is the heart of the State. In 1947 it had a population of 4 millions living in an area of about 84,000 sq. miles. About 77% of the population are Muslims, 20% are Hindus, and 3% Sikhs, Buddhists and other minorities. The population, however, is not spread over uniformly and while in the south eastern part of Jammu the Hindus are in majority, in the north western part the Muslims are numerically superior. Poonch, the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan are predominantly Muslim. Ladakh, lying to the east of the valley of Kashmir is inhabited by a Buddhist population of Tibetan stock. In pre partition days, in spite of the fact that majority of the people of Kashmir profess Islam, it was not the Muslim League but the National Conference which had established its sway over the valley and this was one of the reasons why the arrival of Indian Army in October 1947 to repel the tribesmen assisted by Pakistan was hailed. It is important to remember that the National Conference, first under Sheikh Abdullah, and later, after his dismissal under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, had shared the ideology of the Indian National Congress which has consistently repudiated the pernicious two-nation theory in the Indian sub-continent. It aimed at the establishment of a secular rule and the economic and

social progress of the State as against "the perpetuation of feudal rule combined with Mullah domination". Although Kashmir has important links with Pakistan—the three rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) flowing from Kashmir into Pakistan, no doubt, provide considerable export facilities for Kashmir log timber, and their control may influence Pakistan agriculture—the trade trends unmistakably pointed out the natural place Kashmir had in the Indian system. In 1944-45, it imported goods to the amount of Rs. 46 million from the present territory of India as against goods worth Rs. 12 million from the territory of Pakistan; in 1945-46, the respective figures were Rs. 47 million and Rs. 9 million; and in 1946-47, Rs. 59 million and Rs. 12 million. Thus in three consecutive years 80% of imports came in from India and 20% from the area that now forms part of Pakistan. For the main imports—cotton textiles, drugs, medicines, metals and metal manufactures, leather and leather goods, sugar, tea and spices—Kashmir had to rely on India even as for the export of wool, woollen clothes, silks, drugs, fruits and vegetables and cottage industries, the state had to depend on the Indian markets. Even for Kashmir wood and timber there has been, in spite of river transport facilities into Pakistan, a greater demand in India than in Pakistan. Moreover, "the construction of the trade route between the valley and India over the Banihal Pass has normalised communication to the south to such an extent that it seems out of date to put the trade policies of the northern and southern parts of the state on the same footing".

Origins of conflict. The dispute about Kashmir goes back to the months of August-October, 1947 when the Maharaja asked to accede to India in view of the large-scale attack by tribesmen from outside the state, and the Indian Army took over its defence. At present the State is divided into three areas of which two are under the protection of Pakistan and one under that of India. The area under India includes Jammu, the Valley of Kashmir, and Ladakh and is a state in the India Union. The area protected by Pakistan falls into two parts—the Northern Territories and the area known as Azad Kashmir. On August 15, 1947, when the partition of India took place, Jammu and Kashmir, along with other Indian princely states, had to choose between acceding to India or to Pakistan. The Maharaja, Hari Singh, hoped that the necessity of joining either would not arise. In order to maintain the *status quo*, he approached both India and Pakistan to enter into a standstill agreement with the State. On August 14, Pakistan signed an agreement undertaking to run Kashmir's communications and postal and telegraph services. Intensely pre-occupied with the problem of merger of more than 500 princely states which lay within her borders,

and possibly to discourage the Maharaja from his separatist dreams, India did not sign an agreement and chose to wait until the state had made up its mind. As the communal riots spread from the Punjab to Jammu, Pakistan started coercing the State into accession to it and despite the standstill agreement began an economic blockade of food, petrol, and other commodities and tampered with communications and hindered the free transit of people. In instigating the Muslim subjects of the Maharaja and rousing communal frenzy, Pakistan left no stone unturned. Hit and run border raids were organised and Pakistan nationals began to infiltrate into the State territories from the adjoining districts of Pakistan. The State requested India for 5,000 gallons of petrol which Pakistan had been unable to provide and India did send 500 gallons. Along a 450-mile frontier, to meet the raids of Pakistanis, Kashmir had dispersed and deployed its troops along a wide distance, thus rendering its defences too thin to resist an all out attack. Early in October, Major General Janak Singh was replaced by Mehr Chandra Mahajan as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, and on October 15, the latter complained to the British Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan had broken the Standstill Agreement by discontinuing supplies of essential articles, and that the railway service from Sialkot to Jammu had been stopped without any reason. He also represented that the whole of the State border from Gurdaspur to Gilgit was threatened with invasion and that it had already begun in Poonch. No reply to this letter was received from the British Prime Minister. On October 18, Kashmir protested to the Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan against the breaches of the Standstill Agreement and the continuous raids. To this Jinnah replied on October 20 protesting against the tone and language of the communication and ascribing the delay in the despatch of essential supplies to the widespread disturbances in East Punjab and the disruption of communications caused thereby, particularly by the shortage of coal. On October 20, 1947 the invasion of Kashmir started and immediately all the Muslims in the State Forces deserted and many joined the raiders. Frontier tribesmen estimated at 5,000 (Afridis, Waziris, Mahsuds, Swathis, and soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave)—led by some regular officers who knew Kashmir well—advanced from Abbottabad in the NWFP along the Jhelum Valley Road. On October 24, the raiders captured the Mahura Power House which supplied electricity to Srinagar and announced that they would celebrate Id on October 26 at the Srinagar mosque. On the evening of October 24, India received a desperate appeal for help from the Maharaja and the relevant information regarding the raiders' advance and their probable intentions from the Supreme Commander,

Field Marshal Auchinlek. In the morning of October 25 the Defence Committee met. The problem of troops reinforcement was considered and Mountbatten, who presided over the meeting, urged that it would be dangerous to send in any troops unless Kashmir had first offered to accede (to India). The committee decided to send Sri V.P. Menon, Secretary of the States Department in India, to Srinagar to find out the real position there.

What followed Menon's visit to Srinagar is an exciting story indeed. Menon was oppressed by the stillness as of a graveyard all around. "Over every thing", Menon writes in the *Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, "hung an atmosphere of impending calamity...The road leading from the aerodrome to Srinagar was deserted. At some of the street corners I noticed volunteers of the National Conference with *lathis* who challenged passers-by, but the State police were conspicuous by their absence...Mahajan who is usually self-possessed, seemed temporarily to have lost his equanimity...The Maharaja was completely unnerved by the turn of events and by his sense of lone helplessness. There were practically no State Forces left and the raiders had almost reached the outskirts of Baramula. At this rate they would be in Srinagar in another day or two...The one hopeful fact was that Brigadier Rajinder Singh had promised to hold the raiders as long as possible from reaching Baramula and we knew that he would fight, if necessary, to the bitter end". Menon advised the Maharaja to leave for Jammu with his family and jewellery and left for new Delhi early in the morning of October 26. He reported to the Defence Committee and "pointed out the supreme necessity of saving Kashmir from the raiders". Mountbatten still insisted on Kashmir's accession before any military aid could properly be rendered, for, Kashmir was "at the moment an independent country". Menon also discloses in his book that Mountbatten "further expressed the strong opinion that, in view of the composition of the population, accession should be conditional on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite after the raiders had been driven out of the State and law and order had been restored. This was readily agreed to by Nehru and other Ministers".

V. P. Menon flew to Jammu and found it "in a state of utter turmoil with valuable articles strewn all over the place". Describing how the Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharaja, Menon writes: "The Maharaja was asleep.... I woke him up and told him what had taken place at the Defence Committee meeting. He was ready to accede at once. He then composed a letter to the Governor-General describing the pitiable plight of the State and reiterating his request for further help. He further informed the Governor-General that it was his intention to

set up an interim government at once and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with Mehr Chand Mahajan his Prime Minister. He also signed the Instrument of Accession. Just as I was leaving, he told me that before he went to sleep, he had left instructions with his A D C that, if I came back from Delhi, he was not to be disturbed as it would mean that the Government of India had decided to come to his rescue and he should therefore be allowed to sleep in peace, but that if I failed to return, it meant that everything was lost, and, in that case, his A D C was to shoot him in his sleep."

Same day (October 26, 1947) Menon returned to Delhi with the letter of accession and the Defence Committee met at once. After a long discussion, the accession was accepted subject to the proviso that as soon as law and order had been established in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invaders, "the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". The Committee decided to despatch an infantry division to Srinagar on October 27. This decision, it should be remembered, was fully supported by Sheikh Abdul'ah who was in Delhi at that time. It is very interesting to note that even after this decision had been reached "Lord Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of the India Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks involved in the operation". It was only when Nehru asserted that "the only alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar, which would be followed by a major communal holocaust in India", that the decision was implemented.

On the morning of October 27, Indian forces were flown to Srinagar. In the words of Menon, "never in the history of warfare has there been an operation like the airlift of Indian troops to Srinagar on 27th October and on subsequent days, an operation put through with no previous thought, let alone organised planning, and at such remarkably short notice". At no time had Pakistan even suggested that the future of Kashmir should be determined by ascertaining the wishes of the people. The invasion was producing favourable results. Meanwhile Sheikh Abdullah had become the head of the Emergency Administration and early during the invasion phase the Azad Kashmir Government had been formed in Poonch under Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim. As soon as the news of Kashmir's accession and the entry of Indian forces in Srinagar reached Jinnah, he ordered General Gracey, the Acting Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, to rush troops in Kashmir which he refused to comply without the approval of the Supreme Commander. On October 28, the Supreme Commander reached Lahore and explained to Jinnah that since Kashmir was now legally a part of India "an act of invasion would involve automatically and immediately the withdrawal of every British officer serving with

the newly formed Pakistan army". Jinnah who had expected "to ride in triumph into Kashmir" was frustrated. The orders to march in Kashmir were cancelled and Jinnah invited Mountbatten and Nehru to Lahore for discussions on Kashmir. On November 1, Mountbatten alone went to Lahore, Nehru being ill. Meanwhile the Gilgit Agency had been treacherously occupied by the Pakistan forces. The talks bore no fruits. In November, charges and counter-charges were flung at each other by India and Pakistan. On November 8, Baramula was occupied by the Indian forces, and by November 11, they had reached Uri. The meetings of the Joint Defence Council held early in December failed to yield any results. Mountbatten suggested to Gandhiji and Nehru to invoke the good offices of the U.N. which Nehru at once accepted. On December 22, 1947, Nehru handed over an official letter of complaint to Liaquat Ali Khan in which the details of the aid and assistance which the raiders had been receiving from Pakistan were recited, and in which India asked Pakistan to deny to the raiders access to the use of Pakistan territory for operations against Kashmir, all military and other supplies, and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle. No reply was received to this letter in spite of a reminder on December 26. On December 31, 1947 Nehru informed Liaquat that India was referring the Kashmir question to the Security Council, requesting the Council to ask the Government of Pakistan (i) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State, (ii) to call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Kashmir, and (iii) to deny to the invaders access to, and use of, its territory for operations against Kashmir, military and other supplies, and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

KASHMIR AT THE U.N.

The Kashmir case has been dogging the United Nations for so long, the debates have been so wearisome, the arguments so repetitious, that one can safely assume that nothing has really changed, that it is all unimportant, and that the same old record simply keeps spinning on the political time-table. During the past eleven years the case of Kashmir has built up a set of attitudes and habits of thinking in India and Pakistan which have an importance far transcending the boundaries of the two countries. It affects all aspects of the domestic and foreign policies of the two countries and, as a result, each side lives in constant fear of the other. Mr. Suhrawardy, during whose premiership Pakistan stirred up the controversy with renewed vigour, justified his country's membership of regional pacts to his followers by saying that allies were needed to support Pakistan's case against

India When Pakistan entered into an arms deal with the USA joined the SEATO and signed the Baghdad Pact, she did so with an eye on Kashmir, even though the gaze of the Western partners was fixed on Moscow and Peking. Thus, "the horse thought one thing and he that saddled him another. Pakistan carried bitterness and power politics even to the platform of Afro-Asian solidarity and refused to meet the Colombo Powers in Delhi during the Suez Crisis in November 1956, as it would not serve any useful purpose". At the United Nations, as we will notice, the Western Powers, particularly Britain and the United States, got interested in evading the primary issues and in converting the Kashmir question into one of Indo-Pakistan relations as a whole.

The Primary Issues The primary issues before the Security Council, when India first referred the question to the UN, were (i) Had Pakistan in fact committed aggression as alleged by India in her complaint to the Security Council? (ii) Whether the accession of the State to India was valid in law? Later on, the question was also raised whether India's position on the question of plebiscite has remained consistent with the pledges given at the time of acceptance of the State's accession, and with the resolution adopted by the UN Commission on India and Pakistan. If Kashmir's accession to India was valid and if Pakistan helped and aided the tribesmen, Pakistan is guilty of a gross violation of international law and is aggressor in Kashmir. India's reference of the Kashmir issue was an "act of faith", and in defending Kashmir she had acted with scrupulous rectitude and propriety, sending her troops only after the Maharaja supported by Abdullah's National Conference had acceded to India and with the pledge, given *voluntarily and unilaterally*, that it would be for the people of Kashmir to decide finally whether they wished to accede to India or Pakistan. Nothing was done in the passion of the moment and the Indian occupation of the State was not in pursuance of any "conspiracy between the Maharaja and the Indian Congress leaders". This insinuation made by Zafarullah Khan was only a figment of his fertile imagination for no conspiracy, even if India would have tried to hatch one, could have been formed with a British Commander-in-Chief and a British Chief of the General Staff.

The facts of aggression by Pakistan and of her abetment of, and aid to, the tribal invaders were too patent to be denied. Despite India's protests and pleas, Pakistan had continued to let her territory be used as a base for invasion on a neighbouring state. Pakistan denied these facts in the Security Council but on August 13, 1948, the UN Commission in their resolution stated "As the *presence of troops of Pakistan in the*

territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agree to withdraw its troops from that State". This finding was upheld by Sir Owen Dixon, who stated on September 5, 1950: "When the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed . . . by the hostile elements, it was contrary to international law and when in May 1948 units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent with international law". Leading Pakistani statesmen admitted their complicity in the invasion of Kashmir. In his budget speech to the Legislative Assembly of the Frontier Province on March 7, 1949, Premier Abdul Qayyum Khan recalled "with pride the fact that in our greatest hour of danger the Masuds responded to our call by rushing to the rescue of the oppressed Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State". In 1952, the Khan of Mamdot claimed from the Pakistan Government a sum of Rs. 68,000 which, he asserted, as Chief Minister of Punjab at the time, he "spent out of his own pocket to facilitate the tribesmen's invasion". The Pakistani argument is that it was only in May 1948 that "for the first time in fear of a threat from India's Regular Army, Pakistan had moved units of the Army into Kashmir".

But this does not even touch the substantive charge of aggression on a territory legally forming part of India. The accession of the State became complete and final by the execution of the Instrument of Accession by the Ruler and its acceptance by the Governor-General of India. It was not a provisional or strictly a conditional accession, for, the offer to hold a plebiscite was not a pledge given to Pakistan or to any other party. It was an offer (voluntary and unilateral) made by India, guided by considerations of self-determination—an offer which could be cashed if Pakistan would have co-operated with India in restoring law and order by withdrawing her forces from the State. The offer, moreover, was not part of the Instrument of Accession which was unqualified. At no time during the debates and discussions in the Security Council was the legality of accession of Kashmir to India ever called into question. The resolutions adopted by the U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan (U.N.C.I.P.) on August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, were, in fact, predicated on the assumption that the accession was perfectly legal. In the August resolution Pakistan was required to withdraw its army, tribesmen and its nationals who went there for fighting. This clearly demonstrates that Pakistan had no legal status in Kashmir.

On the other hand, the right of India to maintain forces in Kashmir for defence and for assisting the local authorities

in the observance of law and order was clearly recognized. In the UNCIP resolution of January 5, 1949, the proposed Plebiscite Administrator was to be appointed by the Kashmir government from whom he was to derive the powers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite, and to whom, along with the Security Council he was to submit the results of the plebiscite. The right of the Indian Army to defend the State was clearly affirmed. Thus seen, Kashmir became legally a part of India, Pakistan committed aggression against India in abetting and helping the invasion on Kashmir, the promise to hold the plebiscite was not made to Pakistan or to the U N but it was an offer expressing India's wish "that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". Since Pakistan has not vacated the aggression, she is herself blocking the way to a plebiscite in Kashmir. In addition to its failure to withdraw its troops from Kashmir, Pakistan made determined efforts to organize the so-called Azad Kashmir forces into a disciplined force with the necessary administrative and ancillary units commanded and led by Pakistani officers. The clandestine building up of these forces was contrary to the terms of the August 13 Resolution of the UNCIP which had specifically called upon the High Commands of India and Pakistan to "refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control including all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective side".

During 1953-55 and after Pakistan started joining the Western Powers in their search for allies willing to accept foreign bases on their soil. Its membership of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and its military aid agreement have only one reasoning for India—that Pakistan wishes to reinforce its occupation of Kashmir and "to seek a solution of the Kashmir conflict by means of military and political pressure". At the U N forum, Pakistan tried hard to reduce the Kashmir problem to religious terms, suggesting that since the Muslims were in majority in Kashmir, the latter belongs to Pakistan. But it is obvious that "the dividing line of partition was not a religious one". It was political, despite the religious colouring which Pakistan endeavoured to give to it. India was partitioned between composite Indian nationalism on the one hand and reactionary political sectarianism on the other, and accepted the partition as it provided the only peaceful means of attaining freedom. Acceptance of the partition as a political necessity did not mean that India also accepted the entire ideological facade which the Muslim League had created for its own purposes.

U.N. Handling of the Dispute. It was on January 1, 1948, that India referred the Kashmir question to the United Nations. On January 15, the Security Council heard Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Zafarullah Khan—delegates of India and Pakistan respectively. From the very beginning the Council, in spite of all legal arguments submitted together with arguments of a political and economic nature, by-passed entirely the legal aspect of the case. This omission affected the whole procedure of mediation, and neither the U.N.C.I.P. nor the mediators appointed by the U.N. were able to consider the very basis of the complaint of India, i.e. aggression as seen in the light of international law and of the law of partition. On January 20, the President of the Council announced that India and Pakistan had agreed to the appointment of a Commission to mediate between them. This was, however, dropped and the Council tried to effect a direct agreement between the representatives of the two countries. But the deadlock was complete. Pakistan would not admit its guilt; the Council would not seize the legal aspect of the case; India would not abdicate its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order by withdrawing its troops until the plebiscite had been held. On April 21, the Council succeeded in passing a resolution setting up a 5-man United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan which was to proceed immediately to the Indian sub-continent to undertake the arduous task of effecting a cease-fire and facilitating the necessary measures for a plebiscite.

The U.N.C.I.P. It was not before June 15, 1948 that the Commission could meet at Geneva and it set out for Karachi only on July 5. Meanwhile Pakistan had moved units of her army into Kashmir. The Commission published the first instalment of their report on August 13, 1948 and the other on January 5, 1949. These resolutions provided for the demilitarization of Kashmir in two stages, pending a plebiscite. In the first stage the Pakistani troops were to be withdrawn, followed by the exit of the tribesmen. India would then proceed to "reduce the bulk of her armed forces" from the State. Certain regular forces would be left by India "to assist local authorities in the maintenance of law and order". The territory evacuated by Pakistan would be administered by local authorities under the supervision of the Commission. In the second stage, a free and impartial plebiscite would be held to determine Kashmir's accession to India or to Pakistan. This plan was accepted in principle both by India and Pakistan but wide and basic differences with regard to the implementation of the plan rendered it illusory. On September 21, 1948 the Commission left for Geneva in order to prepare their report to the Security Council. On January 1, 1949, a cease-fire in Kashmir had been

made effective. On September 10, 1949, the U N C I P proposed Admiral Chester Nimitz as an arbitrator but this position could not be accepted by India. The U N C I P's third interim report published on December 9, 1949 revealed that one year after the cease fire order had been implemented, there was no sign of a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The Commission, in frustration, asked the Security Council's Canadian President, General McNaughton to take up private discussions with the contestants.

The McNaughton Plan The McNaughton Plan proposed (i) the withdrawal of the regular forces of Pakistan and of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, (ii) the reduction by disbanding and disarming of local forces including, on the one side, the armed forces and militia of the state of Kashmir and on the other the Azad forces (iii) the inclusion of the northern area in this programme of demilitarization and its continued administration "subject to U N supervision by existing local authorities", and (iv) the appointment of a single U N administrator to replace the Commission. These proposals were accepted by Pakistan for, they brought her "a status equal to that of India". India on the other hand, suggested some modifications. Mr B N Rau proposed that the programme of demilitarization should include the withdrawal from Kashmir of regular and irregular forces of Pakistan, the disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces, and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or the maintenance of local law and order on Indian side of the cease fire line. India also demanded that after the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces just referred, the responsibility for the defence of the northern area should rest with her and with the Government of Kashmir. The Council turned down these suggestion.

Dixon Mission Soon after, on February 24, 1950, the U S A, the U K, Norway and Cuba sponsored a resolution in the Council, calling upon "the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order to prepare and execute a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of General McNaughton's proposals or of such modification of these principles as may be mutually agreed upon". The progressive withdrawal was to be effected over a period of five months and Sir Owen Dixon, a judge of the Australian High Court, was subsequently charged with the task of demilitarization. Both India and Pakistan accepted this resolution on March 14, so that demilitarization was to be achieved by August 14, 1950. Although the main objective of

Mr. Dixon was to prepare for the plebiscite, he was also empowered "to make suggestions at variance with that objective" if he ruled out plebiscite as impracticable.

Sir Owen Dixon came to the sub-continent in May 1950 but by August 22 he confessed failure and announced that "no purpose can be served by my remaining longer in the sub-continent". Dixon declared that the crossing of the frontiers of Kashmir by hostile elements "was contrary to international law", and that "when in May 1948, units of regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State that too was inconsistent with international law". One of his proposals was that "wherever the desires of the inhabitants are known, the territory should be partitioned between India and Pakistan in accordance with those desires, due regard, however, being given to geographical, economic, topographical and demographical considerations. But where the desires of the people were unknown, there a plebiscite should be held for the purpose of ascertaining them. The voting would be confined to that area". Even though Dixon held Pakistan aggressor in Kashmir, he advocated the withdrawal of the Indian forces as well as the pro-Pakistani Azad Kashmir forces and proposed the regulation of the State's militia. He at last attempted to bring the Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers to a table and put forward a new plan under which the Plebiscite Administrator was to be made the head of the plebiscite area and he was to be helped by non-officials and was to be authorized to exclude troops of any description from the area. India rejected this plan. In his final report Dixon reverted to the scheme of partition. "The interest of the people, the justice as well as the permanence of the settlement and the imperative necessity of avoiding another refugee problem all point to the wisdom of adopting partition as the principle of settlement and of avoiding that of an over-all plebiscite". He advised the Security Council against sending any other representative to Kashmir and proposed that the issue be left to the parties concerned for negotiation and settlement.

Dixon's failure was followed by the discussion of the Kashmir issue at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference at London. The Conference is reported to have mooted three alternative courses: (i) the maintenance of forces in Kashmir by Commonwealth countries before and during the plebiscite at their own expenses; (ii) a joint force of Indian and Pakistani troops under a common command in occupation during the plebiscite; and (iii) a local Kashmiri force raised by the plebiscite administrator for security enabling all other forces, regular or irregular, to be withdrawn. Pakistan easily accepted all three alternatives but India, for obvious reasons, had to reject every one of them. The diplomatic initiative had now clearly been

seized by Pakistan and in public eye India was viewed as hypocritical and obstinate. By a curious irony, the aggressor had now placed its victim in the criminal dock.

Graham Mission Meanwhile the Kashmir Government had decided to convene a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for the State as part of the Indian Union. The issue had again shifted to Lake Success, where the Security Council noted on February 21, 1951 that the main points of differences between India and Pakistan were concerning the procedure and the extent of militarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and the degree of control over the functions of government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite. In March, the U.S.A. and the U.K. moved another resolution under which partition plan was left aside, the principle of plebiscite was accepted and a new U.N. mediator, in order to effect demilitarization of the State was to be appointed. After three months the new mediator would report all outstanding points of disagreement to the Council and these were to be settled by arbitrators appointed by the International Court of Justice in consultation with the parties. India entirely rejected this scheme, for, arbitration could not be applied to a situation involving her rights as a sovereign state. The Anglo-U.S. resolution, however, was adopted by the Security Council on March 30, 1951 and on April 30, 1951 Dr. Frank D. Graham, an American national, was appointed as U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan to act as arbitrator and to report progress after three months.

Frank Graham reached the subcontinent on June 30, 1951. Meanwhile the proclamation of the Yuvaraj issued on April 30, 1951, provided for elections to the Constituent Assembly based on indirect suffrage. On May 4, Pakistan had protested to the Security Council against this decision and on May 29, 1951 it communicated to the parties its apprehensions about the C.A. But this did not deflect the Kashmir Government from its course and the C.A. met in October 1951. In March 1952 it passed the law providing for land reforms and in June it abolished the monarchy and replaced the hereditary ruler by an elected head of the State. In July an agreement was reached between India and Kashmir under which the latter ceded to the former foreign affairs, defence and communications. A draft 5-year Plan integrated with India's 5-year Plan was also formulated and, under it, of the estimated expenditure of Rs. 13 crores, India decided to contribute Rs. 7 crores.

By September 7, 1951, Graham had evolved his plan, contemplating that the demilitarization of Kashmir should be effected in a single, continuous process, and asking India and Pakistan to reaffirm their will to make the ceasefire effective from January 1, 1949 their determination not to

resort to force and their faith in free plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The discussions Frank Graham had with the leaders of India and Pakistan narrowed down their differences to two basic points: (i) the minimum number of armed forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. Pakistan demanded that equal forces of four battalions of Azad Kashmir troops and Indian regulars should remain on either side of the cease-fire line after the demilitarization period of 90 days. India wanted to retain 10 battalions without commitment as to its withdrawal. (ii) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.

The Devers Plan. On September 12, 1951 Graham left for Geneva and on October 15, he released the first instalment of his report in which the Security Council was requested for an extension of six weeks in which he could make renewed efforts for a detailed agreement on the process of demilitarization. On November 10, the Council acceded to this request and on January 17, 1952 he presented his second report to the Council. The two points of disagreement referred earlier still defied solution. During the discussions the Indian delegate told the Council that a definite period of demilitarization and the date for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator could be settled without difficulty "provided agreement was reached on the scope of demilitarization and the quantum of forces that would remain at the end of the period of demilitarization and the programme agreed upon for this purpose were satisfactorily implemented". During those discussions in January 1952, the U.N. Secretariat released the so-called 'Devers Plan' for the demilitarization of Kashmir. The origins of the Devers Plan are still ambiguous. It is believed that General Jacob Devers, the military adviser to Dr. Graham, held separate talks with the representatives of India and Pakistan, as a result of which he succeeded in inducing India to agree to withdraw an additional 7,000 troops. This reduced the Indian and State forces to 21,000 troops exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000 which Abdullah had raised in the early phase of the campaign. To balance these, on the Pakistan side were to be left three regular battalions, 4 battalions of Azad forces and a civilian police force of 4,000. According to Lord Birdwood, "the Devers Plan was communicated to both Governments on November 29, 1951 and in substance appears to have been accepted by India. When, therefore, on 21st January, 1952 a different form of the plan was published purporting to be the original agreed upon, India emphatically denied all knowledge of it. The new plan reduced the disparity of forces on either side to about 4,000 (India 13,600, Pakistan 10,200). This would have satisfied Dr. Graham's view that the

ratio of troops remaining on either side of the cease-fire line should be the same after withdrawal as it was on 1st January, 1949. Exactly how the misunderstandings arose is one of those matters of academic consequence which will remain buried in the files, for the doubts round the Devers Plan are now regarded as a storm in a tea-cup' (*Two Nations and Kashmir*, p. 109)

This episode, however, created sharp misgivings in India with regard to the intentions of the Western powers. The discussions in the Security Council held in January 1952 were also characterized by the vehement Soviet attacks on the West. Jacob Malik broke his country's silence on the Kashmir question and charged Britain and the U S A with interference in Kashmir with a view to converting the State into an Anglo-American colony. He lent support to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. The Security Council, however, asked Graham to continue his efforts and he remained in the Indian sub-continent from February 29 to March 25 1952. On April 22, he released his third report which also underlined the two basic points of disagreement. On September 16, he submitted his fourth report much of which was concerned "with the wrangle over numbers left on either side at the end of demilitarization". This was followed by a resolution moved by Britain and the U S A in the Security Council on November 6, 1952. The resolution called upon India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations in New York in order to reach an agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. The resolution suggested that the armed forces to be kept on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line should be between 3,000 and 6,000 in number and those on the Indian side should be between 12,000 and 18,000. Introducing the resolution, the British delegate told the Council that the proposal to limit the forces on the Pakistani side to an armed civil police force while leaving a military force on the Indian side was not consistent with a really free plebiscite. The resolution was adopted by the Council. Pakistan accepted it and India rejected. Since the resolution requested Graham to continue his efforts, like the true "opera star who cannot resist the temptation to repeat the farewell performance", Graham returned to the question. He held discussions with the representatives of India and Pakistan but could reach no solution and in agreement with the two governments, he decided to end the discussions. He registered a complete failure as "the position of the two governments derived from their differing conceptions of their status in the State". Not being authorized by the Security Council to go into the difference of this status from the legal point of view, he was unable to bring the two parties together. Thus the question was now left to the

initiative of the two governments. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan now started direct talks on the subject.

The Nehru-Mohammad Ali Correspondence, 1953-54.

In 1953, there was no discussion on Kashmir in the Security Council. In June that year Nehru and Mohammad Ali met in London at the Commonwealth Conference. Later, they met in July at Karachi and "prepared the ground for further talks" at New Delhi. Meanwhile the situation at Srinagar was fast changing. Early in 1953 Sheikh Abdullah began to reveal his mind, began to oppose Kashmir's merger with India and hinted at the possibility of an Independent Kashmir. While there is little evidence of foreign intrigue in Kashmir, it is widely believed in India that the U.S.A. had lent encouragement to Sheikh Abdullah in his scheme of an independent Kashmir. The mounting Indian criticism of the U.S. foreign policy had aroused U.S. indignation. Growing irritation in Pakistan prompted urgent action. The fundamental weakness of the Sheikh offered the opportunity. Containment of Communism provided the spur and the need for bases supplied the incentive. Meanwhile Abdullah's position had been made difficult by the Praja Parishad agitation, by his government's failure to improve the people's standards of living, and by the death of Dr. S.P. Mookerji in prison in Kashmir in most unfortunate circumstances. Sheikh Abdullah, therefore, succumbed to the temptation of carving out an independent state for himself, assuming that, in this, he would be helped by Pakistan as well as by the Anglo-American camp. Gradually in Abdullah's cabinet two groups—one pro-Indian and the other pro-Independent Kashmir—came into existence. On August 9, 1953 events reached a climax when Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and arrested and Ghulam Mohammad Bakhshi was appointed in his place. Bakhshi at once affirmed loyalty to Delhi, declared the bonds between India and Kashmir indissoluble, expelled some Americans from the State and asked the U.N. observers who had been sent to observe the cease-fire line to stick to their duty and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the State.

The news of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, whom Pakistan had till now regarded as a traitor and a sworn-enemy of the Muslims but who, because of his slogan of an Independent Kashmir, had suddenly become the protagonist of the Muslims, caused consternation at Karachi. On August 10, Mohammad Ali cabled to Nehru about the urgency of a meeting of the two Prime Ministers. This meeting came off on August 16, when Mohammad Ali came to New Delhi. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed that the issue should be "settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State" and agreed that a Plebiscite Administrator would be inducted in office before the end of April 1954. During the

✓ period 1953-54 twenty-eight letters were exchanged between Nehru and Mohammad Ali in which the questions of press campaigns, regional plebiscite, the replacement of Admiral Nimitz as Administrator and the voting rights of refugees from Kashmir in a plebiscite in the region of their origin were discussed. Although this last issue had not been raised by Mohammad Ali in his meeting with Nehru at Delhi on August 16, on his return to Karachi the Pakistan Prime Minister must have been obliged to insist that the Kashmir refugees on Pakistan soil should not "be deprived of their vote in the plebiscite." Towards the fall of 1953, the question of Pakistan's receipt of military aid from the United States was introduced in the correspondence as well as in the official joint committee. of Indian and Pakistani officials who had come to discuss the details arising out of the Delhi meeting of the two Prime Ministers.

American military aid and Kashmir In January 1953 it was rumoured that Pakistan was about to join a Middle East Defence Organization. It had sharp reactions in India. In November 1953, Chulam Mohammad, the Pakistan Governor-General and General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief visited the United States and on the 15th November, Nehru referred to the reports circulating in America that Pakistan was negotiating military aid from that country. Fifteen days later, the Soviet Union protested to Karachi. Early in December, Pakistan denied that a formal military alliance with the U.S.A. was in the offing and on December 20, Karachi informed Moscow that "Pakistan does not contemplate taking any step in hostility or unfriendliness to any Government or State with which it has friendly relations." Three days earlier, however, Mohammad Ali had declared that "our aim is to make ourselves strong militarily and stop any evil designs on our country." On December 9, Nehru had referred to the U.S. military aid to Pakistan in his letter to Mohammad Ali as a serious obstacle in the way to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. On February 19, 1954, Ankara and Karachi announced that a treaty of friendship between Turkey and Pakistan had been signed. ✓ Three days later, Mohammad Ali announced that the U.S.A. had agreed to give Pakistan military assistance under the terms of the U.S. Military Security Act.

This step completely upset the Indian Government and Nehru vehemently condemned it. On March 1, 1954, he made a statement in the Parliament giving a spirited defence of India's stand. "The House will remember that for the last three years we have repeatedly offered a no-war declaration to Pakistan. A no-war non-aggression pact. Now we have offered that repeatedly and Pakistan has been repeatedly rejecting that for whatever reason it may be. If there had been such a no-war declaration

or non-aggression pact, obviously that would have eased tension between the two countries and in surrounding areas and produced a greater feeling of security in both countries . . . Now it is in the context of this rejection of our proposal for a no-war declaration that we have to view this military aid from the U.S.A. to Pakistan . . . For my part, I would welcome the strengthening of Pakistan, economically, even militarily in the normal sense; if they build up themselves I have no complaint. But this is not a normal procedure. This is a very abnormal procedure, upsetting normality, and in so far as it upsets normality, it is a step away from peace. Now, the President of the U.S. has stated that if the aid given to Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression, he will undertake to thwart such aggression. I have no doubt that the President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago with dire consequences. Nevertheless, the U.S. have not thus far condemned it and we are asked not to press this point in the interest of peace. Aggression may take place again and be denied as the previous aggression was denied till it could not be hidden The military aid given by the U.S. to Pakistan is likely to create the conditions which facilitate and encourage aggression. As I have said repeatedly, this grant of military aid by the U.S. to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan. These problems can be solved by the two countries themselves and not by the intervention of others. The military aid being given by the U.S. to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems which is likely to have more far-reaching results than the previous types of interventions The Prime Minister of Pakistan has stated . . . that this military aid will help to solve the Kashmir problem. That is an indication of the way his mind works and how he thinks this military aid might be utilised. Military aid is ably utilised in war or in a threat of war. There is another small matter—not a small but relevant matter—relating to Kashmir. The House will remember its long history and how for the last two years among the questions being discussed has been the quantum of forces to be left in Kashmir with a view to having afterwards a plebiscite, that is, a reduction of forces—sometimes it is called demilitarization. There has thus far been no agreement on that issue. Now the whole issue has to be considered from an entirely different point of view when across the border, across the cease-fire line on the other side, large additional forces are being thrust from outside in Pakistan and put at the disposal of Pakistan. It does make a difference”.

Indeed, the U S military aid to Pakistan threw a serious challenge to all that the Indian foreign policy as formulated by Nehru stood for. It was a challenge to peaceful approach, to the concept of neutrality, to Indian reluctance to divert funds for a 5 year plan to armaments and to our honest desire to keep as large an area in the world free from the fever of the war mentality as possible. Pakistan, on the contrary, held a different view. Mohammed Ali repeatedly argued that in seeking military aid from the U S A, Pakistan never thought of a war with India and that Pakistan could never afford anything in the nature of a double-cross in Kashmir even if she felt so inclined. In his letter to Nehru, dated March 29, 1954, he argued "We have sought military aid from the U S A so that, given this assistance to strengthen our defences, we may be able to devote our domestic resources increasingly to the development of our economy. We believe that by doing so we can better serve the cause of peace in this area. We do not have, we cannot possibly have, any intention of using this aid for the purpose of settling the Kashmir dispute by force while I do not share your views I respect the sincerity with which you have expressed them. May I hope that you will credit us with the same sincerity in holding our views in this matter."

Change in India's Policy, 1955-56 With the advent of the U S military aid, followed by the conclusion of the S E A T O and the Baghdad Pact, India's policy underwent a basic change. The pressure of public opinion in favour of a clear and unambiguous stand on the Kashmir issue, the fear of increasing military strength of Pakistan, the growing sympathy and support of the Western Powers for Pakistan were now pushing Nehru to take a more definite position. It would be recalled that even on March 5, 1954, Nehru had stated "Ever since the Constituent Assembly (in Kashmir) came into being more than two years ago, our position in regard to it has been perfectly clear and has been stated in the Security Council and elsewhere. We said then that the C A was perfectly free to decide as it liked, in regard to the State's accession or other matters, but, so far as we are concerned, we would abide by our international commitments. There has been at no time any question of our repudiating the decision of the C A and indeed we have no right to do. That elected Assembly has every right to express its wishes in any way it chooses. So far as we are concerned, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State was legally and constitutionally complete in October 1947 and no question of confirming or ratifying it arises. Nevertheless, we had said that the people of Kashmir should be given an opportunity to express their wishes about their future, and we had agreed to a plebiscite under proper conditions."

It is because those conditions have not been agreed to that delay has occurred".

This position was somewhat anomalous, for, if the Kashmir Assembly was free to decide as it liked, India could not abide by her "international commitments", and if "the accession of Kashmir State was legally and constitutionally complete in October 1947", and if "no question of confirming or ratifying it" arose, there was no meaning in giving to the people of Kashmir "an opportunity to express their wishes about their future". This position, however, was based on one logic: creation of proper conditions for the promised plebiscite. And since Pakistan, instead of clearing off the Indian soil, had now augmented its strength, it had committed continued aggression which had rendered the promise of plebiscite meaningless. Throughout 1954-55, the process of consolidation of Indian-held Kashmir as well as of the Azad Kashmir and of the West Pakistan in one unit continued. In May 1955, General Iskander Mirza and Mohammad Ali came to Delhi and the communique issued on May 18 was rather uninspiring: "In the course of joint talks the Kashmir problem was discussed in all its aspects. It was decided to continue these talks at a later stage after full consideration had been given by both governments to the various points that had been discussed in the course of these meetings". As time passed, India insisted that in any attempt to solve the Kashmir problem, "all that happened during the last nine years" must be taken into consideration. Addressing a public meeting on April 13, 1956, Nehru stated the changed policy of his government. "The question of plebiscite was dependent on the clear stipulation that the entire Pakistani Army should first withdraw from Kashmir. Pakistan has failed to fulfil this important stipulation during the last nine years during which the face of Kashmir has been changed. If now something is done which upsets all that has been achieved in Kashmir it will be a dangerous thing for Kashmir, India and Pakistan, because any new upheaval is bound to bring in its train a calamity like that the two countries witnessed and suffered in 1947 . . . Many new things have happened. The U.S. military aid to Pakistan has changed the entire face of the problem. I agree that it is not the intention of the U.S.A. that U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be used against India. But the fact is that this aid increases the strength of Pakistan in relation to India. We have said very clearly that this aid has changed the entire face of the Kashmir problem because even if the Pakistani armies left the soil of Kashmir and entrenched themselves 20 or 30 miles away from the border, their increased strength would give them greater striking power to attack even from there. U.S. military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's membership of the military pacts . . . has destroyed the roots and foundations of the pl-

plebiscite proposal in Kashmir. A big burden has been created in India by large scale influx of Hindus from East Bengal. In my mind the question of influx of refugees from East Bengal into India is inter-related to the Kashmir problem."

The proposal of plebiscite had now, therefore, been officially repudiated and Nehru expressed his willingness "to accept that the part of Kashmir which is under you (Pakistan) may be demarcated the border on the basis of the present cease-fire line".

The Jarring Mission, 1957-58 With the turn of the year 1956, the Kashmir issue reverted to the United Nations. On January 2, 1957, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Malik Feroz Khan Noon addressed a letter to the Security Council President saying that since direct negotiations had failed, the Council must intervene. He charged that a new constitution framed by the "assembly sitting in Srinagar" would make the State an integral part of India and that the constitution was scheduled to come into force on January 26. He also contended that "many prominent leaders of public opinion" in Srinagar had been imprisoned for long periods without trial and that half million Kashmiris had been displaced from that region and were restively awaiting an opportunity to return home. He added that "the Indian Prime Minister's declaration that he is now opposed to a plebiscite" accompanied by the steps that were being taken unilaterally to integrate the State with India, had combined to create an explosive situation. The Security Council met on January 16 to consider the situation for the first time in four years.

After hearing statements from the Indian and Pakistani representatives, the Council on January 24, by a vote of 10 to none with the U.S.S.R. abstaining reaffirmed its earlier decision that the people of Kashmir should have an unhampered opportunity to express their wishes on accession. It reminded the parties to the dispute of previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the U.N.C.I.P. calling for a plebiscite, and declared that the convening of a C.A. as well as any action which such a body might take in regard to affiliation would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle. In presenting India's case to the Council, Mr. Krishna Menon, India's Defence Minister, spoke for seven hours and 48 minutes on January 23 and 24. He reiterated the legal aspects of the case in a manner which won him tremendous popularity in India. He stated that the commitment about a plebiscite was only the expression of a wish which did not and does not constitute an international obligation. Referring to the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, Menon pointed out that the idea of an assembly had been there long before there was an invasion of Kashmir. Pakistan's delegate gave the usual reply and,

denying that the conditions in Kashmir had changed, declared that "there has been no change that impairs the imperative necessity of holding the agreed plebiscite". Noon urged the Council to resolve the deadlock and demanded the introduction of a United Nations force in Kashmir, the withdrawal of all Indian and Pakistani troops, demobilization of local militia on both sides of the cease-fire line, and a U.N. supervised plebiscite for the Kashmir people. Speaking on February 8, 1957, Menon tried to dispel the doubts of the Council with regard to the adoption of a constitution in Kashmir on January 26. The C.A., he declared, "did not create anything. It was what the international lawyer calls a declaratory act rather than a creative act This territory has already been part of India for a long time. All that happened on January 26 was that the Kashmir C.A. was dissolved".

The Soviet Veto. The Council met again on February 15, and it had now before it the famous 4-power draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Cuba, the U.K. and the U.S.A., calling for the current President of the Council, Gunnar Jarring (Sweden), to undertake a mission to India and Pakistan. Under the provisions of the resolution Mr. Jarring would explore the ways of settling the Kashmir dispute, and examine Pakistan's suggestion that a temporary U.N. Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.) be sent to the Kashmir area pending the State's demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite. The resolution asked him to report to the Council not later than April 15, 1957 and invited India and Pakistan to co-operate with him in his efforts and asked the Secretary-General and the U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan, Dr. Frank Graham, to give him such assistance as he might request. Menon, however, unequivocally told the Council that it dare not "ask us to accept the introduction of foreign troops on our sacred territory", and he added: "We shall reject any attempt to introduce war elements in the way of a United Nations force, following upon the other war apparatus and military pacts upon our frontiers, which have extended the whole realm of the cold war right into the heart of our country".

The U.S.S.R. proposed important amendments to this resolution, seeking to delete all references to U.N.E.F. or demilitarization, and to delete the time limit of April 15. On February 20, 1957, the Soviet amendments were rejected by a vote of 1 in favour, 2 against, and 8 abstentions. Then, the 4-power resolution was put to vote and was at once vetoed by the U.S.S.R. It thus met the fate it deserved. On February 21, the Council adopted by 10 votes to none a resolution which asked Mr. Jarring to go to India and Pakistan to seek a solution of the dispute, without reference to a U.N. Force.

Jarring Report Gunnar V Jarring arrived in Karachi on March 14, and in Delhi on March 24, 1957. The talks conducted "in an atmosphere of complete frankness and cordiality" concluded on April 9. Shortly after he reported to the Security Council that he was unable to suggest "any concrete proposals likely to contribute towards a settlement". He told the Council that both the Governments acknowledged obligations covered in resolutions of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, dated August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949. But he reported that the two governments differed as to whether certain aspects of those resolutions had been implemented or not. India insisted that withdrawal of Pakistani forces was a pre-requisite to other measures, and further "felt aggrieved" that the Security Council had not expressed itself on Pakistan's aggression. The Indian Government, therefore, demanded that "the Council express itself on this question", and that Pakistan "vacate the aggression". India complained that Pakistan had not refrained from taking measures to augment its military potential in Kashmir and had not co-operated in "creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations". Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that "Part I of the first resolution of August 13, 1948 had been implemented in good faith and in full" and that the time had come for carrying out the terms which followed. Jarring then queried the two governments on whether they would be prepared to submit to arbitration the question of whether or not Part I of the first resolution had been implemented. Under the form of arbitration proposed, the arbitrator would be empowered, in case he found that the pertinent terms of the resolutions had not been carried out, to indicate to the parties what should be done to arrive at a full implementation. Pakistan accepted it but India could not because this would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and the rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory. It was also argued by India that "arbitration even on an isolated part of the resolution might be interpreted as indicating that Pakistan had a *locus standi* in the question". The Jarring Report supported the Indian contention that the Kashmir situation has changed during the last nine years. He warned that implementation of certain resolutions relating to the Kashmir question might "become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change".

On the day the Jarring Report was released the Council President, Sir Pierson Dixon, received a complaint from Pakistan that Kashmir was being incorporated into the recently established Northern Zonal Council, one of the five regional bodies established under India's new plan for reorganization of its states. Pakistan

alleged that the incorporation of Kashmir into these arrangements was "calculated to destroy the separate entity of the State, with a view to defeating the purpose of the various resolutions of the Security Council", and she reserved the right to seek further action by the Council at a later date. Thus the situation in Kashmir continued to deteriorate and the relations between India and Pakistan became very tense.

Fresh Complaints. On August 5, 1957 Pakistan reported to the Security Council that India was settling non-Muslims in Nawasher, Riasi and Rajouri areas and in the districts of Jammu, Kathua and Udhampur with the intent of converting "the Muslim majority into a minority, thereby complicating the holding of a plebiscite". It was alleged that "Indian harassment of the native population" was leading to an increased influx into Pakistan or Azad Kashmir of Muslim refugees from the Indian-held zone". India denied these allegations on August 9 and informed the Council that "no non-resident person is permitted to become a resident of Kashmir". It declared that no evacuee property had been turned over to non-residents, but that such property had been allotted to Kashmiri refugees "driven from their houses in Pakistan-occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir". India also took exception to the term "India-held zone" which occurred in the Pakistan complaint.

The Graham Mission, 1958. In September 1957, the Security Council once again took up the Kashmir question and it became evident during the debate which went on from September to December 1957 that "the disputants were starting from two different points". Pakistan insisted that the order of steps to the solution of the problem should be demilitarization, U.N. supervision, and plebiscite and that what happened before the acceptance of the resolution of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 was no longer relevant to the question. It dismissed all later developments, including Jarring's mission, as being "the direct result of Indian dilatoriness". Mr. Noon, therefore, asked the Council on September 24, 1957 to proceed from the stage where it left the dispute on December 23, 1952, that is, when it had asked both sides to agree within 30 days on the demilitarization of the State. Menon, on the other hand, reminded the Council that India's acceptance of the two resolutions referred above did not mean that it had rescinded its original charge of aggression against Pakistan and reiterated that the Maharaja's act of accession was legal and binding, and that the legality of the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir could not be questioned. India's agreement to hold a plebiscite was conditional on Pakistan's withdrawal of her forces which had illegally entered Kashmir. While waiting ten years for the Council to pronounce on this aggression, she had expected Pakistan at least to vacate

the aggression "There is a difference between India and Pakistan", Mr Menon told the Council on October 9, 1957, "in relation to the Indian Act (1947) We are the successor state, the Government of India the legitimate successor of British authority in India we have taken over all the liabilities, therefore, even without any accession, we have the obligation to go to the rescue of these people" Pakistan, thus, had *no locus standi* in Kashmir, and with regard even to the plebiscite, all that it had to do was "to hear the results" Menon ably rebutted the Pakistani charge of dumping of a large number of non-Muslims by India in Kashmir He charged Pakistan of genocide and told the Council that the Mangla Dam being built by Pakistan near Mirpur on Azad territory to divert the River Jhelum would lead to serious topographical changes and enable Pakistan to consolidate its position in the territory it had unlawfully occupied" He pointed out that as a result of construction of the dam, 122 villages and 66 sq miles of land would be submerged and about 100,000 persons would be deprived of their livelihood He also referred to a new wave of aggression, sabotage, murder and incitement launched by Pakistan Eventually a resolution was passed by the Council on December 2 by 10 votes to none, with the Soviet Union abstaining The resolution authorised Dr Frank Graham to visit the sub-continent again and to renew efforts to achieve a settlement of the question India and Pakistan were requested to "refrain from making any statements, from doing or causing to be done or permitting acts which might aggravate the situation" India rejected the resolution as it was "cast in a mould which was regressive" The Soviet Union charged that the resolution served the interest of Pakistan only, and that it merely repeated proposals which already had "proved to be fruitless" Pakistan objected to some features of the resolution but agreed to co-operate with Dr Graham Its objections related to a reference to proposed recommendations by Dr Graham on implementation of cease-fire provisions of the resolution of August 13 1948 Pakistan held that she had fully implemented these provisions

In January 1958, India again invited the attention of the Council to the Mangla Dam project Pakistan, however, refused to retrace the steps Meanwhile, Dr Graham came to India and Pakistan and after spending five weeks he returned to New York early in March 1958 On March 31, Graham submitted his report to the Council in which he confessed his inability in ironing out basic disagreements between the two states Graham made five recommendations (a) Both India and Pakistan should renew appeals to their people to assist in maintaining an atmosphere favourable to further negotiations (b) They should reaffirm their respect for the cease-fire line (c) They should

undertake a study, under Dr. Graham's auspices, to determine how the area might be administered by local authorities on the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. It was recommended that "with a view to increasing the security of the area to be evacuated" consideration be given to the possibility of stationing a U.N. force on the Pakistan territory bordering Kashmir following withdrawal of Pakistan's troops. (d) There should be reached an early agreement between the two governments on the interpretation of the third part of the August 1948 resolution and those parts of the January 1949 resolution which provide for a plebiscite. (e) A Prime Ministers' conference should be held at the earliest possible time under his auspices so that negotiations at the highest level should be started.

While Pakistan "agreed to these recommendations in principle", India could not, for, these proposals were "made without regard to the failure to implement the Security Council resolution of January 17, 1948" and provisions of Part I of the August 1948 resolution. It was contended that a new declaration about peaceful atmosphere and the cease-fire line "might denote a displacement of the previous engagements" and would imply that Pakistan had not violated previous undertakings. The third recommendation was turned down by India because it felt that the proposed study "would tend to by-pass and evade what they considered to be the main issue, namely, the illegal occupation of Indian Union territory by Pakistan. The fourth recommendation was unacceptable in view of the preliminary objections. The proposal of a Prime Ministers' conference was rejected since it would, in India's view, "place the aggressor and aggressed on the same footing".

Conclusions. Graham, however, emphasized that while India had declared its inability to accept the recommendations, it had voiced its desire to promote and maintain peaceful relations with Pakistan, and that it continued to seek "a constructive and peaceful approach" and firmly adhered to a determination "to pursue paths of peace, while placing faith in the U.N. and its Charter". Probably no other policy is feasible. History, geography and economics all demand peaceful relations and friendship between India and Pakistan. An Indo-Pakistan war involving hostilities on a 2,000-mile-long double frontier might lead to a large-scale internal conflict and disorders caused by minority revolts, would invite foreign intervention and would impose an unbearable burden on the resources of both. Some-times it is suggested that the Kashmir problem may be settled on the basis of partition without plebiscite and on the same basis on which India was divided in 1947. To this India, at any rate, can never agree as it would revive the two-nation theory. The alternative of plebiscite is now clearly ruled out for reasons

we have already discussed Plebiscite in Kashmir is neither necessary nor desirable. It is unnecessary because the people of Kashmir, as all impartial foreign observers have affirmed, have finally decided to remain as part of India and because Pakistan by abetting and helping the raiders, by accepting military aid from U.S.A., and by joining the regional pacts has repudiated the basis of plebiscite to which India was only unilaterally and conditionally committed. It is undesirable, for, it might unsettle the settled facts, reopen the closed controversies and rouse communal tensions. A plebiscite, in which no canvassing would be allowed, would be undemocratic and the results of such a plebiscite would be determined by ignorance and inertia. An indirect plebiscite (vote by an elected assembly of intelligent representatives) would hardly be practicable. An agreement on the requisite conditions for a plebiscite—the appointment of a plebiscite administrator, withdrawal of troops, a non-partisan administration during the course of plebiscite—has not yet been possible. Huge amounts that India has so far spent on Kashmir's development cannot be allowed to go waste. Considering the attitude of the Western powers and of the United Nations, it is difficult to depend on the impartiality of any plebiscite administrator. Nor is it possible, from India's point of view, to refer the issue to arbitration "for in the whole gamut of international law no issue of such wide implications had been submitted to arbitration". In international law a State's vital interest could not be submitted to arbitration. Arbitration, as Menon put it, was possible only if there were rules, otherwise it was a jumble. The idea of an independent Kashmir is rather fantastic and no sensible observer of events would vouchsafe it. For sometime Sheikh Abdulah toyed with it but with his arrest in 1953, nobody took it seriously. When in 1958 he was released, for some time he tried this again but it failed to fire people's imagination. Some people have also suggested that the problem of Kashmir could be settled by a barter of territories. For instance, Kodanda Rao suggested that "the only solution of the Indo Pakistan (Kashmir) dispute is the exchange of Kashmir for East Bengal". This proposal is rather "too revolutionary for acceptance". Sometimes it is suggested that Kashmir State should be internationalized. In the context of deep commitments of the two Governments, this proposal too is unrealistic. The entire issue it can be easily seen, has shifted to "the arena of the cold war". In their visit to India in December 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev proclaimed their support of India's stand on Kashmir and declared that the problem had been successfully and rightly settled by the State's people. We have referred to the case of the Soviet veto in 1957. In the light of these developments the best course seems to be to seal the existing frontier for neither can the Azad Kashmir be

occupied by India nor can the Indian-held Kashmir be occupied by Pakistan without a major conflict—a conflict which would be a war of attrition like the Korean war but which, unlike the Korean war, cannot possibly be localised. It may not be a solution based on law or morality but it is a realistic solution based on the maxim that possession is nine-tenths of the law.

CHAPTER 20

Resurgence of Asia

INDIA

With a population of 356,891,624 (according to 1951 census), India has an area of 1,269,640 sq. miles slightly—more than one-third that of the United States. It is the world's seventh largest state in area and the second largest in population. The population is increasing roughly by 5,000,000 a year. We have here extraordinary physical contrasts—one of the wettest spots on earth as well as one of the driest, the highest and largest of all mountain ranges bordering vast river lowlands, dense rain forests as well as lifeless deserts. From the geological standpoint we have the mountain-wall of the Himalayas and other encircling ranges, the plains drained by the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra, and the dissected plateau in the peninsula to the south. The mineral wealth is largely concentrated in the uplands 200 miles west of Calcutta. Coal, iron ore, limestone, manganese, copper and mica are in fair proximity and this has led to a large iron and steel industry. Coal reserves are variously estimated (from 75 to 90 billion tons), and recently petroleum has been discovered in Assam. Our chief industry has always been agriculture and the total cropped area in 1957 was 355 million acres. Between 1951-56, over 20 million acres of forest land under private ownership or management was brought under state control. In 1956, an area of about 70 million acres was under irrigation. The most important industries after agriculture are textile and tea. Other indigenous industries are silk rearing and weaving, shawl and carpet weaving, wood carving and metal working.

Since different parts of the country differ in their products, and these can easily be transported by means of the natural riverways or roads that can be easily constructed, internal trade developed to a considerable extent. "External trade through land and sea routes also flourished on a large scale, but it was for many centuries carried on by foreigners and Indians themselves" played a minor part in it. The bulk of the Indian people did not take to maritime trade readily because the sea was far removed from the interior of the country, only the inhabitants of the coastal regions took it up to any appreciable extent. So under the influence of the physical features and forces, India's economic life developed on an agricultural pattern and thus had

a marked influence on the shaping of its culture as a whole. It stressed the values of peace and constructive activity more emphatically than those of war and destruction”.

The cultural unity of the Indian people is as remarkable as their diversity in respect of race, colour, language, religion and customs. We have here what Nehru has called “a strange mixture of races”—Aryan, Dravidian, Turanian, Semitic and Mongolian. The conquests of the successive migratory peoples and tribes who came here ended in the assimilation of the conqueror in the general pattern of the local civilization. And the various stocks, as O. H. K. Spate has written, have brought diverse gifts, material and cultural, to the common store. Much nonsense has been talked about “the hundreds of languages of India”. There are, in fact, about a dozen major languages and some of them are closely akin. This is hardly “an alarming total” for an area and population such as that of India. Nevertheless, on the one hand, there is colossal illiteracy even now, and on the other, education is “badly balanced”.

Hinduism was the dominant religion even before the partition which has taken away about 7 crores Muslims to Pakistan, leaving behind about 4 crores. The two most important institutions of the Hindus have been joint family and caste and these have led to what Panikkar has called “the fragmentation of social feeling”, which has tended “to sub-divide the social organism in such a way as to make the units smaller and smaller and unrelated to the general society”. It also led to an unusual and unnatural emphasis on the principle of “segregation and exclusiveness”. In recent years, however, there has been a tremendous impact of the forces of Nationalism, Communism, Science and Technology and these together with the creation of a centralized administrative machinery, a unified Army, rapid means of communications and transport, English medium, growth of Press, reaction against missionary activities, the development of industries and urban centres have weakened the hold of caste as well as the joint family. The ancient beliefs came to be shaken. The struggle for independence against the British Imperialism had a unifying force. The adoption of a constitution based on democratic concepts has had the same effect. A tendency to change the old order is, therefore, face to face with the dead weight of tradition. Centuries of political absolutism and alien rule have perhaps led to “the love of metaphysics”, the legend of “India’s spirituality” and “the myth of non-violence” as a rule of conduct. To this we will revert later when we examine the sources of India’s foreign policy. It is enough to point out here that left to itself India cannot afford to remain indifferent to the events that occur outside and the patterns of our economic and political behaviour do not and will not differ fundamentally from those of the rest of the world.

Passive indifference would not be permitted even by India's strategic position

During the imperial era India was regarded as a prize of immense value. It was a strategic focus of the other British dominions bordering the Indian Ocean all the way from South Africa to Australia. It became the centre of the British diplomatic and strategic system in the Afro-Asian Realm, and was a major battle ground in the war against the Axis. Once the British Government was obliged to transfer power to India, it had also to depart from other colonies in Asia and the Middle East even as the junior imperialist powers such as France and the Netherlands were also compelled to retire. 'From the commercial standpoint, the Indian Peninsula occupies "a commanding position at the head of the Indian Ocean", and this has given India "a central and strategic position on one of the world's most important main trade routes, i.e. between Europe and the Far East via the Mediterranean and the Red Sea"'. Three factors make the Indian Ocean extremely vital for us. In the first place, as Papreddy writes, 'whoever controls the Indian Ocean has India at her mercy. The authority that can be exercised over her long coast line, with the minimum of force makes the subjection perpetual, while invasion from across the land frontier has naturally to be sporadic. The history of the last three centuries has shown that any power which has unquestioned mastery of the sea and strength to sustain a land campaign can hold the Empire of India, monopolize her trade and exploit her unlimited resources. While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea. Her life lines are concentrated in that area. Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores fully protected' (*India and The Indian Ocean*, pp. 84-85). Secondly, since most of our trade is sea-borne and carried on through this route, it is a matter of life and death for us to retain this route. "India has 3 500 miles of sea frontage and is extremely vulnerable from the Indian Ocean side. It is self-evident that India would find it difficult to reconcile her national interests with the dominance of the Indian Ocean by the navies of any hostile power or powers. India must preserve friendly relations with those powers which are capable of closing the Indian Ocean to Indian trade and shipping". Finally, the Indian Ocean is extremely important in our defence. India has to be defended first from the Indian Ocean and "an exclusive land policy of defence for India will be nothing short of blindness".

With regard to the land frontiers which are about 8,200 miles, India shares them with Pakistan (on two sides), China,

Nepal, Afghanistan and Burma. From that small strip of territory in northern Kashmir which joins the Afghan frontier, the U.S.S.R. border is only a few miles. To the north is the world's highest mountain system, the towering Himalayas, stretching for 1,500 miles, from the gorge of the Indus on the west to the gorge of the Brahmaputra on the east. The chain has an average crest line elevation of 20,000 feet and contains many of the world's highest peaks. Access across this barrier to the north is possible only during the short summer season and the valleys are too deep and narrow to provide feasible routes to the interior. Flanking the Himalaya on both west and east, are north-south ranges which separate India from Iran and Burma. The western mountains (the Suleman and Kirthar) as well as the Burmese ranges are extremely complex and difficult of access. This Himalayan barrier created a myth of security in India and led to a sense of contempt for the foreigner, in other words, a sort of "a Maginot-line mentality". In modern times, however, the Himalayas do not provide an invincible barrier. Indeed they were never impenetrable. For India, therefore, it is necessary to keep a careful watch on what happens in the neighbouring countries. That explains India's attitude towards Burma, Nepal, China, Afghanistan, the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan. As Dr. J. C. Kundra has written: "The important fact that emerges from the geographical position of India is that she is much more close to the communist world, or to put it more precisely to the principal partners in the communist bloc (China and Russia), than she is to the corresponding principals in the Western bloc. The necessity of India, therefore, to find a *modus vivendi* with her neighbours is greater than those who are at a distance, unless, of course, she is convinced that the neighbours have aggressive intentions against her.....On the other hand India cannot ignore the fact that the navies of the Western bloc dominate the Indian Ocean and most of the water surface of the world. If India chooses to pursue a policy of neutrality between the two blocs, her desire would, probably, be to keep the centres of explosive possibilities as distant from her frontiers as possible. Evidently such a policy could be consistent with her national interests, independence and sovereignty only if she believed that she was not threatened by one or the other bloc" (*Indian Foreign Policy, 1947—1954*, pp. 11-12).

INDIA UNDER THE BRITISH RULE

It is needless to enter into a detailed account of India's struggle for independence from the British control. What is necessary and useful for a student of international relations is

(i) the nature of imperialist policy in India and the impact of the British rule, and (ii) the main landmarks of the struggle for independence

The British Colonial Policy As far as the British imperialist policy is concerned, the ground has been almost fully covered by researchers. After her conquest of India, Britain converted it into her agrarian and raw material appendage, but throughout the colonial rule, agriculture continued to deteriorate so that India represented the classical land of famine which regularly carried off the lives of millions of toilers. The reason for this largely lays in the system of agrarian relationships based on feudal land-ownership that was nurtured, if not implanted, by the British colonisers. Between the owners of the land and the peasant, who cultivated it, there existed a numerous strata of parasitic middlemen sitting on the neck of the peasants and serving as one of the main props of British imperialism in India. The rural India was enmeshed in all kinds of feudal survivals which hampered the economic development of the country. Industries remained thwarted. The cotton and jute industry had arisen in the 19th century and between 1914 and 1939 there developed a metallurgical industry although the production of the iron and steel industry was altogether insignificant. The Second World War gave some impetus to the chemical industry which till then had been almost non-existent. The sugar, foodstuff and leather industries were also developed during this period. Nevertheless, the level of industrial development in India remained extremely poor, and in 1950, it represented about 20% of the total value of the entire production of India. It was largely dependent on the British capital. Even during the Second World War, machine building industry was given no encouragement. That British Imperialism dealt a fatal blow to the indigenous industries of India is not denied by any historian. Witness, for instance, M G Rawlinson's observation: "It cannot be gainsaid that English competition dealt a heavy blow at Indian village industries, which were famous throughout the civilised world. It was stated in evidence in 1813 that the cotton and silk goods of India, up to that period, could be sold for a profit in the British market at a price from 50 to 60% lower than those fabricated in England. Consequently it became necessary to protect the latter by duties of 70 to 80% on their value, or by positive prohibition. Had this not been the case the mills of Paisley and of Manchester would have been stopped in their outset and could hardly have been set again in motion, even by the powers of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of Indian manufacturers. British goods were forced upon her without paying any duty and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a com-

petitor with whom he could not contend on equal terms" (*The British Achievement in India*, pp. 234-235).

What has been stated about the British colonial policy in the economic sphere is equally applicable to social and political spheres. It is true that the British rulers gave us law and order, built up a fine, honest and independent judiciary, created a unified army command, an efficient civil service, and a strong centralized administration. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that administratively the British government in India was "one of the best in the world". It is also true that beginnings of democratic and representative institutions were made by the British as we will shortly see and the Congress itself was founded by an Englishman. By making English the medium of education, the British Government broke the intellectual isolation of the Indian mind and brought it into contact with Western science, literature and history. Liberalism and the concept of equality before the law opened new vistas. British rule may also be said "to have given substance to the idea of a national state which India had inherited from the Moghuls". As K. M. Panikkar has put it, "a conscious process of unification was set afoot, the object of which was not merely to secure the effective exercise of British authority in Indian States, but weld the whole of India into one country. Railways, posts and telegraphs, currency, salt administration—these were the main external forms through which this unity was achieved". The European scholars and researchers reconstructed and rediscovered India's past and in so doing they created among Indians "a historical sense, a pride in their achievements and in their nationality". The Sanskrit learning and the remarkable growth of Indian vernacular languages may also be put to the credit of the British Government. India was quite oblivious to her priceless heritage of sculpture and painting until their significance was pointed out by European scholars. It is, therefore, difficult to substantiate the charge that England brought about the cultural and spiritual ruin of India. On the contrary, "contact with the West had a vivifying effect at a time when Indian culture was at its lowest ebb. Like the Renaissance, it brought about a revolution of the mind and spirit which raised the country from the darkness of the middle ages to the light of contemporary Europe. Western humanism was at the root of the campaign for social reform initiated by Bentinck and Macaulay and carried on by philanthropists like B.M. Malabari".

But this is the bright side of the moon. The "good things" and "modernism" were imposed on India and were not accepted voluntarily. If India had faced the West as an independent country, the results would have been different. Free and independent India must have followed the rule: pick and choose.

There would at least have been a chance to do it although societies which had adopted a foreign culture had generally found it difficult in the past to control the process and to say "We will adopt this element and not the other" Thus possibly an independent India would have judged Western culture on its merits and would have adopted some elements of the foreign culture and reject others. As it was, political subjugation compelled India to accept not what was necessarily useful but what her masters chose to impose on her. "They harnessed India to their own economy and forced through changes without regard to Indian interests. The old traditional pattern of social, economic, and political life was disturbed and at times destroyed. Haphazard and fragmentary beliefs and habits took the place of the old way of life. The old was destroyed beyond recall but the new remains still unborn." While English education broke new ground for us, an undue emphasis was put on literary education. It should always be borne in mind that when foreign institutions are adopted in a country they are usually adopted by a minority in the receiving country. The English language remains confined to a very narrow minority even today. As Professor Humayun Habib pertinently points out "Increasing emphasis on mere literacy cut education adrift from the existing economy of the land. Skill in English was hardly necessary for agricultural or commercial purposes. On the other hand, such skill provided easy and soft jobs in Government or business concerns. The result is that agriculture, India's largest industry is to this day manned by people who are hardly lettered. When an agriculturist takes to education, it is invariably as a preliminary abandonment of agriculture. This divorce of education from the country's economy has resulted in increasing impoverishment. What is worse, it has introduced a new and dangerous division into Indian society. The problems of commercial and provincial jealousy are in themselves serious enough. Still more serious is the problem of the widening gulf that today divides the educated from the uneducated classes in India."

The concept of state under the British rule, it may be restated, was negative. It was, more or less, a police state wedded to the need of maintenance of law and order, repulsion of aggression from outside and collection of taxes. Schemes for reorganisation of the social structure, or for raising the moral or material standards of the people or for increasing the national wealth of the country were rarely considered. Population was constantly increasing partly as a result of increased medical facilities but the country was progressively denuded of its wealth. The result was suffering and conflict, discontent and protest. Britain had supplied revolutionary ideas and urge for social and economic change but did not encourage a revolutionary change.

It is necessary to remind ourselves that men do not found empires for philanthropic motives. "British capitalism served as a progressive force so far as it helped to destroy the prevailing order. It ceased to be progressive when it resisted, as in its own interest it was bound to, the free development of capitalism in India. The compromise through which it effected its purpose was the creation of an extremely strong middle class. It intended that this bourgeoisie should help in the distribution of British goods over the whole of India and still remain content with a mere fraction of the profits by British capital. This the new bourgeoisie soon refused to do. It demanded not only a larger share in the profits but also a share in the British political and cultural heritage. Drawn from an ever-widening sphere, it not only circulated goods but also ideas". Such was the socio-economic background of the protest of India against British colonialism.

In the political sphere, the British Imperialist policy expressed itself in the form of majestic and awe-inspiring institutions intended to inspire fear, confidence and respect of the natives, and efficiency in the administration. The Indian Civil Service, the Criminal Investigation Department and the judicial system were all set up with these aims in view. The legend was assiduously cultivated that the Europeans were racially and culturally superior. The Indians, on their part, having lost in the battle field developed the legend of their "spirituality". This air of superiority on our part may thus be said to be a defensive reaction. This has naturally damaged our way of thinking. The impact of British Imperialism on our social outlook proved to be fatal in other ways also. It is true that Islam and Hinduism in India were two unreconciled cultures when the West intruded itself on us. The transplantation of Western ideas and institutions aggravated the Hindu-Muslim conflict. Hindus and Muslims reacted in different ways to foreign ideas and institutions like modern education and democratic concepts. While the Muslims from whose hands power had been snatched by the British, shunned the British culture and could not quickly adapt themselves to the new conditions of foreign rule, the Hindus took to them eagerly, thus leaving the Muslims far behind in the adoption of Western ways of life. Gradually the Muslims recovered the perspective and started making up the gap. In this, the British Government actively encouraged them. This at first resulted in the demand for separate electorates and then for a separate State (Pakistan). The concept of Democracy was used by the Hindus and Muslims both: by the former to justify unity of India, and by the latter to justify partition of India. According to Hindus, Democracy was rule by majority and in a united India everybody's rights could be effectively safeguarded on the basis of self-government and self-determination. According to Muslims, the majority rule in a

country like India would necessarily be the rule of the Hindus who are in a preponderant majority here "Democracy", Jinnah declared, "can only mean Hindu Raj all over India. This is a position to which Muslims will never submit. A constitution must be evolved that recognises that there are in India two nations, who must both share the governance of their common motherland." This was the spirit of the famous Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940. The British Government made maximum capital out of this Hindu-Muslim conflict using the oft-quoted formula *Divide et Impera*. The Muslim League grew rapidly in the sunshine of favour and when the Congress ministries resigned from the provinces and withdrew their support from their war effort, Lord Linlithgow inevitably leaned towards the Muslims.

Struggle for Independence By common consent the Indian struggle for independence began with the Mutiny of 1857. The background consisted of social and cultural diversities and the division of the country between British India and "Indian India" having more than 500 Indian states. The Indian Councils Acts of 1861 and 1892 and the Act of 1909 had encouraged the demands for self government of the Indian National Congress set up in 1884 and of the Muslim League demand for separate representation for Muslims. With the turn of the century, the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904-5, and the proposed partition of Bengal gave a tremendous stimulus to the nationalists. The first world war exposed the weakness of British Imperialism, weakened the moral authority of Europe, increased the prestige of Japan and led to the development of industries in India. The hitherto unassailable government of India was now obliged to appeal to the "natives" for help. The scale of the Indian war effort in 1914-18, and the Hindu-Muslim unity during the war, *inter alia*, produced a promise from the British Government in 1917 that responsible government would be granted at the end of the War. There was, however, serious disappointment at the Montague-Chelmsford Act of 1919, which enlarged the Provincial Councils and made them predominantly elected bodies, but reserved from their control matters of police, defence, and land.

Meanwhile forces of social cohesion were also at work. The reform movements—the Brahmo-Samaj, the Theosophical Society, the Arya Samaj, etc.—were factors making for social stability. The Russian Revolution of 1917-18 provided social and economic contents to the nationalist movement of India. The appearance of Gandhi on the Indian scene with his technique of non-violence took the movement from the classes to the masses, and soon contacts of the Indian nationalists were established with their counter parts in other countries like Egypt, Morocco, Burma, China, Ceylon, and Ireland. The opposition to the Act of 1919 took the unusual and revolutionary form of non-violent direct

action in a demand for Swaraj. The period between the two wars witnessed the growth of the labour movement, the women movement, the peasant agitation and the Communist party. India was also a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles and became an original member of the League of Nations. Cultural revival was simultaneously proceeding. In 1913, Rabindra Nath Tagore had won the Nobel Prize for literature. J. C. Bose, Ramanujam and C. V. Raman figured prominently on the world map of Science.

The agitation against the Rowlatt Acts, the Jallian Wala Bagh, General Dyer's infamous crawling order and the non-co-operation movement of Gandhiji were followed by the Simon Commission of 1928, the Round Table Conferences (R.T.C.) of 1930—33, and the Joint Select Committee of 1933. The R.T.C. had failed chiefly on the issues of the place of the Princes and of non-Hindu communities in the new set-up. The Government of India Act, 1935 carried the progress towards self-government a long step forward. It separated Burma from India, enlarged the Indian electorate to about 14% of the population, introduced dyarchy at the centre and autonomy in the provinces, and envisaged a federal form of government. In 1937, Congress governments were set up in seven of the eleven provinces, and in two years, before the Second World War began, they initiated financial and educational reforms and repressed communal agitation. The outbreak of the war involved a resumption of power by the Viceroy and the Governors, since Congress ministries wanted a promise of speedy independence, and resigned when it was not forthcoming.

The Second World War witnessed new strides in the nationalist movement. The growing danger to Britain in Europe and the startling victories of Japan in the Far East had spurred the demand for independence. The industrial development received an impetus and by the year 1945, India had wiped out its debts and built up huge sterling balances in London. The failure of the Cripps Mission and the Quit India movement of 1942 had pushed the struggle to new heights. During the war, the Indian working class was considerably strengthened both politically and organizationally. From 1937-38 to 1942-43, the number of workers organized in trade unions rose from 390,000 to 685,000, i.e., by 75%. Towards the end of the war, the number of trade union members exceeded one million. The communists in India were now isolated, for, with the German invasion on Russia on June 22, 1941, the "Imperialist war" had suddenly become the "People's war". They, along with the Muslim League, loyally supported the Government of India. The entire burden of resistance fell upon the Congress and the masses whom it led. During the war, after the fall of Singapore, representative Indians living all over East Asia met in a Conference at Bangkok and decided upon the formation of an Indian National Army (I.N.A.). Already an

Indian Independence League had been established with its branches in Malaya. On July 2, 1943, Sri Subhash Chandra Bose arrived in Singapore and the Indian National Movement took a definite shape. An Indian National State was formed and he was elected its Head. The I.N.A. was reorganized in September 1942. The new State declared war on Britain and America and it was recognized by many powers who were then fighting the Allies. All the Indians in East Asia owed allegiance to this State, and as many as 223,000 were proved to have taken the oath of allegiance and over 23,000 actually volunteered to serve among the combatant ranks of the I.N.A. This Provisional Free Government of India organized on October 21, 1943 had its own funds and resources, and acquired its own territories. Its forces took part in the Arakan Campaign in 1944 and in Burma in 1945. After the occupation of Burma by the British forces, the I.N.A. leaders were captured and some of them—Captain Shah Nawaz Khan, Capt P. K. Sahgal, and Lieut. Dhillon—were put to trial under the Indian Army Act.

Factors leading to independence. After the war events moved rapidly—the Simla Conference, the elections of 1946, the Cabinet Mission, the formation of the interim government by Lord Wavell, the orgy of riots, the Mountbatten Plan, the Indian Independence Act and August 15, 1947. What factors obliged the British Government to surrender power to India? These can be broadly put in three categories: (i) those related to Britain, (ii) those related to India, and (iii) general international situation.

As a result of the war, the British position had thoroughly weakened. A brief analysis of this factor the reader would find in Part Two of this work (pp. 2-3). Here it is enough to point out that physically and materially it became impracticable for Britain to continue to retain its hold on the colonies. Economically, Britain had been reduced to a third rate power and in 1945 the United States was dominating in every sphere, and their atomic monopoly was only one symptom of their supremacy. In relation to India herself Britain had become a debtor. On May 7, 1944 Churchill referred to "the extraordinary consequence of our coming out of this war owing India a bigger debt, after having defended her, than we owed to the United States at the end of the last war" (*Closing the Ring*, p. 546). Soon after the end of the war the Labour Party was returned to power with an absolute majority. Even during the war the coalition government of Churchill was aware of the deepening problem of India. There was a special committee containing important British leaders and presided over by Attlee, and this kept Indian affairs under close review. On forming the government, the first thing the Labour Party did was to set about finding a solution of the Indian problem.

The British concern for a solution of this problem had partly been caused by international pressures. During the war the United States had started exerting pressure on the British Government to take some concrete steps with a view to solving the Indian problem. In March 1942, Roosevelt had gone to the extent of suggesting to Britain "the setting up of what might be called a temporary Government in India, headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occupations, religions, and geographies—this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government" (*The Hinge of Fate*, p. 182). Similarly Chiang Kai-shek was pressing Britain for a change of policy. The U.S.S.R. also favoured a basic change. In fact both Roosevelt and Stalin were cautious in their approach to the Indian problem, for, on this Churchill was extremely sensitive. Churchill, quoting Hopkins, has recorded a conversation of Roosevelt and Stalin at Teheran: "The President referred to one of his favourite topics, the education of the peoples of the Far Eastern colonial areas in the arts of self-government. He cautioned Stalin against bringing up the problem of India with Churchill, and Stalin agreed that this was undoubtedly a sore subject. Roosevelt said that reform in India should begin from the bottom and Stalin replied that reform from the bottom would mean revolution" (*Closing the Ring*, p. 273).

But the most important and the most forceful pressure on Britain was the situation in India which was rapidly drifting to chaos. The I.N.A. Trial had roused popular indignation. The struggle of the working class was assuming alarming proportions and the strike movement was now reaching unprecedented level. During the mass anti-British disturbances in Calcutta in November 1945 and in February 1946 and in other towns during the bloody clashes and the barricade battles in Bombay in January-February 1946, the working class had drawn the broad masses behind it. The uprising of the naval ratings in Bombay in February 1946 and the general strike of the Bombay textile workers as a mark of solidarity with the soldiers was an eye opener. Real power was now slipping from British hands, and senior officials, anxious about their own future, were conscious that they were caretakers under notice and were disheartened. The administration had been almost paralysed and it was apprehended that the armed forces too were not unaffected by the virus of nationalism. Clement Attlee in his Memoirs has thus described the position: "Meanwhile, the machinery of Government in India was running down. This was nothing new. The process of Indianisation, begun after the Report of the Lee Commission just before the First World War, meant that the British element in the Services had been steadily declining. The war itself had meant a cessation of recruitment, while the un-

certainty as to the future of the Indian Empire naturally deterred men from entering. Lord Wavell had reported very fully on this. I recalled Lord Wavell in order to discuss the whole position with him. No progress had been made since the return of the Cabinet Mission and Lord Wavell and his Chief Service advisers were despondent and could only suggest a progressive retirement from India province by province, which was, in my view, a counsel of despair. I had a great admiration for Lord Wavell, both as a soldier and a man but I did not think that he was likely to find a solution. I did not think that he and the Indian could really understand each other. New men were needed for a new policy" (*As It Happened*, pp. 182-183).

INDEPENDENT INDIA, 1947-1958

The Indian Independence Act had conferred full independence on India, it had provided for partition and it terminated the relationship between the Crown and the Indian States, leaving them free to determine their own future. The aftermath of partition was grim, and while India was celebrating the dawn of freedom the minorities whose fate was hanging perilously in the balance, were getting nervous and panicky. The Radcliffe Award had satisfied neither Hindus nor Muslims. The tremendous problem of communal turbulence and the colossal task of the rehabilitation of the refugees taxed the sources of the new government. The partition had broken asunder the economy of the country. The problem of law and order and the difficulties in hammering out a constitution were soon got over. The native states were integrated on the basis of a firm and imaginative policy. The first general elections, the world's largest free elections, were held in 1951-52 on the basis of adult franchise embracing about 176 million voters. These were followed by the second general elections held in February-March 1957. The process of political consolidation was accelerated by the States reorganization in 1956 and on November 1, 1956, the number of political units was reduced to 14 states and 6 small centrally-administered territories. In place of the old haphazard political fragmentation India was now divided on primarily linguistic lines. Zonal Councils have been created for purposes of economic development. Social problems like untouchability, tribal welfare, and scheduled tribes are being effectively dealt with. Important social legislations have been enacted. The questions of child welfare, youth welfare and women's welfare are being tackled. Community projects and National Extension Service have introduced a new approach to social problems. The Planning Commission has placed much emphasis on measures for the improvement of medical and public health services. Education is fast expanding.

In the economic spheres, under the first five-year plan adopted in 1951-52 and the second five-year plan of 1956-57, spectacular results were achieved. Agricultural development as well as great irrigation and power schemes form a main feature of the plans. Foodgrain production increased from 54 million tons in 1950 to 58 million tons in 1953 and 70 millions in 1954. The Chittaranjan Locomotive Factory and the Sindri fertiliser factory are outstanding examples of industrial development. The three steel plants now being erected indicate the future trend. The heavy chemical industry has rapidly developed. A beginning has been made to solve the land problem and in many states zamindari has been abolished. Acharya Vinoba Bhave, with a band of sincere workers, is bringing out a tremendous psychological change by his Bhoodan movement.

But this catalogue of achievements, though impressive by any standard, does not explain the full picture. There are many unsolved problems. Democracy in India is yet on the anvil and its prospects are not yet certain. Whether it will succeed in solving the economic problems of the country, before it is too late, is a big question mark. The forces of disunity, regionalism, communalism and linguism are very much alive as has been amply demonstrated in recent years. The problem of corruption and inefficiency of the administration in all levels is extremely serious. The Congress Party is rent with schism and its future is most uncertain. What will happen if the Congress loses the ground, or when Nehru would have gone, is a question which is often asked and rarely answered. Again, India is most vulnerable on the economic front. Even the problem of food has not been effectively solved and the second five-year plan is facing a veritable crisis. Unemployment is increasing and the forces of extremism are getting stronger. The pressure of increasing population is engulfing positive achievements in the sphere of production. All round India democracy seems to be failing. Recent events in Burma where the Prime Minister has asked the Commander-in-Chief to take over, and in Pakistan where martial law has been promulgated are naturally causing anxiety in this country. Parliamentary democracy has become deeply snarled up in Ceylon as well as in Indonesia. In fact, India today is the only democracy left in Asia. The "personal background" of those who are working it is 400,000,000 hungry people; their "global background" is all Asia on the brink of the totalitarian abyss. What the world, for its own safety, needs is a stable and prosperous India; what India, for its own welfare, needs is world peace. These are matters of foreign policy to which we now turn.

INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In a sense before 1947 India had no foreign policy, for in relation to every country, the policy used to be determined by the British Government. The policies pursued by the Moghuls have little relevance now, at any rate an analysis of these policies is not necessary in this work. The leaders of thought during the period of British hegemony reacted to external events and sometimes these reactions were expressed in the resolutions of the Indian National Congress. As early as 1892, the Congress condemned the increased military expenditure in pursuance of imperial interests. It was during World War I that matters of foreign policy seriously engaged the attention of the Indian leaders whose primary concern continued to be dislodging the foreign rulers. Everything else was, of course, secondary and subordinate to the principal goal. The recruitment of Indians in the army and their travel abroad gave them a new experience. At the end of the war India signed the Treaty of Versailles and became an original member of the League. The effort of Indians to represent their country at the Paris Peace Conference remained abortive. Bal Ganga Dhar Tilak's letter to Clemenceau indicates the value our leaders attached to foreign pressures on the British Government in favour of India's freedom. India's participation in the League activities was regular and the Indian delegations to Geneva invariably contained non-official representatives. India had already been admitted to the membership of the Imperial Conference in 1907 and she was duly represented at the Imperial War Conference. In the early years the Secretary of State for India used to lead the Indian Delegation at Geneva. But in 1930 this honour was given to Sir Mohammad Habibullah and in 1931 to Sir B. L. Mitter. India held a permanent seat on the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation and in 1931, Sri Atul Chandra Chatterjee was elected chairman of the Permanent Committee of the I.L.O. This country also participated actively in the social and humanitarian activities of the League. She took part in important International Conferences like the Washington Conference and the World Economic Conference.

Certain guiding principles for the conduct of international relations were laid down by the Indian National Congress between 1920 and 1927. Resolutions were then passed to the effect that India (i) would co-operate with other especially neighbouring countries, (ii) would support the subject peoples and oppressed races in their struggle for freedom and equality and would condemn racial discrimination, (iii) would avoid all *foreign entanglements*, (iv) would oppose colonialism and imperial-

ism in all forms, (v) would promote peace and oppose an imperialist war and would never join a war without the consent of the people, and (vi) would use ethically correct means to achieve right ends. When Japan attacked Manchuria, Italy invaded Ethiopia and Germany and Italy intervened in Spain, the Congress condemned the aggressor in an unqualified manner. In 1937-38, when Japan was committing aggression in China, the Congress condemned the brutal imperialism of the Japanese and decided to send a medical mission to China as a token of its sympathies with the Chinese people. At the Haripur Session, it emphasised the need of world co-operation and respect for the independence of all states and condemned fascism. In October 1938, the Congress Working Committee sent "their profound sympathy to the brave people of Czechoslovakia in their struggle to preserve their freedom".

Thus it can be legitimately asserted that in the inter-war period India had achieved a position of some importance in international affairs. In the thirties the Congress also built up a separate foreign policy section of its organisation and Nehru became its virtual director. During the Second World War, the Congress offered to co-operate with Britain against Nazi Germany but since our co-operation was not sought except on the British terms, the Congress Ministries resigned. At no time, however, the Indians had any sympathy for the fascist countries. Even the I.N.A. under Subhash Chandra Bose cannot be said to be a pliant tool in the hands of the Japanese. The news of Japanese bombing of coastal towns of India stirred the heart of Indians and Nehru boldly declared on April 7, 1942 that "the Japanese assertion that they are coming to India to set us free is absurd and wholly false". The Non-aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was consistently criticised by Indians and the Indian leaders were rather impatient of the U.S. lukewarmness on the question of Indian independence. The visits of Nehru to European countries amply bear out the Indian distaste of power politics. Nehru has recorded how he avoided meeting Mussolini at the time of the Abyssinian campaign. The Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms and their inapplicability to India left the Indian leaders amazed. The news of the German invasion on Russia stirred them. They watched with relief the progress of the Second World War and the ending of the Nazi-Fascist menace.

At the end of the war, the Congress took stock of the contemporary international situation and re-examined the possibilities of Indian freedom in this long perspective. The British agents in the U.S.A. had, throughout the war, carried on wild propaganda against India and this had to be counteracted. The San Francisco Conference and the principles of the U.N. Charter

were hailed by India. The dropping of the atom bomb by the Americans on the Japanese soil wounded our feelings and the trial of war criminals of Japan and Germany was viewed as farcical. Sri Radha Binod Pal, the Indian representative at the Tokyo Trial, indeed, gave a dissenting judgment. It was an earnest of India's belief in international co-operation that soon after the formation of the Interim Government in September 1946, India took steps to establish friendly relations with all countries. Early in 1947, at the initiative of India the Asian Relations Conference was convened where the principles of foreign policy of Independent India were proclaimed.

SOURCES OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

(i) *Geography* Before we analyse the principles and elements of India's foreign policy, it is necessary to discuss briefly the sources from which they are derived. "Foreign Policy", it has been said, 'is never original. It is determined by a certain order of facts, geographical, historical, and economic'. No state can escape its geography or history. Earlier we have referred to the impact of geography on India's foreign policy. On March 17, 1950, Nehru told the Parliament: 'We are in a strategic part of Asia, set in the centre of the Indian Ocean, with intimate past and present connections with Western Asia, South-East Asia and Far Eastern Asia. Even if we could, we would not want to ignore this fact. Now that the greater part of Asia is free from the colonialism of the past, our minds inevitably go back to the old days and old relationships with other countries in Western, Eastern and South-Eastern Asia'. The peninsular as well as the continental position of India, on the one hand, brings India closer to the maritime powers, such as Britain, and, on the other, leads to a special relationship with powers such as China and the U.S.S.R. Geographical factors also dictate a policy of neutrality or alliance with all the border states from which India might be attacked—Persia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indo-China, Siam, the Netherlands, and East Indies. Access to the oil from some of these countries, the welfare of Indians living there, and safety of sea and air routes in the Indian Ocean on which the security and commerce of India depends—these are other basic interests dictated by Geography.

(ii) *History* Historical traditions play a vital role in the making of a foreign policy. The historical relations between India and Britain, for instance, cannot be easily wiped out. These relations crystallize in the form of economic and emotional bonds. The common political tradition of parliamentary government and the bond provided by the English language, ultimately tie down the two countries. We have already referred to other bonds that link India with the Commonwealth (Part II, Chapter 9). It may

here be added that India sends her Chiefs of Staff to London occassionally to participate in joint exercises so that they could gain wider knowledge of modern methods of warfare. Whenever there is a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference there is, side by side, a conference relating to defence matters. India (as well as Ceylon) does not attend such conferences, for, "we have nothing to do with the defence, peace or war approach of the U.K. or Commonwealth countries". India's participation in the joint naval exercises is more dictated by necessity than by choice. Obviously, the army and the navy must have some kind of practice to keep in trim. This could be done by having mock manoluvres. But as Nehru said : Our Navy is not big enough to be divided into two forces for having a mock battle. Maybe the British navy, the Soviet navy, could do all that internally. We cannot; so we take advantage of these naval manoeuvres and participate in these mock battles". The British Government's decision to quit India touched the heart and stirred the emotions of Indians and inspite of sharp differences, friendly relations between India and Britain persist. The historical love of the metaphysics colours the thinking of Indians on foreign affairs. (The relations between China and India can partly be explained in terms of history. As Panikkar has put it, "the thousand years of contact between India and China constitute one of the central facts of Asian history Undoubtedly, what gave a spiritual and cultural unity to non-Islamic Asia was this prolonged contact between India and China. It is, in spite of nearly a thousand years of interruption, still a major strand in Asian history" (*India and China*, p. X). The fact that Burma was at one time part of India partially affects our attitude towards that country just as the historic ties between India, on the one hand, and Ceylon, Indonesia, Nepal and Afghanistan, on the other, have something to do with our relations with those countries. The fact that India has no tradition of wars is also an important element. The whole force of history can be seen by any student of Indo-Pak relations and one need not really be surprised at the contrast between the prevailing tensions and the popular acclaim to the cricketeers. Finally, the anti-colonialism of India is also rooted in history.

(iii) *Ideological sources*. There are what can be called as the intellectual or ideological sources of our foreign policy. One view is that this can be related to the 'Mahabharat' and 'Arthshastra'. According to Panikkar, for instance, Mahabharat is "that encyclopaedia of Indian thinking to which, in spite of all our familiarity with Western literature and thought, we still return for the solution of our problems". Arthshastra of Kautilya, according to him, "enables Hindu thinkers to evolve a purely secular theory of state of which the sole basis is power". In the

context of foreign policy, at any rate, it is difficult to see how Indian foreign policy actually reflects the kind of state-craft that the Mahabharat and Arthshastra recommend. As one critic has recently written: "Not only are policies rarely, if ever, explained and analysed by the government in the context of a national interest or of strategic thinking generally, but certain policies, notably those toward Russia and China, actually deviate from Kautilya's precepts of political geometry, in that they seem to disregard the presence of aggressive tendencies among strong neighbouring states." One may not entirely agree with this view but it has a grain of truth. Nor can it be suggested that Buddhism is or can be a source of India's foreign policy, or any foreign policy for that matter. Non-violence, while a commendable rule of individual conduct, can hardly serve as a principle of international relations. It is doubtful if the Indian revolution was really non-violent. Nehru, the main architect of India's foreign policy, at any rate, has no doctrinaire attachment to the concept of non-violence. Karunakar Gupta has pointedly written: "A bare statement of the main principles of Indian foreign policy may lead us to think that Indian statesmen are basing their policies on idealistic principles of truth and non-violence laid down by Mahatma Gandhi. We find, however, that the main tenets of Indian foreign policy as laid down by the Congress party, namely (i) opposition to imperialism, (ii) avoidance of foreign entanglements, and (iii) peace—were ideas drawn from the founding fathers of the American Republic, who were not mere idealists but conversed in 'real politics'. It is doubtful how far Gandhian principles of truth and non-violence have influenced the policy of the Indian Government either in internal or external affairs. Soon after his death, new India took totalitarian measures to fight communist and communal opposition. In dealing with Kashmir and Hyderabad armed violence was resorted to, as also recently in the internecine conflict in Nepal. The character of the budget which provides more than 50% in military expenditure reveals the stress on police measures in state policy in India today. Under these circumstances, any talk about the Gandhian principle of non-violence exercising a decisive influence on the foreign policy of India, cannot be accepted at its face value" (*Indian Foreign Policy*, pp. 13-14).

Ideologically speaking, in fact Marxism, more than Gandhism, seems to have affected India's foreign policy and thinking. India's view of capitalist democracy, private enterprise and colonialism is all moulded by Marxism. (Our attitude towards the cold war and partial preference for the socialist camp is an evidence of Marxist influence. The West we condemn outright, to the U.S.S.R. and China, however, we are inclined to give the benefit of doubt. Nehru, it is a matter of common knowledge, has

been deeply impressed by Laski's ideas. And since these ideas were a blending of liberalism, constitutionalism and Marxism, Nehru has also sought to reconcile these. In what quantity the ingredients have been taken up, it is difficult to define. But both Laski and Nehru have looked upon the U.S.S.R. with admiration; both have been impressed by the tremendous socio-economic achievements of that country, but both have shunned the totalitarian methods of the Soviet regime. Nehru, therefore, remains an admirer of the Soviet system minus its ruthlessness. The result is an attitude of neutrality in foreign affairs. While he approves the communist objectives, he condemns the Communist Party of India. At times he has even characterized communism as a reactionary force. But he assumes that China and Russia are more peace-loving than the Western countries and that capitalist countries tend to be imperialistic. He does not regard communism as a threat to India and his whole stress is on raising up the standards of living of the masses in India. This, together with his deep hostility to Western Imperialism and his Asianism, finds a rational vindication in Marxism.

(iv) *Economic factors.* There are economic forces which have greatly influenced the making of Indian foreign policy. In the economic sphere, a number of factors are relevant. First is the comparative backwardness of the country. Our economy is yet to be stabilized and our agriculture and industries are yet to develop. On the one hand, we are in need of foreign aid to assist us in building up our economy, and, on the other, we are extremely sensitive about political strings that may be attached to them. We, therefore, welcome aid from all quarters—U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A., Germany and Japan. This, again, presupposes non-alignment. Then, there is the danger of war and devastation. India, therefore, is always in favour of peaceful approach. She must, therefore, build up her strength *in peace*, and under the shelter of neutrality. (Neutralism, in this sense, is not based on mere sentiments; it is organically related to our national interest. It is not merely a creation of Nehru himself; it is the dominant mood of the Indian people.) Secondly, India has to develop rapidly without much loss of time; hence the ambitious targets in the 5-year plans. In order to develop quickly, we cannot have a blind devotion to the idea of free enterprise. Indian economic policies, therefore, remain a puzzle to the outsiders and sometimes they appear to be communistic to the United States and capitalistic to the U.S.S.R. On the one hand, India has granted handsome pensions to the Princes and generous compensations to the Zamindars, removed controls, reduced taxes on higher personal income and business profits, and has given inducements to the foreign investors. On the other hand, the public sector has been

expanded, death duties have been levied, and state control has been tightened and while democratic forms and methods are retained, unregulated private enterprise has been avoided. Thirdly, India's foreign trade is predominantly with the Commonwealth and the U S A Foreign capital is still predominantly British and foreign banks, mainly British, play a dominating part in financing India's trade "Before the Trade Pact of 1953, in spite of an offer of certain types of capital goods by Russia, the Government of India did not proceed further than making informal enquiries" Similarly for technical skill India ignored the U S S R. until 1954 Economically, India is largely tied up with the West, although in recent years economic relations with the U S S R are also developing These factors have created complications in foreign policy India has not tried to uproot the old trade contacts with the West and at the same time has developed new trade connections also This sometimes gives the impression that we are emphasising one way or the other How can a country which economically is closely dependent on the West can pursue a really independent policy is a question which constantly has to be kept in mind in appreciating India's foreign policy India's association with the Commonwealth partly and with the Colombo Plan wholly can be explained by economic considerations

(v) *Personal and Political Factors* Another source of India's foreign policy can be said to be personal Thus it is suggested that "the principal source of Indian thinking on the subject of foreign affairs is the complex biography of the Prime Minister" There is the famous observation of D F Karaka that "Our attitude to the powers of the West has been conditioned by the personal complexes of Pandit Nehru" and, that "the translation of these complexes into action has become our foreign policy," (*Nehru, the Lotus Eater from Kashmir*, p 20) One may not go as far as that. It is, of course, true that Nehru's influence is the most dominant. The highly emotional content of our foreign policy as well as the agitational approach to international relations can be appreciated in the context of "the omnipotent influence of the Prime Minister, and the immense popular support that is given to his enunciations on this subject" The fact that Nehru is the Prime Minister as well as the Foreign Minister has lent unusual authority to him personally His initiative generally finds approval in the Cabinet except in special cases His enormous popularity with the people and his stature in the Party as well as in the country naturally enables him to count on the support of the people. But even such a popular hero (if not a dictator) as Nehru has to reckon with some of his colleagues, the senior officials of the Ministry and diplomats, the Parliament and the Press Referring to the influence exercised by Ministers, J. C. Kundra has written "It cannot be said that Prime Minister Nehru makes our policy

towards Pakistan all by himself. First Sardar Patel and now Pandit Pant are known to be exercising a significant influence on the policy towards Pakistan. In specific disputes like the Canal Waters Dispute, it is likely that the Minister of Irrigation plays a role in the formulation of that policy. Sardar Patel is believed to have persuaded Nehru to take a tough line with China in the beginning of the Tibet dispute. Later that policy was reversed because of Chinese intractability over the matter. Similarly Shri Krishna Menon is known to be a trusted adviser of the Prime Minister in foreign policy matters While it would be true to say that Prime Minister Nehru by and large makes our foreign policy, it cannot be assumed that the Cabinet remains always passive" (*Parliamentary Studies*, New Delhi, Vol 2, No. 4 Sept. 1958, p. 21). While Sri K. M. Munshi was the Food Minister of India, he was reported to be reluctant to import food grains from the U.S.S.R. The senior officials and diplomats also exert their influence, through their memoranda, notes and advice and "it is a close guess that in the beginning stages of India's foreign policy, the foreign ministry officials introduced a certain pro-Western bias . . ." In the establishment of cordial relations with Peking, K. M. Panikkar has certainly played a dominant role. To a lesser extent Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan brought about a greater understanding between Delhi and Moscow than his predecessors. The influence of the External Affairs Ministry on foreign policy is considerable in this country as elsewhere. The Ministry is headed by the Foreign Minister (also the Prime Minister) who holds the portfolio of External Affairs and is assisted by a Deputy Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries. The President cannot be said to be an active force in India's foreign policy. His visits to neighbouring countries are mere goodwill visits. The Ministry consists of a Secretariat and four subordinate offices and has 85 sections grouped into 11 Divisions. The subordinate offices deal with emigration, affairs of the North-East Frontier, Naga Hills—Tuen Sang Area, and the Assam Rifles intended for helping peaceful administration of the North-East Frontier Agency and other Tribal Areas. The 11 Divisions are: American, Western, Eastern, Southern, African, Pakistan, Protocol, Administration, External Publicity, Foreign Service Inspectorate and abducted persons, and Historical. The Central Haj Committee is the only Advisory Body functioning in the Ministry. The Ministry brings out three regular publications and a number of casual publications, besides confidential notes and impressions.

The role of the Parliament has been less tangible. There is an informal Consultative Committee of Parliament on foreign affairs to which members of all parties and groups are invited and which meets under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

But its influence is not considerable. The domination of the Congress Party and the subservient character of the Parliament is partly responsible for this. Again, most of the foreign policy has received national approval and all parties agree on the basic principles. Hot debates on foreign policy are rare. The weakness of the opposition parties is also a relevant factor. After the death of Dr S P Mookerji there is no forceful voice against Nehru's foreign policy and the criticisms offered by leaders like Acharya J B Kripalani and Pandit H N Kunzru do not go very far. But even a subservient Parliament like ours can at times rise up to the occasion as it did on the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The concession of a piece of territory made by Nehru to Noon in September 1958 without the prior approval of the Parliament has also caused some stir. Earlier in 1950-51, an appeal made by about 80 members of the Union Parliament to the U S Congress for food aid to this country raised interesting questions.

The role of the people in the formulation of India's foreign policy has also not been very considerable. The people are, by and large, inert and ignorant and public opinion on matters of foreign policy does not go very far. In the elections matters of foreign policy have rarely been touched. The intellectuals and university teachers have not been able to influence in any tangible manner India's foreign policy. There are hardly any great research organizations in this country which could have exerted some influence. Organizations like the Indian Council of World Affairs are still immature. The tradition of consulting such persons as have visited foreign countries and have acquired some knowledge of them has not yet developed. The Government has shown no inclination to consult elements outside the official circles.

The Press has, however, played an indirect role in the shaping of our foreign policy both by the publication of news and by the editorial comments. The Indian Press is largely controlled by business and the editorial notes therefore are largely pro-West. With regard to the news, "the Indian Press has pursued a policy which secures that the Western point of view be presented more fully to Indian readers than that of the Soviet. This is largely due to the fact that the Indian Press depends for its foreign news on agencies which are Western, i.e. Reuters, Agence France-Presse and the United Press of America. "An analysis of the foreign news content of a representative section of Indian papers, carried out by the International Press Institute in 1952, showed that the Indian papers generally devoted 12.5% to 33.3% of their editorial space to foreign news of which as much as 80% was from West European countries and the United States, and the United Nations. The news from Reuters, although 'y independent and objective, is heavily weighted in favour

of the British point of view". Thus the news of the communist countries is partially reported and is sometimes distorted. Even Asian countries are not covered adequately and an average Indian does not very much get from the Press about the neighbouring countries. The Press Trust of India, the Indian news agency owned by Indian papers, has recently begun to develop an Asian service of its own. The impact of pressure groups on foreign policy is on the whole insignificant at present. The trade unions are not well knit and are too loose to be an influence. The Chambers of Commerce, of course, influence trade and commercial policies and may thus be said to affect the course of foreign policy also. The whole background of foreign office officials and diplomats is influenced by business interests. While the church has influenced the foreign policy of the United States, Britain and some other countries, in India organized religion has not yet intruded in the realm of foreign politics. Pressure groups may emerge here in course of time, and may become a powerful influence on our international relations.

We may thus conclude that the fabric of Indian foreign policy is largely the handiwork of Nehru in consultation with some of his colleagues in the Cabinet and the advisers in the External Affairs Ministry. But it is obviously "incorrect" to describe it as "Nehru policy". Refuting the theory of "Nehru policy", Nehru told the Parliament: "It is completely incorrect to call India's foreign policy as Nehru policy. It is incorrect because what I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances in India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind in the struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the case today. . . . Personally I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in charge of foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power, they could not deviate very much from this policy. Some emphasis might have been greater here or there". On this showing, the present foreign policy of India, in essentials, may be said to represent every circumstance that goes towards making the thought of India on this subject

(vi) *Indian Diplomatic Service.* The influence of the diplomatic personnel is very limited. There was no Foreign Service (F.S.) in India in 1947. We had a Foreign and Political Department "concerned partly with the conduct of relations with Princely states . . . and the administration of special areas like the N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, etc. and partly with the execution of British policies in certain neighbouring countries or regions like the Persian Gulf, Tibet, Nepal and Afghanistan". Since most of them were British officers, they

left the country after independence. The Government, therefore, utilised the services of Indian Civil Service Officers "to constitute a minimum nucleus for the Foreign Service". In 1947 about 80 officers were recruited. In 1948 the Union Public Service Commission recruited a few officers through a competitive examination and since then a regular Indian Foreign Service has been growing. Some people with distinguished service in public life have been taken to man our diplomatic missions abroad. Since the FS is still in its infancy, we have no great diplomatic talent or tradition. *It is only when the FS is fully developed that a real assessment of the influence of diplomatic service on our foreign policy can really be made.*

(vii) *National Interest* An Englishman said about his country that "England has neither permanent friends, nor permanent enemies, she has only permanent interests". This is true of India also. To forget this is to get confused in the so-called contradictions in India's foreign policy. Even Dr John Matthai is reported to have confessed "If we have a policy, it is beyond layman's comprehension. North Korea as an aggressor must be stopped, China as an aggressor must be appeased." Indian foreign policy is said to be "a mirror of competing purposes and pressures generated in a semi-colonial economy with a class as well as a caste hierarchy at the same time conditioned by the fixed facts of geography as well as the fluid facts of power relationship in the changing context of the world balance of power". It is considered to be one of the national interest of India to pursue a policy of peace and co-existence. War is taken to be a graver threat than communism, which is merely a local nuisance and can be easily suppressed locally. India's membership of the Commonwealth, recruitment of and transit facilities to Gurkha mercenaries for the British army and Indo-American Technical Co-operation Agreements can all be understood in the context of national interest. Through the Commonwealth India has greater chances of making her influence felt and affecting world policies. Membership does not involve any contractual obligation. Then, there are strategic and economic considerations. Lawrence K. Rosinger emphasised the dependence of India on Britain "in significant ways". "The Indian army, navy and air force", he added, "were originally products of British training, and in the latter two services British officers still hold key positions. Britain is also the leading country in India's foreign trade, Britain's war debt to India (£12,00 million in 1945) tends to tie India to the sterling bloc, and British shipping, banking, marine insurance, and investment are powerful factors in Indian commercial life. There is also considerable emphasis in India on the idea that the country relies on Britain for naval defence" (*India and the United States*, p. 115). The

British Empire possesses developed bases in the Indian Ocean without which the continental defence of India would scarcely be possible. Again, an average Indian tends to view Britain more favourably than the United States or the U.S.S.R. English language is still dominant and is the only "vehicle through which the knowledge and research of the rest of the world can impress itself on the people of India". There exists "a fund of silent good will" between the two countries. It is the British practice that influences the commercial and industrial life of this country. Indian membership of the Sterling Area also ensures that funds can be transferred freely between India and other Sterling countries. The Indian system of administration, law, education, medicine, police and other professional services is largely based on the British pattern and this produces a broad community of outlook. Thus, even though ideologically India and Britain may seem to be apart (India is anti-imperialist and anti-colonial), it is not sentiment but national interest that dictated India's choice to join the Commonwealth.

It may sound inconsistent on the part of India to oppose colonialism and to have allowed facilities for the transit of Gurkha troops to Malaya for the suppression of national revolt in that country. But here also "the Indian Government was guided by their own conception of National Interest rather than any high ideal or pressure from outside". We have already dealt with the position of Nepal in an earlier chapter. It is a sort of buffer between India and China and is virtually a satellite of India. It is "a territory where feudalism reigns rampant, where the only item of export is cheap manpower recruited from the vast mass of pauperised peasantry. The immediate result of the stoppage of transit facilities to the Gurkha mercenaries would be the complete collapse of Nepalese economy, leading to a politically explosive situation with dangerous implications to India's security. It was neither concern for the poor people of Nepal nor pressure for Britain, which has been the main determinant of policy in this matter".

Similarly on other issues involving colonialism, the policy of India has been fairly moderate, for, moderation was dictated by National Interest. The final resolution of the Delhi Conference on Indonesia was "moderate and workable" (see Rosinger, *India and the United States*, Chap. 6). On the Suez crisis in 1956, while Nehru vehemently condemned the Anglo-French action, his counsel to Cairo was moderation. The clearing of the Suez was a matter of vital importance to India and the Suez crisis led to serious consequences for our 5-year plan. Indeed, Nehru has repeatedly told the people that while India was all out in favour of colonial liberation, she could not afford to fight other people's battles. In the light of the many factors and sources of India's foreign

policy that have been discussed above, it is inevitable that India could not pursue any one line in foreign affairs for some of these factors tended to pull her in one direction and some in another. As Nehru stated on March 22 1949 "Any attempt on our part, i.e., the Government of the day here, to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our own country which would not be helpful to us or any other country". All these diverse factors, therefore, prompted India to avoid definite commitments or rigid alignments, and induced her to pursue a policy of neutrality and non-alignment based on National Interest. Shortly, we will examine the ingredients and application of this policy in various parts of the world.

(iii) *Asian Resurgence* An important source of India's foreign policy is the consciousness that the West had been unjust to Asia and that Asia now is in revolt. The insistence, therefore, is that Asia, and not the West, should now count in the settlement of Asian problems. This partially explains our attitude towards colonies in Asia, towards communism, and towards the cold war. Nationalism is the dominant mood and much more than Communism, Colonialism is resented. As Robert Trumbull wrote in 1952 "When the Asians hand the white race, a licking as the Chinese-North Korean Army did to the U.N. forces in Korea, a thrill runs through other Asians that they cannot keep entirely secret".

Our relations with Japan and China particularly with China reflect this sentiment of Asian-ness, for "having thrown off Western bondage themselves after experiencing the colour bar and other sorts of humiliating treatment at the hands of white rulers, Indians naturally feel a strong bond with other peoples who are trying to do exactly the same thing".

POLICY OF NON ALIGNMENT

The foreign policy of India has been repeatedly called a policy of "neutrality", "dynamic neutrality", "non-involvement" and "non-alignment". What do these terms imply? First, the policy of non-alignment means a refusal to accept definite commitments or to join a system of pacts or alliances committing our armed forces one side or the other. The country is poor and underdeveloped and what we need is breathing time. As Nehru stated on March 17, 1950 "About 150 years ago, the Western World was breaking up on account of all kinds of imperial and revolutionary wars. Having achieved independence by breaking off from the British Empire, the United States was naturally affected by these upheavals, nevertheless it avoided being involved in the chaotic situation of Europe—although doubtless it had its particular sympathies—because that was the natural thing for a nation in

that state of affairs to do.....for a country that has newly attained freedom.....this is the natural policy to pursue". To join an alliance would mean a mixing up with other country's problems at the cost of our own.

Secondly, it means a policy of peace—a policy of "talking in a quiet voice and not shouting" or a policy of "converting strong feeling into strength and not into bad temper": It is a policy based not on the inevitability of war but based on the conviction that war can be avoided. "If you are mentally convinced that war is bound to come", Nehru told the Parliament, "you naturally accustom yourself to the idea and, perhaps unconsciously, even work for it". On the other hand, if you want to work for the avoidance of war, you must believe that it can be avoided". Entangling alliances mean postures of war which must be avoided.

Thirdly, it means an independent policy, conditioned and controlled by India's own strength. On the one hand, this policy reflects our own capacity which is not very large. "If a policy does not take the capacity of the country into account it cannot be followed up. If a country talks bigger than it is, it brings little credit to itself". India, at present, has neither military nor financial strength and this leaves us only a degree of moral strength. This is reflected in the policy of non-alignment. On the other hand, it also implies that we are not an automaton or a puppet in the hands of other powers. We are not pushed or harried about by others and made to participate in bitter conflicts. To become part of a power bloc means giving up the right to have a policy of our own and following that of somebody else.

Fourthly, this independence of action enables us to judge each issue on its own merit. India is not a blind camp follower of any big power. Non-alignment implies a position to judge issues without prejudice or bias. This enhances the chances of effective mediation in bitter conflicts and, thereby, brightens the prospects of world peace. The world situation also favours this. "The twin events of the Communist Revolution in China and the first atomic explosion in Russia that took place in 1949, together with Communist China's victory over U.N. armies under General Mac Arthur in the fall of 1950, brought about a geo-political shift in the world balance of power. The two big power blocs are just evenly balanced today and this has given India, associated with other Asian countries, an opportunity to make her weight felt in the balance in favour of peace". In the Korean war and the tangle of Indo-China, the role of peace-maker that India played was vital. It was a policy to prevent the disaster of a war, to avoid it and even if it comes, to retain a certain position of being able to stop it even after it had started. Thus the secret of

this policy is that India is neither permanently with the West nor with the East. On disarmament, racial discrimination, colonialism, Peking's membership of the U.N., regional security pacts and the Japanese peace treaty India has been pro-Soviet. But on many major issues India has been clearly pro-West. India, for instance, condemned the aggression of North Korea, even though material essential to the refutation of the Communist charge that the North Koreans were defending themselves against aggression is still not available." The pro-West move, however, did not prevent India from opposing the U.S. military adventurism in Korea and in January 1951, Nehru refused to call China an aggressor. But in May 1951, consideration of the Indian Food Aid Bill might have induced India to abstain from voting on the issue of imposing an embargo on strategic goods to China. Again in September 1951 Mrs. V. L. Pandit pointedly declared to the Americans: "In the recent sessions of the General Assembly, we voted as you did 38 times out of 51, abstaining 11 times and differing from you only twice." Along with the condemnation of the Anglo-French action in Suez, India also denounced the Soviet intervention in Hungary and the execution of Imre Nagy. We have trade relations with both sides in the Cold War.

Fifthly, the policy of non-involvement does not imply pacifism or isolationism, for every country has to reckon with the possibilities of war and no country can function in a vacuum. Nehru has been repeatedly saying that he is not a pacifist, but that India need not fear the invasion of any great Power—the U.S.S.R. or the United States. "We", Nehru told Tibor Mende, "don't come in the way of either group. It is a question of geography. There is no particularly strong incentive for either of them to attack India. Secondly, if they attack India they would have a very hot welcome. They would rather add to their difficulties. We can make it very hot for anyone who does that. So India is safe. One thing Gandhi has taught us was not to be afraid. Now, what you said about a guarantee. In practice there can be now no guarantee of the old type unless it is a guarantee not to have war. A guarantee which says that there will be a war, except in your country, has no meaning today when war is world-wide. Therefore, the guarantee must be to avoid war, and going a step further to avoid interference with any country. That is why we talk so much in India and in some other countries about the Panch Shila" (*Conversations with Mr. Nehru* pp. 80-81).

X As for isolationism, India has established diplomatic relations with almost all the independent states. She has cultural and commercial relations on a very wide scale. She is one of the most enthusiastic members of the U.N. and ancillary organiza-

ons. She is part of the Commonwealth of Nations. She is one of the 5 Colombo Powers and plays a major role in the Afro-Asian organizations. The solid basis of all this is not isolationism but co-operation. The policy of non-alignment, therefore, means co-operation and consultations with others, but at the same time following an independent course.

Sixthly, this policy is not based on a desire to build up "a third force" or, "a third bloc". There is nothing like a Nehru Doctrine or India's Monroe Doctrine with us. To build up a power bloc or a military bloc is considered to be both undesirable and impracticable. Any effort to do that would frighten other Asian countries which do not want to be satellites of India. Again, the biggest countries today are small compared with the two giants and it would be absurd for a number of countries in Asia to come together and call themselves a third force. The aim of India's policy, therefore, is to build up "a third area"—an area which does not want war, works for peace in a positive way and believes in co-operation. Thus India's policy of non-alignment is directed to expand the area of peace, to ease world tensions, to achieve disarmament, to pool the resources of the world for the uplift of the downtrodden and to achieve racial equality and liberation of colonies.

Seventhly, it is not a policy of neutrality in the accepted sense of the term. It does not mean sitting on the fence or a refusal to examine or even to take sides. But it does mean that there can be more than two ways of action in the world today. If one takes the position that there can be only two ways—the Soviet way and the American way—one has certainly to join the cold war or join a military bloc, or at least "a mental military bloc". The policy of India repudiates this approach. It does not mean passive indifference or a sort of unresponsiveness to one's environment. It does not mean suspended judgment or suspended animation. It is not a cloak for partiality towards the Communist countries or the West. It is not a posture of a priest lecturing to a sinful audience. This neutrality is, thus, not negative or static or didactic. It is rather positive and dynamic. It impels activity; it does not spell inertia. It only means a refusal to commit in advance. This is nothing new. The United States and Britain have followed this policy for long. In India this policy is not merely a creation of Nehru but it "flows from our historical as well as our recent past". In short, it is a policy intended to help those forces that we consider right and to disapprove of the things that we do not like, fundamentally keeping away from other countries and other alignments of powers which normally lead to major conflicts. As Nehru told an American audience "Where freedom is menaced, justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral";

Finally, we have referred above to the Panch Shila. What does it imply? and how does it express the strength and limitations of our foreign policy?

THE PANCH SHILA

The phrase Panch Shila reminds one of Pansul of Buddhist literature, of the six paramitas and of Asoka's Edicts. Perhaps Panch represents the symbolism of numbers, as Dr Soekarno, addressing the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Independence on June 1, 1945, referred to the 5 rites of Islam, five fingers, and the 5 Pandavas. The five principles of international conduct were first envisaged and formulated on April 29, 1954 in the Sino Indian Agreement on Tibet as

- (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- (2) Non aggression,
- (3) Non-interference in each others internal affairs,
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit, and
- (5) Peaceful co-existence.

It was on the 23rd of September, 1954 at a banquet given in honour of the Prime Minister of Indonesia, that Mr Nehru introduced the term "Panch Shila" into the domain of international relations to mean the 5 principles formulated in the Sino-Indian Agreement mentioned above. On October 17, 1954, the President of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Dr Ho Chi Minh, announced his adherence to it. On 22nd December, 1954 Yugoslavia was the first European country to accept the Panch Shila. By April 2, 1955 it was officially stated in the Indian Lok Sabha that Burma, China, Laos, Nepal, Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Cambodia had accepted the Panch Shila. On April 10, 1955 the non-official Asian Conference held at New Delhi and attended by 200 delegates from 14 countries also resolved to pledge support to the Panch Shila as the sure foundation of mutual understanding. Later, Afghanistan, Syria, the Panchan Lama, Laos, and Saudi Arabia also commended these principles as the basis of international relations. The Bandung Conference held in April, 1955 and attended by 29 countries of Asia and Africa, further elaborated and reinforced these principles. In many cases, references to the United Nations were made. Two significant ideas were added—respect for fundamental human rights and settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means. On October 5, 1955, Australia, on June 4, 1955 Austria, on June 27, Poland, and on September 27 the U.S. Ambassador to India, spoke in favour of and adhering to the principles of Panch Shila.

What are the basic ideas underlying the Panch Shila? In the first place, nations of the world are to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This implies that there would be no effort to impose political or military conditions on less powerful and less fortunate countries. It underlines the basic assumption that neither territorial nor economic imperialism shall be upheld by any nation. Extra-territorial jurisdiction, forced economic privileges, establishment of puppet regimes in weaker states, retention of military bases on foreign soil, subversive activities, subsidies from foreign states to political factions in a politically unstable state—all of them constitute violation of sovereignty of a state and involve interference in its internal affairs. Interference can be economic, political or ideological and in every case it sets in motion a chain reaction of fear, suspicion and tension. Non-interference, therefore, narrows down the war area and widens that of peace. It lessens the prospects of aggression. A pledge of non-aggression strengthens the climate of peace. It removes the posture of war. One may have a pistol and the bullets in one's pocket but a loaded pistol with one's fingers on the trigger make an important difference. A slight pressure will set on the fire and, after that, the deluge.

Then, again, the Panch Shila lays stress on equality and mutual benefit. All states big and small are equal and can conduct peacefully only on the basis of equality and each other's benefit. Each nation has much to learn from the other and the collective wisdom and knowledge of the modern world need not leave any one underfed, unclothed and unhoused. By pooling our resources and knowledge we can leap out from the realm of necessity to the realm of plenty. There is no scope or need of using big stick. Food scarcity in an area need not evoke economic pressures by the richer countries; if any thing, it should stimulate the instinct of mutual help.

Finally, there is the all important principle of peaceful co-existence. There exist, at present, different social and political systems in various parts of the world and anybody's conviction that his own system is far superior to that of the other need not lead him to wage a war in which both would be destroyed. The competition may well be peaceful provided that both accept the fundamental assumption that neither would be forcibly made to submit to the other. The application of this principle, therefore, demands constant and active endeavour to solve all important international problems, especially those which represent the main sources of tensions in the world, by means of peace-loving co-operation of all states to their mutual advantage without regard for differences in their political and social systems. This peaceful co-operation evidently demands non-aggression, non-interference in internal matters and equality. This approach would, therefore,

decrease tensions and would pave the foundations of a firm and lasting peace. This would also enrich the total world culture. Each social and political system represents an approach to progress somewhat different outlooks on the objectives aimed at, but broadly the objectives are the same—peace, progress, and plenty. Truth, it is a mere platitude, is not confined to one country or one people, it has far too many aspects for any one to presume that he knows it all, and each country and each people, if they are true to themselves, have to find out their path themselves, through trial and errors, through suffering and experience. Only then do they grow. If they merely copy others or attempt to copy, the result is likely to be stultified growth or no growth at all. Even though the copy may be faithful, perfectly good, it is something imposed upon them or something undertaken by them without that normal growth of the mind which really makes it an organic part of themselves. Peaceful co-existence is, therefore, a correct, natural and expedient approach to survival, prosperity and enrichment of culture.

But one may well say that all this is vague, idealistic, unrealistic and unworkable, "loud sounding nothing"—good phrases which solve no problems and are intended to delude the simple and the innocent. Recent events indeed seem to confirm these criticisms and Nehru himself has expressed his scepticism. The Panch Shila can be easily compared to the famous Holy Alliance of 1815 or the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which sought to outlaw war, to exorcise war by words. The "spell did not work when the devil (Axis Powers) challenged". The Panch Shila is at best a declaration setting forth certain principles, a moral declaration based on the sanctity of independence and territorial integrity of states. It does not constitute a contractual obligation. It does imply support to the ideal of pacific settlement of international disputes. But it sets no machinery either for its enforcement or even for its interpretation. What is "aggression" and what constitutes "mutual benefit" is something which can be interpreted according to one's interest. One can respect and violate a country's sovereignty at the same time. The U.K., for instance, respected the sovereignty of Egypt and yet insisted on the internationalization of the Suez Canal and used military force to achieve the goals of its policy.

Again, the Panch Shila has no sanction to back it, except the good faith of the powers concerned—the faith that the other party would keep the word. It is true that once the head of a state has announced his country's support and acceptance of it, it may be embarrassing for him to break the pledge. Mr. Nehru expressed this feeling when he initiated the foreign affairs debate in the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1954. Talking about the five principles and their usefulness he said, "people have taken

exception to it. On what grounds? Oh they say 'How can you believe that this will be acted upon'? Of course, if you cannot believe in anything there is no fun in talking or writing and the only thing left is to live in isolation or to fight and subdue the other party—there is no other way. It is not a question of believing the other party's word; it is a question of creating conditions where the other party cannot break its word. May be the other party breaks its word and it is likely to find itself in a much worse quandry.....If those five principles are repeated by the various countries of the world in their relations to each other, they do create an atmosphere".

But, then, what is the strength of this "atmosphere". The Pact of 1928 which renounced war as an instrument of national policy was almost a universal pact of non-aggression which no country could refuse to sign but which remained "an international kiss, purely Platonic and promising nothing for future". The Panch Shila is likewise absolutely unexceptionable and nobody can oppose or dislike it and refuse to proclaim his support and adherence to it. But such declarations obviously do not bind any state to peaceful course. It is difficult to understand if they depart in any considerable measure from the principles of the U.N. Charter. True, the Panch Shila brings in China which is not yet properly represented at the United Nations, and thereby seeks to bridge the gulf between the New China and the rest of the world. Its principles have been approved and accepted by countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and America. It may, therefore, be said to represent an effort to establish a universal declaration of those principles which are enshrined in the Charter of the U.N. which has so far denied the right of representation to one-fourth of human population. As long as the concept of sovereignty remains the basic principle of state system, all such declarations will remain instruments of policy—what Nehru has called "mere apparatus of diplomacy". They only reflect the aspirations for peace; they do not and cannot constitute an insurance for peace. They are incapable of guaranteeing peace, for, there are certain real problems of international politics which cannot possibly be solved by peaceful negotiation. The sword, in such cases is the Last Argument of Kings. Some of the states that had accepted the doctrine of Panch Shila have not adhered to its spirit. One may not agree with the view of Acharya Kripalani that "this great doctrine was born in sin because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally". But the Sino-Soviet interference with Yugoslavia in 1958 and the execution of Imre Nagy are hardly a fulfilment of the Panch Shila. Finally, the Panch Shila over-simplifies the problem of intervention. To argue that a country should, under

no circumstances, intervene in a civil war may at times become preposterous. For instance when Franco revolted against the Spanish Republic, Nehru and the Congress censured England for not going to the help of the Government established by law.

The principal aims of India's foreign policy may now be listed: (1) Prosperity of the country (2) The establishment of India as a great power (3) Keeping open of all channels of international trade (4) Retention of control over the foreign relations of Nepal (5) The promotion of the strength and solidarity of all Asia—indeed, of the entire non-Western World. (6) Fight against colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination. The emphasis here is on Western imperialism. The West resents this emphasis and charges India for having shut her eyes to "Soviet imperialism or colonialism" (7) Non involvement in power blocs or military alliances and maintenance of India's independence in foreign affairs (8) Integration into India of Portuguese and French India (9) The setting up of independent nationalist regimes in South East Asia and the stabilization of such regimes as in Burma and Indonesia (10) Solicitation of foreign aid from all quarters (11) Securing international support on the Kashmir question and other Indo Pak disputes (12) The protection of Indians abroad.

INDIANS ABROAD

With this last, we may deal here. Roughly there are two categories of Indians abroad, those who are "Indian nationals" residing temporarily and those who are descendants of former emigrants from India, and are now "nationals" of those countries by birth or naturalization. The number of both is about 4,000,000 and they are spread over 81 countries, from 1 in Portugal to about 1,000,000 in Ceylon. Their number in the Commonwealth countries—Malaya, South Africa, Trinidad, British Guiana, Mauritius and Fiji—is about 3,255,000, and in other countries, excluding Burma, about 166,000. In Dutch Guiana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Indonesia there are about 25,000. In the earliest phase the origins of Indian emigration were connected with religion and art. But from the early 19th century, emigration was largely one of unskilled labour and was effected through the indenture system. It has been thus defined by one authority "The abolition of African slavery in the British Empire about 1834 created a labour vacuum in the sugar plantations in certain tropical British colonies, like Natal and the British West Indies. India was tapped to fill it. Unskilled Indian labour was recruited with the consent of the Government of India by organizations set up by

employers abroad. The term of indenture was usually five years, at the end of which the recruits were entitled to reindenture or to repatriation to India or to settlement as citizens in the country of adoption, subject to no discriminations and disabilities because of their Indian origin. Often they were induced to reindenture and settle down, and add to the labour supply. In course of time there grew up a body of Indians who were born in the colonies and gradually the 'colonial born' came to preponderate over the 'home born', due to death and repatriation of the latter and the tapering off of emigration from India". Gradually women also emigrated. In addition to "indenture immigration" there were also free emigrants.

In 1915, the emigration of indentured labour was abolished by India, that of unskilled labour in 1922, and in 1939 even voluntary emigration was controlled. The recipient countries also put restrictions on Indian emigration—some by law and other by administrative order. The British Dominions followed the latter method. Canada adopted the "through voyage in the same ship" formula, Australia, "the language test", and South Africa, "the deeming order". In 1918-21, they condemned the Imperial citizenship theory. Canada, following the U.S.A., also adopted quota restrictions on the immigrants from India. The status of Indians differs from country to country. While they have franchise rights in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, it is different in South Africa. In the British colonies they have the franchise, although in Fiji and Kenya, they vote only for Indians and "their representation in the legislatures is not proportional to their voting strength". We have earlier discussed the position of Indians in Ceylon. We may now deal with the problem of Indians in South Africa.

India and South Africa. The worst treatment is given to Indians in the Union of South Africa where their number is 300,000. They are mostly concentrated in Natal. They are now denied all political rights. The Cape Town Agreement of 1926 under which some Indians were to be repatriated to India and the rest were to be treated fairly, was denounced by South Africa. The policy of apartheid or "residential segregation and economic strangulation as the alternative to assisted emigration from South Africa" was adopted. The Satyagraha offered by Indians failed. And in 1946, India referred the question to the U.N. Assembly as the South African enactments against the Indians were a violation of the U.N. Charter. The matter was also considered by the Assembly in its 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th sessions but various recommendations made by it were not implemented by South Africa. At the 7th session the story was repeated and

the Union held firmly its view that the question of its racial policies was a domestic one and that the Assembly had no jurisdiction in the matter. On January 12, 1952, the Assembly recommended the establishment of a tripartite commission of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa to reach a negotiated settlement. The effort, however, failed. The Eighth General Assembly passed another resolution on December 5, 1952, establishing a 3 man Good Offices Commission (Cuba, Syria and Yugoslavia) in order to study the racial situation in the Union and to offer its good offices and assist in negotiations between the parties concerned. In September 1953 when the Assembly met in the 9th session, the Good Offices Commission reported failure. The Assembly only adopted a resolution sponsored by 17 states which requested the Commission to continue its study and to suggest measures for promoting a peaceful settlement of the problem. In 1954 no further progress could be made. On July 1, 1954 the Indian High Commission in South Africa was closed. In 1955 the Assembly again urged the parties to pursue negotiations. In November 1956, the South African Minister for External Affairs informed the General Assembly that "until the U.N. shows that it is prepared to respect the Charter principle of domestic jurisdiction, the Union of South Africa will in future maintain only a token representation at the meetings of the Assembly and at the Headquarters of the Organization". On January 7, 1957, India and Pakistan reported to the Special Political Committee that South Africa had refused to negotiate with them as the Assembly had requested in its resolution of December 14, 1955. On January 30, 1957, the Assembly approved by a vote of 42 to 0 with 12 abstentions a 6-power resolution regretting that the Union "has not yet agreed to such negotiations", urging it to co-operate, and asking for a report to the General Assembly. On August 8, eight African, Asian and Latin American countries asked the Assembly to include the question of race conflicts in the Union on the agenda of the 12th session.

It may be pointed out that in 1952, the Assembly had set up a 3 man Commission to study the race relations in the Union of South Africa so that the whole problem may be thoroughly investigated in a scientific and rational manner. Moreover the South African intransigence has so far thwarted all efforts for a peaceful settlement.

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

In Part Two we have examined some aspects of India's relations with different countries both in the Commonwealth and outside. Earlier in this volume we have analysed India's relationship with various Afro-Asian nations. In the last chapter we

have examined the complex Indo-Pak relations and have discussed the river dispute, the evacuee property dispute and the Kashmir dispute. It may here be added that almost all aspects of our foreign policy are, one way or the other, affected by Indo-Pak relations. In recent months the frequency of incidents has increased both on the western and eastern borders. The trouble on the western side has been about a dozen small disputed territories and the dacoity incidents. On the eastern side occasionally two groups of peasants have clashed on pieces of land and the result has been firing as in the Khasi hills. Sometimes there has been real aggression by Pakistan, though on a small scale. In the Pakistani Press, there have been continuous headlines about Indian aggression along with "most ghastly cartoons". These pinpricks may not be treated as "preliminary to a war", but they are definitely a reflection of deep-seated tensions between India and Pakistan and, in their turn, they continue to heighten the tensions which we have dealt with in the last chapter. In the following, we will briefly outline India's relations (1) with the West, and (2) with the Communist States, and will indicate the main factors underlying the prestige of India in foreign affairs.

India and the West. In relation to the West, Indian foreign policy has been characterized by a degree of flexibility. Since India did not view international communism as a threat to her, and since the whole basis of the Western bloc is that Soviet Russia and communist China, along with lesser communist countries, had hostile and aggressive intentions towards the non-communist world, a conflict of views between India and the West was inevitable. This conflict expressed itself in India's opposition to defensive pacts sponsored by the West, particularly in the Middle East and South-East Asia. The Rio Pact did not concern India at all and the Brussels Treaty also left her disinterested. The N.A.T.O., however, was a little different, for, the North Atlantic Pact provided for collective protection (by the signatories) of the colonies of the colonial powers parties to the Pact. France and Portugal, both signatories to this Pact, held small colonial territories on India's mainland. On June 21, 1952, Nehru referred to this aspect of the N.A.T.O.: "I do not know if N.A.T.O. affects India; may be very distantly. We are not worried about the Atlantic Pact But geographically it spreads. I have no objection to that But what is more important is the tendency for the Pact to include in its scope the protection of colonial territories of Atlantic Powers". But more vocal was the Indian opposition to the A.N.Z.U.S., to the proposed M.E.D.O., the Baghdad Pact and the S. E. A. T. O. On the question of racial discrimination also the relations with the West have been strained. The Western countries have been indirectly supporting the Union of South Africa in their policy of *apartheid*. With regard to the

development of the backward areas, there has been a feeling that their needs are sacrificed for the sake of the European peoples. The tendency of the West to take Asia for granted and to attempt to settle Asian problems without taking the Asians into account has been under fire. Thus in spite of cultural and economic relations, the community of political ideals, and agreement on basic values, the relations with the West have not been very cordial.

Indo-US Relations Differences between Indian and American foreign policy were hardly noteworthy until the cold war entered its critical phase and became a frightening reality for the world. Between 1947-49, India, however, resented the U.S. attitude on Kashmir, racial discrimination against the Negroes in the United States and the U.S. colonial policies. On all these issues the Indian people had strong feelings. In the economic sphere also, the U.S.A. fell short of Indian expectations. The U.S. capital was not forthcoming for investment in India. The importance of the Indian trade with the U.S.A. has always been far less to the U.S. than to India and this disparity in importance continues. In April 1949, India decided to stay in the Commonwealth and by the middle of the year the Communists had driven out the Kuomintang from the mainland. This was the crowning failure of the U.S.-China policy. In October 1949, Nehru visited the United States, after accepting the U.S. invitation in May 1949, and having declined it in March that year. The net results of the visit were moderate. Nehru at once proved his independence of the U.S. influence by recognizing Peking on December 30, 1949. This, indeed, can be said to be a turning point in the history of Indo-US relations and the clash of views between the two governments became bitter, first on Korea, then on Macarthyism, membership of China to the U.N., the questions of Formosa and Indo-China, the problem of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the U.S. military aid to Pakistan and the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. While for India the question of recognition of Peking was not a question of approving or disapproving the change, but one of recognising a major event in history and dealing with it, the U.S.A. withheld recognition on the ground that Peking was subservient to "the Soviet imperialism" and because of Peking's maltreatment of U.S. citizens and seizure of the military barracks in Peking on January 6, 1950 which housed the U.S. Consular Offices. The Korean War and the Chinese intervention in it hardened the U.S. attitude. While India felt that the danger of war was increasing by keeping the Chinese communist government outside the U.N., the U.S.A. opposed Peking's entry since it would be putting premium on Chinese aggression. On Korea the U.S.A. resented India's policy for many reasons. (a) After joining them in con-

demning the North Korean aggression, India did not follow up its decision by actively participating in military campaign and she only offered a field ambulance unit and 400,000 jute bags. (b) The U.S.A. resented India's mediation efforts in Korea and her attitude of neutrality. (c) Indian opposition to the crossing of the 38th parallel by the U.N. forces in Korea also created bitterness. (d) The Indian opposition to the U.S.-sponsored resolution branding China as aggressor led to misunderstanding. (e) The Indian insistence on seating China in the U.N. as a way out of the Korean muddle was not to the liking of the U.S.A. The Indian policy, however, was that by remaining out of the Korean campaign she would be in a position to mediate and bring about a settlement. It was also argued that Indian forces were built for home defence and not for service in distant theatres of war. India opposed the crossing of 38th parallel because her ambassador in Peking had warned Delhi that this step would at once lead to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. When, therefore, the Chinese actually intervened, India rather than blaming the Chinese for it, blamed the U.S.A. for having precipitated a crisis and created the risk of a general war. In 1952-54 "considerable friction was caused over the question of the composition of the Political Conference on Korea". The U.S. opposition to the inclusion of India along with Syngman Rhee's unrestrained attacks on India, "created some misunderstanding" between Delhi and Washington.

With other issues that divided India and the U.S.A. we have already dealt in Part Two of this work. The U.S. attitude towards the Suez Crisis in 1956 brought India and the U.S. closer than ever and for a time it appeared that the misunderstanding over aid to Pakistan would be gradually got over. The aid to Pakistan had destroyed the fund of good will in creating which Chester Bowles had played such a vital role. The U.S. policy of military alliance with countries that are hostile to us and which day in and day out indulge in war cries against us naturally causes irritation and uneasiness in Indian mind. As M.C. Chagla, India's Ambassador to the U.S. said: "The U.S. is undoing with one hand in India what she is doing with the other. She is pouring millions and billions of dollars into India to help to organise herself industrially; at the same time, by giving arms to countries hostile to us, she is compelling us to spend more and more on our defence and this diverts our resources from being used for the good of our people to building up arms and armaments". The U.S. offer of similar military aid to India does not very much help this country, for, acceptance of this offer would be a complete repudiation of the essentials of our foreign policy. The U.S. promise that their arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India for "aggressive" purposes is hardly reassuring. For one thing, this assurance is

meaning-less in the context of the war-cry in Pakistan. For another, in a war, it has rarely been established as to which partly is the "aggressor". A pistol can be used as freely for offence as for defence and once the trigger is off, the question whether aggression was intended or not becomes merely academic.

All these doubts have marred the Indo-US relations. In 1957, Nehru visited the United States on a good-will tour. But the Eisenhower Doctrine early in 1957 and the US intervention in Lebanon had again created a rift. The implicit US approval of military dictatorship in Pakistan in the fall of 1958 has not dispelled the Indian suspicions. The border incidents and clashes between India and Pakistan throughout 1958, and the war-cry by General Ayub Khan reacted on Indo US relations.

In the economic sphere the relations between the two countries have been much closer. The U.S.A. was solicitous about the success of the democratic experiment in India. During the period 1949-54 India received \$129.5 million from the International Bank, \$186,000,000 as direct aid from the U.S.A., and about \$10,000,000 from private agencies in the U.S.A. In 1951, India also received a loan of \$190,000,000 for the purchase of two million tons of wheat from the U.S.A. Over the first plan period, the total U.S. aid amounted to Rs. 238 crores—or about 4/5th of all foreign assistance received by India over the First Plan period. Of this 55% was in the form of loans. In August 1956, the U.S. Commodity Credit Agreement provided surplus agricultural products to the value of Rs. 137 crores in loans and grants. In 1957-58, the U.S. was approached by India for more economic aid to help the fulfilment of the second five-year plan and the visits of India's Finance Ministers achieved favourable results.

India and the U.S.S.R. The relations of India with the U.S.S.R. are not based on a fixed pattern. At one time there used to be the legendary fear of a Russian invasion through the North Western Frontier. But the first instinctive reaction of Indian leaders to the Bolshevik revolution was one of sympathy. Nehru hailed the Soviet system as the prelude to an era of happiness and prosperity. The ruthless regimentation and the denial of civil liberties, however, dissipated this feeling. The Soviet-Nazi Pact of non-aggression disillusioned the Indian leaders and the Soviet invasion of Poland and Finland repelled them. The split between Germany and the U.S.S.R. came as a big relief and the Indians followed the Soviet resistance to the Nazi forces with admiration. But the Soviet silence on the question of Indian independence was resented. When India was free, the Government, therefore, had an open mind towards the U.S.S.R.

In 1946-47, India and the U.S.S.R. agreed on many issues—racial discrimination, colonialism, disarmament, atom bomb, and the veto, so that on January 18, 1947 J. F. Dulles went to the extent of saying that “in India Soviet communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu government”. But this phase was short-lived and on the issues of Greece, Korea and the Interim Committee, the U.S.S.R. and India ran apart. Meanwhile, in India the Government suppressed the Communist Party (C.P.I.) The Indian approval of the Brussels Treaty and Armament widened the rift between Delhi and Moscow. In March 1948, the C. P. I. denounced Nehru’s neutrality as “a mask to cover collaboration with the Anglo-American imperialists”. Early in 1949, the Soviet Press accused the Indian leaders of making a deal with “Anglo-American Imperialism”. In April 1949 R. P. Dutt compared Nehru with Chiang Kai-shek. In June 1949, Marshall Zhukov declared that Nehru had “revealed” his “anti-popular character”. Nehru’s anti-communist policies at home as well as in relation to the civil war in Burma and the up rising in Malaya, his government’s industrial and economic policies of 1948, the decision to stay in the Commonwealth, and Nehru’s visit to the U.S.A. in October 1949, prompted the U.S.S.R. to criticise and condemn the Indian Government as a stooge of Western Imperialism. Nehru’s reference at Chicago to the Soviet system as “characterized by regimentation” was hardly complimentary.

Towards the close of 1949, however, the relations started improving. The Indian advocacy for the recognition of Peking and its entry in the U.N. seems to have led to this improvement. In July 1949 S. Radhakrishnan was appointed our ambassador to Moscow and this fact also brought about a change for the better. In 1949, trade pacts were signed between Delhi and some communist countries, and the U.S.S.R. agreed to supply 220,000 tons of wheat and maize to India in exchange for raw jute and tea. In 1949-50, relations with Peking improved further and the credit for this goes to Sardar K. M. Panikkar. On January 26, 1950, Chairman Mao, and the Soviet President sent warm felicitations to India. The Korean war in June 1950, however, caused a jerk and India’s line-up with the West in the condemnation of North Korea was legitimately resented in Russia as well as at home. But soon the error was corrected and Nehru’s peace appeal in July 1950 elicited warm praise from Stalin. While the Indian moves on Korea estranged relations with Washington, they brought India and the U.S.S.R. closer. But in December 1950, the Indian effort to achieve a cease-fire in Korea prompted M. Malik to say that India was attempting to “save the U. S. troops from disaster”. In February 1951, however, India refused to support the U. S. resolution branding

China as aggressor. This was followed by our refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty in September 1951. In April 1952, Stalin honoured Radhakrishnan by granting him an interview—the first to a foreign diplomat after two years. In December 1952, however, there developed a friction on the issue of the Prisoners of War in Korea and Vyshinsky vehemently criticised India in the U.N. Assembly for her “peace plan” in Korea as “designed to aggravate the conflict”. Early in 1953, S. Radhakrishnan did a disservice to Indo-Soviet understanding by criticising the Cominform as “a source of international tension”.

In March 1953, Stalin died and glowing tributes were paid to him by Indian leaders. The U.S. opposition to India's participation in the Political Conference on Korea only pulled India and Russia closer. The Soviet opposition to U.S.-sponsored Middle-East Command and U.S. military aid to Pakistan had the same effect. In mid-1953 the anti-American sentiment, partly roused by Sheikh Abdullah's slogan of Independent Kashmir, reached the peak. It was commonly and widely believed that the Sheikh was in league with the U.S.A. Towards the close of 1953, the Indo-Soviet Trade Pact was signed.

In 1954, Chou and Nehru reached the agreement on Tibet which contained the famous Panch Shila. In October, Nehru visited China and came with admiration for that country. The Manila Pact and the Baghdad Pact strained Indo-U.S. relations while the Bandung Conference in April 1955 brought India closer to Russia and China. Nehru's visit to Russia in 1955 was a singular success, and the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India in December-January, 1955-56 further cemented the Indo-Soviet bonds. The Soviet support to India on Kashmir and Goa, the Soviet technical and economic assistance, the Soviet policy of treating India as one of the Great Powers and the Soviet adherence to Panch Shila established lot of good will in this country. While the trade between the two countries in 1953 amounted to 8 million rubles, in 1957, it was more than 50 million rubles. That year the U.S.S.R. took 56% of all India's exports of small hides, 30% of her exports of leather footwear, 27% of her spices, and 30% of her wool. All the returns from the sale of Soviet commodities to India are used to purchase goods from India. Soviet equipment and machinery are generally supplied to India on credit terms. Soviet experts are helping the construction of the Bhilai iron and steel works and in oil and gas prospecting works in India. Soviet professors are training lecturers and preparing the curricula for the Bombay Technological Institute. In 1957, an agreement was signed under which the U.S.S.R. would co-operate in the construction of a heavy engineering works, a mining equipment plant, a heating and power plant and a number of other enterprises.

A credit of 500 million rubles has been granted for these purposes. The cultural contacts between the two countries are also increasing and the Indian books are being translated in the U.S.S.R.

But in the diplomatic field there developed some misunderstanding in 1956-57 on the question of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. This, however, did not break the process of rapprochement. The Soviet decision to suspend nuclear experiments in 1958 unilaterally was hailed in India. In short, the Indo-Soviet relations, at present, rest on a firm basis.

India and China. We have referred to the historic friendship existing between China and India. In the past there was considerable commercial, religious and cultural contact between the two countries, in spite of the formidable geographical barriers, consisting of high mountain ranges and vast steppes and desert extending over hundreds of thousands of square miles. Intermittent diplomatic relations were also established between the South Indian Courts and the Chinese Empire. Not only great Chinese scholars like Fa Hien, Yuan Chuan and I-tsing came to India, but also distinguished Indian scholars went to China, spending their lives there, translating Indian books and propagating Indian thought. Scholars like Kashyapa Matanga, Kumarajiva, Dharma Kshema, Paramartha, Bodhi Dharma, and Vajrabodhi went to China and did considerable work. These scholars not only took Buddhism to that country but they also introduced Sankhya, tantra sastra, and other beliefs of Hinduism before which "China was overwhelmed, baffled and overenjoyed". The culture of both countries acted and reacted on each other. Gradually, however, the disruption of the line of communications from India across Central Asia in the 8th century, the decay of Buddhist faith in India, and the violent inroads on India by Muslims from north-west broke the land links between the two countries. And the sea routes also passed under the control of the Arabs and the communications of the south with the Far East were almost disrupted by the close of the 10th century. During the 18th and 19th centuries Western Imperialism stood in the way of the resumption of contacts between the two countries. But colonial experience indirectly brought them closer and in 1927, at the Brussels Congress of the League against Imperialism, the Indian and Chinese delegates in a joint declaration denounced the use of Indian troops in China. At the time of the Japanese invasion on Manchuria in 1931, the Indians in sympathy with the Chinese boycotted the Japanese goods. During the Sino-Japanese war beginning in 1937, the Indian National Congress sent a medical mission and supplies to China. Nehru visited Chungking in 1939 and admired the Chinese resistance. In 1942 Chiang Kai-shek visited India to rally Indian opinion against Japan. He pleaded

with the British Government to concede the demands of the Congress for Indian independence. But here also the British Government played the trick Churchill referring to Chiang's visit in his war memoirs records. "The War Cabinet could not agree to the head of a foreign state intervening as a kind of impartial arbiter between representatives of the King Emperor and Messrs Gandhi and Nehru. I, therefore, wrote to the Generalissimo. 'We think here in the Cabinet that your suggested visit to Mr Gandhi at Wardha might impede the desire we have for rallying all India to the war effort against Japan . . . I venture to hope that Your Excellency will be so very kind as not to press the matter'. In the event the Generalissimo deferred to my wishes, and, the ill timed visit passed off without doing any harm" (*The Hinge of Fate*, pp 176-177).

With the establishment of the People's Republic in China, India and China started drawing closer together. In December 1949 Delhi recognised Peking in spite of a mild opposition offered (with regard to timing) by C. Rajagopalachari, the Governor-General of India, Sardar Vallabhai Patel and a powerful section of the Civil Service including some of the senior officials of the Foreign Office (*vide Panikkar In Two Chinas*, p 64). In May 1950, Panikkar returned to China as India's ambassador. It was a matter of some credit for him that even though he had served as our ambassador to Chiang's Government he, for that reason, had not been a *persona non grata* with the communists. Panikkar has been largely instrumental in clearing up the ignorance of Chinese people with regard to this country. The task indeed was difficult. He has recorded that "no one knew anything of modern India. But soon I discovered that the Chinese were anxious to know about India. They were in two minds. Instinctively they recognised that India was friendly to them, but as communists they could only think of India as a capitalist country, and by all text-book maxims it seemed clear that India must be reactionary and must belong to the opposite camp". Panikkar not only interpreted modern India to China but he also interpreted People's China to us. He held that the Chinese revolution was the culminating event of Asian resurgence that the new Government in China is the fulfilment of a hundred years of evolution, that it is determined to maintain the continuity of her life and culture, and that the American theory that the Peking Government was a puppet of Moscow is baseless. Thus the Indian view of the Chinese Revolution was most sympathetic and this, combined with the almost complete absence of a background of conflicts and wars, paved the way to cordial relations.

But just as the Chinese had a suspicion with regard to India's role, the Indians too had a feeling of uneasiness with regard to the intentions of the new leaders of China. The Indians also

despised the means the Chinese employed in achieving their ends—means which are “revolting to the free mind”. Even Panikkar admits that “compared to the state, the individual has lost all value and this is the strange thing in China which adds a tinge of sorrow even when one appreciates and admires what the revolution has done for China and Asia generally”.

Invasion on Tibet. The major source of friction that developed between India and China was Tibet. Tibet is India's neighbour and has ancient commercial and cultural ties with us and its “central position over the valleys of the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej and the Indus have made Tibet of great importance in the caravan trade across Asia”. During the British rule, in 1906, a convention was signed between Britain and China under which the former recognised the latter's suzerainty over Tibet. India obtained the right to station an Indian agent at Lhasa and trade agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung, post and telegraph offices along the trade up to Gyantse, and the right to station a small military escort at Gyantse to protect this commercial highway. Meanwhile the relationship between China and Tibet remained vague. In 1908, China seized administrative power in Tibet, and in 1910, in face of the Chinese troops the Dalai Lama fled. In 1911 as a sequel to the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese troops were expelled and the Dalai Lama declared Tibet to be independent. The Chinese, however, declared Tibet to be an integral part of China. In 1914 a convention was signed under which Tibet was divided into Outer Tibet (including Lhasa), and Inner Tibet, the area adjoining China. Outer Tibet's autonomy was recognised. This convention, however, was not ratified by China. From 1914 to 1948, the Chinese continued to claim sovereignty over Tibet.

In this background, the communist government also considered Tibet an integral part of China. On January 1, 1950, Peking declared the liberation of Tibet as one of 25 basic tasks, in order to bring to an end the imperialist activities to which India was also suspected to be a party. Earlier in November 1949 Nehru at a Press Conference at London had clarified India's view that she regarded Tibet under Chinese suzerainty but as an autonomous unit, and that he recognised the need of placing Sino-Indian relations with regard to Tibet on a stable basis. India and China started negotiations but on October 25, the Peking Radio announced that the process of “liberating Tibet” had begun. India lodged a strong protest to which China gave a strong reply, accusing India of having been “influenced by the imperialists”, and claiming that, “China had not taken any military action but was determined to liberate Tibet by peaceful means”. The Indian rejoinder, equally strong, recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and disclaimed all desire to intervene in its affairs, emphasised once again our desire that “the issue

between the Tibetans and the Chinese should be decided peacefully and not by the use of force" Although the Chinese maintained their right to "liberate" Tibet, they actually limited their military action to the frontier, and, perhaps as a result of Indian reactions, did not march their troops further into Tibet. On October 30, 1950, it was confirmed that Tibet had asked for Indian help, and when it was not forthcoming, they appealed to the U N. On November 7, 1950, El Salvador also appealed to the General Assembly for help to Tibet. But in December 1950, India reported that the Chinese invasion had been halted. The Tibetans, too, did not follow up their appeal and the matter was dropped. On April 22, 1951, a Tibetan delegation appeared at Peking and on May 23 an agreement was signed between Tibet and China by which the latter gained full control over Tibet's external affairs, communications and trade and the integration of its forces with the People's Liberation Army. Tibet was granted autonomy. The Chinese did not interfere with the Indian interests in Tibet, nor was there any infringement of India's frontiers. It will be recalled that Nehru had declared on December 8, 1950 that "so far as India was concerned the MacMohan Line of the Simla Convention was the definitive frontier and that no body would be permitted to cross it". The agreement of May 1951 was duly recognised by India and was confirmed in 1954 when Chou visited India and he and Nehru enunciated the Panch Shila.

On other issues India and China pulled together. On the problems of Korean War, the parleys on Indo-China, and Formosa as well as the Chinese entry in the U N and the Japanese Peace Treaty the two countries shared almost common views. Many goodwill missions have been exchanged between the two countries and Nehru's own visit to China in November 1954 proved to be momentous. In short, the Sino-Indian relations have been given a firm basis and intimate contacts are increasing. It may be said that "the primary goal of India's China policy remains her role as an honest broker for peace". We have already discussed the role of India in explaining China to the rest of the world in Part II of this work. That was our constant aim at Bandung. Panikkar has thus summarized India's policy towards China. "Our policy towards China has been of a two-fold character to co-operate on the basis of respect of each other's rights in every sphere where such co-operation is possible, and secondly to use such influence as we have to bring about an understanding between China and other nations. We have made no secret of our opinion that any system of international relations which ignores the major fact of the emergence of a new, united and powerful China cannot be conducive to peace or good understanding and that the primary condition of a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern questions is the frank acceptance of the change that has taken place in China."

India and the Foreign Enclaves—Goa. India's independence naturally remains incomplete without the withdrawal of France and Portugal from their enclaves here. With France the method of negotiations succeeded and Chandernagore was transferred to India after a referendum in June 1951. With regard to the rest—Pondicherry, Mahe, Karikal and Yanaon, an agreement was signed on October 23, 1954 and these areas were transferred to India on November 1, 1954. The total area of the 5 enclaves was 196 sq. miles with a population of about 400,000. With Portugal it has been different. The Portuguese dominion in India consists of 3 settlements all situated on the west coast of the Indian peninsula—Goa, Daman and Diu, with an area of 1,537 sq. miles and a population of about 650,000. We have referred to India's concern about Portugal's membership of the NATO and its implications for the Portuguese possessions in India. Hoping for an early negotiated settlement, India opened a legation in Lisbon in 1949. The Indian Government has been claiming these territories on grounds of geographical contiguity, nationality, security, and economic considerations. Ethnically the people of these areas are of Indian stock. These areas were not acquired by Portugal by law. Moreover, the Portuguese retention of Goa, Daman and Diu raises security problems for India. Economically, Goa has become a hot bed of smugglers. The economy of India is adversely affected and the prohibition policy of Bombay is to a great extent defeated. India, therefore, suggested to Portugal that once the principle of reunion of these possessions with India was accepted, ways and means for their transfer could be devised by friendly consultation. Portugal, however, refused to discuss, much less to accept, this position. On January 14, 1953, India in a note to Lisbon pointed out that "political borders artificially created by an accident of history for which no justification existed at the present moment", could "no longer stem the rising tide of the national urge for unity". Portugal's reply was that "we hold a nation to be a distinct and separate social aggregate, regardless of their geographical position". In July 1953, therefore, India closed its legation at Lisbon. Since negotiations did not make any further progress, on July 25, 1955, India asked Portugal to withdraw the Portuguese legation in New Delhi. Earlier in 1954 a liberation movement encouraged by the Government of India developed and threatened to lead to conflict. In 1955 the liberation marchers tried to enter Goa but when the situation became serious the Government cried a halt to this policy.

The problem of the Portuguese possessions has certain international aspects. The Goa issue placed Britain in a particularly embarrassing position since Portugal is her oldest ally and India is a fellow member in the Commonwealth. The

Western powers, particularly Britain and the U S A , are quite in a position to exercise diplomatic pressure on Portugal to accept a satisfactory solution of the problem. Instead of so doing, these powers have, on the whole, supported Portugal. While China and the U S S R have unequivocally supported India's claims, J F Dulles declared on December 7, 1955 that "as far as he knew all the world regarded Goa as a Portuguese province" and that "he believed they were under the constitution of Portugal". Thus, of course, does not represent the views of the majority of Americans. Pakistan is also reported to have encouraged the Portuguese intransigence. All this has naturally put our policy based on peaceful approach and co-existence to a severe strain. Any other country situated as India would have definitely reacted very differently. The present policy of India seems to be one of economic isolation of Goa and of denial of all facilities of transit. This aspect of the matter is under the consideration of the International Court of Justice. How long Portugal will take in accepting a reasonable view of things is anybody's guess, and how will India eventually solve this problem with peaceful methods, future alone will tell. International pressure is not forthcoming from the West and a reference to the U N would be entirely off the point.

India and the U N Article 51 of the Indian Constitution enjoins on India "to promote international peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration". These are some of the objectives enshrined in the U N Charter. The formation of the U N was hailed by this country as an epoch making event, as the only source of solace to a war weary world, and as a ray of hope to those who were denied freedom, justice and honour. Even before independence was achieved India had sent a powerful delegation to the U N. With the achievement of freedom India became one of the most vocal and enthusiastic members of the family of nations. India believes that the foundations of peace can be strengthened by elimination of colonialism, racial discrimination, race for armaments, and want. This belief underlies India's activities at the United Nations. Indian championship of the freedom of the peoples of Indonesia, Libya, Tunisia, Malaya, Indo-China, and Gold Coast is thus explained. In addition, India advocated full control by the U N in supervising the U N Charter, and we supported the principle that in the administration of non-self governing territories the colonial powers should be answerable to the U N in the same manner as the trustee powers are in regard to the Trust Territories. The Indian

insistence on disarmament is partly intended to ease international tensions and partly motivated to divert funds which are wasted on arms production to the uplift of the backward areas.

India has viewed regional alliances as contrary to the intent and purposes of the U.N. and as a device for furtherance of colonialism. On all important international disputes, Indian representatives have played a very active role, without aligning themselves with any power bloc. Indeed, India's policy of non-alignment is in full conformity with the spirit of the U.N. Charter. On such delicate issues as Korea and the Suez Crisis the role of India has largely contributed to the peace of the world. It is true that with regard to her own disputes with Pakistan, particularly Kashmir, India has not been able to accept arbitration. But the fact that in a matter involving vital interests, India approached the United Nations for redress and the further fact that in spite of not getting this redress, she continues to cling to the U.N. is an ample evidence of India's faith in the principles on which that body stands. In all the social, economic and humanitarian activities India has made considerable contribution.

On matters of organization, India has been in favour of larger representation of Asian countries at the U.N. The Indian view is that the U.N. must be a truly universal body "subject to strict adherence to the qualifications for membership laid down in the Charter". We have examined in Part Two of this work the effective role of this country in securing membership of the U.N. by 19 states in 1956-57. India's anxiety for the unseating of Chiang Kai-shek's representatives and the entry of the People's China is based on her desire to make the U.N. function effectively on issues which concern China and the world. With regard to the Security Council's composition, Indians have held the view that Asia is under-represented in that body and that, along side China, one more country should be given a permanent seat. On the problem of the veto, although India is not happy with the way it has been used by many powers, she is, nevertheless, in favour of its continuation, for, essentially it is a reflection of the harsh realities of the international situation. International disputes, in India's view, cannot be settled by imposition of the majority verdict on the minority. After all it is not the individual who is a member of the U.N. but nations which are represented by their governments having one vote each. Many Great Powers have their satellites and their votes can be easily manoeuvred in organising aggression or in meeting an "imaginary aggression". To get over this difficulty veto is indispensable. The veto is, then, only a reflection of prevailing international tensions and if, therefore, this tension is reduced, the exercise or misuse of veto would be automatically reduced. India has also

been opposed to a revision of the U N Charter. At the present moment what is wrong with the U N is not its machinery but the absence of goodwill amongst its members. In an atmosphere charged with suspicion and hatred even the most perfect machinery cannot work. The drawing up of the Charter in 1945 did not turn out to be an easy task and at many stages compromises had to be made. In the following years these compromises did not work. This, in India's view, is the nature of the United Nation's malady. What is necessary, therefore, is not to find fault with the structure of the U N. There may be many defects in it and some of them serious. But this is not the time to try to remove them.

Finally, Indians have occupied prominent positions in various organs of the United Nations including the International Court of Justice. In 1950 she was elected to the Security Council for a period of two years (from January 1, 1950).

CONCLUSIONS

The foreign policy of India has been criticised as inconsistent, vague, idealistic and agitational. It is pointed out that in respect of essentials India's foreign policy has failed and that India has no genuine friends in the world. After analysing the various elements of India's foreign policy, it is unnecessary to attempt to answer these criticisms. But on the whole, it is submitted that in India there is a remarkable unity and agreement among the people on questions of foreign policy and its underlying principles. Criticisms are there and it is good to be critical of government's decisions in foreign affairs.

Secondly, in the world outside, India's prestige is fairly high. In Korea and Indo-China the role of India as mediator has been generally admired. Referring to the work of the Indian Custodian Force in Korea, Eisenhower said "No military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate and demanding peace-time mission than that faced by the Indian forces in Korea. The performance of these officers and their troops was fully in keeping with the high reputation of the Indian army. They deserve the highest commendation." Indeed, India counts a good deal in international diplomacy. This is partly due to the high stature of Nehru who is extremely popular in India and Asia, and partly due to the size, resources and location of India. India is not a Great Power in military sense. But, at present, she is the most stable country in non-communist Asia. The communist victory in China has driven the West to realize increasingly the importance of a stable regime in India. Again,

the Indian leadership of South-East Asia is undoubtedly a fact, however, unsought it may be.

Thirdly, it is wrong to suggest that the Indian policy is based on cheap homilies for external consumption. As we have stated above, its solid basis is the National Interest as conceived by its architects. Nevertheless, even on matters which affect us vitally, India's approach has been peaceful as is amply demonstrated by Indian policy towards the Portuguese possessions, Kashmir, and Tibet. Sometimes this approach is misunderstood as appeasement. But there are clear limits beyond which no Government can go and it is good that people in India and outside realize these limits. Every country has to make compromises but these compromises are invariably on non-essentials and they are made to safeguard the essentials. A foreign policy is primarily intended to achieve security, prosperity, political independence and prestige. And this has to be a slow process. Brilliance in foreign policy is an attribute of dictators and political adventurers. A country wedded to democratic means and positive ends has to work its way up steadily and unostentatiously. The days of sudden and high success in diplomacy are probably gone. The number of independent units in international relations is increasing practically every year and with this is multiplying the number of centres of decision in the diplomatic field. War has become a costly venture. Actions of statesmen and diplomats are constantly watched and examined by millions. It is within these limitations that a foreign policy is to be conducted in our times. In this light the record of India has not been discreditable after all.

Resurgence of Asia

CHINA

We have traced the story of China's resistance to Western Imperialism and Japanese aggression from 1919 to 1945 in Part One of this work. The years 1945 to 1949 in China "present an extraordinary spectacle of millions of people in constant turmoil", marching to and fro across the continent, plundering and slaughtering one another. With the defeat of Japan in August 1945, the Nationalist Government of China was face to face with a vast array of problems: the repatriation of the Japanese armies and reoccupation of the areas conquered by the Japanese, providing relief and rehabilitation to millions, the reconstruction of war-devastated areas, building up country's economy with a balanced budget and stable currency, creating a sound machinery of public administration and achieving national unity. These problems the Kuomintang government was hardly equipped to solve. It had neither the will and inclination nor the resources demanded by the occasion. The successive blows dealt by the Japanese had drained its strength. No help from outside was given, or at least not given timely and in volume proportionate to the task. The U.S.S.R. had shifted its support to the rising Red Sun, the U.S.A. followed a muddled policy of bolstering up an ally which had been struck with paralysis. Indeed, it may even be said whether any amount of U.S. help could have weathered the storm and prevented the debacle.

The civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communists had never ceased since 1927 in spite of the ostensibly United Front of 1937-45, and with the defeat of the Japanese it broke out in a fury. Soon after the end of the war, the United States pursued a policy of bringing about a rapprochement between the two factions. In November 1945, General Hurley resigned his post as the U.S. Ambassador to China, and General Wedemeyer, U.S. Commanding General in the China theatre, reported to Washington that the unity of the Nationalists and the Communists and the gigantic plan of reconstruction of China's economy was vital for the stability of that country. He also recommended that Manchuria might be placed under U.N. trusteeship system. Late in 1945, Truman sent General Marshall as his personal

envoy to China. Marshall viewed the war between the Kuomintang and the Communists as privilege fighting the disinherited, and the powers of high finance fighting against the masses. In January 1946, he secured an armistice and on February 25, 1946, an agreement between the two factions was signed entitled "Basis for Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army". Under this, the two parties "agreed to a major reduction of their respective armed forces and their integration into armies which would combine contingents from both and which would be divorced from politics". Three-men committees were to set out to the troubled areas with power to enforce the pledges of peace made by both sides. For a time it was thought that unity and peace would be restored in China.

On March 11, 1946, Marshall left for home "to report to the President on the situation in China" and in his absence the fighting was resumed. The weakness of Marshall's design for peace lay in the fact that the truce could be effective only so long as there was a real hope of a political settlement. Marshall had hardly left on his aeroplane when the Kuomintang put an end to any hope of such a settlement. On April 18, he returned to China and the same day the Communist forces attacked and occupied Chang Chun, the capital of Manchuria. Meanwhile a change had taken place in the attitude of the Chinese Communists towards the United States and for this the indiscreet remarks of Lt. General Gillem of the U.S. were largely responsible. But by June 7, 1946, Marshall succeeded in bringing about a truce which lasted for 15 days. On the 17th Chiang gave an ultimatum to the Communists asking them to evacuate Jehol, Chahar, and Shantung and their strong points throughout Manchuria. The fighting began and by August 10, the situation was out of hand. On the 13th, Chiang blamed the Communists for the breakdown of negotiations. On the 30th, China and the U.S.A. signed an agreement for the sale of the U.S. surplus property in the Pacific to which the Communists objected. The deliveries were, therefore, suspended. On October 1, Marshall told Chiang that unless a basis for agreement with the Communists could be reached without further delay, he would go back. Nothing, however, came out of this. On January 6, 1947, Truman announced Marshall's recall. While leaving China he declared: "The greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other . . . The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties".

In the summer of 1947, Truman sent General A.C. Wedemeyer to study the situation in China and report. He spent about a

month there and got disgusted with "the mistaken military policy and the corruption and inefficiency of the National Government", and recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria as an alternative to its falling in Communist hands. Meanwhile the U.S. aid to China was continuing. Before V.J. Day the military aid had totalled \$845,000,000 and from V.J. Day to March 31, 1949, the assistance had reached the figure, \$2,000,000,000 in grants and credits, together with sales of surplus government property costing over \$10,00,000,000 for which China paid \$232,000,000. Of these large sums \$267,000,000 had come through the Economic Co-operation Administration and \$46,400,000 through the U.S. foreign relief programme. After V.J. Day military aid through Lend-Lease amounted to about \$700,000,000 plus naval vessels costing \$141,300,000 and a grant under the China Act of 1948 amounting to \$125,000,000.

Causes of communist victory But this aid could not prevent the collapse of the Kuomintang regime. Much of this aid was unwisely expended, some of it was misappropriated, some went into equipment quite unadapted to Chinese needs, some of it was administered by Americans who were unfamiliar with China. It may also be pointed out that this sum, though considerable, was yet inadequate for the task and was much less than what was given to the Philippines or to Japan. The supplies and munitions, in fact, never got to the Nationalist soldier. "Either they were stored away by regional commanders in preparation for the private war after the War, or they found their way for cash payments, to the Japanese, through third parties operating in the large stretches of no man's land dotting the Chinese landscape." Possibly the cease-fire which Marshall had brought about had given the Communists a breathing-spell. The Civil War continued to rage till 1949, "the Communists gaining as much from desertions as from victories, as much from arms and equipment handed over by renegade Nationalists as by arms and equipment left behind in Manchuria by the Japanese and allowed by the Russians to fall into their hands." The morale of the Kuomintang troops had been shattered and they used to melt away before a determined Communist advance. As they surrendered, huge quantities of U.S. equipment fell into the Communist hands. By the end of 1948, the Kuomintang forces had been expelled from practically every section of Manchuria, and in January 1949, Peking fell to the Reds almost without a struggle. By the spring of 1949 all of China north of the Yangtze River had passed under the Communists and the Kuomintang armies were fast disintegrating.

But the causes of the success of the Communists lay deeper. Partly they fully exploited the rampant corruption, decay and inefficiency of the Nationalists. The intelligentsia and the students

had been completely alienated due to intolerance of dissent, and public confidence had been shattered by inflation and the failure of currency. Production was at a very low ebb and stark poverty and famine stalked the land. The Nationalist armies had no "stomach for fighting" and had no cause to fight for. The Government was inert, weak and divided. What really proved decisive in the end was "the Kuomintang leaders' loss of touch with the people who really mattered—the peasants and the small but important merchants class ; they looked instead to the big landowners whose main idea was to preserve their privileges. Reliance on outside help had deprived the Kuomintang of the courage to reform within".

On the other hand, the Communists had deep roots in the soil. In the areas which they had controlled, they had established an administration which was excellent by any standard. They were honest, efficient, and thorough-going. They had the record of fighting the Japanese and saving the country's honour. Their armies were recruited from the peasantry and their organization was a model of efficiency and unity of purpose. They had captured the leadership of Chinese nationalism. As one authority has put it : "The strength of the Communists was found in the combination of their ideology, held with conviction, the tight organization and discipline of the Party, the army, the tireless devotion and austerity of the leaders, the absence of corruption in Communist officialdom, the appeal to the peasantry, and skill in propaganda". The communist armies were thus fighting from strong bases rooted in public opinion, with a marvellous tenacity, indefatigable will and unshakeable faith in their destiny. While military disaster after military disaster quickly sealed the doom of Chiang's regime, the Communists consolidated each victory. They had had experience of popular administration and they were hailed by the people everywhere as their saviour from the loot and plunder of Nationalist armies and officials. The Communist armies were well-fed and well-disciplined and its treatment of the populace in the process of liberation was in striking contrast to that of the most of the hordes that had served under the Kuomintang. Its officials were hard-working and in their dress and diet were a sample of simplicity and asceticism. Their concern was, or at least it appeared to be, popular welfare and the salvation of the country. They had no stigma or taint of serving as imperialist agents and exploiters. Faith, courage, conviction and determination were at clash with effeminacy, indifference, purposelessness and intellectual schism. The outcome was a foregone conclusion. A vicious and crooked breed of grandees could hardly stand the onslaughts of seasoned, ruddy men in boots. One is indeed led to think that the fall of the Kuomintang was almost inevitable and pre-destined and that the Chinese civil war was

not decided in the fighting of it. In this fall there was no sign of grandeur anywhere, no element of pity. None shed tears on it. It was as if destiny was having its revenge and the whole past of Chiang was recoiling on him and his friends.

The victory of Communists in China was more than the defeat of Kuomintang and the debacle of the U.S. policies in China. It was a fulfilment of a hundred years of aspirations of the Chinese people, and a symbol of their dreams. But it is certain that the masses had not accepted communism as an ideology. As Vinacke has put it: "Active peasant support was initially gained on the basis of progress of agrarian reform which was actually more in conformity with the principle of the 'People's livelihood' of Dr. Sun than with the principle of collectivization. The allegiance of the scholar class was transferred from the Kuomintang to the Communist Party, not as a revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat but as a party with a programme of political and economic reform apparently adapted to the requirements of national post-war reconstruction. The intellectuals viewed Mao Tse-tung's 'New Democracy' as a valid formulation of objectives for the post-war stage of the continuing Chinese revolution. They did not, however, make the distinction which the conception of movement by stages requires" (*Far Eastern Politics in the Post-War Period*, p. 132). The communists, therefore, had popular sympathy and support born of frustration and disgust with the preceding regimes. They provided new chances and new channels with which they would manufacture a new system.

People's Republic of China 1949 By the summer of 1949 Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang had fallen to the Communists and in the autumn the Nationalists had lost Canton and Sinkiang. In January, 1949 Chiang had retired as President of China and made a strong bid for peace with the Communists. The Communists, however, demanded unconditional surrender which Chiang refused. Till the end, this uncrowned, dishonoured and discredited representative of Chinese landlordism refused to read the signs on the wall. The struggle was to continue. By the fall of 1949 the Communists had occupied Canton and by the end of the year the last Kuomintang relics had been driven out of the main land to Formosa, a small and heavily populated island, less than 120 miles from the Chinese mainland. There Chiang took about 600,000 troops and formed the "government in exile" which continues to represent the whole China to the United States and at the U.N. On December 7, 1949 Taipei, the capital of Formosa, was declared the capital of the Republic of China and on March 1, 1950, Chiang Kai-shek resumed the Presidency of China in Formosa.

Meanwhile, the Communist Revolution "had created such a wave of power, principle and passion that no one could hold it back any more than a man with a broom can hold back a flood that has burst its dam". By August 1949, the North-East People's Government had been formed, and in September 1949, a People's Political Conference was convened in Peking and adopted its own Organic Law and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, with Mao Tse-tung as chairman. Within a month the new regime was recognised by all the Communist states and within a few months other states followed.

NEW CHINA: 1949-1958

The new government of China had to face problems as difficult as any had to face before it. Referring to these problems Jackson writes: "The task of the Communist rulers was of appalling magnitude. They were responsible for more people than any other Government in the world's history (the census figures of 1954 gave a total of 602 million Chinese, of whom 11.7 million lived overseas), and the population was increasing at the rate of 12 million a year. There seemed to be none of the foundations for progress in the 20th century sense. The people were uneducated, nearly 80% were more or less illiterate, and not more than a quarter of a million had been to a University or secondary school. The means of dealing with the most usual vagaries of the weather—draught and flood—did not exist. Nor did a system of transport and communications on which any improvement of the standard of living must depend: there were few roads and even before the war had devastated the railway system there were only 12,500 miles of railway. The Communists would have to begin everything almost from the beginning—devise a popular script as the basis for mass literacy, get dams built by manual labour with no equipments other than spades and baskets, lay roads and railways by pre-machine age methods". (*The Post-War Decade*, p. 162).

The problems of New China, therefore, were those of modernising the country, reconstructing the economy, raising the standards of people, eliminating feudal aspects of social structure, instituting land reforms, creating a sound administrative machinery based on a constitution, suppressing the internal enemies of the regime, achieving national unity, renovating the national culture and educational system, and laying the bases of a strong, dynamic and workable relationship with her neighbours and other centres of power.

Social and economic rehabilitation. During the first three years the People's Government of China cleared the debris

by ending the currency inflation and achieving the stabilisation of the currency and commodity prices. A balance was struck between revenue and expenditure and State trading organizations were enabled to control and regulate the supply of various essential materials in order fully to meet the demands of the market. All accounting was centralised. Native banks and exchange shops which used to make fortunes by speculation were forced to close down or change their occupation. Market conditions were placed on a new basis. In 1950-51, a nation wide movement began for the interflow of goods between city and countryside which put an end to the stagnation of urban-ural trade caused by war and opened up outlets for the peasant's surplus agricultural products and native goods. In December 1951, the San Fan and the Wu Fan movements were launched. The former was against three evils of corruption, waste and bureaucratism among workers in government institutions and the latter was directed against five vices: bribery, tax evasion, theft of State property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing economic information for private speculation.

By 1952, prices had fallen by about 10% and expenditure by Government had been cut down by 50% of 1949 figure. In 1952, again, the agricultural and industrial production had gone up by 77.5%, coal and electricity were almost doubled and the production of steel and iron increased seven to eight fold. Cotton yarn increased in 1951 by 24% over 1949. The production of paper had been doubled and cigarette output went up by 50%. The share of state, co-operative and joint state-private enterprises rose from 36.7% of the total industrial production in 1949 to 61% in 1952. State concerns and co-operatives handled 63.2% of domestic wholesale trade and 34% of retail sales. Foreign trade was brought under control. More than 10,000 kilometres of old railway lines were repaired and 1267 kilometres of new ones were constructed. All State industries and a number of private industries underwent reforms. Wages increased and in 1952 they were 70% higher than in 1949. In May 1951 following the promulgation of the Trade Union Law and the Labour Insurance Regulation, a system of labour insurance was introduced in all factories employing more than 100 workers. Hospitals, nurseries and sanatoria were built up for workers. There were three principal factors which explain this phenomenal development: (i) the land reform which gave each poor peasant in the country a piece of land, (ii) the provision by the Government for loans, fertilizers, modernized farm implements, selected seeds and insecticides, and (iii) the proper utilization of an immense release of energy, of a great spirit of self-assurance and desire to achieve things. As Panikkar has put it: "Economically a holding of three mow ($\frac{1}{3}$ th of an acre) for an individual is nothing very much.

But the land reform has broken the chains, made the villager free, and has given him a new sense of dignity and self-respect".

Similarly in the cultural and social spheres life was renovated. The Summer Palace was converted into "a workers' paradise". The Temple of Heaven was repaired. In the villages peasants' organizations, study groups, women's organizations and "the entire paraphernalia of New Democracy" were set up. Colleges for National minorities were established. A large number of schools were started in the country-side in a move to wipe out illiteracy. Women were liberated and prostitution was completely abolished. Public health measures were effectively adopted and a country-wide movement of sanitation was launched. Art, literature, stage and cinema were all revolutionised. Cultural centres, libraries and museums were repaired, reformed and new ones established.

In 1953, China embarked on its First Five-Year Plan for development of the National Economy and this plan (1953—57) was formally adopted on July 30, 1955 by the first National People's Congress. During this period the country made all-round progress. Heavy industries were firmly laid and the growth of light industries was duly encouraged. Existing industrial enterprises were fully utilised. The co-operative movement in agricultural production was promoted by using the method of persuasion. Water conservancy and afforestation work was attended. Transport and post and tele-communication services were developed. Individual handicrafts, transport enterprises and other small businesses were integrated into the States' over-all plan. The hold of socialist economy over capitalist economy was firmly established. The stability of the market was firmly ensured by balancing revenue and expenditure. The work of training personnel for national construction was continued. National waste was reduced, strict economy was observed and the minorities were further integrated. In 1956-57 the preliminary draft of the Second Five-Year Plan was made public. The table on p. 650 indicates the rise in production during the period 1953—57 and the targets laid down for the Second Five-Year Plan to be completed in 1962. Indeed by 1957 China had come out of the feudal stage and was well on the way to become a Great Power.

Political regimentation. The Communists gave China the strongest government the Chinese ever had. The earliest political task was the adoption of a constitution. We have stated earlier that in 1949 the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference had adopted the Common Programme which served as the provisional constitution. On January 13, 1953, the Central People's Government Council appointed a Committee to draft the constitution. In March 1954, the Drafting Committee completed its work and the draft was widely circulated and discussed all over

	(In thousand metric tons)						
	1952	1955	1956	Target in 1957	Estimate 1957	Preliminary Targets 1962	
Cotton Yarn (in thousand bales)	3,613	3,968	5,119	5,000	5,600	8,000	
Electricity (in million Kilowatt hours)	7,260	12,278	14,120	15,900	18,000	43,000	
Pig iron	1,900	3,630	4,537	4,674	6,000	8,000	
Steel	1,350	2,853	4,508	4,120	5,500	12,000	
Cement	2,860	4,503	6,304	6,000			
	16 3			29 2			
Metal working machines	436	966	1,198	2,012			
Crude Oil	63,528	93,064	108,885	112,985	120,000	210,000	
Coal	249	500	600	686	700	2,400	
Sugar							

the country. On June, 14, 1954 a second draft was made public and later a third draft was prepared. On September 9, 1954, this was adopted by the Central People's Government Council and on September 20, it was adopted by the National People's Congress of China. The Constitution is socialistic and gives the government a free hand to bring about a socialist transformation of the national economy through nationalization and collectivization. It provides for highly centralized direction and control of all kinds of local and state affairs. With the development of centralized economic planning since 1953, and the highly centralized function of the Communist party policy and ideology, the political direction has become more and more centralised. Structurally, the Constitution is based on the Soviet pattern. Whatever forms of democracy are provided, (e.g. the Bill of Rights) their operation is strictly within the iron framework of the Communist monopoly of power. ✓

All impartial observers have stated that the real power in China is wielded by the Communist party through administrative machinery, mass organization, and the army. The methods used are mass indoctrination, incessant propaganda campaigns, control of education, surveillance, and even violence. From the earliest years of their rule, the Communists started liquidating the counter-revolutionaries on a mass scale. On March 26, 1951, 199 counter-revolutionaries were executed in Peking alone. All over the country martial law courts disposed of the remnants of the Kuomintang. "The Peking authorities", Pannikar has recorded, "were in no mood to take risks, and the mass campaigns they started for the liquidation of counter-revolutionaries and reactionary elements seems to have effectively disposed of over a million and a half people who were either actively Kuomintang agents or suspected of sympathies with Taipeh". A full campaign of persecution of the European missionaries was launched and those who desired to go away could not get exit visas. Catholic nuns in different cities were tried for "large-scale murder of children in their orphanages". The process of "re-education" is carried on in the streets, in the schools, in the homes, and in the cinema houses. During the Korean war, in the villages walls were "plastered with slogans of "Resist America, Aid Korea". There is hardly any sphere of life, private or public, in which the government does not intrude and it is no exaggeration to say that the individual has been denied "even his right of silence". In the achievement of the three-fold task of consolidating control, destroying the old society, and establishing a new pattern of thought and life, the Communists have harnessed economics, religion, art, literature, prisons, schools, and everything. One might say that "good things" are being forced down the throat of the people in China. Not that the people do not support the Communist government.

'They support it, on all showing, for it has given them land, bread, employment, leisure, confidence and self respect. It has unified the country and it has made China a great power in international sphere. To this aspect now we turn.

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

From what sources the foreign policy of China proceeds? An answer to this question can be found if we bear in mind that the Communist revolution in China derived its strength from several basic forces which provide the clue to Asian history during the 20th century: nationalism, economic discontent, and resentment of the foreigner. It also satisfied a widespread desire for orderly government. Marxist-Leninist ideology gave it a new drive, and opened new directions. To the strength of nationalism and the legendary conservatism of Confucian philosophy and Chinese culture has now been added the revolutionary zeal and speed of Marxism. *Essentially the foreign policy of China flows from basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist theories but that does not mean that People's China is a mere appendage to the U.S.S.R.* In their contempt of the West, particularly the U.S.A., China may even excel the U.S.S.R., but it would be incorrect to say that nationalism in China has been completely submerged in international communism and that the Chinese foreign policy is dictated from Moscow. Mao himself is "one of the most Chinese elements in his own movement" and he did not visit Moscow until December 1949.

Indeed, "at two vital moments in his career he chose his own course in defiance of Moscow's advice and in each case events proved that he was right. The first was in the late twenties after the breach between the Communists and the Kuomintang. He decided to build up the party on the basis of peasant support with land reform as the centre of his programme. The second occasion was in 1949, when he defied Stalin's advice to confine himself to guerilla warfare and entered on a bold campaign that was to prove decisive within a few months." Whether judged on his own record as a Communist or as the acknowledged leader of the largest nation on earth, he is second to none in the Communist world after the death of Stalin. Even on Marxism, China may hold fast to the dogma, but with regard to its application in China, the Chinese leaders have to take into account the Chinese context. The Chinese economy is so backward that such undertakings as exist must be encouraged and cherished, and not endangered by too radical a treatment. It is the peasantry and not the industrial proletariat that dominates in China. The Chinese flag—five golden stars—stands for the Communist party, the worker, the farmer, the small capitalist, and the State capitalist. It is true that terrorism has been used in China by the

Communists to liquidate the reactionaries, but it should also be remembered that terrorism and intolerance were patent characteristics of the regime that preceded them.

Principles. The principles of the Chinese foreign policy, as we stated earlier, apparently proceed from the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference meeting in September 1949, laid down some of these principles—protection of the independence, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country; upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the people of all countries; and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war. It was announced that China "shall examine all the treaties which the Kuomintang concluded with foreign governments and "shall recognise, abrogate, revise or renegotiate them according to their respective contents". The Chinese declared that on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty, they will negotiate with foreign governments which have severed relations with the Kuomintang reactionary clique, and that China "may restore and develop commercial relations with foreign governments and peoples on a basis of equality and mutual benefit". Finally, it was stated that China would protect "the proper rights and interests of the Chinese residing abroad", would protect the "law abiding foreign nationals in China", and would accord the right of asylum to foreign nationals who seek refuge in China because they have been oppressed by their own government for supporting the people's interests and taking part in the struggle for peace and democracy". On this showing, sovereignty, anti-imperialism, peace and international co-operation may be regarded as the four bases of China's foreign policy. They arise out of the New Democracy established in China, and conform to its historical experiences.

The Chinese leaders have often proclaimed that "the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is founded on the scientific principles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin". According to these principles foreign policy is an instrument in the world-wide struggle of communism against capitalism and all alliances and coalitions with capitalist states would aim at sharpening this struggle and serving the cause of Communism. The struggle between Socialism and Imperialism is eternal and in this struggle the Chinese must always be on the side of Socialism. In an article of July 1949, Mao Tse-tung wrote: "The Chinese people must either incline towards the side of imperialism or toward that of socialism. There can be no exception to this rule. It is impossible to sit on the fence, there is no third road.....Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does not exist...Internationally we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union. We can only turn to this side for genuine and friendly

assistance, not to the side of the imperialist front". Again, in this struggle against imperialism, Communism must make common cause with a nationalist upsurge in the colonies fighting for liberation. But there is a difference between "proletarian patriotism", and "bourgeois nationalism". The latter is the vehicle by which the *bourgeoisie*, the ruling class of the nation, attempts to enlist the participation of the people in the subjugation and exploitation of another nation. Thus the "offer of military and economic aid by a capitalist nation to another nation is merely a variation of nationalism's methods, merely another form of oppressing the receiving nation". This struggle against Capitalism and Imperialism requires a flexible technique and not a rigid course. As Stalin put it "Marxism does not recognise immutable conclusions and formulae, binding all epochs and periods". Every situation is to be viewed and reviewed in its historical setting and, tactics, therefore, keep on changing. This is not opportunism, for goals and objectives never change.

Shorn of its Marxist garb, the Chinese foreign policy would appear to be simple. It is largely determined by "competing purposes and pressures generated in a semi-colonial economy" and 'at the same time conditioned by the fixed facts of geography as well as the fluid facts of power relationship in the changing context of the world balance of power'. Like any other foreign policy, "the Chinese Communist policy is as much reaction as it is action". Every nation must adapt its policies to the policies of other nations and to the "objective realities" of the "immediate international situation". In short, China's foreign policy is conditioned by the ideological views and likes and dislikes of her leaders, by the assigned priorities in domestic and international policies, by the limitations upon her freedom of action because of internal pressures and weaknesses, and by the assessment of the opportunities and dangers inherent in the existing world situation. As we will shortly see, her leaders have special ties with the U.S.S.R., special interests in Asia, and special animosities toward the United States. They have special problems such as Formosa on which they feel strongly.

Problem of recognition Immediately following the proclamation of the People's Republic, the new regime invited recognition by the states of the world. On this question three points of view have emerged in the non communist world. (i) The U.S.A. refuses to recognise Peking and so to admit Communist China to the U.N. It has continued to extend its protection to Chiang Kai shek in Formosa. (ii) Britain agreed to recognise the new regime in January 1950 and would favour its admission to the U.N. At the same time it maintains a united front with the U.S.A. in relation to Asian Communism. Even today regularly accredited diplomatic representatives have not been exchanged.

between London and Peking. (iii) India was one of the first countries to have recognised the new government and has been a staunch supporter of its admission to the U.N., Largely because of the opposition of the U.S.A., Communist China has not been allowed to get in the U.N. where China is supposed to be represented by the Nationalist Government of Formosa. This ostracism naturally rankles with the leaders of the mainland and has been a source of friction between India and U.S.A.

Soon after the establishment of the People's regime in China, the Nationalists accused the U.S.S.R. of using the Chinese Communist Party "to undermine the independence and integrity of China and the peace of the Far-East", and requested the General Assembly to give the matter immediate attention. The U.S.S.R. hit back and demanded the unseating of Nationalist representatives and the seating of those of the new regime. On December 8, 1949, the Assembly passed "a colourless resolution" postponing consideration of the matter and referring some aspects of the problems to the Interim Committee of the U.N. On January 13, 1950 the U.S.S.R. in protest boycotted the Security Council and all other U.N. agencies on which the Chinese Nationalists were represented. In June 1950, the Korean War broke out and later the Chinese intervened in it. This, at once, stiffened the U.S. attitude. The resolution branding China as aggressor was passed in February, 1951 and on May 18, the U.N. imposed an arms embargo against Peking and North Korea. The U.S.A. was also annoyed with Peking's assistance to the Communists of Indo-China and its vitriolic blasts against the West in general and the U.S.A. in particular. On January 29, 1952 the General Assembly accepted a resolution, by 25 to 9, with 24 abstentions, stating that the U.S.S.R. in its relations with China since the surrender of Japan had failed to carry out the Treaty of Friendship with China. Since then in all the United Nations bodies the question was repeatedly raised by the U.S.S.R. but the 6th, 7th and 8th Assemblies all postponed consideration of the problem. In 1954, the U.S. Senate voted 91 to 0 in favour of a provision of the Foreign Aid Bill reiterating the opposition of the Congress to the entry of Communist China in the U.N. While previously the U.S. had taken the stand that it would treat the question of representation as procedural and that, therefore, the veto would not be applied, now its stand was that in case of a division in the Assembly on this issue it would insist that this question required a two-thirds vote, and that in the Security Council veto would be used. Since then no progress has been made, and in spite of repeated efforts of India and the U.S.S.R., China is not represented at the U.N.

Nevertheless, China has been recognised by 32 states in the world and in terms of population by about $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of mankind.

The countries that had recognised Communist China till August 1958 are Albania, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Austria, the United Arab Republic, Finland, East Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Nepal, the Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Outer Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., the U.S.S.R., North Viet Nam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, there are 44 countries that recognise the Republic of China, of which 20 are Latin American countries, and the rest are other allies of the U.S.A. The Republic of China has diplomatic missions in 34 countries and 13 countries have diplomatic missions in Formosa. But it is the sizeable economic and military aid of the U.S.A. on an annual basis that sustains the Chiang regime in Formosa, and it is doubtful if the bulk of the people in the island really like the American tutelage. In late May, 1957, anti-American riots, arising out of a particular incident involving a U.S. serviceman, took place in Taipei. But these had no lasting effect. It is, however, Communist China which dominates the international scene and it is becoming an increasingly important factor in world affairs. In 1951-52, Peking representative was invited to appear before the Security Council of the U.N. In 1954, Chou En-lai led the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference where the details of a truce in Korea were hammered out. In June 1954, with Nehru he enunciated the Panch-Sheel. In April 1955, he participated in the Bandung Conference. Thus the Chinese representatives have been actually appearing at various international gatherings. Indirectly the U.S.A. has been forced to recognise Peiping *de facto*, if not *de jure*, recognising that is, that Red China is a power in the world, that Red China controls the mainland, that Red China cannot be ignored. As Neal Stanford wrote in August 1955 "Mr. Dulles went to Geneva to talk with Red China's premier but he did not call it recognition. This summer U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, was talking in Geneva with representatives of Red China, but Washington will not call it recognition. Currently the administration is referring to the Peiping regime for the first time by its official title—the People's Republic of China. If these developments are not at least an elementary form of recognition then that word has no meaning, all of which points up the fact that Peiping is the most widely recognised unrecognised government in the world."

RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN STATES

¹The three principal pillars of Chinese foreign policy are (i) uncompromising opposition to the U.S.A., (ii) a firm alliance with the U.S.S.R., and (iii) a bid for leadership in Asia. From

the Chinese point of view, the countries of the world are divided into four categories : (a) the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies which are extremely friendly; (b) the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which "share a common interest in the wiping out of colonialism and there are no basic conflicts of interest among them, for their common aggressors, oppressors and exploiters are the imperialists"; (c) all the Western countries other than the U.S.A. "All these countries had enjoyed special privileges in old China, and among them are some colonial powers. These enfeebled old colonial powers naturally are not happy to see the Chinese people stand on their feet", (d) the U.S.A. and her partners. The U.S. aggressive bloc has from the very beginning adopted a hostile attitude toward the liberation enterprise of the Chinese people", and "has attempted to oust new China from international society". In the following we will briefly examine China's relations with countries in these categories.

China and the socialist camp. The preamble to the Chinese constitution refers to the "undestructable friendship with the great U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies". This has been the sheet anchor of Chinese Communist foreign policy for many years. But the precise nature of the Sino-Soviet relations is not known. There appear to be three points of view with regard to these relations: (a) that China is nothing more than a satellite of the U.S.S.R.; (b) that Chinese revolution was not fabricated at Moscow and that China is a distinct centre of power and pursues its own course but in close collaboration with the U.S.S.R.; and (c) that China is too big to be a satellite, that Russia actually courts China, and with courtship go gifts, but that China also courts Russia. According to this last view "the relationship between Peking and Moscow is shot through with contradiction, because a powerful, united China is both a boon and an obstacle to America".

According to the satellite theory, both China and Russia are in full accord on the final objective of a Soviet world. As one critic has put it : "No sooner had they conquered the Chinese mainland than the communists "began to spill over the borders". Co-ordinating their policies with those of Russia, they participated against the U.N. in the Korean war ; gave considerable aid to the Communists in Indo-China ; supported subversion in Malaya, Burma, Siam, Indonesia and India ; and in general spear-headed the drive for a Sovietized Asia. "When Malenkov assumed the leadership in Russia after Stalin's death, Mao telegraphed that China would co-operate with the U.S.S.R. definitely forever, and with maximum resoluteness. The anti-democratic Rome-Berlin Axis was destroyed during the Second World War ;

but from its restless aftermath there emerged a new anti-democratic Moscow-Peking axis." It is pointed out that praise of the Soviet Union is a daily ritual in China and that "while the Chinese declarations resemble loyalty oaths, the Russian, gracious acceptance." The Chinese citizen, it is argued, is exhorted to emulate the Russian example. Both officially and unofficially, China and the USSR use every conceivable opportunity, such as national anniversaries, army days, the birthday of heroes, inauguration days and anniversaries of treaty signatures, in order to exchange greetings, delegations and toasts. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association has been fostering exchanges. It is suggested that the Kremlin avoids being too dictatorial, but, in effect the Chinese policies are determined in Moscow, and that after burning their fingers badly in China in 1920, the Soviet leaders have learned to respect Chinese nationalistic sensibilities. Moscow, however, pulls the strings and "the Chinese Communists dance puppet-like".

Secondly, it is suggested that China is not a puppet of the USSR. The Chinese communists won control of China by their own efforts, without Russian assistance, except for Manchuria. Mao and his colleagues made their own revolution with little help and at times with some hindrance from Stalin until a very late stage when success was assured. And success came as a big surprise to the Soviet leaders. Again, Mao is the greatest literary contributor to theoretical Communism. In power, it is argued, the Chinese Communists have attached great importance to developing policies of their own in Asia and to achieving a co-equal status with Moscow within the framework of international communism. It is also stated that Red China has firmly assumed leadership over the Communist movement in the Far East, and Asian Communists have come to seek and desire her assistance. Mao's theory of Chinese Revolution is said to be "a new development of Marxism-Leninism in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries and especially in the Chinese Revolution". It is hailed as a significant development for the world communist movement and as "a new contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism". Finally, it is argued that China's size, population, location and potential power all make for a relationship between Peking and Moscow quite different from the Soviet satellite status of the People's Democracies of East Europe. China has its own policy objectives. It was not as minions of Russia that the Chinese drove the Americans back from the Yalu River in 1951 and it was nothing to do with Russia that Communist China came into dispute with the United States over Formosa. It is, therefore, argued that "while there is no reason to assume that Peking is a completely free agent in International Communism, there is equally little reason to assume that Peking is or can be

completely dominated by Moscow. An axis relationship appears to have developed between the two major communist states”.

Finally, it is suggested that a strong United China is both a boon and an obstacle to Russia, and that the relationship between the two is rather uneasy. It is argued that Red China keeps Japan off the Asiatic mainland and impedes U.S. power in the Far East. Thus China becomes Russia's buffer against the vast exposed Soviet territories in Asia and its hostility with the U.S.A. deflects considerable U.S. strength and attention away from Russia. These are valuable services China renders to the U.S.S.R., On this showing, Moscow should skilfully try to aggravate the hostility between China and America without creating a situation of war. War may be a gamble and would, at any rate, tax the U. S. S. R. But short of war, Moscow can only benefit from the strains in Sino-U. S. relations. To play this role, however, China must be strong, and Russia is, therefore, willing to reinforce the military and economic power of the Chinese Communists. Thus “Moscow is perceptibly nervous about its relations with China. China is Moscow's biggest foreign headache. For though China is still the weaker country, Russia has been under uncomfortable Chinese pressure. This is Russia's dilemma. A strong China blocks Japan and America. But a strong China also stops Soviet expansion in the Far East and has already compelled Russia to retreat”.

But whatever the precise nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship, there is no doubt that these relations are very close and both countries have had compelling reasons to help each other. For the U.S.S.R., the communist regime is a pillar of strength from any point of view—political, economic or strategic. On her side, China's plans for economic expansion are dependent on Soviet aid (loans, equipment and technical skill) and the U.S. hostility makes the Soviet support imperative. In fact, this forged the strongest bond between them since “America was the enemy of Communism and the national aspirations of both countries”. Soon after the revolution, Mao led a Chinese delegation to Moscow, and on February 14, 1950, concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaties. Three agreements were signed : (i) a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, for 30 years, (ii) a Treaty on the Chang Chun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen; and (iii) an agreement on credits. The first provided for mutual assistance in the event of either a renewal of Japanese aggression or of aggression by any other country in alliance with Japan and each was to refrain from concluding any alliance directed against the other. Under the second agreement Russia promised to hand over the Chinese Chang Chun Railway immediately after the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty or in any case not later than the end of 1952. The Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Port

Arthur not later than 1952 and the Soviet Union was to be reimbursed for installations erected there since 1945. The future of Dairen was to be discussed after a Japanese peace treaty but meanwhile China was to take over all property administered by or leased to the U.S.S.R. in the port. The third agreement provided for a Soviet loan of \$300 million over a period of five years for the purchase of industrial and railway equipment. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 was superseded.

In the following years, friendliest relations continued between the two states. In September 1952, Chang Chun Railway was returned to China but it was agreed that Port Arthur would not be returned until Japan had concluded a peace treaty with Russia and China. In October 1954, however, it was agreed that Port Arthur would be returned in 1955 and the transfer took place in May 1955. Meanwhile close economic relations in the spheres of finance, joint enterprises, commerce and technical aid were established. Four joint stock companies (50-50 basis) were established to exploit China's resources. In October 1954, new agreements were signed between the two countries which provided for the sale of Russian interests in these companies to China, for the extension of additional Russian credit to China and for the construction of a new railway parallel to the Trans-Siberian line. Thousands of technical advisers and experts are working in China to build up the Chinese economy.

Politically, the two countries work in close collaboration. The U.S.S.R. has been the strongest champion of the Chinese entry in the U.N. The Soviet support in the Korean War was undoubtedly given. In 1954-55, they both condemned the regional security pacts sponsored by the Western Powers in the Middle East and South East Asia. In 1956-57 both condemned the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. Throughout the Hungarian and Polish revolts there were regular consultations between the two capitals. The Chinese had shown moderation in the denunciation of Stalin and had differed from some aspects of Khrushchev's thesis at the 20th Party Congress. But in 1958, the two states jointly attacked Tito. During the recent crisis of Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, the Soviet leaders made a hurried visit to Peking and held consultations.

Peking's relations with other Communist States have been quite close. There is a steady exchange of students, athletes, musicians, dancers, and technical experts. Wide trade relations have been established and trade pacts have been signed with all of them. In 1950-51, a Sino-Polish Sea Transport Company was established. Generally, China, until recently, appears to have made no effort to play a leading part in the councils of the Communist States in Eastern Europe, being content to regard

this area as a Soviet sphere of influence and the status of such smaller Communist nations as irrelevant to her own relationship with the Soviet Union. She has given firm support to the Russian efforts to halt the movement towards greater independence in these countries. Indeed it may even be said that the revolt in Hungary caused Moscow to enlist Peiping's aid, with the result that Chou En-lai paid his first visit to Eastern Europe during this period. In Budapest, he assured the Hungarians that China would not remain mere bystander if attempts were made by "reactionary elements" to overthrow the legally elected popular government of any Communist country. "But in gaining the backing of the Chinese, Moscow had to grant the Chinese Communists direct access to the satellites for the first time. This was of great significance for China and helped boost the building up of her economy. China had carried out trade with the East European satellites before, and indeed on a large scale, but never directly. The Soviet Union had always played the role of broker and all dealings went through the Soviets. Now, China was able to negotiate with her trade partners directly, and from a position of strength".

Relations with Asian, African and Latin-American States. China's relations with India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal, Japan, Indo-China, Siam and Philippines and the Middle East countries have already been dealt with. We have also surveyed the attitude and policy of China towards the national movements in Africa and Latin America. It is enough to point out here that the Chinese Communists did not need Russian encouragement to turn their attention to South-East Asia. Special effort is made by China to cultivate Japan and India. With India, except Tibet, they have had no difficulties as we have already seen. With Japan, in spite of absence of diplomatic relations, wide economic and cultural exchanges have taken place. On February 26, 1958, a 5-year contract providing for the barter of Chinese iron-ore and coal for Japanese steel products was signed by representatives of the Chinese National Metals Corporation and leading Japanese Steel Companies. On March 5, 1958, the Fourth Private Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement was signed in Peking. But an incident on 2nd May involving the tearing down of a Chinese Communist flag at an exhibition in Nagasaki led Peking to announce, on May 10, the suspension of all commercial relations with Japan, including the barter agreement of February 26. Finally, it may be mentioned that the relative influence of China on Asian countries is constantly increasing. In India particularly there is always a tendency to draw comparisons with developments in China. Peking has also become "the focal point for communist conferences, rallies, goodwill missions, social and cultural exchanges, and economic negotiations in Asia".

China and the West. With Britain, China has special animosities except that Hongkong may at some future date become a source of tensions. The British businessmen have been given fair treatment and the British recognition has obviously softened Peking's policy towards the U.K. It is really the United States of America which is indisputably Public Enemy Number One of Communist China. At the end of the war in 1945, the Chinese Communists had no rigid dislike for the United States. We have referred to the role of Marshall in the Chinese Civil War. The change in the Communists' attitude seems to have come over in the autumn of 1948 when they confined the American counsel at Mukden, Angus Ward, and his staff to his compound and kept them cut off from the outer world for six months. In October 1949, they arrested Ward and 4 subordinates on the charge of assaulting a former Chinese employee. In January, 1950 the U.S.A. withdrew its consular and diplomatic staff from the mainland in protest against the seizure of some of its property in Peking. In December, 1950, following Peking's intervention in the Korean War, the U.S.A. placed drastic restrictions on trade with Communist China and shortly after, the Peking Government seized all American property in China and "froze" American bank accounts there.

Since 1949, many factors have contributed to the worsening of relations between China and the U.S.A. We have referred to the U.S. refusal to recognise the Communist regime and the U.S. opposition to its entry in the U.N. The U.S. policy of rearming Japan in the wake of the policy of containment of Communism in Asia was viewed in China as a policy of restoring fascism. The Japanese Peace Treaty, and the Mutual Security Treaty (September 1951), if anything, confirmed these suspicions. The war in Korea drove "the Hate-American Campaign" to new heights and led to the slogan that the U.S.A. is "a paper-tiger and can be fully defeated". The U.S. policy on Formosa we have already surveyed in Part Two of this work. This was related by Peking to the U.S. policy on Korea and "both appeared in their eyes as a co-ordinated scheme of imperialism". On Formosa the Chinese feel strongly and the U.S. policy to help Chiang's Government there, in their eyes, is an act of gross interference in China's internal affairs. In the spring of 1955 a serious crisis developed over the offshore islands—Quemoy and Matsu. At the Bandung Conference an effort was made to settle some of the problems that divided Peking from Washington but the Sino-U.S. talks at Geneva held in 1954-55 achieved no results. In 1956-57, the tension continued to increase and in 1958 it reached new heights.

The Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks in Geneva had continued until the end of 1957 when the U.S. Ambassador concerned went

to another post. However, no progress was made regarding the question of the renunciation of force in the Formosa area. The U.S.A. and Communist China agreed to continue the talks in Warsaw. Within this frame-work the position in the area from mid-1955, although remaining tense, was nevertheless quiet in a military sense. Sporadic bombardments occurred, initiated by one side or another, and there was a certain amount of aerial activity, but no major clashes occurred. The territorial position has remained unchanged since the Nationalist evacuation of the Tachen islands in February 1955. On the political front, the propaganda war continued unabated. On May 7, 1957, the U.S.A. announced that U.S. Air Force troops armed with the guided tactical missile Matador (T.M. 61) would be stationed on Formosa. This naturally caused serious indignation in Peking. By July 1958, the crisis had deepened again and Peking authorities increased their air activity in the area of the Formosa straits. On August 7, two Chinese Nationalist jet aircraft were shot down by the Communists. The Communists concentrated heavy artillery bombardment against the Quemoy group and, later, there was some concentration against the smaller islands of Tan-Tan and Ehr-Tan, south-west of Quemoy. On August 25, a substantial naval engagement took place between Nationalist and Communist forces on August 25. Meanwhile the U.S.A. had reinforced its Seventh Fleet in Formosan waters with an aircraft carrier and four destroyers from the Mediterranean and deployed air forces from the Philippines on Formosa. On August 14, Chiang's Defence Minister had declared that "the offshore islands would be held and defended to the last". On August 19, 1958, Moscow Radio warned the U.S.A. against provocation in the Formosa area. On August 23, Dulles, referring to Quemoy and Matsu Islands, announced: "These islands have been continuously in the hands of the Republic of China, and over the last four years the ties between these islands and Formosa have become closer and their inter-dependence has increased. I think it would be highly hazardous for any one to assume that, if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change this situation by force and now to attack and seek to conquer these islands, that could be a limited operation. It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area". On August 27, Eisenhower said that nothing definite could be said what the U.S.A. would do if Quemoy and Matsu were invaded by Communist China. Same day the Chinese Communist Commander in Fukien issued the warning that China would liberate Taiwan as well as the offshore islands and that a landing on Quemoy was imminent. The U.S. reply followed the next day. Recalling Dulles's warning of August 23, quoted above, it concluded: "This direct threat and the massive bombardment of Quemoy came as stark reminders

of Peking's militarism and aggressive expansionism, and are in direct contrast to Peking's repeated professions of peaceful intentions."

Thus China's relation with the U S A have throughout been strained. The Eisenhower Doctrine, the crisis in Syria and the U S intervention in Lebanon gave new dimensions to the cold war. In short, it appears that in the near future there is no chance of any rapprochement between China and the U S A. The problem of Formosa tends to defy settlement, and unless a solution to it is found as part of a larger over-all bargain, it will continue to be a most serious danger spot in Asia.

Policy objectives and means We may now summarize the basic foreign policy objectives of Communist China (a) the recovery of territories traditionally regarded by China as Chinese, (b) the strengthening of security of China's frontiers, (c) the expansion of Chinese influence in Asia, and (d) the extension of the practice of Communism.

Among the territories where China's sovereignty was still disputed were Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, Hongkong, Macao and Formosa. In Sinkiang, the new Government immediately sent troops to occupy the area and they are still there. Although it did not and could not secure the return of Outer Mongolia, it obtained, what was denied to Chiang's Government, the exchange of ambassadors and in 1952 concluded a ten-year agreement on economic, cultural, and educational co-operation. We have discussed the recovery of all the special concessions granted by Chiang to Russia in Manchuria and the provisions of the Treaties of February 1930 regarding Dairen and Port Arthur. In 1950, China liberated Tibet. For the present, Peking is not making any effort to secure the return of Hongkong and Macao. Formosa problem we have already examined. It has now been realized by Peiping that it has no chance of securing Taiwan by military force, for, that would mean a war between China and the U S A in which the U S S R would, of course, come in. China, therefore, is now concentrating on the possibility of "peaceful liberation", by promising suitable positions to the Kuomintang leaders and by playing on the patriotic feelings of the Chinese in Formosa.

With regard to the second objective of security of the frontiers, the Chinese aim is to secure (i) the elimination of the hostile power of the Kuomintang in Formosa, or at least, "the withdrawal of the U S aid and alliance which alone makes this power a menace", (ii) the withdrawal of U S power south from Korea, and if possible the replacement of the present Government of Syngman Rhee by one friendly to China, and (iii) the removal of U S power and influence from Japan.

About the third objective—extension of Chinese influence in Asia—it may be stated that China has made constant efforts to build up its influence in Japan and Korea. Soon after the Korean war, the Chinese outbid the Soviet offer of £90 million worth of aid with an even larger one of £112 million. In South Korea the sentiment of Korean unity has been exploited in an attempt to secure the overthrow of Syngman Rhee and the withdrawal of U.S. and U.N. troops. In Japan, propaganda has been carried on against the presence of U.S. troops and U.S. loans there and against the revision of the constitution required for full Japanese rearmament. Here also the major menace is not the Japanese strength but the U.S.A. The effort, therefore, is directed to secure a neutralist government in Japan which might expel the U.S. forces and remove the U.S. bases. Meanwhile, cultural and trade relations continue and the Japanese civilians were returned in exchange for trading concessions. Elsewhere the Chinese have exploited the anti-Western sentiment of nationalist regimes, and the attack on the S.E.A.T.O. was aimed at building moral influence in the region. Incidentally, in attacking the S.E.A.T.O. China was attacking the U.S.A. We have already examined the Chinese efforts to humour Burma, Indonesia, even Siam and Malaya. In Indo-China, the ultimate aim is a United Viet Nam, friendly to China. With New Delhi, Peking's relations are hundred per cent correct. The summoning of the conference of Asian and Pacific Nations in 1952 in order to mobilize support for their case in Korea and against the Japanese rearmament, the setting up of a Peace Liaison Committee for the Asian and Pacific Region, and the Chinese participation in the Bandung Conference have been other moves of Peking to make up with neighbours and to build up influence. Finally, the extension of communism. In fact this seems to be "the most remote aim of Chinese foreign policy" and is clearly subordinated to other more vital objectives.

The means adopted for the realization of these objections have been: (1) the building up of Chinese power and raising the standard of living of the Chinese masses; (2) the effective use of diplomacy such as using "the witch cry of imperialism to arouse hostility towards the U.S.A., Britain and other Western nations among all under-developed countries" or again, there is the attempt to exploit the differences between countries hostile to China or its ideology; (3) The Sino-Soviet alliance as a source of military, economic and political strength.

Impact of Chinese Revolution on World Politics. The emergence of China as a unified national Power under communist leadership has been an epoch-making event not only in the history of China, but also of Asia and the world. In China it

was the fulfilment of centuries of aspirations of the masses. In Asia it is a part of the nationalist upsurge and all that it implies. In the world, it has opened new directions and has inaugurated a major centre of power. It registered the failure of U.S. policies in the Far East. It has placed enormous human and material resources on the side of the "Socialist Camp", and has tilted the balance of power in favour of the U.S.S.R. It has led to new frictions and schisms in the Western world. On the issues of recognition of the new regime in Peking and of its representation at the U.N., it has brought to the surface the conflict of interests of the U.S.A. and Britain, U.S.A. and India and other South-East Asian countries. It led to the extension of the doctrine of containment of Communism from Europe to Asia, to the widening of the systems of regional alliances and military pacts, and to the acceleration of the race for armaments. It contributed to a material change in the U.S. policies towards Japan and India particularly. Before 1949, China was regarded as the bastion of the West and enormous money was sunk by the United States to bolster up the Kuomintang regime. After 1949, the United States did the stock-taking and changed the order of priorities in Asia by placing Japan and India in the forefront. It also obliged the Pentagon to support reactionary regimes in South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. It brought to the limelight the need to develop the under-developed areas and the Colombo Plan may be said to be its immediate outcome. In the Communist world, until 1949, the U.S.S.R. was the unchallenged leader. The Chinese Revolution undermined the Soviet supremacy, indirectly contributed to the national ferment in the Communist Camp, and led to a new ordering of loyalties. In the Far East, it led to a major upset, and created many danger spots. Referring to this aspect Pannikkar writes:

"Abbot, in his *Expansion of Europe* says 'Among the many diverse events which make a period memorable in history none is more striking than the rise of a State to equality or supremacy among the powers of the world. Preceded almost invariably by a long period of slow development, precipitated by the advent of some extraordinary circumstance, or the ambition or ability of some individual, and culminating for the most part in a great convulsion, a final arbitrament of arms, with its vast expenditure of energy, treasure, and blood, and the relative decline and readjustment of other powers of the polity into which the new power thrusts its way, this recurrent phenomenon of history is at once the chief motive of progress and distinction in the drama of politics'. This phenomenon was in fact what we were witnessing in the Far East. China has become a Great Power and was insisting on being recognised as such. The adjustments which such a recognition requires are not easy, and the conflict in the

Far East is the out-come of this contradiction". (*In Two Chinas*, pp. 177-78).

Indeed, a historic event has occurred, and the rest of the world might debate for long its causes and might take long in recognising that it has taken place. It is not a question of anybody liking it or disliking it. One has to suffer the consequences of shutting one's eyes to something which exists but which one ignores or does not recognise. The adjustments which such a recognition requires may be, as Panikkar says, difficult but it is only in times of difficulties that statesmanship is put to test.

CHAPTER 22

The United Nations

Origin

In Part One of this work we have surveyed the genesis growth and failure of the League of Nations during the period between the two world wars. We have also discussed the various steps taken by the Allied leaders during the Second World War in the direction of establishing a more effective organization in the post war period taking into account the grim realities of the contemporary international situation. Briefly stated these steps were the Declaration of Four Freedoms (January 6, 1941), the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941), the United Nations Declaration of 26 Governments (January 1, 1942), the Moscow Declaration (October 30, 1943), the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (November 9, 1943), the Teheran Declaration (December 1, 1943), the creation of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (I B R D) and International Monetary Fund (I M F) at the Bretton Woods Conference on July 21, 1944, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (25 proposals) for an International Organization for World Peace in October 1944, and the Yalta Agreements of February 1945. At Dumbarton Oaks the main outlines of the proposed organization were drawn out and it was agreed that peace should be kept by collective action, by mediation or, if that failed, by force. At Yalta, the signal for the transition from planning to action was given when Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill resolved on the earliest possible establishment of a general international security organization declared that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals laid the foundations for such a body, and announced that a United Nations Conference to prepare a charter of the proposed organization would be held on Wednesday, 25th April, 1945.

The San Francisco Conference April 25—June 26, 1945

The Conference to draw out the Charter of the United Nations Organization (U N O) was held before the end of the fighting and the Charter was separated from the Peace Settlement necessary to liquidate World War II. Now, this procedure was materially different from that used after World War I, for, the Covenant of the League of Nations was written into the Peace Treaties of 1919 after all the fighting was over. It was felt in 1945 that "statements of basic objectives were an essential element in securing the widest popular backing for the war effort", and that it would be better to unite for peace

"while the ties of war-alliance still were strong". An agreement reached in time of war had a fair chance of being kept up in time of peace. After the war, there might be bickerings and dissensions which might render the task insuperable and even impossible. For Roosevelt, there was the lingering memory of Wilson's tragedy and he, therefore, "felt it wise to secure the consent of the Congress of the United States to the establishment of a world organization before those domestic political differences, which tend to return so rapidly to all democratic countries after the close of a war, made agreement on such a controversial subject less sure". It may be asked why was a new international organization considered to be necessary. There was the League and it could have been allowed to continue with some improvement and reform. Why was it thought necessary to spend so much money and time in drawing out a new Charter? Three reasons compelled the new venture. First, the U.S.A. would have been still averse to joining the League which the Senate had condemned in 1920. The American leaders, therefore, thought that they must present to the Senate "a new scheme more American in origin and thinking". Secondly, since the Soviet Union had been expelled from the League they would have never agreed to its revival. Finally, people generally thought that "a fresh start would bring something stronger than the League had been and less affected by the stigma of failure which, more or less unjustly, rested upon the League".

San Francisco proved to be a good site for the Conference. Its choice symbolised the increasing power and mounting prestige of the United States. The Conference opened on the 25th April as scheduled. The delegates of 46 nations were all government representatives. The 850 delegates and their advisers, 1,500 newspaper, radio and cameramen and 1,200 public spectators streamed through the marble foyer to their seats and behind them, stretching far beyond the confines of the conference town and of the American continent itself, was an endless sea of faces, the common people of all countries the world over. These millions, majority of whom had known at first hand the meaning of being at war, were now looking to this Conference for hope, guidance and peace. Stettinus opened the first session and at once came the voice of Truman, speaking by telephone line from the White House in Washington about 3,500 miles away, through the loud speakers with a key-note call to the Conference to work in the spirit of Roosevelt who had died on April 12, 1945. "It is not the purpose of this Conference", Truman declared, "to draft a treaty of peace in the old sense of that term. It is not our assignment to settle specific questions of territories, boundaries, citizenship and reparations. This Conference will devote its energies and its labours exclusively to the single problem of

setting up the essential organization to keep the peace You are to write the fundamental charter We fully realize today that victory in war requires a mighty united effort Victory in peace calls for, and must receive, an equal effort We were not isolated during the war We dare not become isolated in peace If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace"

The actual work of the San Francisco Conference, however, clearly indicated the trend of events to come, and the first clash came on the question of the appointment of a permanent chairman. Eventually a compromise was suggested by Eden and it was agreed that the presidency of the plenary sessions should rotate among the four sponsoring powers, that the four presidents should periodically meet under the chairmanship of Stettinius who would have the delegated powers of the other three to conduct the business of the Conference, and that he should preside over all meetings of the Steering Committee and its executive. The question of representation of states like Poland, Argentina, Ukraine and White Russia was settled and at the end, the admission of Argentina, Ukraine and White Russia brought the number of participating states to 49 and a few days later the entry of Denmark carried it to 50.

The Conference worked through four Commissions — on General Provisions, the Assembly, the Security Council and the Judicial Organization. Each Commission set up committees on which every delegation was entitled to be represented, to provide technical consideration of sections of the proposed Charter, and prepare draft provisions for the Commission to pass on to the plenary session. The ground plan was the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and various delegations had suggested amendments totalling 400 pages which were collected into a single indexed volume by the Secretariat and copies were issued to each delegate. All draft decisions of the Committees were examined by a Co-ordinating Committee assisted and advised by a small committee of jurists. Meanwhile the Big Five were constantly meeting to review the committee decisions. Responsibility for preparing the final text of the Charter rested with the Co-ordinating Committee and when they had finished, the jurists gave it a last minute review.

On three issues serious conflict of views occurred in the Conference: (i) the veto power of the Big Five permanent members of the Security Council (ii) the relationship of regional defence systems to the general organization, and (iii) the plan for trusteeship over areas inhabited by backward and dependent peoples. On every issue bitter debate preceded a compromise.

The fear and anxiety of the Latin American States, which apprehended that the veto in the Security Council would paralyse

collective security, was allayed when Truman assured that he would "invite them to negotiate a treaty which would be consistent with the World Charter while advancing the historic system of inter-American co-operation". On the question of veto, the opposition was launched by the smaller powers. While they conceded the principle, they opposed its unlimited operation and insisted on getting its use regulated. It was at Dumbarton Oaks that the principle of veto had been settled but there the voting procedure had not been considered. At Yalta the Big Three agreed (1) that each member of the Security Council should have one vote; (2) that decision of the Council on procedural matters should be made by a majority of any seven of the eleven members; and (3) that decisions on all other matters should be by a majority of seven members, which must include all five permanent members, except that a party to a dispute should not vote when it was only a question of seeking a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or any other peaceful means. Among the Big Four there arose differences with regard to the interpretation of this formula. The smaller powers demanded that the veto should not apply to the investigation of the facts of a dispute by the Council or to its recommendation of a settlement. At one stage they decided to concede this demand but later on the U.S.S.R. backed out of it and it was only when Stalin, at the request of Truman, intervened that the U.S.S.R. delegates withdrew the objection. The Big Four thus agreed that no individual member of the Council could alone prevent consideration by the Council of a dispute or situation likely to lead to a dispute. "But", the agreement added, "beyond this point decisions and actions by the Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might in the end require the Council to invoke measures of enforcement. This chain begins when the Council decides to make an investigation or determines that the time has come to call on states to settle their differences, or makes recommendations to the parties. It is for such decisions and actions that the unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso for abstention from voting by the parties to a dispute". It was recalled that in this respect the Charter would improve on the Covenant which allowed the Council of the League of Nations to take substantive decision only by a unanimous vote of *all* its members, with the exception of the parties to a dispute (under Art. 15), and by Art. 11, (under which most disputes were dealt with by the League) the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute. The Yalta formula (as now interpreted), with its provision for action in the Security Council by a majority of seven, would make the operation of the Council easier than

was the case under the League rule of unanimity. It was also pointed out by the Big Four that after all the five permanent members could not act by themselves, for since a decision in any case could be taken only by seven members, the five permanent members would need the concurring votes of at least two non-permanent members. Thus it would be possible for any five of the six non permanent members, acting as a group, to exercise a veto

The veto formula was thus finally approved, the veto was lifted from the discussion of disputes, the members were allowed to act immediately and without prior authority as regional defence groups until the Security Council took action against an aggressor, and a clause was inserted in the Charter, ensuring a seat on the Council and a veto to any nation whenever a decision is being discussed that may involve the use of its armed forces

On the question of the Trusteeship System the difficulty was that the Dumbarton Oaks proposal contained nothing about trusteeship and the League precedent under the Mandate System could not serve as a useful basis. It could not, because the League mandates plan was part of the Versailles Treaty and referred to actual areas taken from Germany and Turkey while "the U.N. Conference was meeting before any treaty of peace had been drafted and so had to delineate general principles of trusteeship and sketch a working machinery of a world wide system without being able to refer to specific territories. So every thing had to be done in the abstract". It was decided that the trusteeship system would apply to (i) ex-enemy possessions of the last war now under mandate system, (ii) those areas which might be detached from the enemies at the end of the second world war, and (iii) territories voluntarily placed under the system by colonial powers, on terms agreed between them and the U.N.O. The position of India and Syria both dependencies in 1945, and both represented at the Conference, was covered by the provision that trusteeship would not apply to any member of the U.N. A distinction was also envisaged between strategic trust areas (under the Security Council's supervision) and non-strategic trust areas (under the Assembly through a Trusteeship Council). Thus, while under the League there were three types of mandates and all areas had to fit into one of these, under the new plan status would be determined separately. While the League prohibited militarization of mandated areas, the new plan recognised the right to fortify only such areas as were designated as strategic. And while the Covenant made no provision for fitting the mandates system into the world security organization and as part of "the world peace-keeping machinery", the trusteeship plan expressly provided for such a link. The conflict at the San Francisco Conference was between those who asked for specific pledge of independence for dependent peoples

(e.g. Russia, China, India and other smaller nations) and those who opposed such a pledge (e.g. Britain, U.S.A., and France). Eventually the compromise included among the basic objectives—not pledges—of the trusteeship system, promotion of “progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances” of the areas concerned.

The rest of the matters were decided comparatively easily. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar headed the Committee on the Economic and Social Council and the final plan, covering 18 clauses of the Charter, provided for a Council of 18 nations to be elected by the General Assembly. Shortly before the San Francisco Conference a committee of jurists from thirty nations had met at Washington to prepare a draft statute for an International Court of Justice and it had prepared 69 articles. These, together with five clauses of the Dumbarton Oaks plan and 120 amendments, were examined by two Committees and they produced the plan that was finally approved by the Conference. There was some conflict of views on some questions: Should the court be new or a continuation of the old one with modifications? Should its jurisdiction be optional or compulsory? How should the judges be nominated? Should the Court render only decisions or could it give advisory opinions? All these questions were settled without much difficulty. The principal issues settled in the last days were the scope of the Assembly's powers of discussion and the procedure of amendment of the Charter and members' right to withdraw from the organization. Since it was thought that “to mention withdrawal would give the organization an air of impermanence, the Charter remains silent on this and only provides “for the suspension of a member's privileges and for expulsion of a persistent violator of the Charter's principles”. But the recommendation for expulsion was to be made by the Security Council (where the veto operates) and the decision on it is to be taken by the General Assembly.

On the question of amendment 28 nations wanted a special revision conference called not sooner than the fifth and not later than the tenth year after the Charter came into force. It was finally decided that a review conference could be called any time by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly and of any seven members of the Security Council. If no such conference had been held for ten years the proposal for one could be put on the agenda of the tenth session of the Assembly and the conference would be held if so decided by a majority vote of its members and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Any alteration of the Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference would take effect when ratified in accordance with their

respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the U N including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Thus the Big Five were given a veto right on amendment.

The last major issue was that of the powers of discussion to be given to the General Assembly. The 45 smaller powers wanted to vest large powers in the Assembly where there would be no veto and where they would have a greater weight. Here also a compromise was found and it was decided that the Assembly would be entitled to discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter and make recommendations but not "with regard to that dispute or situation" of which the Security Council is seized, unless the Security Council so requests. Towards the end, Mexico moved a resolution barring Franco's Spain and the Manchukuo from the membership of the U N and, though the Charter does not contain the bar, the resolution by common consent "was placed in the minutes as the official interpretation of the Charter rules governing membership."

Signing the Charter The Charter containing 10,000 words in 111 Articles divided in 19 Chapters was finally prepared in 5 official languages—English, French, Spanish, Russian and Chinese. All told, the various Committees held about 400 meetings and the entire conference is reported to have used 500 tons of paper. The total cost to the U S A—the host—was estimated at £400,000. The last business session of the Conference was held on June 25, 1945 and that night the Charter was unanimously approved. The signing began on June 26 and China, the first of the United Nations to have suffered attack by one of the Axis, got the honour of signing first. In the final session the Conference observed a minute's silence during which the audience rose in respect of the memory of the men and women killed in the war which was not yet over. The first atom bomb was used on August 6, 1945, the Charter establishing the U N O was, therefore, conceived in the pre-atomic era. The Charter came into force on October 24, 1945, it was, therefore, to function in the atomic age! By October 24, the number of ratifications deposited with the Government of the U S reached the minimum required by Article 110. But in order to bring the organization into effect it was still necessary to complete certain legal preparations. On June 26, 1945, the signatories of the Charter had established a "Preparatory Commission of the United Nations in order to make provisional arrangements for the first sessions of the General Assembly and the three Councils, the establishment of the Secretariat, and the convening of the International Court of Justice." The Commission was to consist of one representative of each Member Government and its functions were to be exercised between sessions by an Executive Committee of 14 members. The Commission decided

on June 27, 1945 that the Executive Committee might carry on the work of the Commission in London. The Committee met there from August 4 to November 24, 1945 and by December 23, 1945 the documents had been drafted covering the provisional rules of procedure, privileges and immunities, and provisional staff rules. Meanwhile the Commission set up a committee to negotiate with the Supervisory Commission of the League on the transfer of the League's assets. The last session of the League Assembly met at Geneva from April 8 to April 18, 1946 and it assented to the transfer of assets to the U.N. From April 19, 1946, the League of Nations ceased to exist.

Assumptions underlying the Charter. In order to understand the functions of the United Nations and its role in world affairs, it is necessary to be clear about the explicit and implicit assumptions underlying the Charter. It was assumed by its framers, *firstly*, that scientific and technological advance has led to the invention of such a formidable war machinery that the only alternative to peace is a total annihilation of world civilization. Peace, therefore, is to be achieved at any cost. *Secondly*, it was thought that maintenance of international peace and security involved collective action "not only in dealing with threatening disputes and situations but also in creating political, economic, and social conditions favourable to peace throughout the world". *Thirdly*, it was assumed that this collective or common action must be based on voluntary co-operation between various governments, and not on dictation or coercion by anything like a world government. The U.N.O., therefore, was to be based on the sovereign equality of all its members. Indeed, it may even be said that the U.N. is almost in every respect the very anti-thesis of world government and the deference paid to the principle of national self-determination, the divorce of responsibility from power through the eclipse of the Security Council by the General Assembly and the incongruities of the principle of 'one state, one vote', all suggest that "the organization may excite rather than discourage national particularism and individualism". *Fourthly*, it was also assumed that within the framework of the co-operative system on which the U.N. is based, the primary and final responsibility for taking action for the preservation of peace and security in specific situations must rest with the great powers "acting in accordance with the purposes and principles to which all are committed". It was, therefore, hoped that the war-time unity between the great powers would continue. The Charter's collective security formula was, therefore, based on the assumption of a continuing "Armed Concert" of great powers. During the course of the second world war the idea had developed that instead of one power controlling world events, there should be a new world system in which the major powers were to work together—

an idea which, in the words of Toynbee, was "comparable with coalition government at the national level" The U N was the product of this idea But since even at the San Francisco Conference there were signs of disruption in this concert, many people there had shown reluctance to make the future success of the U N entirely dependent on the concept of continuing unity of the Great Powers This reluctance is duly reflected in provisions of the Charter such as those relating to the functions and powers of the General Assembly But, to the responsibility of the Great Powers for peace and security, was to be combined the interest and regard for the smaller states, for, otherwise their confidence in the U N O would be destroyed

Again, it had been supposed that "although the powers responsible for the defeat of the Axis powers should undertake initially the drafting and enforcement of the terms of the peace settlements, the new organization should assume primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security on the basis of these peace settlements once the major powers relinquish their special responsibilities" In fact it was thought that co-operation among the Great Powers would not merely be confined to the questions that might come up before the U N, but that it would also extend to the terms of peace to be imposed on the defeated powers without which the basis for effective co-operation within the U N itself would be greatly weakened In future years, most of these assumptions proved to be illusory, as we will shortly see

Purposes and Aims of the U N The purposes of the U N as defined by the Charter are, *first*, to maintain peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace *Secondly*, it aims at developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace *Thirdly*, its objective is to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion *Finally*, it aims at becoming a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends In the preamble it is pointed out that the basic aims of the U N shall be "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the

obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained; to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom; to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours; to unite to maintain international peace and security; to accept peaceful approach; and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

Nature and Principles of the U. N. Certain characteristic features of the U.N. become clear on a perusal of the Charter. In the *first* place, like the League of Nations, it was a League of the Victors. It "was conceived in the midst of war and in the fear of war. It was the product of the victors of World War II, and their trade name was carried over to become the name of the universal organization for peace". Only those states had been invited at the San Francisco Conference which had signed the Declaration by the United Nations and enemies as well as neutrals had been excluded from original membership. Article 107 makes a clear distinction between the U.N. and the "enemy States" and to deal with them the responsibility is implicitly given to the Big Five. "It was their share in winning the war upon which was based the claim of the Five Powers to predominance in the U.N., and no new state can be admitted without the consent of all five. The term 'peace-loving state' was interpreted to mean those states which had been willing to war against the Axis aggressors".

Secondly, the U.N. is characterized by the supremacy of the Big Five in relation to the smaller powers. Even at the San Francisco Conference, whenever the latter criticized the veto right of the former, they were reminded that the war had been mainly fought by the Big Powers. When, for instance, Belgium attacked the Big Power veto on amendments of the Charter, the U.S.S.R. retorted that but for the sacrifices of Britain, Russia and the U.S.A., they would not be there to complain and argue. The veto also extends to the admission of new members and the appointment of a Secretary-General. "This special position does not depend upon their ability to meet stated criteria; they are arbitrarily named and there is no way to unseat them, even by amendment without their own consent. They can block almost any action in the Security Council; on the other hand, when they are in agreement, they should easily be able to influence the two other votes needed to take affirmative action". The veto has even been pushed forward to cover the question whether a question is substantive or procedural. Under section 2 of Article 27 of the Charter the veto is not permissible on procedural matters. But there have been differences of opinion whether a particular matter was procedural or not and this question has been treated not procedural but substantive and, therefore, vetoable. This is

called the "*Double Veto*" It is true that the rules of the Security Council have been interpreted to prevent this practice and on at least one occasion the Soviet representative agreed to this interpretation. But the principle of supremacy of the Great Powers has been further extended by Articles 106 and 107. Article 106 authorises them to take such action on behalf of the Organization as they may consider necessary for the preservation of international peace and security. Under Article 107 it is provided that "*nothing shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorised as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action*". The phrase we have italicized impliedly hands over the control over enemy states to the Big Five.

Seen from another standpoint, this principle of the Great Powers supremacy has accentuated the tendency on the part of smaller nations to align with one Big Power or the other. If aggression is committed by any one of the Big Five, it can be shielded by the veto, if it is committed by the smaller nations, they can be compelled to submit to Security Council decisions. The result has been that most of the smaller powers tend to align with a great Power, and in their calculations the veto is taken into account.

Thirdly, the Charter bases the U.N.O. on "the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members". The Charter is thus a treaty which recognises the principle of sovereign equality. The organization, therefore, cannot reach into a member state and legislate for that member. The Charter carefully protects each member against interference. The members are only enjoined "to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter", to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to give the U.N. every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter. No rule of law can, however, be issued by the U.N., which is binding on a member without its own consent. It is only in the field of enforcement action against an aggressor (Chapter 7) that a member may be bound to action without its own consent. The Security Council can give no final decision, but can only make recommendations in disputes between members. Nor is there anything to prevent a member from withdrawing from the U.N., temporarily or permanently. The U.S.S.R. did actually withdraw temporarily early in 1950 as a protest against the seating of Nationalist China in the U.N. Finally, the U.N. is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or from requiring the members to submit such matters to settlement under the

Charter. The only exception to this is provided under Chapter VII entitled "Action with respect to threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression". Here the Security Council is armed with the power "to repress the illegal use of force". Except for this, the corner-stone of national sovereignty is left unaffected. It is, indeed, carefully protected. Thus seen, the U.N. is far from being a super state; it is an association of states, with each member free to do as it wishes except for certain limitations upon its right to use force in its international relations. It is far from being a world government.

Fourthly, it follows from what we stated earlier, that the U.N. is another example of that political form of maximum stability and effectiveness where one finds, the mixture of federal union and the unitary state, of order and variety, whether the proportions be properly adjusted or not. *It is not so much a legal order as a political system.* The rule of law is severely limited. The General Assembly as well as the major Councils—the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council—are all political bodies. (The only legal organ is the International Court of Justice and its jurisdiction is hedged in by limitations and its judgments can be ignored with impunity). Nowhere does the Charter say that decisions of these bodies shall be reached in accordance with the principles of international law. It is only indirectly that legal principles may enter the making of a political decision, but even here much would depend on personal equation. The fact that the development and codification of international law is one of the functions of the U.N. is irrelevant to the issue we are presently considering. It is only in section 1 of Article I that a lip service is paid to "the principles of justice and international law". The U.N., therefore, hardly represents a legal order.

But if it is not a legal order, it is certainly a political system based on "co-operation" and "decentralization". What is "Co-operation" in this context? It implies the "willingness" and "the ability" of its members to co-operate, and both are hypothetical matters. The willingness and the ability to co-operate will, in any given case, depend partly or wholly, on the smooth adjustment of national interests, and not on any set of absolute rules or categorical imperatives. The natural disposition of most states is to harp on those rules which are in line with their own particular national objectives and to play down the rest. The prospects of collective action usually turn, therefore, far more on the majority's recognition of coincidence of national interests than on a genuine deference to these rules. On this showing, the U.N. cannot be said to be a world authority endowed with a will of its own the capacity to enforce that will. *It is only in a very formal sense that the U.N. can be said to be an "entity".* For

instance, it can certainly be said that the U N can take its own corporate action which is technically (but only technically) separate from the acts of its member states, just as a corporation can take action which is separate and apart from the individual acts of its directors or stockholders. In this sense although the mediator for India and Pakistan, Dr Frank Graham, is an American citizen, he has no instructions from the United States Government, he is paid by and represents the U N in its efforts for an accommodation of views on the problem of Kashmir. But students of diplomacy also know that the views of a mediator almost invariably reflect the views of the country to which he belongs.

And what about "decentralization"? It is in two ways that this principle is reflected in the U N. *First*, while the League of Nations tended to move in the direction of centralization, the U N tends in the direction of decentralization in respect of specialized agencies. The League "sought to bring all international activities under one umbrella", though it did not fully succeed in doing this. The U N, on the other hand, "encourages the building of separate international organizations, each with its own special functions, its own staff, and its own treaty base". All the specialized agencies are specifically designated in the Charter, and they are linked with the U N. *Secondly*, there are the provisions for regional security organizations based on the concept of collective self-defence as distinct from the concept of collective security. This we have fully discussed in Part Two of this work and the reader may refer to its pages (252—254).

Thus seen, the U N is a political system based on the twin principles of co operation and decentralization. It is not a body active outside the framework of decisions of member governments. It reflects world anarchy, tensions, rifts and cracks. It cannot abolish conflicts of ideology and power, or the new nationalism or the revolutionary upsurge of peoples. The world is face to face with a choice between peace and plenty or total annihilation, and the U N is the response of civilised man to this kind of a world. It is a method by which disruptive forces can be kept within the peaceful bounds laid down by the Charter. It is a series of continuing international conferences, and a forum. These conferences provide a diplomatic clearing house where representatives of many governments see each other regularly, and get to know each other as individuals. The U N Assembly, for this reason, has been called as the "Town Meeting of the world". The U N presents a method and instrument of foreign policy by which governments can negotiate with each other on the basis of Charter purposes which they must have in mind, whether they support them or not. It is a form of "multilateral diplomacy", a modernized version of 19th century "Conference diplomacy".

It can even be called as a diplomatic contrivance to facilitate collective action, but as such, it can for the most part do no more than its members collectively are prepared to do. Permanent delegations at the U.N. headquarters have been called "World embassies", because of the wide scope of contacts and negotiations they must undertake.

The League and the U.N. compared. In saying all this, the reader will be reminded that some such things were said about the League of Nations too. Indeed it has been said that the organization which emerged in the U.N. Charter is, in general, another League of Nations. It will be more correct to say that the U.N. is not a mere replica of the League. In some respects the U.N. is similar to the League; in some, it represents a material improvement on it; and in others it even seems to be weaker. Like the League the U.N. is making serious efforts to contain, if not to abolish, war as a scourge which has brought untold sorrow to mankind. Both have been based on the concept of sovereign equality of member states, both have relied on diplomacy and agreement to achieve their ends, and both have utilised much the same type of organs and agencies. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Court of International Justice remind one of the League Assembly, the League Council and the P.C.I.J. The Trusteeship system reminds us of the Mandate system. Analogous to the commissions and specialized agencies of the U.N. were the "technical organizations" of the League and the "technical commissions" to deal with such matters as intellectual co-operation, health, communications and transit, armament, and traffic in dangerous drugs. In both systems objective has been stated and machinery has been provided, but in both actual progress has to depend upon the voluntary co-operation of member states rather than on their own authority. The instruments of both have been persuasion, public opinion, consultation, and discussion:

In many ways the system of the U.N. is weaker than the League system. In the Covenant the obligations of the Members were stated in very definite terms, while in the Charter those obligations are couched in rather general terms. Under the Charter, Members are under no obligation to take enforcement measures of any kind in case of a threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, until the Security Council has taken decisions specifying the measures to be applied. On the other hand, Article 16 of the Covenant required the immediate application of economic and financial sanctions against a Member resorting to war in violation of the Covenant. Under the Charter system, however, in case of flagrant aggression, the Security Council is expected to take enforcement measures without delay and to the full extent required by the circumstances.

Again, the limit of domestic jurisdiction in the Charter system is much more stringent than it was under the League system. The Charter specifically provides that "nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the U N to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." In cases where there is a conflict of views, whether a matter falls within the domestic jurisdiction of a state or not, the Charter leaves a wide gap. Each state would be its own judge. The parallel provision of the Covenant was "If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement." It was also declared to be "friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." While, in effect, the League was also helpless in cases which members claimed to fall within their domestic jurisdiction, its Council could certainly decide according to international law as whether to a specific question fell within its domestic jurisdiction or not. Under the Charter there is no provision as to who should decide the question. Nevertheless, the U N has not been restrained in taking action on matters despite frequent protests that to do so would be to intervene in a member's domestic affairs.

Though in some ways weaker than the League system, the U N system represents a definite and significant advance on the pattern and ideas on which the League was based. The two most powerful and most reluctant states—the U S A, and the U S S R—were persuaded to enter the new organization and without their participation there could be little hope of progress. At least, in theory, the Charter recognises what the Covenant did not, viz that it is the "peoples" and not mere "governments" that an international organization is intended to serve. In the Preamble to the Charter, the words used are "we, the peoples of the U N" while in the Covenant it was "the High Contracting Parties", i.e. the Governments which agreed to unite in the League. Even though the people have no direct contact with the U N and the delegates are just representatives of the governments of the Member States, the Charter, in making the people party to the U N, has thrown a new responsibility upon the people. Again, although at most points the organs of the U N have only powers of recommendation, at a number of points they do have powers of decision and command exceeding anything in the League system. Majority voting is

accepted for the making of decisions much more widely than in the League, both for the General Assembly and various Councils. On paper, at least, the U.N. has a more powerful system of enforcement and more discretion in its use at numerous important points. It is a definite gain on the League system that "the unanimity rule, so long prevailing in international conferences, is abandoned and that a veto can nowhere be used except in the security field, and that instead of veto belonging to every Member and to be used in all voting, a veto can now be used only by five states and only in the security field".

Moreover, the U.N. system of sanctions is more elaborate, involving as it does an obligation on the part of states to make agreements with the Security Council defining their respective contributions to the prevention of aggression, and supported as it is by a Military Staff Committee, an organ for which there was no counter-part in the League. In 1950, the system was expanded further (as we will note later) by an arrangement giving the General Assembly the right to employ military sanctions when the Security Council is deadlocked by a veto. Thus, the authority to require Members to use armed forces against an aggressor is a decided gain over the League as a legal matter, however, weak it may be in its actual operation. The Covenant provided for sanctions against any power which defied the authority of the League. The U.N. can take "enforcement action" not only when war has actually broken out but it can also take "preventive action" when there is a threat to peace. The Covenant, being an integral part of the Peace Treaties, encouraged the tendency to equate security with the *status quo*. The U.N. does not suffer from this handicap. The Covenant did not clearly demarcate the functions of the Council from those of the Assembly, and this had weakened the League somewhat. The Charter clearly demarcates the functions of the Security Council from those of the General Assembly and the former is much stronger and has the power to decide whether there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression and also to decide as to the application of the enforcement measures.

Again, while the Covenant did not provide for collective self-defence, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter specifically defines the scope and extent of the right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the U.N. As we will note later, with regard to the colonial questions also, the U.N. system is more effective than that of the League and the Trusteeship Council has more powers than the Permanent Mandates Commission ever had. Finally, greater recognition is given under the U.N. system, to the need for social and economic collaboration than under the Covenant. The League had no regular representative organs, except the I.L.O., for dealing with economic questions,

its Financial and Economic Committee being mainly an expert fact finding body, with no power of action. The I.L.O., cut adrift from the old League of which it was a part, remains in being under a new Constitution drawn up at its Philadelphia Conference of 1915, and has been accepted, with its tripartite legal structure, as the instrument of the U.N. in the field of labour. Again, the Economic and Social Council (E.C.O.S.O.C.) with its many commissions and specialized agencies represents a much more ambitious effort to deal with problems of peace-time co-operation than that put forth by the technical organizations and advisory committees of the League. The organization of the former is larger and its objectives are more inclusive than were those of the latter. The U.N. Specialized Agencies have an autonomous status not matched by the agencies of the League dealing with similar subjects. "Whereas it was possible under the League system for older international agencies, such as the Universal Postal Union, to become affiliated with the main organization, as a matter of fact they were not brought so generally into a working relationship with the League as has been true of them under the U.N. (In other words, the U.N. embraces an even larger percentage of the total existing international organization than did the old League)"

Functions of the U.N. The primary function of the U.N. is the maintenance of peace and security on the basis of peaceful settlement of international disputes, common action against threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, regional security arrangements and disarmament. The U.N. is authorized to consider any situation likely to impair friendly relations among states and the principal method used by the U.N. has been mediation. As a mediator the U.N. has attempted to resolve the conflicts by providing a channel of communication between the combatants, by supplying a scapegoat which each side can hold responsible for failure to obtain its maximum demands, by providing a possible source of acceptable new proposals on which discussions can proceed, by inducing an atmosphere of friendliness and ease in which each nation's fears, expectations and hopes can be discussed, and by focussing the attention of world opinion on the issues in dispute. The U.N. has achieved peaceful settlement of disputes by investigating facts through commissions (e.g. in the early phase of the Greek civil war in 1946), by exercising good offices and conciliation (as in the Indonesian dispute in 1948-49), by a reference to the International Court of Justice (as in the Anglo-Albanian dispute), by appointing Truce Commissions (as in Palestine), and by issuing cease fire orders (as in Kashmir and Egypt).

Secondly, the U.N. has been entrusted with the task of bringing about peaceful change and treaty revision. Under Article 14,

"the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter" This is the counterpart of Article 19 of the Covenant. The U.N. General Assembly here has no power to order or enforce any change whatever.

Thirdly, the U.N. promotes international co-operation in the political field and encourages the progressive development of international law and its codification. It promotes international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields, assisting in the realization of human rights, and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

Fourthly, the U.N. promotes the well-being of the inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories on the basis of the "general principle of good neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world in social, economic, and commercial matters". It also promotes the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories.

Finally, the U.N. functions as a platform of discussion, a forum of world opinion and as an agency of co-existence. When the normal diplomatic channels are not available and due to tensions diplomatic relations between two or more than two states are broken, the U.N. serves as the main diplomatic point of contact which renders negotiation possible (e.g. during the Berlin blockade in 1948-49) and the clearing of the Suez Canal in 1956-57. It also serves as a great shock-absorber and as an outlet for pent-up emotions. By letting out the steam, it enables statesmen to cool down. Prospects of peace are thereby brightened and the dangers of war recede backward.

STRUCTURE OF THE U.N.O.

Membership. We have already dealt with the Preamble, purposes, and principles of the U.N. Charter and with the basic functions of the U.N. As for membership, in the first place all the states participating in the San Francisco Conference (50) became the original members. These were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelo-Russia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Commonwealth,

Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Union of South Africa, USSR, U.K., U.S.A., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. To these 50, Poland also joined as an original member on October 15, 1945. Membership is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and they can be admitted by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. In this vote, a veto may be used in the Security Council and a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly is required. At first, entry of new members was very strict, and later, the cold war put fresh hurdles in the way of states aspiring for membership. Nine states were admitted in the yearly ears—Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden and Thailand (1946), Pakistan and Yemen (1947), Burma (1948), Israel (1949) and Indonesia (1950). The applications of a number of other states were vetoed in the first post-war decade. Spain did not even apply for membership until September 1955 for reasons earlier stated. The Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco were allowed to become members in 1956 without much difficulty. Sixteen states—Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Cambodia, Finland, Hungary, Irish Republic, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Laos, Nepal, Portugal, Rumania, and Spain entered the U.N. in the famous package deal in December 1955. This had brought the number of members to 79. In 1956 Japan entered as the 80th member and in 1957 Ghana and Malaya brought the membership to 82. In contrast to the problem of admissions, there has been no controversy over the operation of the Charter provisions on suspension and expulsion. While these provisions have not yet been applied, a state against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken may be suspended from the U.N. by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. Such a state may be restored the rights of membership by the Security Council.

Obligations, privileges and legal character. Members are obliged, under both general international law and Art 2 of the U.N. Charter, to fulfil in good faith their obligations under the Charter. Non members have no obligations under the Charter, but may find themselves subjected to U.N. action if they presume to disturb the peace. Non members have the rights to apply for membership, to bring any disputes to which they may be parties to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly, if they accept in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. They have also a right to join the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) on conditions determined by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.

The Organization is to "enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes". The representatives of the Member states and officials of the U.N. are to enjoy "such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the organization". The General Assembly is responsible for making recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of privileges and immunities.

The Organization has been given a legal capacity and under Article 104, it is to "enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes". The U.N. has its own emblem and flag. The U.N. emblem reproduced in the U.N. flag had its origin in an emblem prepared by the Presentation Branch of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in April, 1945 in response to a request for a button design for the San Francisco Conference. On December 7, 1946 the Assembly approved the San Francisco design with slight modifications. The revised design is "a map of the world representing an azimuthal equidistant projection centred on the North Pole, inscribed in a wreath consisting of crossed conventionalised branches of the olive tree in gold on a field of smoke—blue with all water areas in white. The projection of the Map extends 40° South Latitude, and includes four concentric circles".

In 1947, the need was felt for a flag. The U.N. Commission of Investigation concerning the Greek Frontier Incidents had been using the unofficial flag designed by the U.N. Secretariat. This flag was composed of the official emblem of the U.N. as approved by the General Assembly in the previous year, embroidered in white on a background of light blue and encircled by the words "United Nations". The Commission had used this flag so that it might enjoy the protection of, and be identified by, a neutral symbol while travelling through troubled areas or participating in meetings under the jurisdiction of several countries. The Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, recommended that the flag be adopted, but without the encircling words, as it possessed the essential requirements of dignity and simplicity. On October 20, 1947 the Assembly adopted this recommendation and directed the Secretary-General to draw up regulations concerning the dimensions and proportions of the flag as well as authorising the Secretary-General to adopt a flag code. On December 19, 1947, a Flag Code was issued by the Secretary-General and this was amended on July 28, 1950, and further amended on November 11, 1952. The U.N. Flag Regulations were issued on August 21, 1950.

Finances The expenses of the regular budget of the U.N. are shared by member governments broadly according to their capacity to pay. The percentage each member has to pay is decided by the General Assembly. In fixing the contributions the Assembly is advised by an expert committee which takes into account such factors as national income, comparative income per person, temporary dislocation of national income and ability of members to secure foreign currency. Special consideration is given to countries with low *per capita* income. The minimum contribution has been fixed at 0.01% and the maximum at 33.33%. The Assembly has also recognized the principle that in normal times the *per capita* contribution of any member should not extend the *per capita* contribution of the member which bears the highest assessment. Although the U.S.A. pays one-third of the total contribution, four other countries pay more on a *per capita* basis. In 1958, U.S.A. pays 33.33%, the U.S.S.R. 13.96%, the U.K. 7.81%, France 5.70%, China 5.14%, Canada 3.15%, India 2.97%, Italy 2.08%, Australia 1.65% and Pakistan 0.55%. The total expenditure of the U.N. in 1957 amounted to \$18,250,700. An automatic penalty for falling into arrears is provided in Article 19 of the Charter: the defaulter "shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years". The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS

The principal organs of the U.N. are (1) The General Assembly, (2) the Security Council, (3) the Economic and Social Council, (4) the Trusteeship Council, (5) the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), and (6) the Secretariat. Under Article 7 (Sec. 2) such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the Charter.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Articles 9 to 22 of the Charter deal with the composition, functions and powers, voting and procedure of the General Assembly. The Assembly consists of all the members of the U.N. Each member is entitled to be represented at its meetings by 5 delegates and 5 alternate delegates, but has only one vote. It meets regularly once a year, commencing on the third Tuesday in September, e.g. its 13th session met on September 16, 1958. Special sessions may be convoked by the Secretary-General if requested by the Security Council, or by a majority of the

members of the U.N., or by one member concurred with by majority of the members. For instance, emergency sessions were held on the Middle East situation on November 1-10, 1956 and on the situation in Hungary on November 4-10, 1956. It elects its President for each session. Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit was thus elected the President of the 8th session of the General Assembly.

The Assembly functions through a number of committees. Seven of them are Main Committees on each of which every member is entitled to be represented by one delegate: (i) Political and Security, (ii) Economic and Financial, (iii) Social, Humanitarian and Cultural, (iv) Trusteeship (including non-self-governing territories), (v) Administrative and Budgetary, (vi) Legal, and (vii) Special Political Committee. In addition, there are two procedural committees: (1) a General Committee to co-ordinate the proceedings of the Assembly and its committees, and (2) a Credentials Committee to verify the credentials of the delegates. The former consists of 15 members comprising the President of the General Assembly, its seven Vice-Presidents, and the Chairman of the seven Main Committees. The latter consists of nine members elected at the beginning of each session of the General Assembly. The Assembly has two standing Committees—an Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and a Committee on Contributions. Subsidiary and *ad hoc* committees have been established by the Assembly whenever necessary, viz., the Interim Committee, the International Law Commission, Special Committee on the Representation of China, Collective Measures Committee, Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the U.N. Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. These, then, are the four types of Committees used by the Assembly.

The Assembly can discuss any questions within the scope of the Charter relating to the powers and functions of any organ of the U.N., and except for those matters which may be pending before the Security Council, it can make recommendations to the member states or to the Security Council or to both on any question or matter. It may consider general principles of co-operation and disarmament, and may also call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. It may study and make recommendations for the development and codification of international law, international co-operation in social and economic spheres, and for the peaceful adjustment of any situation which may threaten general welfare and friendly relations among the nations. It also receives and considers annual and special reports from the Security Council and from other organs of the U.N. It supervises the work of the Trusteeship Council. It also considers and approves the

budget of the Organization and elects members of various organs. Finally, it has constituent functions related to the amendment of the Charter.

The decisions of the Assembly on important questions are made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council and of all the members of the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, the admission of new members, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, question relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, budgetary questions, and the question of determining additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds vote. On other questions decisions are made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Increasing importance of the General Assembly Even at San Francisco Conference the smaller powers had sought for arming the General Assembly (where every member was represented and each had one vote) with adequate powers. Since its inception, its powers have been increasing and its prestige has been growing. A view of its increasing scope can be had by a perusal of the agenda of its 12th session. It contained 69 items concerning political matters, dependent peoples, economic questions, social problems, human rights, refugees and rehabilitation, legal questions and matters of administration and budget. The increase in powers and prestige has been largely due to the fact that it includes the representatives of all the eighty-two members. Secondly, the veto has often deadlocked the Security Council and it has not been able to function effectively because of the split among its permanent members. Thus "in dealing with many matters, such as disarmament, the settlement of disputes, and even collective security, where it was expected that the Security Council would play the primary, if not the sole role, the General Assembly has become increasingly important." It is sometimes argued that while the decisions of the Security Council are binding on the members, the decisions of the Assembly are mere recommendations which members are free to ignore. But the significance of this distinction should not be over rated, for, the sense of legal compulsion behind the Council's decisions has not prevented even the lesser powers from ignoring them, with impunity. Egypt, for instance, successfully defied the Council's resolution of September 1, 1951 calling upon her to terminate the embargo on shipping through the Suez Canal bound for Israel.

Little Assembly The truth, therefore, seems to be that the actual working of the U N has rather falsified the assump-

tion of its main architects, viz. that the Security Council and not the Assembly would be the centre of gravity. By the autumn of 1947, the Security Council had been almost paralysed by the veto and the cold war and the vigilance of a disunited Council was hardly sufficient "to impart any sense of safety to a troubled world". A pressing need was felt for the permanent accessibility of that wider forum, not paralysed by the dissensions of the great powers which only the General Assembly was able to offer. To this need the General Assembly responded by setting up a subsidiary organ known as the "Interim Committee"—unofficially called the "Little Assembly"—on November 13, 1947. This was to sit between normal Assembly sessions and certain questions within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly were to be dealt with by the Little Assembly. These questions included such disputes or situations, involving a danger to international peace as may have been proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly and, in the view of the Little Assembly, were important matters requiring preliminary study. In such cases the Little Assembly had power to conduct its own investigations, appoint commissions of inquiry, and to advise the Secretary-General to summon a special session of the General Assembly. To clarify the Little Assembly's position in relation to the Security Council the General Assembly directed that the Little Assembly should at all times take into account the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter as well as the duties assigned to other Councils or to any committee or commission. Each Member of the General Assembly was entitled to appoint one representative to the Little Assembly but the Soviet bloc countries never accepted the legality of the Little Assembly and never appointed any representatives. Originally it was created only for a year and then continued for another year. In November 1949 it was re-established indefinitely, though it has not met since 1952. But as one authority has put it: "If the Little Assembly played no spectacularly successful part in the life of the organization as a whole and has not been greatly missed since its virtual eclipse in 1952, that was due rather to the increasing length of the General Assembly's regular sessions, and not to the failure of the experiment itself" (Martin and Edwards, *The Changing Charter*, p. 25).

"Unite For Peace". The final consummation of the trend initiated by the creation of the "Interim Committee" was registered by the "Unite For Peace" Resolution of November 3, 1950, two days before the United Command in Korea officially reported the intervention of Chinese forces in the Korean War. Though ostensibly preserving the primary responsibility of the Security Council in security matters "it was in fact based on the postulate that the Security Council would almost certainly be paralysed

by Soviet obstructionism, and that, in such an eventuality, the General Assembly could properly act in its place"

Thus the immediate background of this resolution was the Korean war and the imminent Chinese intervention in it. In June 1950, the Security Council had acted very speedily and this was due, among other reasons to the absence of the Soviet representative (as part of the Soviet policy of boycotting certain organs of the U.N. as a protest against the U.N. decision not to allow the entry of People's China) In August 1950, the Soviet delegate resumed his functions in the Security Council and "his attempts to impeach the resolutions which had been passed in the Korean case left no room for doubt that all of them would have been vetoed if the Soviet Union had been represented at the meetings concerned" The Western powers, therefore, had to counteract what they called Soviet obstructionism in the Security Council by allowing the General Assembly (where the veto does not operate) to step in the breach Thus, with the thought that in the case of another Korea the Soviet Union might be present in the Security Council from the outset, able to veto action, the 5th Assembly adopted on November 3, 1950 the "Acheson Plan" for "United Action for Peace"

Under this plan, emergency special sessions of the General Assembly could be called on 24 hours' notice after the veto-less vote of any seven members of the Security Council or by a majority of the Members of the organization. If the Security Council due to dissensions fails to exercise its responsibilities in any case where there appears to be a threat to, or breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the Assembly would at once consider the matter. It may then make "recommendations" for "collective measures", including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security". It may be noted that this was merely to be a "recommendation" which, legally, any Member State could disregard. "Thus if a Member state does, in fact, choose to disregard the Assembly's finding of aggression (as the Soviet bloc and India did in the case of Chinese intervention in the Korean War), that Member would not violate the Charter if it were to stand aloof from any sanctions that might be taken against the reputed aggressor, for the obligation of Members to join in collective measures of enforcement is contingent upon the existence of a breach of peace or act of aggression, so found by the Security Council. There is not even a contingent obligation to join in measures taken, or about to be taken solely on the Assembly's authority, its call for assistance, whatever else the language may suggest is a mere recommendation". Thus seen, the Resolution was based on the assumption that the majority of Member States would respond to

the Assembly's call. This was put to a test in 1951. On February 1, 1951, the Assembly branded China "aggressor" and on May 18, 1951, it passed a resolution calling for an embargo on the shipment of war materials to People's China and North Korea. By the end of June 1951, 31 member and 3 non-member States had implemented the resolution and in due course the number went up to 45.

The Resolution also established a 14-man Peace Observation Commission including the representatives of the Big Five to observe and report the situation in an area of international tension. It was felt that quick action by the Council in Korea had been facilitated by the presence of the U.N. Commission on Korea whose report formed the basis of the Council's action. A permanent commission, therefore, was set up but it was to function only in those territories where permitted to do so by the state concerned, as directed by the General Assembly or the Little Assembly, and it could not be used in connection with questions on the agenda of the Security Council.

Under Section C of the Resolution, members were invited to survey their resources to determine the nature and scope of assistance they might be in a position to render. Member States were asked to earmark certain of their armed forces "so trained, organized, and equipped that they could be promptly made available for service as a U.N. unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or General Assembly". This was almost a revolutionary departure from "the original scheme of the Charter which never contemplated the use of armed force by recommendation of the General Assembly".

Finally, the Resolution established a Collective Measures Committee to study and report to the Assembly and the Council on methods of maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. This was designed to "extract and apply the lessons of the Korea experience". The Secretary-General was requested to appoint, with the approval of this Committee, a panel of military experts to be made available to advise members on technical matters.

Thus the Resolution produced a massive change in the U.N. practice. It enabled the General Assembly to overshadow the Security Council in the sphere of peace and security as in everything else, and rendered the U.N. "an Assembly-centred rather than a Security Council-centred Organization". It "covered the maximum ground short of formal amendment of the Charter". It did not change the actual distribution of power in the world and in circumventing the veto in the application of sanctions, it did not modify the realities on which the veto was based. It remains true, as it was true in 1945, that no large

power will employ sanction against its wishes and that if force was used, under Assembly directions against the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A., the result would be war. The Resolution, nevertheless, challenged in particular, one basic assumption upon which the veto was based, namely, that no enforcement action by the U.N. would be effective unless approved and joined in by all the permanent members.

In short, as a forum for the consideration and settlement of political issues, at any rate, since the second half of 1949, the General Assembly has been gaining ground constantly from the Security Council. The broad and flexible nature of the powers given to the General Assembly by the Charter favoured their further development and expansion. This had led to a demand for a modification in the voting system at the General Assembly. It is argued that the increasing strength of the Assembly has encouraged "voting power politics" the aim of which is to muster the number of votes required to secure the passage of a resolution. If the prescribed majority can be obtained, the minority can be voted down. It is pointed out that in international sphere, a majority is not entitled to impose conformity, that a majority vote gives no legal power of coercion, and that usually a majority does not have the capacity or the will to coerce. After all, a minority's conformity with a resolution of the Assembly would "in most cases be dictated much more by fear of diplomatic isolation or of a threat to a government's position at home than by any belief in its intrinsic merits". Some states are more sensitive to such considerations than others. Britain, for instance, proved to be more sensitive to such considerations on the Suez crisis than the U.S.S.R. on the question of Hungary. It is, therefore, argued that resolutions of the Assembly backed up by arithmetical majorities are applied unequally by different states and those which are sensitive to majority opinion have to suffer by agreeing to comply with them. Against those which choose to ignore them, no action is taken, none can, indeed, be taken to force them to comply with such resolutions. The emergence of the Afro-Asian bloc at the U.N. has introduced an element of uncertainty. It is, therefore, suggested sometimes that there should be "weighted voting".

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Chapter V (from Articles 23 to 32) deals with the composition, functions and powers, voting and procedure of the Security Council. The Council consists of 11 members, each represented by one delegate having one vote. There are five permanent members (China, France, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S.A.) and six non permanent members elected for a 2-year term by two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Retiring members are not eligible for im-

mediate re-election. In electing non-permanent members the Assembly keeps regard for fixing representation to various geographic regions and to the contribution of members to the fulfilment of aims of the Charter. From 1947 to 1957 the following states were elected to the Council and their term expires on December 31 of the year indicated :

- 1947 Australia, Brazil, Poland.
- 1948 Belgium, Colombia, Syria.
- 1949 Canada, Argentina, Ukraine.
- 1950 Norway, Cuba, Egypt.
- 1951 India, Ecuador, Yugoslavia.
- 1952 Netherlands, Brazil, Turkey.
- 1953 Pakistan, Chile, Greece.
- 1954 Denmark, Colombia, Lebanon.
- 1955 New Zealand, Brazil, Turkey.
- 1956 Belgium, Peru, Iran.
- 1957 Australia, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Philippines.
- 1958 Colombia, Iraq, Sweden.
- 1959 Canada, Japan, Panama.

"The pattern of representation thus far has included one Commonwealth country, two Latin-American states, one Communist state (until Greece replaced Yugoslavia for the term expiring in 1953), one Western European state and one Middle Eastern state". A gentleman's agreement in earlier years permitted the representatives from each geographical area to be chosen by the states of that region, their choice being accepted by the other members in the formal election which was subsequently held by the General Assembly. This arrangement collapsed with the election of Yugoslavia in 1949, after the break between Tito and Moscow. On this occasion under American leadership, Czechoslovakia, supported by Russia, was defeated by the Western candidate. The Middle Eastern seat was held until 1950 by a member of the Arab League when in that year the monopoly was broken by the election of Turkey. Any member of the U.N., not a member of the Security Council, is invited to participate without vote in the discussion of questions specially affecting its interests. India and Pakistan, for instance, participated in the Council's proceedings on the Kashmir Question in 1957-58.

The Veto. Decisions of the Council on procedural questions are made by an affirmative vote of seven members. On all other matters the affirmative vote of seven members must include the concurring votes of all permanent members subject to the provision that when the Security Council is considering methods for the peaceful settlement of a dispute, parties to the disputes

abstain from voting. In practice, an *abstention* by a permanent member is not considered a veto. Secondly, there also exists what is called the "*double veto*" referred earlier in this Chapter. It may be pointed out that the rules of the Security Council have been interpreted by the Western powers to prevent this practice. Thirdly, the principle that the *absence*, or non participation of a member from a meeting of the Security Council does not legally prevent the adoption of a resolution was established when the Soviet Union was away from the Security Council in the Korean case. The U.S.S.R. has never accepted this principle of equating "absence" with "abstention".

On the question of the veto there are three points of view. The original position of the U.S.A. was that it could ratify the Charter with the veto in it and would have rejected it without the veto. Since the Security Council can make legally binding decisions which could involve the use of U.S. military forces, the U.S.A. insisted that those decisions should not be made against the wishes of the U.S. Government. Since then the U.S.A. has always opposed any course of action that would throw into doubt the fact that the veto is part of the Charter. Nevertheless, the U.S.A. has been willing to agree with other governments which have the veto that it should not be exercised on recommendations for the peaceful settlement of disputes and on the admission of new members. This willingness was expressed in the famous Vandenberg Resolution. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has been entirely unwilling to limit the veto and has used it some 80 times. The most to which it has been willing to agree is to confer with other veto-holding powers before voting on important questions. Almost all the vetoes used by the U.S.S.R. have been on questions arising in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes or application for membership. Finally, there is the view held in some circles that veto is undemocratic and should be abolished.

But it will be readily seen that abolition of the veto is neither desirable nor practicable. On the other hand it may even be said that the veto is likely to wither away. With the development of the General Assembly and the declining role of the Security Council, the problem of the veto, except in the field of membership, may be said to have become of an academic nature. At the moment the veto does not create or aggravate conflicts or tensions. It is a symptom of disagreements already existing and is a reflection of the cold war. Its use has not paralysed the U.N. and it is hardly a primary issue which will condition the continuance of the U.N. Much can be done without it, indeed much has been done in spite of it as the General Assembly can take over and has already taken over, a good deal of what it was originally hoped the Security Council could do. Finally, it is doubtful

whether the actual experience of the Council in dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes and situations and with the regulation of armaments can be really interpreted as supporting the conclusion that the veto has prevented a satisfactory solution from being achieved in many of the cases in which it has been employed. The Soviet veto, for instance, in the Syrian-Lebanese case did not prevent the U.K. and France from accepting the proposal supported by the majority of the Council. It is doubtful that if the Security Council could have investigated into the *coup* in Czechoslovakia in 1948 anything definite would have been gained except by the use of armed force. And "approval of the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission by majorities of the Council that did not include the Soviet Union would not have brought the world any nearer to the regulation of atomic armaments because if a control system for that purpose were to be established it could not be effective without the agreement and participation of the Soviet Union". In short, the veto is not the cause but it is the effect of existing tensions and until there is a definite improvement in the world situation, there is little hope that any voting procedure can be devised that will strengthen the Security Council and develop its role along the lines laid down in the Charter.

Functions and powers. The Security Council is entrusted by the Charter with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Parties to a dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger peace and security of nations, are first to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Council may call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. Under Article 34, the Council may investigate any dispute or situation likely to lead to international friction or dispute. Any Member of the U.N. or a non-Member may bring such a dispute or situation to the notice of the Council (or of the General Assembly). The Assembly and the Secretary-General of the U.N. may also bring to the notice of the Council such a dispute. The Council is empowered to recommend procedures or methods of adjustment at any stage of a dispute referred to it, or may recommend terms of settlement. Legal disputes are to be referred to the Court of International Justice.

Chapter VII in the vests the Council with power to take enforcement or preventive action. It is empowered to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make recommendation or decide to take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and

security (Before so doing, it can also take certain provisional measures without prejudice to the rights, claim or position of the parties concerned) Two kinds of endorsement measures are contemplated in the Charter (1) Measures not involving the use of armed force These include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, and postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations (2) Measures based on the use of force These include action by air, sea, or land forces, demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the U N The Security Council can require members of the U N to contribute and make available to it, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including right of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security For this purpose *special agreements* would have been concluded between the members and the Council The Council plans the application of armed force with the assistance of a Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Council or their representatives The Council decides if the action necessary to carry out its decision is to be taken by all or by some of the members of the U N Pending the coming into force of the *special agreements* referred above, the Charter provides that China, France, the U S S R, the U K, and the U S A after consultation are to take joint action on behalf of the U N for maintaining peace and security Article 51 provides for the right of individual or collective self-defence of members until action is taken by the Council but action taken by them is to be reported to the Council All action, undertaken or contemplated, for maintaining international peace and security by regional agencies or under regional arrangements are to be reported to the Council

The Council's functions in relation to trust territories and non self-governing areas are dealt with in details in a later Chapter The Council has certain functions in admitting, suspending or expelling members from the U N O The affirmative vote of any seven members of the Council is required to call a General Conference to amend the Charter, and amendments to the Charter have to be ratified by all its permanent members before they take effect It has to make annual reports to the Assembly and it is assisted in the discharge of its duties by the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice It participates in the election of the Court's Judges, takes measures to give effect to the Court's judgments and can ask the Court for an advisory opinion on any legal questions Thus the functions of the Council are general, deliberative, executive, and constituent How far has it been successful in the discharge of its duties we will discuss shortly

The Security Council functions continuously. Its members are permanently represented at the seat of the organization but it may meet at any place that will facilitate its work. The presidency of the Council is held for one month in rotation by the member states in the English alphabetical order of their names. It decides its own rules of procedure and may establish such subsidiary organs as it considers necessary. We have already referred to the Military Staff Committee. Then, there is now a 25-Member Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals on disarmament and atomic prohibition, established by the General Assembly on January 10, 1952 (and enlarged by the 12th Assembly (1957) from 11 to 25). This Commission superseded the A.E.C., and the C.C.A. (See chapter on Disarmament). The Council has two Standing Committees, each consisting of representatives of all its 11-members—the Committee of Experts to decide rules of procedure, and the Committee on the Admission of New Members. In addition, from time to time, it establishes *ad hoc* Committees and Commissions such as the Commission for Indonesia and the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

The Economic and Social Council (E.C.O.S.O.C.). Chapter IX of the Charter deals with International Economic and Social Co-operation and Chapter X is related to the Economic and Social Council (E.C.O.S.O.C.), its composition, functions and powers, voting and procedure. The E.C.O.S.O.C. consists of 18 members of the U.N. elected by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority. Six of them are elected each year for a three-year term and retiring members are eligible for immediate re-election. At the first election, of the 18 members chosen, the term of six members expired at the end of one year, and of six other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly. Each member has one delegate having one vote. Decisions are made by a majority of the members present and voting. Thus far, the "five major powers" have held seats in the Council continuously. The E.C.O.S.O.C. meets at least three times in a year at the seat of the U.N. or elsewhere if it so decides. The functions of the Council include the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, solution of international economic, social, health and related problems, international cultural and educational co-operation, and universal respect for human rights. It has to study and report on all these matters to the Assembly, to the U.N. Members, and to the specialized agencies concerned. It has to prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly on matters within its competence, and it calls international conferences on matters within its competence.

The broad scope and variety of the Council's areas of interest has led to the creation of commissions and committees to deal with special phases of its work. These include a Statistical Commission, a Population Commission, a Social Commission. A Commission on Human Rights was specifically provided for in the Charter. Then, there are three regional economic Commissions, one for Europe (E.C.E.), one for Asia and the Far East (E.C.A.F.E.), and one for Latin America (E.C.L.A.). Participation in such Commissions is not limited to members of the Council and other nations are also given an opportunity to participate actively in the economic and social programmes of the U.N. There are also Commissions on Transport and Communications, Status of Women, Narcotic Drugs, and International Commodity Trade. The Children's Fund (U.N.I.C.E.F.) established by the General Assembly on December 11, 1946, also functions under the supervision of the E.C.O.S.O.C. It assists child health in 98 countries and territories and its work is financed through voluntary contribution from governments and donations from the public. Other special bodies are the Permanent Central Opium Board, the Supervisory Body (both on Narcotic Drugs), the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements, and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination.

The E.C.O.S.O.C. has five standing Committees: the Technical Assistance Committee, the Committee on Negotiations with Specialized Agencies, the Interim Committee on Programme of Meetings, the Council Committee on Non Governmental Organizations, and the Agenda Committee. In addition, the E.C.O.S.O.C. creates ad hoc Committees whenever necessary, e.g. the Committee on Restrictive Business Practices.

Two principal features of the organizational set up of the E.C.O.S.O.C. deserve special attention. First, it co-ordinates the policies and activities of the Specialized Agencies, and has brought many of them into relationship with the U.N. These Specialized Agencies are *autonomous international bodies* having their own charters and performing functions in many of the fields covered by the E.C.O.S.O.C. (the I.L.O., the W.H.O., the F.A.O. are all working in such fields). All the Specialized Agencies have their own constitution, membership, officials and budget. Some of them include within their membership states that have not been members of the U.N. until very recently. Through negotiated agreements, the Specialized Agencies have undertaken to make annual reports of their activities to E.C.O.S.O.C. which, after examination and debate, makes recommendations to the individual Agencies as to priorities in their work and lines of activity that should be undertaken. Representatives of the

Specialised Agencies are permitted to participate in E.C.O.S.O.C.'s deliberations without vote.

Secondly, the E.C.O.S.O.C. has also made arrangements with *international non-governmental organizations* and, after consultation with the Member concerned, with *national organizations*. Some of them are permitted to participate in the debates of the E.C.O.S.O.C., viz., the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the International Co-operative Alliances, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, the International Organization of Employers, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the World Federation of United Nations Associations. Others have "consultative status" which permits them to submit documents and recommendations to the Council for consideration. By January 1957, 291 non-governmental organizations had been granted consultative status.

For the Trusteeship Council, the reader may refer to the Chapter on Trusteeship System. We, therefore, pass on to consider the International Court of Justice.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (I.C.J.)

The I.C.J. was created by an international treaty, the Statute of the Court, "which forms an integral part" of the U.N. Charter (Chapter XIV, Articles 92—96). This Statute was drawn up at the San Francisco Conference and is based on the Statute of the P.C.I.J. which largely remains unchanged, except for changes necessary to bring it into harmony with the pattern of the new organization. All Members of the U.N. "are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the I.C.J." and a state which is not a member of the U.N. may become a party to this Statute on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Procedure. The Court is housed in the Peace Palace in the Hague, the Netherlands, erected in 1913 at the wish of Andrew Carnegie who donated part of his fortune for establishing "an international Court house, of which the doors shall be kept open in time of peace and closed in time of war". It can hold its sittings and exercise its functions wherever it considers desirable. The Court languages are French and English. Under Article 39 of the Statute, the Court may authorize, at the request of any party to a dispute, the use of any other language by this party. Under Article 40, when a case is brought before the Court, the Registrar of the Court communicates it to all concerned and notifies the Members of the U.N. through the Secretary-General. The hearings are public unless the Court directs otherwise or the parties

demand that the public be not admitted. Questions are decided by a majority of the judges present. In case of a tie the President has a casting vote. The judgment of the Court is final and without appeal, but a revision may be filed on the ground of a new material factor provided that a petition for revision is made within ten years of the date of judgment. Each party, unless otherwise decided by the Court, has to bear its own cost. The expenses of the Court are borne by the U N.

Organization The Court consists of fifteen Judges elected for nine years by the General Assembly and the Security Council voting independently, and chosen from amongst the reputed jurists of the world regardless of their nationality. They should be persons of high moral character, possessing the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. No two Judges may be nationals of the same state and together the Court represents "the main forms of civilizations and the principal legal systems of the world". The Judges are "chosen from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration established by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. In the case of members of the U N not represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, candidates are nominated by national groups appointed for the purpose by their Governments" (Art. 4). The Judges are eligible for immediate re-election. The Court elects its own President and Vice-Presidents for three years and remains permanently in session except for judicial vacations. The quorum in the Court is nine. Under Articles 26 and 29 of the Statute, the Court "may form chambers of three or more judges for dealing with particular categories of cases and forms annually a chamber of five judges to hear and determine, at the request of the parties, cases by summary procedure".

Jurisdiction and competence Only States, parties to its statute, not individuals, may be parties to cases brought before the Court. Other states can approach the Court on conditions determined by the Security Council. The Court's jurisdiction extends to all cases which the parties refer to it and to all matters provided for in the U N Charter and to treaties and conventions in force. All disputes regarding the Court's jurisdiction are settled by the Court itself. Under Article 37 of the Statute, whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the P C I J, it shall, as between the parties to the Statute, be referred to the I C J. The judgments of the Court are in accordance with international law, which comprises international conventions and customs, the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations and judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.

✓ All members of the U.N. and all states permitted to come before the Court, undertake to comply with its decisions and in case of non-compliance by a party, the other party may appeal to the Security Council which may then take measures to enforce the decisions. The General Assembly, the Security Council, other organs of the U.N. and Specialized Agencies may seek an advisory opinion of the Court on any legal question arising within the scope of their activities. The Charter emphasises to a greater extent than did the Covenant the special appropriateness of the use of the Court in the settlement of legal differences. Nevertheless, it does not impose on members the obligation to submit any disputes to the Court, even legal disputes. However, under Article 36(2) of the Statute the states parties to it may "recognize as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation". It is also provided that under Art. 36 of the Statute of the P.C.I.J. still in force at the time the Charter entered into effect it will be deemed, as between parties to the new Statute, acceptance of the *compulsory jurisdiction* of the I.C.J. The Security Council resolved on October 15, 1946 that "a State not a party to the Statute may in its general declaration of acceptance of the conditions of access to the Court, accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court subject to certain conditions". By 1954, 35 states had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36. These acceptances, however, have been subjected to serious restrictions. The U.S.A., Mexico, France, and Pakistan, for instance, excluded disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction as determined by them. In some cases special categories of disputes, other than those that fall in domestic jurisdiction, have been excluded and, in others, compulsory jurisdiction has been limited to future disputes.

In addition to declarations under Article 36 of the Statute, however, "states may by agreement among themselves accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in specified categories of disputes and under defined conditions. Such agreements may be bilateral or multilateral in character. All the bilateral economic co-operation agreements entered into by the U.S., for example, contain a clause whereby the parties agree to submit to the Court private claims that might arise from governmental measures taken after the date of the signing of the agreements. In fact it is a common practice for a treaty to include a specific provision

that any dispute regarding its interpretation or application will be referred to the Court'. Finally, it may be emphasised that except where a state has agreed in advance to accept the Court's jurisdiction, the UN Members are under no obligation to accept such jurisdiction over a particular dispute without specific consent being registered.

Achievements of the Court Thus seen, it becomes clear that the ICJ is not intended to have a role of greater importance than the PCIJ had enjoyed. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that "certain of the major states envisaged for it a role of less importance". The reason for all this seems to be that at the San Francisco Conference international law was viewed with greater diffidence than formerly as offering a satisfactory guide for the settlement of disputes. In actual practice the Court has so far tried 15 disputes, and has given 14 legal opinions. More important of them have been the *Ambatielos Case* (U.K. and Greece), the *Fisheries Case* (U.K. and Norway), the *Minquiers and Ecrehos Case* (U.K. and France), the *Morocco Case* (France and the U.S. concerning the rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco), *Monetary gold removal case* (Italy, France, the U.K., and the U.S.A.), the *Asylum Case* (Colombia and Peru); the *Nottebohm Case* (Guatemala and Liechtenstein), the *Anglo Iranian Oil Case* (the U.K. and Iran), and the *Indo-Portuguese dispute*. Of the advisory opinions handed down by the Court two concerned admission to membership in the UN, but failed to solve the basic problems involved. Another established the right of the UN to bring claims against states responsible for injuries done to UN agents in the performance of their duties. This was an offshoot of the assassination of Count Bernadotte while acting as UN mediator in Palestine. One opinion (1950) was related to procedures for resolving disputes over the interpretation of the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, and another opinion concerned South Africa's obligations with respect to her mandate for South-West Africa. One opinion permitted the Communist states to sign the Genocide Convention with reservations which some of the other parties had refused to accept. Again, an opinion (July 1954) held that the General Assembly did not have the right to reverse the decision of the UN Administrative Tribunal which had awarded indemnities to UN employees dismissed in connection with the U.S. loyalty programme. On October 23, 1956, the Court decided by nine votes to four to comply with the request of the U.N.E.S.C.O. Executive Board for an advisory opinion on three questions concerning certain judgments of the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal. Almost all the cases practically have been of a legal nature involving interpretation of international law and treaties. In a few cases, as in the *Corfu*

Channel Case, security interests were involved. In the Anglo-Iranian Case important economic and security interests were involved. The conflict between Colombia and Peru over the right of asylum raised an issue of great importance to the Latin American republics. The dispute between India and Portugal Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections), referred to the Court in 1957-58, has raised political and security problems. In an order of November 27, 1956, the Court decided to postpone to April 15, 1957, the time-limit for the filing of the counter-memorial or of the preliminary objection of the Government of India. The memorial of Portugal had been filed according to the order of March 13, 1956. India's objections were filed on April 15, 1957 and the Court fixed June 15, 1957 as the date by which Portugal could state its submissions on the objection. The date was later extended to August 15, 1957. On November 26, 1957, the Court gave its judgment concerning the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction raised by India. The Court rejected four objections and joined the remaining two to the merits. In an order of February 10, 1958, the Court extended the time-limits for the rest of the proceedings.

The case of the Suez Canal company in 1956 was not referred to the Court at all. In October 1957, three applications were filed with the Court against Bulgaria by Israel, the U.S.A., and the U.K. Israel filed the application instituting proceedings against Bulgaria regarding an aerial incident which occurred on July 27, 1955. The application recalled that on that date an aircraft belonging to an Israeli airline company was shot down on Bulgarian territory by the Bulgarian Security Forces, 51 passengers and seven crew members being killed. The Government of Israel requested the Court to declare Bulgarian responsibility under international law for the damage caused and to determine the amount of compensation. The application of the U.S.A. and the U.K. related to the same incident and were filed on October 28, and November 21, 1957 respectively. According to these two applications, several nationals of the U.S. and the U.K. were killed in the incident, and the Bulgarian Government having first accepted liability to the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.K. and promised compensation, had subsequently gone back on this decision. These applications are still pending but it is doubtful if the Court will be able to do anything effective about the matter.

Five broad conclusions follow from a perusal of cases so far decided by the Court. First, the Communist States have, as a rule, not referred their disputes to the Court. May be that disputes that occur in the Soviet bloc do not lend themselves to a judicial process. In the Corfu Channel Case to which the U.K. was a party, Albania refused to implement the judgment of the Court on the amount of

compensation due to the U.K. A suit brought by the U.S. on March 3, 1954 against Hungary and the U.S.S.R. for damages resulting from the forcing down in Hungary of an American C-47 by a Soviet fighter was dropped from the list of pending cases on July 15, when Hungary and the U.S.S.R. refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. *Secondly*, most of the disputes submitted to the Court "have involved states with similar legal traditions, with common attachment to Western social and political ideals". *Thirdly*, the "disputes resulting from the efforts of states to achieve full independence in the management of their own affairs" have generally not lent themselves to settlement by submission to the Court. *Fourthly*, in practice the I.C.J. has not played that prominent role in the working of the U.N. which the P.C.I.J. had played in the working of the League of Nations. This may be due to several reasons, e.g., nature of the conflicts after 1945, the non-acceptance by some states particularly the U.S.S.R. of international law as developed in the West as a standard to be applied to international disputes and the extreme nationalist sentiment of the Afro-Asian states. *Finally*, the Court has been used as frequently by great powers as by small powers.

THE SECRETARIAT

Chapter XV (Articles 97 to 101) of the U.N. Charter deals with the Secretariat composed of the Secretary General—the chief administrative officer of the organization—and an international staff appointed by him under regulations established by the General Assembly. While the Covenant said nothing about the functions of the Secretariat, the Charter is more explicit. The constitutional basis of the Secretariat is thus the same as of other organs. It may be called as the executive and administrative arm of the U.N. The Secretariat "prepares the ground for the meetings of the deliberative organs (the General Assembly and the three Councils) so that they may more readily arrive at agreed international policies", and it carries out those decisions and policies "in the most efficient possible manner". Its importance lies in the fact that it is a continuing organ, a permanent body of career officials. It represents the permanent element in a constantly shifting society made up of conferences, councils, boards and committees. The Secretariat, therefore, "transforms the U.N. from a series of periodic meetings of Assembly and Councils into a permanent and cohesive organization. Without the Secretariat the U.N. would be deprived of its centre of communication and co-ordination, its international core as distinct from the national character of the delegation which make up the Assembly and the Councils". Zimmern described the League Secretariat as the "residuary legatee of the powers which flowed into Geneva". The U.N. Secretariat may be said to be the all-

pervasive cylinder on which the U.N. machine functions. On the efficiency and honesty of the Secretariat largely depends the efficiency of the U.N. and the extent to which the objectives of the Charter are realized.

The Secretary-General (S.G.) is the chief administrative officer appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The first Secretary-General was Trygve Lie (Norway) from 1946-53, and the present incumbent is Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden). He acts as the Chief Administrative Officer in all meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the E.C.O.S.O.C., the Trusteeship Council and performs such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. More than any body else, the S.G. stands for the U.N. as a whole. His functions are administrative, technical, financial, organizational, political and representational. He is authorised to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. He was intended to be, and has become, a more powerful official than was the S.G. of the League. He can initiate proposals for action and suggest to the world a definite line of policy. Witness Trygve Lie's active support of the partition plan for Palestine in 1947, his intervention in the Berlin Blockade (1949), his journeys to the Capitals of the Big Four and his 10-point memorandum for peace, and his role in Korea. Witness again, Dag Hammarskjöld's journey to Peking in the service of the U.S. air-men held there and his active role in the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian revolt (1956-57). In fact from November 1956 to March 1957 the S.G. "led the field" in political negotiations and was almost constantly in the public eye (cf. Elmore Jackson: 'The Developing Role of the Secretary-General' International Organization, Vol. XI, No. 3 Summer 1957).

Any one who turns the pages of Trygve Lie's *'In The Cause of Peace'* would find an overwhelming evidence of the vital role of the S.G. at some of the most crucial moments. He has to prepare the agendas and determine priorities. He has to meet visiting national delegations and play host on numerous occasions. "On a wise use of his power of appointment and dismissal, and on his daily relations with his staff, the morale and *esprit de corps* of the Secretariat will largely depend. He is responsible for the carrying out of the Headquarters Agreement with the U.S. and any similar arrangements with other host countries, and must adopt a personnel policy that both protects the independence of the staff and at the same time leaves no ground for criticism that national laws are not being properly observed. And as Chief Administrator he has the heavy task of supervising the budgetary and financial work of the U.N. under regulations adopted by the

General Assembly" Finally, he has to co-ordinate the work of the various U N organs and specialized agencies And the reader will weigh all these functions of the S G and his role with all its potentialities and its pit falls for the future "against the hard political realities of a world by no means ready yet to accept either the outlook or the responsibilities of world citizenship"

Organization The Secretariat has eight departments Political and Security Council Affairs, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Trusteeship and Non Self Governing Territories, Administrative and Financial Services, Conferences and General Services, Public Information, Legal In addition there is an Executive Office for the S G to co-ordinate his work The Department of Technical Assistance Administration (T A A) was created in 1950 Each of these departments has sub-divisions

Functions There are multifarious functions which the Secretariat has to perform It prepares and services international meetings called by the U N and prepares the agendas, translates records, and keeps the minutes, records, and decisions It helps in the process of negotiations, and endless consultations are held in the office of the S G It helps the various U N Commissions with services of trained staff members In the sphere of technical assistance, it processes reports, plans programmes, organizes seminars and schools, evaluates the work done, and utilizes the contributions which come in inconvertible currencies It conducts research and publications, prepares world economic surveys, reports on social developments, legal and technical analysis of many kinds, throwing light on world trends and supplying data for policy-making organs It performs information services of the U N by receiving and supplying information from governments, telling the story of the U N to the peoples of the world and by maintaining its own press, film, radio, and television services It maintains 18 Information Centres It renders valuable services to the regional commissions and to the temporary relief agencies And, finally, it has to carry out all the tasks of internal administration, viz the selection and training of staff, the application of staff regulations and rules, the briefing of experts and arrangements for travel, the management of properties, and the purchasing of equipment and supplies

Characteristics Six basic features characterize the Secretariat of the U N First is the international loyalty of the personnel, or an international outlook How can it be defined? In the words of Wilfred Jenks "A lack of attachment to any one country does not constitute an international outlook A superior indifference to the emotions and prejudices of those whose world is bounded by the frontiers of a single state does not constitute an

international outlook. A blurred indistinctness of attitude towards all questions proceeding from a freedom of prejudice born of lack of vitality, does not constitute an international outlook. The international outlook required of the international civil servant is an awareness made instinctive by habit of the needs, emotions, and prejudices of the peoples of differently circumstanced countries, as they are felt and expressed by the people concerned, accompanied by a capacity for weighing these frequently imponderable elements in a judicial manner before reaching any decision to which they are relevant". *Secondly*, the Secretariat personnel is independent otherwise they would not be loyal to the U.N. Under Article 100 of the Charter, "each member of the U.N. undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the S.G. and the staff" and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. *Thirdly*, the composition and recruitment policy in the Secretariat is based on the postulate that the staff positions should be sufficiently spread among the countries, races and regions of the world to give reality, both in fact and in appearance, to the international character of the world's Civil Service. *Fourthly*, the international Civil Service has security of tenure, attracts talents and is not unresponsive to changing world conditions. The Joint Appeals Board, the Special Advisory Board, and the Administrative Tribunal look after their interests. *Fifthly*, it is governed by rules of conduct enjoining dignity, integrity, impartiality, independence, reserve and tact so that international status may not be undermined. *Finally*, the Secretariat staff enjoys certain immunities and privileges but, at the same time, each member has to perform his or her private obligations, observe laws and police regulations. "In any case", the staff Regulation runs, "where these privileges and immunities arise, the staff member shall immediately report to the Secretary-General, with whom it rests to decide whether they shall be waived". These immunities are (a) from legal processes in respect of words spoken and written; (b) from taxation on salaries and emoluments paid to them by the U.N.; (c) from national service obligation; (d) from immigration restrictions and alien registration (this extends to their spouses and dependent relatives); (e) the same privileges with respect to exchange facilities as are accorded to the officials of comparable ranks forming part of diplomatic missions to the government concerned; (f) repatriation facilities similar to those given to diplomatic envoys, (g) the right to import free of duty their effects at the time of their first taking up the post in the country in question; (h) the right to have the U.N. laissez-passer accepted as a valid travel document, and to have visas, where necessary, granted as speedily as possible, together with facilities for speedy travel.

In short, the UN Secretariat is a vital organ, a sort of clearing house. It has to face heavy odds, tasks of tremendous difficulties and delicate situations. In 1952-53, for example, the U.S. investigating bodies claimed that they found evidence of subversive activities by U.S. nationals in the UN Secretariat. This raised the problem of the relations of the UN with the "host country". But whatever be the actual solution of this problem, it indicates the difficulties which the Secretariat has to face.

SOME SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

The International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) We have surveyed the organization, functions and activities of the I.L.O. from 1919 to 1945 in Part One. In 1946, the I.L.O. was recognised as the UN Specialized Agency responsible for international action in the field of improving labour conditions, raising living standards and promoting economic and social stability. The reader will recollect that one of the principal functions of the I.L.O. is the formulation of international standards in the form of International Labour Conventions and Recommendations. Member states are required to submit the I.L.O. Conventions to their respective national authorities for ratification and those which ratify, have to bring their laws into line with their terms and to report annually how these regulations are being applied. By 1957, more than 1650 ratifications of 104 Conventions had been deposited. The I.L.O. can easily ascertain whether Conventions thus ratified are effectively applied. Recommendations do not require ratification and are comparable to the Directive Principles of State Policy in many constitutions. Member states are expected to consider them with a view to giving effect to their provisions by legislation or other action. If a member is not in a position to ratify a Convention or implement a Recommendation, it has to submit an explanation.

In the organization there has been very little change. There is none with regard to the General Conference now called as the International Labour Conference. It consists of four delegates from each member on the old basis. The Governing Body which formerly comprised of thirty two members, now consists of forty members representing twenty governments, ten of which are most important industrial countries and ten include other governments elected to the Body for three years by the Conference. In the former category are Canada, China, France, Germany (Federal Republic), India, Italy, Japan, U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.A. In the latter are Argentina, Australia, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and Uruguay. Of the forty members, twenty represent these twenty governments and ten represent

workers and ten employers elected every three years by their respective representatives to the Conference. The Governing Body selects items for the agenda of the Conference and supervises the work of the International Labour Office and of the various Committees and Commissions. The I.L. Office undertakes research on labour, social and economic problems and renders advice to member governments. In the post-war period (after 1945) the I.L.O. has been conducting surveys in the field of man-power and an operational programme in the sphere of employment, service organization, training and migration. Field offices have been set up at Bangalore, Lima, Mexico City, and Istanbul. The I.L.O. has prepared model codes for underground work in coal mines and for industrial establishments. It also renders technical assistance to member governments and organizations, sends advisory mission, and conducts a fellowship programme. The 39th session of the I.L.O. Conference held in Geneva from June 6 to 28, 1956 and attended by 73 member countries adopted a recommendation on welfare facilities applied to manual and non-manual works employed in public or private undertakings, excluding agriculture and sea transport. The recommendation included detailed clauses covering facilities for feeding, recreation and transport and also related to the management and financing of such facilities. The Conference also discussed vocational training in agriculture, the questions of forced labour and living and working conditions of indigenous populations in independent countries. In November 1956, the 133rd session of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. was held in Geneva and it decided to request the Director-General to communicate to the governments of member states the resolutions concerning the regulation, limitation and reduction of armaments to the Secretary-General of the U.N. for transmission to the bodies concerned. In its 134th session held from March 5 to 8, 1957, the Governing Body approved the expenditure of \$ 7,855,081 for the year 1958, and accepted the proposals concerning the Expanded Programmes of Technical Assistance and the financing of the *ad hoc* tripartite technical meeting on mines other than coal mines. The Governing Body was also invited to approve the convening in Geneva, towards the end of 1957, of a meeting of experts on workers' education to discuss the scope and content of workers' educational programmes, methods and techniques of workers' education and review of the past activities of the I.L.O. in this field and recommendation for future action. The Governing Body also discussed the report of the meeting of experts on dangerous substances which had been held in Geneva in August 1956 and it was decided that at the end of 1957 a meeting of experts on radiation protection would be convened.

The 40th session of the I.L.O. held in Geneva in June 1957 decided to seat as deputy members on certain committees

If employers' delegates and advisers from certain socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The Conference adopted the Forced Labour Convention, 1957 under which each member ratifying it would undertake, *inter alia*, not to use any form of forced labour as a means of political coercion or education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system, or as a method of mobilizing and using labour for purposes of economic development. The Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 was also adopted. In another Convention it was provided that governments should develop co-ordinated and systematic action for the protection of the tribal and semi-tribal populations, for their social, economic and cultural development, and for their progressive integration into the life of their respective countries, with respect in particular to the right of ownership of land, recruitment and conditions of employment, vocational training, social security scheme, and suitable education programmes. The Conference also adopted resolutions concerning abolition of concentration camps and the deportation of national minorities, methods of wage payment, debt bondage and serfdom, abolition of anti trade union legislation, safety in mines, establishment of a tripartite committee on women's work, workers' education, housing construction, the application of ILO Conventions in non-metropolitan territories, disarmament, and the testing of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the 137th session of the Governing Body held in October-November 1957, the Director-General was requested to communicate the relevant resolutions to member governments, and the resolution on disarmament to the U N Secretary-General. The 138th session of the Governing Body was held in March 1958 and the 41st session of the Conference in June 1958. The ILO, like many other agencies of the U N, could not escape the brunt of the cold war. We have noted in Part One (pp 411-412) that the U S A joined the ILO only in 1934 and since then the U S participation has been regular and consistent. It has been different with the U S S R. During the twenties, the U S S R apparently viewed the ILO "as a capitalist attempt to blunt the class consciousness of the workers". As a sequel to its policy of co-operating with the League, the Soviet Union participated in the League from 1935 to 1939, but this participation was minimal and there was no indication that its basic view of the organization had changed.

The original hostility to the ILO reappeared at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 where Soviet opposition was responsible for the withdrawal of a British proposal to make explicit provision in the Charter for co-operation with the ILO. It was not before 1954 that the U S S R joined it and since then

the Soviet charge has been that it does not adequately represent the workers' interest.

Other Agencies. *The Food and Agricultural Organization (F.A.O.)*, conceived in 1943 and created on October 16, has now seventy-four members. It reviews the food and agricultural conditions in the world, advises its members on the agricultural subjects and furnishes them the necessary data. *The World Health Organization (W.H.O.)*, born in June-July 1946, started functioning on April 7, 1948 and has now eighty-four members and four associate members. The W.H.O. works for the eradication of epidemic and endemic diseases; prevention of accidental injuries; improvement of nutrition; housing; sanitation; recreation; working conditions; promotion of maternal and child health and welfare; promotion of research in health and improved standards of training; promotion of mental health and standardization of diagnostic procedure; and development of international standards with respect to food and biological products.

The International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) was established on December 27, 1945 as a sequel to the Bretton Woods Conference. It has sixty members and the total subscription in gold and national currencies in 1956 was \$8,751,000,000. In the Conference of the I.M.F. the International Bank for Re-construction and Development (I.B.R.D.) and the International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.) at Delhi in October 1958, the Board of Governors decided to consider the enlargement of the resources of the Fund through increases in quotas of member countries. Its purpose is to promote international monetary co-operation, exchange and stability, and remove exchange restrictions. It seeks to facilitate expansion of world trade. It collaborates with member governments in establishing a pattern of exchange rates fixed in ratio to gold and the U.S. Dollar and changes by more than 10% in these rates must be approved by the Fund's Board of Executive Directors. The Fund has a Board of Governors to supervise its activities and each member government is represented on it. It assembles once a year. The Executive Directors are responsible for the conduct of the general operations of the Fund.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development began to function in June 1946 with forty-four members and with the objective of providing and facilitating international investment for increasing production, raising living standards, and helping to bring about a better balance in world trade. In 1956, its subscribed capital stock was equal to \$9,100,000,000 and now it has sixty-eight members. Of this amount 20% was paid in and could be used for loans subject to certain conditions; the rest of 80% can be called only if needed to meet the Bank's obligations. In the meeting held in October 1958, at Delhi, the Board of

Governors of the I B R D decided to enlarge the resources of the Bank. The Bank functions by making loans out of its own funds, or out of funds raised by the sale of its bonds. During the year ending on June 30, 1958, the Bank lending amounted to \$711 million or over 75% more than the average of the previous three years. During July-October, 1958, the Bank had loaned out \$380,000,000. The Bank helps backward countries in building up their economy and furnishes technical assistance to its members. The most important function of the Bank is to send out general survey mission to study a country's resources and formulate recommendations to serve as a basis for a long-term development programme. In 1956, it established an Economic Development Institute in Washington to formulate economic policies for planning development programmes. In 1957-58, the Bank concluded nine loans with India amounting to \$275,000,000, seven loans with Japan, four with Ecuador, and three with Pakistan. It continued lending substantial amounts in Mexico and the Belgian Congo. This high rate of lending in 1957-58 was matched by more borrowings which reached a gross total of \$650,000,000.

Other agencies are the International Civil Aviation Organization (I C A O) established on April 4, 1947, the Universal Postal Union (U P U) whose constitution was revised on July 1, 1948, the International Telecommunication Union (I T U) now based on the revised convention of October 2, 1947, the World Meteorological Organization (W M O) created in 1947. The I T U, *inter alia* allocates radio frequencies and registers radio-frequency assignments.

✓ *The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)* It was on July 12, 1945 that the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education adopted a resolution requesting the British Government to invite members of the U N to a conference in London to consider the creation of a permanent educational and cultural organization. This Conference met in London in November 1945 and it was attended by forty-four nations, including all the great powers except the U S S R. The outcome of this Conference was the U N E S C O which came into being on November 4, 1946. In 1957, it had eighty members. The U N E S C O is based on the premise that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed". It has a General Conference composed of representatives from each member state, an Executive Board of twenty-four government representatives elected by the General Conference, and a Secretariat. National Commissions act as liaison groups between the U N E S C O and the cultural, scientific and educational life of their own countries. Its functions include a study of the tensions conducive to war, the study of racial

problems and East-West tensions; study of the problems of international contacts and international means of communications; planning of educational reconstructions; rendering relief and rehabilitation; promotion of cultural interchange in order to develop in all peoples awareness of the solidarity of mankind and inculcate respect for one another's culture; and promotion of international collaboration in the scientific field.

The U.N.E.S.C.O. has been very successful in various fields of its activities. It conducted a useful study of social tensions in India under Dr. Gardner Murphy. In 1952, an investigation was initiated into the positive measures taken by governments and by religious, educational or civic authorities to end discrimination. Earlier in December 1951, it organized a conference in Delhi to consider the ways and means of promoting East-West understanding. In 1948-49, it set up a Temporary International Council for Educational Reconstruction. It rendered considerable educational relief to the Arab refugees from Israel and the victims of the Korean War and spent huge sums on it. Its work on fundamental education started with a small conference of experts in 1946 and by 1952 it developed the concept of "education for world citizenship". Its most significant contribution to writers and artists has been the Universal Copyright Convention designed to provide protection throughout the world to authors and other copyright proprietors of literary scientific and artistic works. This Convention was signed in September 1952. The U.N.E.S.C.O. has also organized exhibitions of paintings, and worked out programmes of translation of world classics. It has facilitated the international circulation of visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific and cultural character. In 1953, it prepared an International Instrument for the Removal of Obstacles to the Movement of Persons Travelling for Educational, Scientific or Cultural Purposes. It has set up a fifteen-member International Commission to prepare a scientific and cultural history of mankind. In December 1952 it decided to create an institute for oceanographic research in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It has established Field Science Co-operation Offices at Delhi, Jakarta, Manila, Cairo and Montevideo. Finally, it has promoted international scientific co-operation by encouraging meetings between scientists and aiding the work of international scientific organizations (1953-55). The 9th General Conference of the U.N.E.S.C.O. was held in November-December, 1956 and was attended by 73 member states. It appropriated a budget of \$ 23,849,355 for 1957 and 1958. In the programme, emphasis was placed on the extension of primary education in Latin America, and a project on scientific research on arid lands for a period of 6 years, for the improvement and coordination of research on problems of the arid land, especially in the region stretching from the eastern

Mediterranean through the Middle East to South Asia. Member states were invited to promote the affiliation with existing international organizations of associations and societies in the various spheres of the social sciences. The Director-General was authorised to encourage and facilitate the development and improvement of teaching of the social sciences. Member states were invited to encourage the study of the social, cultural and moral problems involved in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. In the field of cultural activities the conference adopted a major project for a period of ten years on mutual appreciation of eastern and western cultural values. Emphasis was put on the preparation production and distribution of reading material for new literates as well as on programmes for the development and improvement of the contribution made by libraries and museums to the cultural life of the community and placing teaching materials for arts and crafts at the disposal of member states. Programme resolutions in the field of mass communication were aimed at reducing obstacles to the free flow of information, continuing the clearing house services and promoting international understanding through public information. The Director-General was authorised to continue the work done in promoting exchanges of persons, especially workers teachers and young people, and in providing fellowship for study and training abroad, especially in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The conference also decided to implement the expanded programme of technical assistance. The 45th session of the Executive Board of the UNESCO meeting at New Delhi in October-December 1956 recommended that it hold its tenth session in Paris early in November, 1958. The 46th session met there on December 6, 1956 and it established a special committee to consider draft comments for presentation to the Trusteeship Council at the latter's meeting on March 11, 1957. It also established a working party to prepare a plan to which member states would be requested to conform in drawing up their reports on "developments and the progress achieved in the field of human rights".

The 47th session of the Executive Board, held in Paris in March 1957, decided to establish an administrative commission, an external relations commission and a working party to study the methods for the preparation of the proposed programme and budget, and the organization of the work of the General Conference. In June 1957, the 48th session was held at Paris and the Board allocated 1957-58 budgets of \$ 839,203 for a ten year plan for the promotion of better cultural understanding between east and west and \$ 500,030 for a six year project for scientific research on arid lands. A third major project, concerned with extension of primary education in Latin America, had been approved by the Board at its previous session. The 49th session of the Board

met from November 18 to December 6, 1957 at Paris and it was decided that in considering the problem of the allocation of charges for administrative and operational service costs of the Expanded Programme between the regular and technical assistance budgets, a long-term solution of the problem should take into account the continuing and expanding nature of the technical assistance programme and its growing integration with the regular programme.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.N.

In keeping with the broad objectives and elaborate organization of the U.N., the range of its activities also is extremely wide. In the *first* place, the U.N. seeks to strengthen the foundations of international peace and security by eliminating hunger, poverty, disease and exploitation. It attacks the basic social and economic problems and by its socio-economic and humanitarian activities, it seeks to promote a balanced personality, and a healthier international atmosphere free from tensions in which political questions may be considered with a detached spirit and solutions based on justice and the principle of give and take may be found and enforced. *Secondly*, it seeks to iron out international differences and provides for the peaceful settlement of international disputes: first by encouraging negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and resort to regional agencies or arrangements; secondly, by resort to judicial settlement provided by the I.C.J.; and thirdly, by providing procedures of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Thus the U.N. has established international obligations, organs and procedures by which pacific settlement of international disputes could be made possible. *Thirdly*, it seeks to prevent wars from occurring by determining the existence of any threat to the peace. *Fourthly*, if and when war actually breaks out, it seeks to provide for individual or collective self-defence as well as collective security. Sanctions are provided under Article 41 (economic and diplomatic), and Articles 42—50 (military). *Fifthly*, since a race for armaments is both wasteful and dangerous to world peace, "in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources" the Security Council is made responsible for formulating the plans to be submitted to the members of the U.N. for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. *Sixthly*, since it is now realized that the continued exploitation of the colonial peoples is a cancer in world politics and is a major source of tensions and a cause of war, the U.N. has established a system to achieve the liberation of the non-self-governing territories and trust territories. *Finally*,

since racial discrimination and mass persecution on the basis of colour or nationality is a powerful force leading to international wars, the U N seeks to create a system in which different peoples may be able to co-exist on the basis of dignity of the individual

In the following, we briefly deal with these activities. The subjects of Disarmament, Trusteeship system, and Minorities and Race Discrimination are discussed subsequently in separate chapters. Here we will confine ourselves to (i) the U N record in the spheres of economic, social, and humanitarian activities and research and publications, (ii) the settlement of international disputes, prevention of wars, and collective security, and (iii) an assessment of the U N

(i) ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Chapter XI of the U N Charter deals with international economic and social co-operation. Under Article 55, the U N, with a view to creating conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, shall promote (a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development, (b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems, and international cultural and educational co-operation, and (c) universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Responsibility for implementing this directive is vested in (i) the General Assembly (Art 13), (ii) the E C O S O C (Chapter IX), and (iii) the Specialized Agencies (Art 57). The Assembly's responsibility is exercised through its Second Committee (Economic and Financial) and Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural), and the plenary sessions. It is related to the E C O S O C from which it receives annual and special reports and to which it makes recommendations, and to the Specialized Agencies with which it approves agreements and to which also it makes recommendations.

The E C O S O C, as we have noted, functions first through its own commissions and such other special bodies which it has either created or taken over from the League of the Permanent Central Opium Board, the Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Board, the U N International Children's Emergency Fund (U N I C E F) and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination. Secondly, the E C O S O C, performs a co-ordinating function with respect to the Specialized Agencies some of which, as we have noted

above, antedate the U.N. Under Article 57 of the Charter these inter-governmental agencies may be brought into relation with the U.N. and Article 63 authorizes the E.C.O.S.O.C. to enter into agreements (subject to General Assembly's approval) "defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the U.N.". The E.C.O.S.O.C. may also make recommendations to these Specialized Agencies, the General Assembly, and the U.N. members with regard to the work of these agencies. The basis and terms of relations between the U.N. and the Specialized Agencies are (a) reciprocal representation at meetings, (b) recommendations by the U.N. to the Agencies and obligations of the latter to report on related actions taken, (c) certain types of assistance to be rendered to the U.N. by the Specialized Agencies upon request, (d) interchange of documents and other information, and (e) co-operative arrangements at an administrative level. But the Specialized Agencies, as we stated earlier, have all been established on the basis of separate international conventions and each has its own individual treaty basis. They conform to a general organizational pattern.

It should always be remembered that the U.N. Charter does not entitle the U.N. to interfere in the domestic jurisdiction of the member states and that this restriction operates in the economic and social spheres as well as the political. Thus, the Assembly, the E.C.O.S.O.C. and the Specialized Agencies all operate, within the framework of this limitation and through "recommendations" and "draft conventions" which may or may not be ratified or implemented by member states.

Main Categories. We may put all the socio-economic and humanitarian activities of the U.N. in five categories: (1) Economic, (2) Communications, (3) Educational, (4) Health and Welfare, (5) General. Under economic category the F.A.O., the I.L.O., the I.B.R.D., the I.M.F., the I.F.C. (International Finance Corporation), the Fiscal Commission, the Economic Employment and Development Commission, the E.C.E. the E.C.A.F.E., the E.C.L.A., the Technical Assistance Board and Commission (T.A.B.C.) and the Commission on International Commodity Trade function. In the second category may be placed the Universal Postal Union (U.P.U.), the I.T.U., the I.C.A.O., and the Transport and Communications (Telecommunication Union) Commission (T.C.C.). In the third category is the U.N.E.S.C.O. In the fourth we may place the W.H.O., the Population Commission, the Social Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Status of Women Commission, and the Narcotic Drugs Commission. And in the fifth may be put the W.M.O. and the Statistical Commission.

Economic Activities. We have already discussed the activities of the F.A.O., the I.L.O., the I.B.R.D., the I.M.F. and

the IFC. Here it may be pointed out that the UN organs and agencies tackled the problem of repairing the economic and social devastation caused by the war. Since 1948, the ECOSOC has been doing regularly a review of the world economic situation and publishes the World Economic Report and the economic surveys of Europe, the Far East and Latin America. The IBRD and the International Monetary Fund have advanced considerable loans as we have already stated. The ECOSOC called an International Conference on Trade and Employment that led to the ill-fated Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. Valuable technical assistance has been rendered by the UN to various countries. The third General Assembly made a token sum of \$228,000 available to the Secretary General for setting up small advisory missions to requesting countries for sending foreign experts to under-developed nations to train local technicians on the spot and for giving fellowships to other technicians from under developed countries for special training abroad. In 1953, the recipient countries contributed nearly \$40 million to the local costs of projects on which some \$20 was spent from the UN Special Account for the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme. During 1953, an average of about 1,100 experts was maintained and 1,600 fellowships were awarded. Assistance under the UN programme is given only to or through governments. In respect of investment the Assembly's resolution of 1952 on the right of any government to nationalize its domestic resources was counteracted by a resolution of the ECOSOC passed on April 30, 1954, entitled "The International Flow of Private Capital for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries". In order to put aid grant on a firm basis, there was a move to create a body, Special UN Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The 100-million dollar Special Fund set up under the resolution of the General Assembly will start operations from January 1, 1959, under Paul G. Hoffman, the Managing Director working under the guidance of the 18-member Governing Council.

On the food front, in 1945-48, the FAO, concentrated on aiding the food supplying countries in allocating and distributing available supplies to meet emergency needs. After 1948, it concerned itself with famine conditions following natural disasters such as floods, draughts and earthquakes. The FAO's goal is to seek an increase in annual food production that will exceed the rate of population growth by 1 to 2%, and for this it has sought to reduce losses now being suffered in the course of producing and storing food, to increase the yield from areas already under cultivation, and to develop new areas. It has fought plant diseases and insect depredations, e.g. the locust control programme in Africa, Asia, the Near East and Central America. It has also

worked on improving tillage, the rotation of crops, the use of adequate fertilizers, clean seeds, and control of weeds and pests. Various governments are assisted by the F.A.O. in the careful planning of land use so that the disastrous results of water logging and salinity can be avoided. It is also aiding governments in increasing fish production in fresh-water ponds, and flooded rice fields particularly in under-developed countries. The F.A.O. has also encouraged land reform, agricultural extension services and measures for making credit available to the farmers.

The U.N. has also attacked the problem of increasing world trade by removing legal trade barriers, for, more food, more wages, stable employment, and balanced expansion of world production depend on international financing and trade expansion. In August 1947, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) was negotiated in Geneva and it was signed by 22 governments on June 30, 1948. At present the number of contracting parties is 35 and these are responsible for about 80% of world trade. These countries have mutually reduced or bound their tariffs on thousands of items. The G.A.T.T. has also served as a major forum for inter-governmental discussion of commercial policy. In 1954-55 the members of G.A.T.T. decided to establish in the near future a permanent organization called as the Organization for Trade Co-operation. In 1956 the parties to the G.A.T.T., recognising that trade restrictions are still maintained for balance of payments reasons, decided to undertake a programme of consultation on a country-by-country basis.

Considerable attention has also been paid to the problem of economic stability and unemployment. The Economic Employment and Development Commission of E.C.O.S.O.C. has done useful work. The U.N. has tried to find ways of preventing sharp fluctuations in the prices of internationally traded raw materials. There exists a Sugar Agreement for a part of the world sugar markets and a Wheat Agreement.

Communication. We have already referred to the U.P.U., the I.T.U., the I.C.A.O. and the T.C.C. The T.C.C. has initiated action looking toward the international regulation of the movement of explosives and other dangerous goods. The I.C.A.O. has helped the under-developed countries to develop their air transport facilities. As a result of its activities there is today a series of floating weather stations located at specific points in the North Atlantic. Long-range aids to air navigation are also maintained in Iceland and in the Faeroe Islands. The I.T.U. has enabled us to pick up a receiver and connect with 97% of the world's telephones. The W.M.O. has created a world-wide net-work of weather stations with common methods and standard for weather

reporting and has established weather codes and efficient methods of broadcasting reports. The U.P.U. has aided governments in improving their postal services. The International Maritime Consultative Organization has promoted safety of life at sea and has prevented collisions.

Social activities—Educational, Health and Welfare

We have referred to the achievements of the U.N.E.S.C.O. in educational, cultural and scientific spheres. We may now survey other activities of the U.N. In the first place there has been the serious problem of providing relief and rehabilitation to those living in war devastated areas (1945—1947). The principal machinery for this was the U.N.R.R.A. and the U.N.I.C.E.F. During 1948—50 emphasis shifted from relief to long term social development by means of fellowships, demonstration centres, and pilot projects to train officials to deal with problems of public welfare administration, child welfare, vocational guidance and the rehabilitation of handicapped persons, care of migrants and other special groups in the community. The U.N.R.R.A. was now terminated and its residual assets absorbed in other U.N. work. After 1950, emphasis shifted from Europe to under-developed areas and majority of the fellowships awarded went to them. A seminar was held for Arab States to consider methods of public assistance for families and children. A demonstration centre for the rehabilitation of the blind has been undertaken in Egypt, and a comprehensive reorganization of the social welfare programmes of Libya and Haiti have been carried out. The U.N. activities in the social sphere are (1) planning, organization and administration for social welfare, (2) community, family, and child welfare, (3) social defence, including prevention of crime and suppression of prostitution, (4) rehabilitation of the handicapped, and (5) housing and town and country planning.

The I.R.O., International Refugee Organization, (1947—52), which succeeded the U.N.R.R.A., accomplished an enormous task and it repatriated 73,000 refugees to the countries of their origin, and resettled 1,000,000 persons outside their homeland, in more than 50 countries. On January 31, 1952 the I.R.O. was terminated and its work was taken over by the office of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.) established by the General Assembly in January 1951. The mandate of the office runs until the end of 1958. Considerable relief was rendered by the U.N. to the Palestine refugees and in December 1949, the General Assembly established the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. In 1953, there were still 872,000 refugees depending upon relief provided by U.N. members. In 1952 the Assembly had authorised the expenditure of \$200,000,000 for a rehabilitation programme and under this, the Johnston Plan for the development of the water resources of the Jordan River

was started. In 1950-51 the Assembly, on the recommendations of the E.C.O.S.O.C., created the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Administration (U.N.K.R.A.) whose cost was to be borne by voluntary contributions from member states. During 1953, the U.N.K.R.A. delivered some \$30,000,000 worth of material including grain, fertilizers, school equipment and trucks. In 1954, the U.N. Assembly approved a programme for solving within four years the problems of refugees, particularly those still in camps in Europe, and the U.N. Refugees Emergency Fund (U.N.R.E.F.) was established to give the programme financial support. The office of the U.N.H.C.R. was awarded the Noble Peace Prize for 1954. In 1956, the Assembly requested the office to co-ordinate the aid for the Hungarian refugees.

The U.N. has made a striking contribution to international welfare of children ensuring maternal and child welfare, children's disease control, child feeding supplies, and emergency relief to children in cases of earthquakes, droughts and famines. By 1956, about 70 million children had been aided in 75 countries.

In respect of health, sanitation and control of disease also the U.N. record has been remarkably successful. In 1947 it fought cholera in Egypt. Through the efforts of W.H.O. Italy, Ceylon, and Brazil have been virtually cleared of Malaria and in 1957, it was assisting 30 countries, including India, in malaria control. It has also helped in combating yaws and tuberculosis. In India alone, 10,000,000 children and young people have been treated, and 4,000,000 vaccinated by 65 teams of doctors and B.C.G. technicians at a reported cost of \$600,000. In 1953 the W.H.O., emphasising the importance of providing training in environmental sanitation, assisted in 35 projects in 37 countries. It has trained sanitary inspectors in India, Liberia, and Mexico. The U.N. has been an instrument of public health services, social security in various countries through the W.H.O. and the I.L.O. It has tackled the problem of housing as part of social and economic development. In India a demonstration village of 80 homes has been erected as a result of the activities of a U.N. mission on low cost housing. The Commission on Narcotics Drugs supervises the application of International Narcotics Conventions. Under the existing treaties governments are obliged to provide the U.N. with annual reports on seizures they have made in illicit traffic of opium, and on the texts of the laws and regulations which are in force in their countries. An agreement signed by 40 countries is in operation under which the opium needs for medical and scientific purposes are estimated and the producing countries adjust their output to these needs. The latter are required to report on their production to the U.N. International supervision is carried out by the U.N. Permanent Central Opium Board.

Human rights With human rights, we deal in detail in the next Chapter. The Assembly has declared genocide a crime under international law and has adopted a convention for the prevention and punishment of genocide. Through a sub-commission of the Commission on Human Rights, other steps have been taken for preventing discrimination and protecting minorities, for ascertaining the extent of prevailing discrimination, for mobilizing public opinion and for co-ordinating activities of non-governmental organizations concerned with this problem. The U.N. has also attacked the problem of slavery and forced labour. Wild allegations that systems of forced labour are used as a means of political coercion and that they play an essential part in the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies have been made in a carefully documented report by an *ad hoc* Committee on Forced Labour set up jointly by the I.L.O. and the U.N.

Conclusions A few conclusions may now be drawn from the brief discussion of the socio-economic activities of the U.N. *First*, the U.N. has not merely carried forward the work of the League of Nations in this sphere but has actually improved on it and has considerably expanded it by developing new procedures, by reforming the old ones, and by setting up new organs. *Secondly*, the cold war has not affected this part of the U.N. activities, although one frequently hears the Soviet spokesmen accusing the Western countries of using the U.N.O. "to further imperialist exploitation and to bring other less fortunate people under the domination of American monopolists". *Thirdly*, the vast programmes of the U.N. in the social and economic spheres have also contributed to the emergence of voting blocs. The under developed countries normally act together in opposition to the more industrialized members, particularly where economic development and human rights are involved. This has led some people to suggest that voting particularly on issues that involve sizeable expenditures, might be on a weighted basis. *Finally*, all these activities raise the problems of finance, distribution of relief on an equitable basis, and of co-ordination of inter related activities and in this there is much to be desired.

(ii) SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The disputes that have been referred to the U.N. can be placed in four categories (1) those solely before the Security Council, (2) those solely before the General Assembly, (3) those before the Security Council and the Assembly both, and (4) those before the International Court of Justice. This last we

have already discussed. In the first category (A) fall the cases of (1) Iran, (2) Syria and Lebanon, (3) Czechoslovakia, (4) Hyderabad, (5) the Berlin Blockade, (6) Trieste, (7) Egypt, (8) Indonesia, and (9) Kashmir.

In the second category (B) we may place (1) the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa, (2) Balkan Peace Treaties, (3) Morocco, (4) Tunisia, and (5) Algeria, (6) Chinese troops in Burma and (7) the U.S. Airmen in China.

In the third category (C), we may put (1) Spain, (2) Greece, (3) Palestine, (4) Korea, (5) the Suez Canal and (6) Hungary. In the following we will very briefly examine the U.N. handling of some of the more important disputes. Many of the disputes we have listed have already been covered in details in Part Two and earlier in the present volume.

CATEGORY (A)

Iran. One of the earliest disputes referred to the Security Council was that of Iran. We have already discussed this question in Part Two (pp. 74—76). On January 16, 1946, the Iranian delegation invited the attention of the Council to the alleged Soviet interference in his country's affairs. But both parties agreed to negotiate and the Council only asked them to keep it informed. On March 18, 1946, Iran reported that the U.S.S.R. was violating the obligations of the treaty which bound it to evacuate its troops by March 2, 1946. The Council took up the question on March 26 and after two days the item was placed on the agenda. Gromyko asked that its consideration be deferred until April 10 failing which his delegation would walk out. But as the Council "marched on", Gromyko "marched out". This was the first walk-out. Eventually, the matter was settled out of the Council room. The U.S.S.R. promised to withdraw its troops on April 6, and Gromyko asked for the removal of Iranian item from the Council's agenda. On April 15, Iran also concurred with this demand. Mr. Trygve Lie also agreed but the Council decided to keep the matter on its agenda, seven years after its settlement although it has not been discussed by that body.

Syria and Lebanon. This was a dispute between France, on the one hand, and Syria and Lebanon, on the other. Even at the San Francisco Conference Syria and Lebanon had protested against the dispatch of French troops there. On February 4, 1946, both countries referred the question of Anglo-French troops to the Council. The U.S.S.R. fell in line with the demand for their withdrawal, while the U.S.A. suggested that a resolution be passed by the Security Council expressing confidence that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible. This

resolution was vetoed by the U S S R. France and the U K, as parties to the dispute, refrained from voting. However, France and Britain announced that they would comply with the resolution and the matter was settled.

Czechoslovakia We have dealt with the story of the coup in Czechoslovakia in Part Two (pp 58—60). After the coup, Jan Papanek, the permanent representative of Czechoslovakia at the UN protested to the Council against the Soviet Communist's interference in his country's internal affairs. But he had been dismissed by the new communist government of Czechoslovakia and his right to speak for Czechoslovakia was challenged. On March 12, 1948, however, Chile presented the case and on March 17, 1948 it was placed on the agenda. The Security Council wanted to investigate the facts but this the U S S R opposed. The majority of the Council expressed the view that it was a procedural matter and was not subject to the veto. The U S S R voted to the contrary and the motion failed. Thus the "double veto" was used. On April 8, 1948, the new Czech government refused to take part in the deliberations of the Security Council.

Hyderabad This case arose from the Nizam's intransigence and unwillingness to join either India or Pakistan. On August 17, Lalk Ali charged India with a series of flagrant breaches of the Standstill Agreement, and on August 21, the government of Hyderabad protested to the Council against India's threat to Hyderabad's independence. On September 9, Delhi decided to take police action against the Nizam. On September 13, the Indian troops marched in and after an operation which lasted 108 hours, they entered Hyderabad city on September 18. On September 20, 1948, the Security Council took up the matter. India opposed the discussion of the issue as Hyderabad was not an independent state and was not authorized to bring the case before the UN. On September 23, the Nizam sent a cable to the Security Council withdrawing the Hyderabad case. Certain foreign powers continued to press for the discussion of the case, but ultimately it was dropped.

✓ The Berlin Blockade We have fully discussed the Berlin Blockade in Part Two, including its handling by the UN (pp 135—139). Here it is enough to note that it was on October 4, 1948 that France, Britain and the U S A brought the matter to the Security Council suggesting that the dispute constituted a threat to the peace under Chapter VII. The U S S R denied that a threat existed and contended that Art 107 of the Charter excluded such matters. The efforts of the Council to break the deadlock failed, and the matter was settled outside. On May 4, 1949 the Council was informed about the results of negotiations.

Trieste. The problem of Trieste has been discussed in Part Two (pp. 289—292). Under the Italian Peace Treaty, Trieste had been internationalized and the Security Council had been made responsible for its government. Pending the appointment of a governor, Trieste was to be occupied by British, American, and French troops (Zone A) and Yugoslav forces (Zone B). In 1948 the West wanted to bolster up the pro-West elements in the Italian election and to hand over Trieste to Italy which Yugoslavia opposed. It asked the Council to declare all arrangements made between Zone A powers and Italy null and void and to appoint a Governor in accordance with the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947. But the Council failed and decided to postpone discussion pending negotiations between the parties. Meanwhile, both Italy and Yugoslavia showed willingness to compromise and early in 1954 both London and Washington were impatient to leave the area. Eventually Zone B was turned over to Yugoslavia and Zone A to Italy. The problem of Trieste was thus settled in October 1954. The U.S.S.R. also acquiesced as part of its campaign to ease international tensions.

Egypt. We have surveyed the history of Egyptian struggle against foreign control earlier in this volume. On July 8, 1947, Egypt protested to the Council against the continued presence of British troops on her soil in violation of the U.N. Charter, and against the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan as a threat to international peace. Egypt contended that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which entitled Britain to keep its troops in Egypt till 1956 had been invalidated by the Charter. Britain denied that there was a threat to peace, and told the Council that negotiations were still on. The Council considered several resolutions but none could be passed. In the following years relations continued to deteriorate and in spite of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez in 1954, the clash of 1956-57 could not be averted.

Indonesia. We have already discussed the evolution of Indonesia as a sovereign independent state and its struggle for freedom from the Dutch control. The Dutch first negotiated a settlement at Linggadjati in March 1947 providing *de facto* recognition of an Indonesian Republic. When the agreement broke down, they sent in troops. Several influential powers, including, for divergent reasons, both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were sympathetic to Indonesia. India (which played a vital role throughout) and Australia, asked the U.N. to intervene. On July 30, 1947 (earlier Ukraine had presented the controversy to the Security Council on January 21, 1946 but nothing had been done) India invoked Art. 35, and Australia Art. 39. The Council ordered cease-fire and asked the parties to settle the matter by peaceful means. In short, the Council was twice able to halt the fighting by calling upon the Dutch and the Indonesians to lay

down their arms—once from January 17 to December 18, 1948, and the second time it was permanent and led to final establishment of an independent Indonesia. During the period, October 1947 to April 1951, a U N Committee of Good Offices (later called the U N Commission for Indonesia) was on the scene helping to bring the parties around a Conference table and suggesting solutions. The Commission consisted of Australia (chosen by Indonesia), Belgium (chosen by the Netherlands), and the U S A (chosen by Belgium and Australia).

Kashmir For this the reader may refer to the Chapter on Pakistan in this volume.

CATEGORY (B)

Rat al Durrimitation in South Africa For this a reference may be made to the Chapter on India in this volume.

Balkan Peace Treaties It was in March 1949, that the question of observance of human rights in Bulgaria and Hungary, later on extended to include Rumania, was raised in the Assembly. It will be recalled that under the peace treaties all three states were obliged to secure human rights to all persons under their jurisdiction. These countries at that time were not members of the U N. In April 1949, the Assembly expressed its concern over the situation. The three states denied that a cause for concern existed and contended that the matter lay within their respective domestic jurisdiction. In October 1947, the Assembly reiterated its views and requested the I C J to give an advisory opinion. The Court opined that a dispute existed which the three states were obligated to arbitrate, and to appoint the arbitrators in accordance with the Peace Treaties of 1947. Nothing was, however, done by the states and in November 1950 the Assembly condemned them for "a wilful refusal to fulfil their obligations under the Treaties of Peace" and asked the U N Members to present relevant information on the question to the Secretary General.

Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria For these the reader may refer to the Chapter dealing with the Revolt of Africa in this volume. When the question of Morocco and Tunisia was put on the agenda of the Assembly in 1952 at the request of 13 Asian and Arab nations, the French delegate protested against what he considered an intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction and declared that the Assembly had no competence to discuss the relationship between France and her North African Protectorates. He, therefore, refused to participate in the debate. The seventh Assembly passed resolutions recognising the fundamental rights of peoples to freedom and requesting the two sides to continue negotiations on an urgent basis. On August 17, 1953 the thirteen Arab nations, joined by Liberia and Thailand, impressed by the

deteriorating situation, asked the Assembly to reconsider the issue in the interest of world peace. The French opposition to the discussion of the matter continued. The Eighth Assembly could not do anything. In 1954 Mendes-France injected a new spirit and on July 31, he offered Tunisia home rule. The Assembly in 1954, therefore, passed a resolution expressing confidence that negotiations would succeed. Eventually on June 3, 1955, a series of conventions were signed by the French and Tunisian governments giving home rule to the Protectorates. This brightened the prospects of Morocco also and in March 1956 diplomatic agreements were signed between France, and Morocco and Tunisia, recognising their sovereign status. Both were admitted to the U.N. in 1956.

With regard to Algeria, it was on September 22, 1955, that the General Committee of the General Assembly by eight to five, with two abstentions voted not to include the question of Algeria on the agenda. But on September 30, the Assembly by a narrow majority of twenty-eight to twenty-seven, with five abstentions rejected the recommendation of the General Committee and included the item on the agenda. The French delegation promptly walked out of the Assembly. This veered the Assembly round and it postponed the discussion until November 25, 1955. Later, it passed a resolution deciding not to consider the question further and declaring that it was "no longer seized of this item on the agenda of its tenth session". Members made it clear, however, that the Assembly would take up the question at a later date if France failed in its efforts to reach a settlement. On November 29, the French delegation returned to the Assembly. Subsequently, the situation deteriorated and the French authorities brutally suppressed the Algerian nationalists. The virtual state of war in Algeria drove the thirteen Arab-Asian bloc members to request the Security Council to consider the question without delay. But on July 26, 1956, the Council by a vote of seven to two, with two abstentions, decided not to put the item on its agenda. Thus, fifteen Arab-Asian bloc countries resubmitted the question to the eleventh session of the Assembly. On October 22, 1956, shortly before the Assembly opened, five of the most highly placed leaders of the Algerian nationalists were arrested by the French after a Moroccan government-chartered plane was diverted to Algiers by its French crew. In the eleventh session the question of Algeria was placed on the agenda "in a simple fashion". The French delegate, however, declared that in agreeing to the inclusion of Algerian question in the Assembly's agenda, France had not changed its position that "this is a French domestic problem which is outside the competence of the U.N."

In February 1957, the First Committee began considering the question and Pineau at once accused various nations of

actively aiding the rebellion in Algeria. And as the Committee began to discuss draft resolutions, the French delegation withdrew leaving only observers. Eventually on February 15, 1957, the Assembly passed a mild resolution by seventy-seven to zero referring to the "situation in Algeria which is causing much suffering and loss of human lives", and expressed the hope that "in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the U.N." In the following months the situation deteriorated further and the resistance of Algeria to French atrocities continued unabated. The discovery of large oil deposits in the Sahara has lent a new significance to the political struggle for Algeria and the nationalists started demanding "recognition of the Algerian nation as one and indivisible, with its natural extension in the Sahara", thus ruling out any partition plan for Algeria. Negotiations between the Algerian nationalists and France did not make much headway and on July 16, 1957, twenty-two members of the Arab-Asian bloc requested for the inclusion of Algeria on the agenda of the thirteenth session which opened in October 1958.

Chinese troops in Burma For this also the reader may refer to the chapter on the Resurgence of Asia in the present volume. It was in 1953 that Burma complained to the Assembly charging the Nationalist Government of China with an act of aggression and instigation of hostile activities by the Chinese forces remaining in Burma. China denied the charge. The Assembly on April 23, 1953 condemned the presence of these foreign forces in Burma, recommended negotiations and use of good offices of certain member states, and requested all states both to refrain from furnishing them any assistance and to help in their evacuation. In 1953-54 Assembly sessions, Burma again raised the question, alleging that little progress had been made. But meanwhile under the auspices of Joint Military Committee (composed of Burma, Nationalist China, Thailand and the U.S.A.) the evacuation of the Chinese soldiers from Burma had begun. But this did not satisfy Burma and its delegation told the Assembly that the evacuation of about two thousand men left over ten thousand Chinese troops in Burma and did not solve the problem. The Assembly passed a resolution noting the "limited evacuation" and urging continued efforts at evacuation.

U.S. Airmen in China It was on December 10, 1954, that the Assembly in a resolution, sponsored by fifteen nations which fought in Korea, requested the Secretary General to seek the release of eleven airmen held prisoner in China and convicted of espionage and sentenced to long prison terms. It was contended that the action of China was in violation of the Korean

Armistice Agreement. Dag Hammarskjöld at once got in touch with Chou En-lai who agreed to receive him in Peking and discuss with him "pertinent questions". From January 5 to 10, 1955, the two statesmen held talks at Peking and on his return, Hammarskjöld held extensive conversations with representatives of countries directly concerned with this problem and gradually the tension was eased. In April, the U.S.A. allowed seventy-six Chinese students to go home. In May, the air and naval engagements in the Formosa straits terminated and four U.S. fighter pilots, held captive by Peking, were released. On August 4, 1955, the eleven U.S. airmen were released and Eisenhower publicly acknowledged his thanks particularly to "the U.N. and its Secretary-General who actively sought this result".

Other questions tackled by the Assembly have been the Thai complaint against Viet Minh and the representation of China, which have been dealt with earlier in this volume.

CATEGORY (C)

Spain. For this the reader may refer to Part Two of this work (pp. 163—166).

Greece. The background of this we have discussed in Part Two (pp 69—71). World War II had left Greece severely damaged and in a state of turmoil and it soon became a bone of contention between the East and the West. At the request of Greece the U.N. Security Council intervened and decided in December 1946 to send an investigating commission on the spot. It filed a 767-page report in June 1947, the majority fixing blame on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary for intervention in the Greek civil war, and the Communist minority dissenting. Meanwhile the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed and the U.N. was bye-passed. The Security Council had been deadlocked and in 1947 the Assembly set up a Special Committee on the Balkans which for the next four years did important work of observing, reporting, and attempting to conciliate. The U.N. observers remained on the job until 1954.

Palestine. Earlier in this volume we have narrated the circumstances leading to the creation of Israel. It was on April 2, 1947 that Britain approached the U.N. for a settlement of the Palestine problem. On April 28, a special session of the Assembly appointed an eleven-man Committee. A majority of this Committee favoured partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews and a minority favoured Federal Union. On November 29, 1947, the Assembly voted partition by thirty-three votes to thirteen with ten abstentions, established the U.N. Palestine Commission to execute the partition plan, and requested the Security Council to take steps to implement it and to treat

any attempt to alter the plan by force as a threat to peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression. It was assumed in this resolution that the Assembly had the power to establish two states out of a former mandate, and to apply sanctions and use force to see that the plan was carried out. The Arab bloc denied both the assumptions and vehemently opposed the plan. The Jews, too, did not like partition. A civil war broke out. Britain blocked further Jewish immigration and refused to allow the Commission to enter Palestine.

In February 1948, the Council took up the matter again and discussions continued for a whole year. The Commission asked for a non-Palestine military force. But the U.S.A. now went back on their earlier stand, arguing that the Assembly had made only a recommendation and that the Council had no authority to enforce it. A second special session of the Assembly thus became necessary. Meanwhile the Council in a series of seven resolutions asked the "Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence immediately", and on April 27, it approved the creation of a Truce Commission composed of the representatives of members of the Security Council to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire resolution.

The second special session of the Assembly was convened on April 16, 1948. On May 14, a Jewish provisional government proclaimed the establishment of Israel and it was at once recognised by the U.S.A. and welcomed by the General Assembly. Next day 5 Arab countries—Egypt, Hashemite Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—sent in troops to overthrow the new state. On May 14, the Assembly had approved the appointment of a U.N. mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, and together with a team of military observers he tried to work out a truce. Meanwhile military clashes added tensions and on May 29, the U.N. called for another cease-fire but a truce went into effect on June 11, 1948 for four weeks. On July 15, the Security Council resolved that a threat to peace existed within the meaning of Art. 39, and ordered a cease-fire and decided that the truce must continue. Widespread violence for a time ceased but on September 17, 1948 Count Bernadotte was assassinated by an Israeli extremist and Dr. Ralph Bunche, an American negro, took on the job and he induced the states to conclude armistice agreements.

Meanwhile, to remove deeper causes of the friction, the Third General Assembly established the U.N. Conciliation Commission (France, Turkey and the U.S.A.). Its job was to solve the problem of 1,000,000 Arab refugees who had fled from Israel, to adjust borders between Israel and the Arab state in Palestine which the U.N. originally had intended to create, and to settle the question of Jerusalem,

a Holy City to the world's three major faiths. In December 1948 the Assembly voted solution for these problems but could not carry them out. They still remain sore points.

Korea. We have already traced the course of events leading to the Korean war in Part Two (pp. 36—38, and 332-333). The Korean dispute before the U.N. has been singular in more ways than one. First, it involved a military attack against a protege of the U.N.—South Korea. Secondly, the relative strength of the adversaries was so unequal that there was no time for mediation and negotiation. Thirdly, it involved a clash of vital interests of three great powers—the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China. And finally, in this case the U.N. applied the concept of collective security. There were three main reasons why the U.N. action proved to be so effective in Korea. (a) The absence of the Soviet representative from the Security Council since January 1950 in protest against the refusal to seat the representatives of People's China permitted the Council to take action which might otherwise have been vetoed by the U.S.S.R. This made possible a U.N. basis for collective action without which many member states would have hesitated in giving approval and support. An effort to tap the Assembly would have involved delay which might have been decisive. (b) The presence of the U.N. Commission in Korea equipped with military observers and authorized to report on developments provided a basis for action by the Security Council. (c) The presence of U.S. forces in Japan and the readiness of the U.S.A. to use this force within the U.N. framework facilitated the task.

The U.N. action may now be summarised. On June 25, 1950, the day North Korea is reported to have invaded South Korea, the Security Council established the fact that a breach of peace had occurred and recommended to members the broad course of action to be taken. It also called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. Thus provisional measures under Art. 40 were taken. On June 26, the U.S.A. intervened, ordered its naval and air forces to help South Korea, and neutralized Formosa. The Security Council legalized this action on June 27, 1950. Fifty-three members of the U.N. showed willingness to support the principle of collective security. On July 7, 1950, the Council recommended a unified command under the U.S. On January 13, 1951 the First Committee of the Assembly adopted five principles of the Cease-fire Group and on January 17, China rejected the Cease-fire Group proposals. Earlier on November 3, 1950, as we noted earlier, the Assembly had passed the Unite for Peace Resolution. By early 1951, 16 members had offered armed forces for action—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, U.K., and the U.S.A. Other members contributed supplies and services. In October 1950 and in the following months, Peking intervened and this was brought to the notice of the Council on November 6, 1950. By that time the Soviet representative had returned to the Council and vetoed its action.

The Assembly was thus tapped and in December 1950, it established a group of three to explore the possibilities of a cease-fire. But this proved to be of no avail. On February 1, 1951, the Assembly branded China as aggressor and set up a Committee to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly. The President of the Assembly was authorised to establish a good offices committee to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

On April 11, 1951, General MacArthur was recalled and on May 18, the Assembly recommended embargo on war materials to China. On June 23, Malik suggested cease-fire and on July 10, 1951, armistice negotiations began in Kaesong. In these, the Assembly took no part until October 1952 when it considered the deadlock which had developed in the negotiations. It made proposals which were not accepted by China and North Korea. On February 19, 1952, agreement had been reached on a "political conference". On October 8, 1950 negotiations for armistice were broken off by the Unified Command. On April 11, 1953 the pact on the sick and the wounded was signed. On April 26, 1953, negotiations were resumed following the death of Stalin on March 5. On June 8, agreement on prisoners of war was signed and on June 18, 25,000 prisoners of war were released by South Korea. On July 27, 1953, armistice was signed and on August 28, the Assembly expressed its approval in a resolution.

In this armistice agreement it had been provided that within three months a higher level political conference of "both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.". On the phrase "both sides" a controversy arose, the U.S. interpreting it to mean the 16 nations involved in fighting and South Korea, on one side and the U.S.S.R., China and North Korea on the other. The latter also wanted the inclusion of neutral nations. Negotiations on the time, place and composition of the Conference took place during 1953-54 but no agreement could be reached. At the Berlin Conference of February 1954, it was agreed that a Conference of interested

parties should be held at Geneva in April 1954, to consider the Korean and the Indo-Chinese questions. No reference was made to the U.N. The rest of the developments in Korea we have already covered in Part Two.

The Korean case had very important repercussions on the U.N. First, it emphasised that absence of a permanent member from the Council's meeting amounted to abstention since absence could not be allowed to hinder the Council from functioning continuously. Secondly, it amplified "the conditions under which sanctions could be applied by the organization". Thirdly, it modified the Charter provisions with regard to application of sanctions and made them voluntary. The Security Council simply recommended action as did the General Assembly. Fourthly, it led to the enhancement of the prestige and authority of the General Assembly, for, "Unite for Peace Resolution" was only an outcome of Korea. Fifthly, it falsified the assumption of the Charter that sanctions to be effective must have the support of the permanent members of the Council. The Assembly could now recommend sanctions and they would be effective if majority of the members are in favour. Finally, it suggested that the decision to take collective measures in the name of the U.N. and the effectiveness of such measures will be largely dependent upon the ability and willingness of one or more great powers to take the initiative.

The Suez. We have discussed some aspect of the story of the Suez Crisis in the chapter on the Middle East and the reader may refer to it. It was on September 23, 1956 that Britain and France, discouraged by the failure of direct negotiations, referred the Suez question to the Security Council—a step which world public opinion had been long urging. But during the Council debates "the confrontation of the opposing views of the West and Egypt generated more heat than progress". On October 9, the Council decided to hold closed meetings in an effort to reach agreement. Outside negotiations were continuing and so, on October 13, when the Council met again, Britain declared that a beginning had been made in the process of finding a basis for negotiation and that six principles had been agreed on: (a) Free and open transit through the canal, (b) respect for the sovereignty of Egypt; (c) insulation of the operation of canal from politics of any country, (d) agreement between Egypt and the users on the manner of fixing tolls and charges, (e) allotment of a fair proportion of the dues to the development of the canal, and (f) in case of disputes, arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the repayment of sums found to be due. The question now was that of implementation. Within the next 15 days tensions mounted steadily and there was intense diplomatic activity. The Secretary-General of the U.N. also held a series

of meetings with Egyptian officials to assess areas of agreement. Meanwhile a difference of practice developed among the members of Suez Canal Users Association (S C U A) as to whether or not tolls should be withheld from the newly constituted Egyptian Canal authority.

On October 19, the Council met to consider complaints by Jordan and Israel. While nothing could be done about it, the Council faced on October 29, the French accusations that the Egyptians were assisting the Algerian nationalists. Same day Israel attacked Egypt. On October 30, the U S called the Council to consider the new situation. The Secretary General told the Council that General Burns, the Chief of Staff of the U N Truce Supervision Organization on the Israel-Jordan Frontier, had already asked for the withdrawal of Israel troops and for a cease-fire to take place at noon but that there had been no reply. The Soviet delegate pointed to Associated Press report from London that Britain and France would intervene "to separate the belligerents (Egypt and Israel) and guarantee the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal." Same day Britain and France served an ultimatum of 12 hours. The U S resolution calling for evacuation of Israeli troops, was vetoed by France and Britain. The Council then adjourned. On October 31, Anglo-French air attack on Egypt had begun. The Council met at 3 p.m. on October 31, and adopted a resolution by 7 to 2 (France and Britain) with two abstentions (Australia and Belgium) calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly under the "Unite For Peace Resolution".

On November 1, the First Emergency Special Session of the Assembly was convened. Heated speeches were made by several delegates. The British delegate compared the British action to that taken by the U S A in Korea when it notified the Council that the Seventh Fleet had already gone into action. The Assembly adopted the U S resolution urging an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of the forces of parties to the Armistice Agreement behind the armistice lines, and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area. Steps were to be taken to reopen the Suez Canal after the cease fire. Meanwhile, the Assembly was considering the proposal for a U N Emergency Force (U N E F). On November 5, the Assembly passed the resolution creating the U N Force by 57-0. Same day, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that a cease-fire had taken place and that at mid-night 6-7 November, the Anglo-French forces would cease hostilities. Implementation of a general cease-fire would, however, depend on agreement concerning the plan for an international force. On November 7, 1956, the Assembly passed another resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw its forces immediately behind the armistice lines and

upon Britain and France to withdraw all their troops from Egyptian soil. It also set up a 7-member committee (Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan) under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General to plan a force. On November 10, the Special Assembly transferred the Suez question to the 11th session of the Assembly opening on November 12, 1956, and on November 15, the first unit of the U.N.E.F. arrived in Egypt.

The General Assembly took up the question on November 23, and next day it passed a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces. By December 22, the Anglo-French forces had left Egypt. Israel, however, refused to evacuate its troops from Sharmel-Sheikh area and from the Gaza Strip. On January 19, and February 2, 1957, two other resolutions were passed by the Assembly on Israeli evacuation and authorizing the Secretary-General to carry out other measures. But Israel failed to comply even now. A six-power resolution was then moved calling on all states "to deny all military and economic assistance and facilities to Israel". On March 1, however, Israel announced readiness to withdraw but warned that if there were any armed interference with ships of Israeli flag in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Strait of Tiran, Israel would exercise its right of self-defence under Art. 51 of the Charter. By March 7, all Israeli troops had left the Egyptian soil. The Egyptian delegates thanked the Assembly: "Words are helpless to give an adequate hint of this, our feeling of gratitude. May I, therefore, be forgiven if I merely say, on Egypt's behalf: 'Thank you and God bless you all'".

For the rest, the U.N. faced the problem of the Canal clearance which cost \$11,000,000 raised by the U.S.A., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The Canal was opened well ahead of time and the credit goes to General R.A. Wheeler who was loaned to the U.N. by the I.B.R.D. Shortly after, negotiations began for the future regime of the canal. On April 26, 1957 the Security Council took up this matter but in this it failed and this was left to the individual states. The cost of the U.N.E.F. up to December 31, 1957 was estimated to be \$27,500,000.

Hungary. For the general study of the Hungarian revolt, the reader may refer to Part Two of this work (pp. 324-331). It was on October 28, 1956 that the Security Council first met to consider "the situation created by the action of foreign military forces in Hungary in violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people which are secured by the Treaty of Peace" at the request of U.S.A., Britain and France. Hungary took the plea

of domestic jurisdiction, and the U S S R supported it in this. The debate in the Council remained inconclusive and no specific suggestions as to U.N. action were made. On November 2, the Council met again to consider Imre Nagy's appeal for the U.N. support in securing withdrawal of Soviet troops. (Meanwhile, as we noted above, the U.N. got engaged with the Suez Crisis and on October 30, the U S S R issued the famous Declaration which seemed to inaugurate a new chapter in Eastern Europe.) The Council, again, could not take any action. On November 3, it considered a U.S. resolution condemning the Soviet intervention and asking the U S S R to withdraw its troops from Hungary at once. But at this stage the Hungarian delegate reported that negotiations between Hungarian and Soviet army leaders had already begun. The Council adjourned when Sobolev confirmed that "negotiations are going on."

On November 4 the Soviet troops launched an all out attack on Budapest and same evening the Council hurriedly reconvened to discuss this event. Even Sobolev was taken aback and he admitted that he "has no official information on the reports about the new developments in Hungary." But the U.S. resolution urging the U S S R "to cease the introduction of additional armed forces into Hungary and to withdraw all of its forces without delay" was vetoed by the U S S R. The Council decided to call a special session of the General Assembly under the Unite For Peace resolution. The Assembly could not do anything except to keep the Hungarian problem before the world. In the 11th session of the Assembly to which the Special Session transferred the Hungarian question, ten resolutions were adopted on various aspects of the Hungarian question—(a) 4 dealing in whole or in part with the intervention of Soviet forces and other political issues, (b) 5 with observation and investigation of the situation within Hungary, (c) 3 with relief for the Hungarian people, (d) and 2 with aid to refugees, who had fled from Hungary. In the first category the climax reached on December 12, when the Assembly condemned "the violation of the Charter" by the U S S R "in depriving Hungary of its liberty and independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental rights." With regard to observation, efforts were made to obtain Hungarian agreement to the dispatch of U.N. observers, and the Secretary-General himself tried to obtain access to Hungary and created a Committee on November 16 to see what information on developments in Hungary might be available outside that country. Several dates were suggested but Hungary rejected them all. On January 10, 1957, the Assembly created a Special Committee (to investigate into the situation) consisting of Denmark, Australia, Ceylon, Tunisia and Uruguay. It was not allowed to go into Hungary but after examining over 100 witnesses in New York,

Rome, Vienna, London and Geneva, it rejected the Soviet arguments and contentions and found the U.S.S.R. guilty of gross intervention in Hungary. The Assembly now met earlier than the schedule (on September 10, 1957) and adopted the report of the Committee. The U.N. relief to Hungarians and aid to refugees have been discussed earlier in this Chapter.

ASSESSMENT OF THE U_N.

We may now draw a few conclusions from the discussion of the U.N.O. and its working. *Firstly*, the U.N. has been a great success in the spheres of social, economic and humanitarian activities—spheres which diplomacy, power-politics and cold war have not invaded. *Secondly*, it has served as a great forum where vital international issues have been dealt with. It has kept the world public opinion alive to threats to peace and to the need of vigilance. Here the statesmen learn better to appreciate political realities and each other's points of view. It serves as an informal face-saving point of contact for adversaries who are ready to settle a dispute. "Pressures of public opinion, mobilized by skilful propagandists in the more formal U.N. proceedings, modify, hasten, and otherwise influence the settlements being negotiated quietly in the lounges and inner offices". *Thirdly*, it serves as a propaganda lever, independent of private peace-making—a means of putting pressure on France to free its North African colonies, for example, or on South Africa to ease apartheid, or on Britain to give up Cyprus, or on the Netherlands to abandon New Guinea. *Fourthly*, it serves as a "great safety valve" for explosive national feelings. "When Arab-Israeli clashes reach fever pitch a U.N. debate is held, or a Mixed Armistice Commission resolution is passed, which gives some satisfaction to the aggrieved party, and full-scale war is avoided. When American public feelings reach the boiling point, as they did over the imprisonment of fliers in Red China, U.N. action is an alternative to a naval blockade or other virtual act of war. *Fifthly*, the U.N. serves as a diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to the member states. "Conflicts may persist for long periods without an agreed solution and groups of states may actively defend special and regional interests. Nevertheless, and in spite of temporary developments in the opposite direction, under the influence of acute tension, the tendency in the U.N. is to wear away, or break down, differences, thus helping towards solutions which approach the common interest and application of the principles of the Charter". *Sixthly*, the U.N. has helped in the process of adjustment of the older powers with the newly independent states in Asia and Africa. Referring to this aspect Dag Hammarskjöld has written: "The U.N. reflects, but is in no sense a cause, of the renaissance of Asia. The

awakening of Africa, and the other great changes that are under way in the balance of power and relationships of the peoples are likewise part of the dynamics of history itself. As always, they bring with them many grave problems of adjustment. These all too easily may become the occasion for arousing passion, fear and hatred, and lead in turn to violent upheavals and to the ultimate disaster of war in this atomic age." Indeed the U.N. has actively promoted the freedom of many colonies. *Finally*, the U.N.O. is a constantly evolving body. Some provisions of the Charter have undergone changes with regard to their original importance. The relative importance of organs and functions has changed in more than one instance. The size of the U.N. has been constantly expanding and in spite of temporary "boycots" and "walk-outs", there have been no withdrawals. The concept of U.N.E.F. has been a major improvement on the military preparedness of the organization. New procedures of peace-making, prevention of war, and meeting threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression have been evolved. Finally, the Charter has been adapted to changing conditions—the conditions of Afro-Asian renaissance, the cold war, and the atomic age. And this adaptation has been brought about in many ways—"partly through the failure of member states to implement certain provisions of the Charter, partly through the conclusion by them of the bilateral or multilateral treaties which either fill up gaps in the Charter or overlap with it, partly through the redistribution of functions between existing organs of the U.N., partly through the creation of subsidiary organs, and finally, through the interpretation of the Charter itself."

It is true that the U.N. has its failings. The U.N. efforts did not materially solve the Anglo-Egyptian conflict over the Suez which culminated in the crisis of 1956. Nor did it resolve the Italo-Yugoslav struggle over Trieste. The perennial Arab-Asian complaint against racial discrimination in South Africa has so far had no effect other than that of making the discrimination worse. In Algeria nothing concrete has so far been achieved. On the question of the Austrian and German peace treaties too the U.N. could not act effectively. The U.N. condemnation of Franco's Spain merely served to solidify the regime in power, and eventually had to be withdrawn. In Kashmir, the aggressor has not yet been named, let alone punished. With regard to West Irish, justice has not yet been done to Indonesia. It may even be said that some times "double standard" has been applied by the U.N. to almost parallel situations, e.g. Korea and Kashmir. Again the use of force is not ruled out altogether and force is permissible under Art. 51, and in situations when military sanctions are decided by the Security Council and when the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority or more, recommends the use of it. It may

also be true that the Charter rules out preventive wars which sometimes may be necessary. Nor does the Charter make any provision for safeguarding the rights of those countries which suffer a civil wrong (e.g. Britain suffered a civil wrong by Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company). The Charter does not adequately provide for peaceful change. The implication of Article 51 seems to be that the *status quo* is to remain. But sometimes a country may be justified in using force to bring about a change in the *status quo*. Many more criticisms may be added. China, for example, is being represented at the U.N. by the Nationalists in Formosa. Power politics affects considerations and decisions by the U.N. organs.

But when all is said against it, the U.N. record has been really admirable. It has to operate in a most unruly and turbulent world while the League functioned within a comparatively stable world. Shifts of power and revolutionary changes naturally arouse discontents, fears and complaints. No system of representation anywhere can be perfect. The success and potentialities of the U.N. depend first and foremost on the moderation, good sense and goodwill of its members, not on its precise institutional machinery. It is easy to harp on the defects and limitations of the U.N. and to make out a catalogue of its failures. The U.N. with all its shortcomings and pitfalls is yet serving "as a useful navigational aid—a diplomatic light house—warning statesmen of the perils to be avoided". And it still symbolizes, in however dim and inchoate a way, those ideals to which majority of mankind stands committed.

CHAPTER 23

Disarmament

The story of disarmament from 1919 to 1945 has already been covered in Part One. This forms the background in which the U N, which had been set up in the pre-atomic era, had to tackle the question of disarmament in the atomic age. The problem had become more grave than ever and called forth a greater earnestness and a greater sense of urgency. The post-war context of disarmament was, in fact, basically different from that of the inter-war period. In 1945, one had to reckon with the atomic weapons, the U S monopoly of the atomic secret, the bipolarization of power and the cold war. The progress of atomic research in Russia and the report of the first atomic explosion in the U S S R in 1949, the possibility of the atomic secrets gradually being known to other nations as well, added to the complexity of the question. True, if each side in a conflict has the capacity utterly to destroy the other, a conflict would be mutually destructive. On this logic, instead of destroying humanity, the atomic weapons would destroy war itself. But can even the grim possibility of a total mutual destruction deter a lunatic like Hitler? That is a question which is really difficult to answer. In spite of the fact that the hydrogen bomb is a great equalizer of numbers and a great neutralizer of geography, lunatics who can assassinate saints like Gandhi can cause the complete destruction of the whole world including themselves. As Mr Pearson has recently written, "hydrogen and hate is a bad mixture." Before 1945 statesmen could afford to bicker, but with the stakes so high it is now more necessary to keep hot blood from overruling good sense. Ratting hydrogen atoms may be as infantile as ratting sabres but it is certainly far more dangerous. The international dispersal of the atomic weapons has, therefore, created a dangerous situation, for if a dozen states have a stockpile of such weapons, the theory of nuclear deterrent is unlikely to work. This factor underlines the importance of limiting seriously the outmoded concept of state sovereignty. The question now is whether any state, large or small, out of lunacy, lust, miscalculation, or passionate gamble has the sovereign right to use the hydrogen bombs and throw back this planet into the stone age? We are, therefore, thrown back on the same old assumption that any approach to peace must attempt to eliminate use of force from international relations. Today, a local conflict can be converted by an irresponsible set of persons at